2026:HHC:36907 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal Nos. 96 and 97 of 2015 Reserved on: 19.08.2026 Date of Decision: 01.09.2026. 1. Cr. Appeal No. 96 of 2015 Kamlesh @ Suneeta ...Appellant Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent ______________________________________________________________ 2. Cr. Appeal No.97 of 2015 Ranjeet Singh ...Appellant Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellant(s) : Mr Adarsh K. Vashista, Advocate. For the respondent(s)/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeals are directed against the judgment of conviction dated 07.03.2015 and order of sentence dated 11.03.2015 passed by learned Sessions Judge, 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 Sirmour District at Nahan (learned Trial Court), vide which the appellants (accused before learned Trial Court) were convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 307, 452, and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and were sentenced as under: Section Sentence 323 of IPC The convict was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹1000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 452 of IPC The convict was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹1,000/- and in default of payment of the fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 307 of IPC The convict was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years, pay a fine of ₹30,000/- and in default of payment of the fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for six months. Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to as in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeals are that the Police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under 3 Sections 307, 452, 323, and 324 read with Section 34 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant, Kajal (PW-2), her sister Ridhima, and brother Harsh were present in their home on 08.03.2013. Their mother, Nisha Devi (PW-1), was present in her kitchen. Ridhima came to the informant, Kajal, and told her that their mother was being beaten. The informant went towards the kitchen and saw the accused Ranjeet and Kamlesh coming out of the kitchen. Ranjeet was armed with a Darat. Nisha was lying on the floor. The informant narrated this fact to Reeta (PW-7), who tried to wake up Nisha, but she was not responding. The matter was narrated to Ram Swaroop, who called the other villagers. Nisha was taken to the hospital. An intimation was given to the Police, and the Police recorded an entry (Ext. PW-14/A) in the Police Station. ASI Neelkanth (PW- 14), ASI Daulat Ram, Constable Amit Kumar, and Lady Constable Neelam visited the spot. ASI Neelkanth (PW14) recorded the informant’s statement (Ext. PW-2/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext. PW-12/A) was registered. ASI Neelkanth investigated the matter. He picked up the blood- stained shawl (Ext P-2) lying on the spot. He put it in a cloth parcel and sealed the parcel with six seals of seal 'T'. He also picked up blood-stained soil and a sample of controlled soil 4 from the spot and sealed them in separate parcels with seal 'T'. He obtained a sample seal (Ext PW-14/B) on a separate piece of cloth. He seized all the parcels vide seizure memo (Ext PW-3/C). He prepared the site plan (Ext PW-14/C). He videographed the informant’s statement and transferred the recording to the CD (Ext PW-14/D). He seized the compromise (Ext PW-3/A) between the parties vide memo (Ext PW-3/B). Dr M.P. Singh (PW-4) examined the injured Nisha Devi and found that she had sustained multiple injuries. The injuries sustained on the head were dangerous to life. He issued the MLC (Ext PW-4/A). Accused Ranjeet made a disclosure statement (Ext PW-8/A) and led the police to the place from where Darat (Ext P-1) was recovered. The police seized the Darat vide memo (Ext PW-8/B). The Police prepared the sketch (Ext PW-14/F) of the Darat, and sealed the Darat in a parcel with four seal impressions of seal 'A'. The sample seal (Ext PW-14/H) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to Ram Lal after use. The site plan of the place of recovery (Ext PW-14/G) was prepared. The case property was sent to the FSL, and the report (Ext PW-14/J) was issued, in which it was mentioned that blood Group 'A' was detected on the shawl, blood-stained soil, and the victim’s blood sample. 5 No blood was detected on the controlled sample lifted from the spot. Human blood was detected on Darat (Ext P-1), but the result was inconclusive in respect of the blood groups. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rajgarh, who committed it to the learned Sessions Judge (learned Trial Court). 