2026:HHC:36701 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 140 of 2015 Reserved on: 20.8.2026 Date of Decision: 31.08.2026. Dalbir Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : M/s B.S. Thakur and Heena Chauhan, Advocates. For the Respondent/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 21.03.2015 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Kinnaur, Sessions Division at Rampur Bushahr, camp at Reckong Peo (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 03.10.2012 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kinnaur, District at Reckong Peo (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that informant Devinder Singh (PW1) was driving a Mahindra Marshal Jeep bearing registration No. HP-26A-0832 on 20.04.2010. Vinod Sharma (PW2) was travelling in the jeep. A Zen Estilo car bearing registration No. HP-25A-0771 came from the opposite side at Piwa Crusher Tapri. The informant took his jeep towards the road side of the road. However, the car hit the informant's jeep on the wrong side of the road. Vinod Sharma (PW2), the informant, Bhag Sukh, Shri Ram Negi (PW3) and Dalbir Singh sustained injuries in the accident. The driver of the Zen Estilo revealed his name as Dalbir Singh (the present accused). The accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused. The injured were taken to the hospital, and intimation was given to the police. The police recorded an entry (Ext.PW9/A) in the daily diary. ASI Pradeep Kumar (PW10) recorded the informant's statement (Ext.PW1/A) and sent it to the police 3 station, where FIR (Ext.PW10/A) was registered. ASI Pradeep Kumar (PW10) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and took the photographs (Ext.P1 to Ext.P3). These were transferred to a Compact Disc (CD) (Ext.P4). ASI Pradeep Kumar (PW10) prepared the site plan (Ext.PW10/C). He seized the jeep and the car vide memos (Ext.PW1/B and Ext.PW4/A). He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. He filed an application (Ext.PW8/A) for the medical examination of the injured. Dr Gautam Dhar (PW8) examined Bhag Sukh and found that he had sustained grievous injuries that could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle accident. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW8/B). Dr Gautam Dhar (PW8) also examined Devinder Singh (PW1), Vinod Sharma (PW2) and Shri Ram Negi and found that they had sustained simple injuries that could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle accident. He issued the MLCs (Ext.PW8/C to Ext. PW8/F). All the injuries could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle accident as per the opinion of Dr Gautam Dhar (PW8). Bhag Sukh subsequently succumbed to his injuries. An inquest was conducted on the dead body, and a report (Ext.PW10/G) was prepared. The report of post-mortem examination (Ext. PW10/H) was obtained. The photographs of the 4 dead body (Ext.P5 and Ext.P6) were taken. Sher Singh (PW5) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles and found that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicles that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ext.PW5/A and Ext.PW5/B). After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses to prove its case. Devinder Singh (PW1) is the informant. Vinod Sharma (PW2) was travelling in the jeep. Shri Ram Negi (PW3) was travelling in the car. Pawan Kumar (PW4) witnessed the recoveries. Sher Singh (PW5) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles. Chet Ram (PW6) did not support the prosecution case. Tara Chand (PW7) is the son of the deceased to whom the dead body was handed over. Dr Gautam Dhar (PW8) 5 conducted the medical examination of the injured. C. Hitender Kumar (PW9) proved the entries in the daily diary. ASI Pradeep Kumar (PW10) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that the police had seized the car and that the medical examination of the injured was conducted. He denied the rest of the prosecution case. He stated that he was not aware why the prosecution case was filed against him. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of the prosecution witnesses proved that the accused was driving the Zen Estilo car which had hit a Mahindra jeep on the wrong side of the road. The statements of the Medical Officer proved that Vinod Sharma (PW2) and Shri Ram Negi (PW3) had sustained simple injuries and Bhag Sukh had died in the accident. The negligence of the accused had led to the accident, causing injuries to the occupants of the vehicle; hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused under: 6 Sections Sentence Section 279 of Indian Penal Code To undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Section 337 of the Indian Penal Code To undergo simple imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code To undergo simple imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹2000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. All the sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by learned Sessions Judge Kinnaur, Sessions Division at Rampur Bushahr, camp at Reckong Peo (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings 7 recorded by learned Trial Court that the accused was driving Zen Estilo at the time of the accident. He had taken the car towards the wrong side of the road, which was the proximate cause of the accident. The fact that Shri Ram Negi had not supported the prosecution case was not sufficient to doubt it. The learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence, and no interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The prosecution version is highly unbelievable that the accused had taken the car towards the wrong side of the road. The possibility of the vehicles having been shifted before the preparation of the site plan and taking of the photograph could not be ruled out. Shri Ram Negi (PW3) and Chet Ram (PW6) had not supported the prosecution case, and their statements were wrongly discarded by the learned Courts below. The statements of prosecution witnesses materially contradicted each other, and should not have been relied upon. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and 8 the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard M/s B.S. Thakur and Heena Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 10. Mr B.S. Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The statements of the prosecution witnesses materially contradicted each other. The informant stated in his cross-examination that he had not made any statement to the police, which demolished the prosecution version. The learned Trial Court had imposed an excessive sentence, and the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the petitioner. