JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Rajesh Lala, learned counsel for the appellant. 2. This appeal challenges the learned Single Judge's judgment and order dated 12.07.2024, dismissing the appellant's W.P.(L) No. 3479 of 2022 questioning the Tribunal's Award dated 11.10.2021 in Reference No. 23 of 2008. 3. By the Award dated 11.10.2021, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.I, Dhanbad held that the respondent-worker’s dismissal from service was neither legal nor justified and directed the worker's reinstatement without any back wages. The learned Single Judge has upheld the Tribunal's Award dated 11.10.2021 and dismissed the appellant's writ petition by directing the appellant to pay costs of Rs. 25,000/-. 4. Mr Lala, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant could not have been faulted for not holding any inquiry into the misconduct of unauthorized absence of the worker. He submitted that the worker admitted to the absence and in such circumstances, there was no necessity of holding any enquiry. Therefore, on the ground that no enquiry was held or that the enquiry was defective, no relief could have been granted to the worker. He relied on Dharmarathmakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramaswamy Mudalair Educational Institution Vs. Educational Appellate Tribunal and Another , (1997) 7 SCC 332 to support this contention. 5. Without prejudice, Mr Lala submitted that the only document based upon which the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge have granted relief to the worker was a medical prescription dated 04.06.2011. He submitted that this document was a forgery or fabrication, because it bears the date of 17.11.2011, below the doctor’s signature. He, therefore, submits that the finding of the Tribunal is vitiated by perversity and warrants interference. 6. Mr Lala submitted that in this case, the reference was barred under Section 2A (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, because the grievance about termination was raised more than five years after the date of termination. Alternatively, Mr Lala submitted that even a reference under section 10 must be made within a reasonable period, and since it was not made within a reasonable period, the reference itself was incompetent. 7. We have considered Mr Lala's submissions, but we do not find merit in any of them. 8. Alternatively, Mr Lala submitted that even a reference under section 10 must be made within a reasonable period, and since it was not made within a reasonable period, the reference itself was incompetent. 7. We have considered Mr Lala's submissions, but we do not find merit in any of them. 8. Insofar as the issue of limitation is concerned, the learned Single Judge has correctly held that this was not a case of an application under Section 2A by the worker, but rather a case in which the Union raised an industrial dispute and sought a reference under Section 10 of the ID Act. Such a reference was ultimately made by the appropriate Government, and the reference order was not even challenged by the appellant. 9. Besides, this can hardly be called a belated or a stale reference in the facts of the present case. It is not as if the workers or the union were indolent in the matter. They were agitating the issue of what they perceived to be an illegal and unfair termination. The appropriate Government, if, after considering all such circumstances, deemed it appropriate to make a reference, we can hardly fault the appropriate Government or declare that the reference proceedings were incompetent, even in the absence of any challenge to the same by the appellant. 10. As regards the contention about failure to hold an enquiry or holding of a defective enquiry, which was bereft of any principles of natural justice, we must observe that the worker merely stated that he was indeed absent because of his illness and now that he has become fit, he should be allowed to resume his duties. Such a statement can hardly be regarded as an admission of “unauthorised absence”. 11. At the highest, what was admitted was the absence. However, there was no admission about such absence being unauthorised. On the contrary, the worker raised specific concerns about his ill health and consequent inability to attend to duties. 12. Therefore, by completely misconstruing the worker's statement, the appellant could not have either done away with the enquiry or held an enquiry which was completely defective. In this case, though, the burden was on the appellant to establish the worker's misconduct; the appellant chose not to examine any witness in the inquiry or the so-called inquiry. 13. 12. Therefore, by completely misconstruing the worker's statement, the appellant could not have either done away with the enquiry or held an enquiry which was completely defective. In this case, though, the burden was on the appellant to establish the worker's misconduct; the appellant chose not to examine any witness in the inquiry or the so-called inquiry. 13. There are concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge on the aspect of failure to hold an enquiry or a defective enquiry. These concurrent findings are supported by the evidence on record and therefore can hardly be styled as “perverse findings”. In this letters patent appeal, therefore, we are loath to interfere with such findings of fact, now that no case of perversity has been made out. 14. The final contention that the medical certificate is a forgery, or fabrication is also entirely misconceived. Firstly, requiring this Court to evaluate evidence is nothing but an attempt to convert this Court into an Appellate Forum, which it is not. Secondly, from the perusal of the prescription/certificate, it is apparent that it was in the nature of a case paper prepared by the doctor. It bears several dates, perhaps indicating when the worker followed up with the doctor and obtained prescriptions. Far from suggesting any forgery or fabrication, this document indicates that the worker was indeed unwell and visited the doctor regularly for follow-up. 15. In the case of Dharmarathmakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramaswamy Mudalair Educational Institution (supra), the factual situation was not even remotely comparable to that in the present case. There was a clear and categorical admission about the unauthorised absence. Here, there was no such admission. The admission was only about the absence, and an explanation was offered for the absence. Therefore, the observations in paragraph 8 upon which reliance was placed will not assist the appellant in the present case. 16. For the above reasons, now we are satisfied that none of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant has any merit and warrants interference in this appeal. However, before we part, we must refer to another disturbing feature of this matter. In this case, the Tribunal made the impugned award on 11.10.2021 and directed the workers' reinstatement. 16. For the above reasons, now we are satisfied that none of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant has any merit and warrants interference in this appeal. However, before we part, we must refer to another disturbing feature of this matter. In this case, the Tribunal made the impugned award on 11.10.2021 and directed the workers' reinstatement. Even though no interim relief was granted by the learned Single Judge of this Court, the appellant, which is a Public Sector Undertaking, chose to disregard the Award with impunity and not to reinstate the worker. The worker, ultimately, attained the age of superannuation on 31.08.2023. 17. The appellant, to date, has not paid wages for the period between 11.10.2021 and 31.08.2023 on the grounds that there was no direction for payment of this amount. This is a grossly unfair approach by a public sector undertaking that litigates using taxpayers’ funds. There was no question of issuing such a direction because the Tribunal expected its Award would be faithfully implemented by the appellant unless, of course, any interim relief was granted or the award was overturned by this Court. 18. Even before the learned Single Judge, the learned counsel for the appellant fairly admitted that no interim relief had been granted. To date, the appellant has not paid wages for the period from 11.10.2021 to 31.08.2023. Therefore, while we dismiss this appeal, with costs of Rs. 25,000/-, we direct the appellant to deposit in this Court the back wages for the period between 11.10.2021 (the date of the Tribunal’s award) and 31.08.2023 (i.e. the date on which the worker attained the age of superannuation), within four weeks with due intimation to the worker who, possibly, on account of penury, has not been able to attend to this Court proceedings. 19. If there is a delay in depositing the above amount together with the costs awarded by the learned Single Judge and the costs awarded in this appeal within four weeks from today, then, this amount will carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum, which shall, of course, be without prejudice to any action under the contempt of Courts Act that will have to be taken against the CMD of the appellant. Besides, the interest component will have to be personally paid by the CMD. 20. Besides, the interest component will have to be personally paid by the CMD. 20. A copy of this order must be immediately placed before the CMD, because very often, a defence is taken that some other officers were handling the matter, and the CMD had no knowledge about the same. Such defences are most often taken in contempt proceedings initiated for failure to comply with orders of Tribunals and Courts, with impunity. 21. The above amount should be deposited in this Court on or before the 24 th of April 2026, unless, of course, any interim relief is secured in the meantime. 22. Though the appeal is dismissed, to mitigate the workman's sufferings, we direct the Registry to place the matter under the caption ‘For Orders’ for consideration of compliance.