3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 307, 452, 323, and 324 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses to prove its case. Nisha Devi (PW-1) is the victim. Kajal (PW-2) is the informant. Tulsi Ram (PW-3) was told about the incident and made arrangements to shift the victim to the hospital. Dr M.P. Singh (PW-4) medically examined the informant. Dr Lalit Gupta (PW-5) obtained the victim’s blood sample. Dr Preeti Kapila (PW-6) went through the CT scan of the victim and issued the report. Reeta (PW-7) is an eyewitness. Ram Lal (PW-8) and Constable Raj Kumar (PW-9) witnessed the recovery. HC Purshottam Singh (PW-10) was working as MHC, with whom 6 the case property was deposited. Constable Suresh (PW-11) carried the case property to FSL Junga. PSI Suneeta Verma (PW-12) signed the FIR. Dr Sachin (PW-13) treated the informant at PGIMER Chandigarh. ASI Neelkanth (PW-14) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted the relationship between them and the victim. They denied the rest of the prosecution case. They stated that the witnesses made false statements against them. Reeta had been living since her birth with the informant party, and she made a false statement at the instance of the informant party. A false case was made to grab the house and the property. They had not caused any injury to the victim. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other on material particulars. The medical evidence also corroborated the statements of prosecution witnesses and proved that the victim had sustained injuries that could have been caused by means of a Darat (Ext P-1). The nature of the injury was stated to be dangerous to life by the Medical Officer. The accused had 7 brought the Darat from their home, which showed their common intention to use it to cause hurt to the victim. The accused had trespassed into the victim’s house after having made preparation for causing hurt. Hence, learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by learned Trial Court, the accused have preferred separate appeals asserting that learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The plea taken by the defence that they were falsely implicated to grab their house and the land was highly probable, and learned Trial Court erred in rejecting this plea. Dr Sachin specifically stated that the injury could have been caused by a fall on a hard surface and from the blunt side of the Darat. Therefore, the possibility of causing the injury by the sharp edge of the weapon was remote. The statement of the Medical Officer made the prosecution case doubtful. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Adarsh K. Vashista, learned counsel for the appellants/accused, and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 8 9. Mr Adarsh K. Vashista, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The prosecution had not examined Ram Swaroop, who had narrated the incident to other persons, and the prosecution version was doubtful. Two versions appeared before the Court, and the version in favour of the accused should have been preferred to the version in favour of the prosecution. The learned Trial Court erred in not extending the benefit of the provision of the Offenders Act to the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon judgments in State of Odisha Vs. Banabihari Mohapatra and Another (2021) 15 SCC 268, Kali Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808 and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, in support of his submissions. 10. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that there is no infirmity in the appreciation of the evidence by the learned Trial Court. The statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other, and these were corroborated by the medical evidence 9 and the recovery of Darat. Mere alternative hypothesis in the cross-examination of the Medical Officer is not sufficient to doubt the prosecution case. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The victim Nisha Devi (PW-1) stated that the accused Suneeta used to quarrel with her over trivial issues. The matter was earlier settled with the intervention of Pradhan Amar Singh. She was working in her kitchen on 08.03.2013. Accused Suneeta called her outside the kitchen and told her that her children had written something on the wall. The victim replied that the same was not done by her children. Kajal was watching TV, and other children were playing outside. Accused Ranjeet was also accompanying accused Suneeta. Both of them beat the victim. The accused dragged her to her kitchen. The accused Ranjeet inflicted injuries on her head with a Darat, and the accused Suneeta gave her beatings. She became unconscious and fell. She regained consciousness in PGIMER Chandigarh. 10 13. She stated in her cross-examination that she had strained relationships with accused Suneeta, but normal relationships with accused Ranjeet. Her husband and accused Ranjeet were working in a vegetable market at Solan, and they used to visit the house casually. She was whitewashing her kitchen at the relevant time. Ranjeet had inflicted a Darat blow inside the kitchen. Suneeta had a stick with her, which she had snatched from the victim. She had noticed a Darat in the hand of accused Ranjeet. Her statement was recorded by the police at PGIMER Chandigarh. She had disclosed to the police that the accused had pulled her from her shoulders; however, this fact was not recorded in her previous statement (Ext D-1). She admitted that accused Suneeta was washing clothes when she was whitewashing her kitchen. She denied that she was making a false statement because of enmity with the accused. 