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that both the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the accused was driving the car and he had taken the car towards the right side of the road, 9 which was the proximate cause of the accident. This is a pure finding of fact, and this Court should not re-appreciate the evidence while deciding the revision. One person had died in the accident, and the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should not have been extended to the petitioner. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed:- “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate upon the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or 10 his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the 11 ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court 12 nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional 13 Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the judgment. 15. The informant Devinder Singh (PW1) stated that he was driving a Mahindra Marshal jeep bearing registration No. HP-26A-0832. Vinod Sharma (PW2) was travelling with him. A Zen Estilo car bearing registration No. HP-25A-0771 came 14 towards the wrong side at a high speed and hit the jeep near Piwa Crusher Plant. He, Vinod Sharma, the driver of the car and the occupants of the car sustained injuries in the accident. Accused Dalbir was driving the Zen Estilo car at the time of the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that the road was wet. However, the spot where he had parked his jeep after seeing the car was dry. He had sounded the horn after seeing Zen Estilo's car being driven on the wrong side of the road. The police reached the spot within 15-20 minutes. The accident occurred when he was trying to stop his vehicle. He could not say what was written in the statement (Ext.PW1/A) because he was only asked to put his signature. He admitted that tyre marks were not visible in the photographs. He denied that he was driving his vehicle in a rash or negligent manner which led to the accident and that a false case was made against the accused. 16. His testimony is corroborated by Vinod Sharma (PW2) who stated that he was travelling in Mahindra Marshal jeep bearing registration No. HP-26A-0832 on 20.04.2010. Informant Devinder Singh (PW1) was driving the jeep. A Zen Estilo car came from the opposite side at high speed and hit the jeep near Kaksthal. The informant had driven the jeep towards the roadside 15 after seeing the car, but the driver of the Zen Estilo car came towards the wrong side of the road and hit the jeep. He, the driver of the car and the occupants of Zen Estilo sustained injuries in the accident. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the driver of the car. He stated in his cross-examination that his jeep was on the unmettaled portion of the road, whereas Zen Estilo was on the metalled portion of the road. He denied that the road was wet. He volunteered to say that some water was sprinkled on the road to settle the dust. Zen Estilo suddenly turned towards the jeep and hit it. He denied that the informant was driving the jeep in a negligent manner, which led to the accident. 17. Devinder Singh (PW1) stated in his cross-examination that the accident occurred when he was trying to stop the vehicle, but Vinod Sharma (PW2) stated in his cross-examination that the jeep was moving at the time of the accident. It was submitted that these two statements cannot be reconciled and this discrepancy made the prosecution’s case doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. The informant specifically stated that he was stopping the vehicle when the accident occurred, which means that the vehicle had not been brought to a halt completely. Thus, the 16 contradiction between the statement of the informant and Vinod Sharma (PW2) is more apparent than real and cannot be used to discard the prosecution version. 18. It was submitted that the informant stated in his cross-examination that he had only put the signatures on the statement (Ext.PW1/A) and he did not know what was written in the statement. Thus, no reliance can be placed upon the statement. This submission cannot be accepted. The statement in the cross-examination has to be read with the statement in the examination-in-chief, wherein the informant had specifically stated that he had made a statement (Ext.PW1/A) to the police. If the informant's statement in the examination-in- chief and cross-examination are read together, it means that the previous statement (Ext.PW1/A) was recorded as per the informant's version. However, the informant had not read it before signing it. Therefore, it cannot be said that the very basis of the prosecution case is demolished by the informant’s statement in the cross- examination. 19. Shri Ram Negi (PW3) stated that the accused was driving the vehicle Zen Estilo car bearing registration No. HP 17 25A-0771. The car skidded and hit the jeep coming from the opposite side at a high speed. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the driver of the jeep. It was submitted that this witness has not supported the prosecution version, and his testimony is sufficient to discard the same. This submission cannot be accepted. The precise negligence against the accused is that he had taken his vehicle towards the right side of the road, which is corroborated by this witness by saying that the car skidded and hit the jeep coming from the opposite side. The site plans or the photographs do not show any skid marks, and his testimony regarding the skid of the car cannot be believed. The accused has not stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC that his car had skidded due to reasons beyond his control. Thus, the statement of Shri Ram Negi (PW3) that the skid of the car was responsible for taking it towards the other side of the road cannot be accepted. However, his testimony proves that the accused was driving the vehicle and the car had hit the jeep coming from the opposite side. 20. Chet Ram (PW6) stated that he was driving the car to Delhi. He saw a huge crowd at Kaksthal Crusher Plant. Bhag Sukh had sustained injuries. The accident had not occurred in his 18 presence. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that the accident had occurred in his presence. He was contradicted by his previous statement, and he denied the same. His testimony nowhere shows that the negligence of the accused was not responsible for the accident or that the accused had not taken the car towards the right side of the road. Hence, his testimony cannot be used to discard the prosecution version. 