JUDGMENT : ANANDA SEN, J. 1. By filing this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:- “a) For issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction in the nature of ‘Certiorari’ for quashing the Order dated 18.07.2011, bearing Memo No. 1753/Ra. Ka. (Ann- 6), passed by the Superintendent of Police, Palamau (Respondent no.4) and for quashing of Order dated 28.09.2011 bearing Memo No.1753/Go. (Ann-8) passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Palamu Range, Daltonganj (Respondent no.3), and for further quashing the Order dated 04.04.2013 bearing Memo No. 107/D. (Ann-11) passed by the Director General- cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand (Respondent no.2), whereby and whereunder, the petitioner has been inflicted with a major punishment of dismissal from service. And petitioner further prays for quashing of order memo No. 3106 dated 30.11.2022 (Annexure-14) passed by Respondent No. 3 in compliance of order dated 22.11.2021 in WPS Case No. 4380/2013 passed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Roshan has directed the respondent no. 3, for reconsideration of quantum of punishment within a period of eight weeks from today i.e. 22.11.2021. b) For issuance of a writ/order/direction in the nature of ‘Mandamus’ commanding upon the Respondents to reinstate the Petitioner after quashing the order of dismissal, with all consequential benefits in accordance with law.” 2. Heard learned counsel representing the petitioner and learned counsel representing the respondents. 3. This is the second round of litigation. 4. The expose of the facts involved in this writ petition are as follows:- 4.1. The petitioner is a Police Constable. 4.2. The allegation against the petitioner and several other Police Constables is that while they were guarding at the Magazine Guard Room, Police Centres, 03 SLR Rifles, 02 Magazines and 30 bullets were found missing. 4.3. A charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 16.06.2009, to which the petitioner replied. 4.4. Since the reply was unsatisfactory, the departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. In the said departmental proceeding, opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. 4.5. Thereafter the petitioner was dismissed from service vide impugned order as contained in Memo No.1753/Ra. Ka. dated 18.07.2011 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition). 4.6. The petitioner preferred an Appeal against the impugned order dated 18.07.2011. The said Appeal was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 28.09.2011 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition). 5. 4.5. Thereafter the petitioner was dismissed from service vide impugned order as contained in Memo No.1753/Ra. Ka. dated 18.07.2011 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition). 4.6. The petitioner preferred an Appeal against the impugned order dated 18.07.2011. The said Appeal was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 28.09.2011 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition). 5. Challenging the aforesaid orders, the petitioner approached this Court by filing a writ petition being W.P.(S) No.4380 of 2013. 6. The Coordinate Bench of this Court heard the petitioner at length and considered all the aspects of the Departmental Proceeding and thereafter concluded that there is no procedural illegality and irregularity in this case and the impugned order of punishment is a well-reasoned order. It is necessary to quote para-5 of order dated 22.11.2021 passed in W.P.(S) No.4380 of 2013, which is as follows:- “ 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents available on record it appears that there is no procedural irregularity in this case and the impugned order of punishment is a well-reasoned order. It is also an admitted fact that the petitioner was made an accused in the criminal case; however, final form was submitted against him. It is true that acquittal in the criminal case cannot absolve any person in the departmental proceeding; however, interest of justice would be sufficed by giving liberty to the petitioner to approach the appellate authority, if so advised, to reconsider the order passed by the appellate authority only on the quantum of punishment.” 6.1. However, since a criminal case was also filed against the petitioner under Sections 379, 409 and 120-B IPC and in that case final form was submitted in favour of the petitioner, the Coordinate Bench of this Court gave liberty to the petitioner to approach the Appellate Authority for reconsideration of the quantum of punishment. It is necessary to quote para-6 of the aforesaid order, which is as follows:- “ 6. Therefore, if the petitioner approaches the appellate authority to reconsider his case on the question of quantum of punishment within a period of eight weeks from today; the appellate authority shall reconsider his case in the background that though the petitioner was made an accused in the criminal case; however, final form was submitted in his case.” 7. Therefore, if the petitioner approaches the appellate authority to reconsider his case on the question of quantum of punishment within a period of eight weeks from today; the appellate authority shall reconsider his case in the background that though the petitioner was made an accused in the criminal case; however, final form was submitted in his case.” 7. The aforesaid finding of the Coordinate Bench of this Court, which is a finding of fact after appreciating the evidence and the order, has not been challenged by the petitioner. Further, from the aforesaid order, it is quite clear that only on the quantum the matter was remitted. This means that the finding of guilt of the petitioner and the misconduct for which he was departmentally proceeded and which was proved, were not interfered with. 8. Thereafter the petitioner had approached the Appellate Authority and the Appellate Authority did not interfere with the order of punishment. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 , has held that the prerogative to punish the delinquent-employee is of the employer. The quantum of punishment must be assessed by the employer and it is not the Court who can substitute its view. Para-19 of the said judgment reads as follows:- “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 10. Further, the quantum of punishment should commensurate with the proved misconduct. In this case, admittedly, the petitioner was the Guard of the Magazine Centre, but due to dereliction of his duty, arms and ammunitions were stolen. It is not a case that the petitioner has stolen the same but because of his negligence, the same got stolen. Naturally thus, the petitioner was not charge sheeted in the criminal case but he cannot absolve himself from misconduct of negligence for which this occurrence had taken place. 11. It is also a case of the petitioner that twelve Guards have been let off with a minor punishment. This Court does not want to interfere with the same as the proved allegation in the departmental proceeding is very serious, for which the punishment which has been imposed upon the petitioner cannot be said to be excessive. 12. Further, since the Coordinate Bench of this Court has already decided that there is no procedural irregularity or illegality as the impugned order is well reasoned, to come to a different conclusion by this Court will amount to review the earlier order which had not been challenged, which will be an absolute judicial impropriety. 13. With the aforesaid observations, this writ petition stands dismissed.