14. Dr M.P. Singh (PW-4) examined the victim on 08.03.2013, and found an incised wound on the left side of the parieto-occipital region, which could have been caused by means of a Darat (Ext P-1). He also noticed one red bruise over the lower part of the right side of the chest and one red bruise just above the right breast. These injuries could have been 11 caused in a scuffle. The injuries on the head were dangerous to life if not treated in time. 15. He stated in his cross-examination that the injuries are bound to come at two different edges by using a Darat. The injuries sustained by the patient were in continuity. The central portion of the Darat had caused the injuries. He denied that the Darat would cause corresponding injury on account of its pointed edge. 16. The statement of the Medical Officer shows that the victim had sustained injuries on her head, which could have been caused by means of the Darat (Ext P-1) shown to him. This corroborates the victim’s testimony that the injuries were caused by means of a Darat. 17. Dr Sachin, JR (PW-13), treated the victim at PGIMER, Chandigarh and found that she had sustained a head injury, which was grievous in nature. He stated in his cross- examination that there was a lacerated wound on the scalp and a fracture beneath it. It is not necessary that a corresponding injury would be caused by the end of the weapon. He volunteered to say that the injury could have been caused by means of the blunt side of the weapon as well as the sharp side, for which he could not comment. He admitted 12 that the injury could have been caused by means of a fall on a hard surface. 18. It was submitted that the cross-examination of this witness shows that the injury could have been caused by means of a fall on the hard surface, which makes the prosecution case highly suspect. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1086, that when the testimonies of the witnesses are found credible, the medical evidence pointing to alternative possibilities is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. It was observed at page 404: “22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative 13 value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” 19. Thus, the prosecution’s case cannot be doubted because of the alternative hypothesis admitted by the medical officer, and the judgments cited in Banabihari Mohapatra (supra), Kali Ram (supra) and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) will not help the accused. 20. It was further submitted that, as per the opinion of Dr Sachin, the injury could have been caused by means of the blunt edge of the Darat, which makes the prosecution case doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. Dr Sachin specifically stated in his cross-examination that the injury could have been caused by a sharp edge or the blunt edge of the weapon. He had treated the victim at PGIMER, Chandigarh, whereas Dr M.P. Singh had treated the victim immediately after she had sustained injuries. As per his opinion, the injuries were caused by means of the sharp side of the Darat. Therefore, the opinion of Dr M.P. Singh has to be preferred to the opinion of Dr Sachin because he had immediately checked the victim after she had sustained injuries. Hence, the submission that the testimony of Dr Sachin will make the prosecution case suspect cannot be accepted. 14 21. The statements of the Medical Officers show that the victim had sustained multiple injuries, two of which could have been caused by means of a Darat. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 13 that the testimony of the injured witness has to be accepted as correct unless there are compelling circumstances to doubt his testimony. It was observed: “22. The importance of an injured witness in a criminal trial cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt such a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely valuable evidence in a criminal trial. 23. In Balu Sudam Khalde v.State of Maharashtra [Balu Sudam Khalde v.State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355], this Court summed up the principles which are to be kept in mind when appreciating the evidence of an injured eyewitness. This Court held as follows: (SCC para 26) “26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be appreciated, the under-noted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind: 26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. 26.2. Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. 26.3. The evidence of the injured witness has greater evidentiary value, and unless 15 compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. 26.4. The evidence of the injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. 26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishment in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence. 26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with the passage of time should be discarded.” (emphasis supplied) 22. This position was reiterated in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, wherein it was observed: “33. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind: “(a) The presence of an injured eyewitness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. (b) Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. (c) The evidence of an injured witness has greater evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. 