21. The statements of the informant and Vinod Sharma are duly corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW10/C) in which the place of accident is shown towards the extreme left side of the Mahindra Marshal jeep. The photographs (Ext.P1 and Ext.P2) also show that the accident had taken place on the left side of the Mahindra jeep. The broken pieces of the Mahindra jeep are lying scattered around it, showing that the position of the jeep was not changed. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly concluded that the accident had occurred towards the right side of the road for Zen Estilo. 22. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as 19 close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 23. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were bloodstain marks and a V-shaped slipper of the deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map, Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road. 24. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj, 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: 20 “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured and by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not take a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 25. In Shakila Khader v. Nausheer Cama, (1975) 4 SCC 122: 1975 SCC (Cri) 379: 1975 SCC OnLine SC 103, the car went to the right side of the road, hit the parapet and turned turtle. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the driver was negligent. It was observed at page 126: “6. The facts in the case speak eloquently about what should have happened. The main criterion for deciding whether the driving that led to the accident was rash and negligent is not only the speed but also the width of the road, the density of the traffic, and the attempt, as in this case, to overtake the other vehicles, resulting in going to the wrong side of the road and being responsible for the accident. Even if the accident took place in the twinkling of 21 an eye, it is not difficult for the eyewitness to notice a car overtaking other vehicles and going to the wrong side of the road and hitting a vehicle travelling on that side of the road. The criterion adopted by the learned Judge for assessing the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 and rejecting them is thoroughly unjustifiable. There may be cases where it is difficult to be clear or specific in giving details as to the cause of the accident, but this is not one such case. The reference by the learned Judge about the slight damage to the electric post and the conclusion drawn therefrom that the car could not have been going at a high speed is not correct, as we shall show later. His further observation that the fact that the car travelled another 45 feet and hit against the parapet wall and turned turtle showed that the car must have been travelling at an extremely high speed but there is a little blue paint on the pole and a faint gray stain on the parapet wall is self-contradictory unless we are to infer that the learned Judge implied that the one or the other is not true. He does not so hold. There can be no doubt about the car having hit the electric post and the parapet wall. That and the fact of its overturning would establish the rash and negligent driving. A car driven normally and travelling behind a bus does not go to the opposite side of the road, hit an electric post and parapet wall, and turn turtle. The car apparently stopped only because it turned turtle. It did not hit the electric post or the parapet wall full tilt; if it did, it would have stopped at one of those points. We should remember that the collision with the scooter and pushing it back would have considerably reduced the speed of the car. Even so, it travelled farther. The slight damage to the electric post and the parapet wall is because the car hit them sideways. Nobody has suggested that they were brought into existence for this case. The car would probably not have stopped but for turning turtle, and it should have been travelling quite fast before it could overturn, as the learned Judge himself realises. There is only one conclusion possible on the facts of this case, and that is that the accused came over to the wrong side of the road and was 22 responsible for the accident, and that is clearly a rash and negligent act in the condition of the road and the condition of the traffic.” 26. The accused breached the Rules of the Road Regulations, which was the proximate cause of the accident. Hence, the prosecution's version that the accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused has to be accepted as correct. 27. Dr Gautam Dhar (PW8) proved that Bhag Sukh had sustained grievous injuries whereas Devinder Singh (PW1), Vinod Sharma (PW2), Shri Ram Negi (PW3) had sustained simple injuries in the accident. He was not cross-examined at all, which means that his testimony was accepted by the accused as correct. Subsequently, Bhag Sukh succumbed to his injuries and the post- mortem report was accepted by the accused. Therefore, it was duly proved that the negligence of the accused caused simple injuries to the informant, Vinod Sharma (PW2) and Shri Ram Negi (PW3) and the death of Bhag Sukh. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held the accused guilty of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304A of the IPC. 23 28. It was submitted that the learned trial Court erred in not extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused and such a benefit should have been extended to him. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving, and a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to him. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus: "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain 24 in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences for the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 29. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they 25 must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 30. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 31. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused, and a deterrent view was to be taken. 26 32. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months with default sentence for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC, simple imprisonment for one month with default sentence for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 337 of the IPC and simple imprisonment for one year with default sentence for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC. Considering that one precious life was lost and three persons were injured, the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be excessive, requiring any interference from this Court. 33. No other point was urged. 34. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it is dismissed. All the pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 35. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 31st August, 2026 (Nikita)