16 (d) The evidence of an injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. (e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence. (f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded.” 34. In assessing the value of the evidence of the eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In respect of both these considerations, circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a Court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere denial yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea or put forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence. (See: Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra:(2023) 13 SCC 365). 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Hari Singh 1974 (3) SCR 725 that a 17 person speaking on oath should be presumed to be a truthful witness unless there is something inherently improbable in his testimony. It was observed: “The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be untruthful or unreliable in any particular respect. The High Court, reversing this approach, seems to us to have assumed that witnesses are untruthful unless it is proved that they are telling the truth. Witnesses, solemnly deposing on oath in the witness box during a trial upon a grave charge of murder, must be presumed to act with a full sense of responsibility for the consequences of what they state. It may be that what they say is so very unlikely or unnatural or unreasonable that it is safer not to act upon it or even to disbelieve them.” 24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. Versus Smt. Noorie Alias Noor Jahan and Others, (1996) 9 SCC 104, that while assessing the evidence of an eyewitness, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, the eyewitness could be present and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. It was observed: - “7. The High Court having acquitted the accused persons on appreciation of the evidence, we have ourselves scrutinised the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3. The conclusion is irresistible that their evidence on material particulars has been brushed aside by the High Court by entering into the realm of conjecture and fanciful speculation without even discussing the evidence, more particularly the evidence relating to the basic prosecution case. While assessing and evaluating the 18 evidence of eyewitnesses, the Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, it was possible for the eyewitness to be present at the scene and whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. The High Court, in our opinion, has failed to observe the aforesaid principles and, in fact, has misappreciated the evidence, which has caused a gross miscarriage of justice. The credibility of a witness has to be decided by referring to his evidence and finding out how he has fared in cross-examination and what impression is created by his evidence, taken insofar as the context of the case, and not by entering into the realm of conjecture and speculation. On scrutinising the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3, we find they are consistent with one another so far as the place of occurrence, the manner of assault, the weapon of assault used by the accused persons, the fact of dragging of the dead body of the deceased from the place to the grove and nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination to impeach their testimony. The aforesaid oral evidence fully corroborates the medical evidence. In that view of the matter, we unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to establish the charge against the accused persons and the High Court committed an error in acquitting the three respondents, namely Inder Dutt, Raghu Raj and Bikram.” (emphasis supplied)” 25. The victim’s testimony is duly corroborated by the informant, Kajal (PW-2). She stated that she was watching TV in her house and her mother was working in the kitchen of the old house. Ridhima came to her and told her that the accused were beating the victim. She went to the old house and saw accused Ranjeet coming out of the kitchen with a Darat in his hand. Accused Suneeta was also coming out of the kitchen with accused Ranjeet. The victim was wounded and lying in the 19 kitchen. The wound was bleeding. She disclosed this fact to Ram Swaroop. Ram Swaroop called the villagers, and the victim was shifted to the hospital. 26. She stated in her cross-examination that the distance between the kitchen of the old house and the room where she was watching television was approximately 30 to 40 feet. Ridhima was washing utensils outside the kitchen. Ridhima told her that the accused were beating the victim. She admitted that she had not disclosed the names of the accused to the Police. She denied that the Darat was lying in the kitchen and that she had made a false statement to falsely implicate the accused. 27. The statement of this witness materially corroborates the victim’s statement. Her testimony in the cross-examination that she had not disclosed the names of the accused to the police will not make her statement doubtful because she has categorically identified the accused Ranjeet and Suneeta coming out of the kitchen, which establishes their presence on the spot. 28. It was submitted that the statement made by her that Ridhima had told her about the beatings given to the victim is hearsay and cannot be relied upon. This submission 20 will not help the accused. The statement of this witness proves that accused-Ranjeet was coming out of the kitchen armed with a Darat and Suneeta was accompanying him. She saw the victim lying unconscious, and that corroborates the prosecution version that accused-Ranjeet had inflicted a blow by means of a Darat to the victim, and Suneeta had accompanied him. Therefore, even if the statement made by her that Ridhima had disclosed to her about the beating is taken out of consideration, her testimony provides valuable corroboration to the victim's statement. 29. Reeta (PW-7) stated that she was watching TV along with Kajal. Ridhima said that the accused were beating the victim. She went with Kajal and Ridhima and found that the victim was lying in the kitchen; blood was oozing out of her wound. She tried to lift the victim, but she did not respond. She saw the accused present at the spot. Ram Swaroop, Padma, and Tulsi Ram came to the spot and shifted the victim to the hospital. 30. She stated in her cross-examination that she is the daughter of Uma, first wife of accused-Ranjeet. She admitted that her mother had divorced her father when she was young and Ranjeet solemnised a second marriage with Suneeta. She 21 admitted that she was residing with her grandmother after the divorce. She admitted that she was brought up by her grandmother. She denied that Ridhima had not disclosed any beatings given by the accused. The accused also had a kitchen on the other side of the place of incident. She denied that the accused were not present on the spot. She volunteered to say that the accused were coming out of the kitchen. She denied that she was making a false statement at the instance of the informant party. 31. The statement of this witness corroborates the statement of the victim and Kajal that the accused had given beatings to the victim. She saw the accused on the spot, which corroborates the victim’s statement that the accused had entered into the kitchen. Even if her testimony that Ridhima had told her about the beatings being given by the accused is taken out of consideration, her testimony regarding the presence of the accused on the spot cannot be ignored. 32. It was submitted that she was residing with the victim and she had an interest to depose against the accused because of the divorce between her mother and the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. She was a natural witness because she was residing with the informant party. It was not 22 suggested to her in her cross-examination that she was not present on the spot and she had made a false statement regarding this fact. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly relied upon her testimony. 33. ASI Neelkanth (PW-14) investigated the matter. He interrogated accused-Ranjeet, and Ranjeet led the Police party to the spot from where the Darat (Ext P-1) was recovered. He denied in his cross-examination that he had lifted the Darat from the room of Suneeta on the date of the incident. His testimony is duly corroborated by the statement of Ram Lal (PW-8), who stated that Ranjeet disclosed in his presence and in the presence of Constable Raj Kumar that he could get the Darat recovered, which was lying in his house. The statement was reduced to writing. The accused led the police party to his house and got the Darat recovered. The police seized the Darat. He stated in his cross-examination that accused-Ranjeet is his elder brother and Nisha is his wife. He denied that the accused had not made the disclosure statement or that he had made a false statement against the accused. 34. Constable Raj Kumar (PW-9) stated that the accused-Ranjeet made a disclosure statement in his presence and in the presence of Ram Lal that he could get the weapon 23 used for the commission of the offence recovered. He led the police party and got the weapon recovered from his house. The police seized the Darat. He admitted in his cross-examination that the accused was on bail on the date of the incident. Ram Lal had come to the police station in connection with his case. The distance between the house of the accused and the police station is about 50 kilometres. He denied that the Darat was not recovered in his presence. 35. The statements of these witnesses corroborate each other in material particulars, and there is nothing in their examination to show that they were making false statements. 36. Ram Lal (PW-8) stated in his examination-in-chief that the Darat (Ext P-1) was not the same. It was submitted that the testimony of this witness makes the prosecution case doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. The statement that Darat (Ext P-1) was not the same Darat appears to be a clerical error, because his statement in its entirety shows that the Darat was recovered in his presence. The report of analysis shows that Darat was blood-stained. The Medical Officer stated that the injuries noticed by him could have been caused by using Darat (Ext.P-1), which establishes the identity of Darat. The victim also identified the Darat. Statements of Constable 24 Raj Kumar (PW-9) and ASI Neelkanth (PW-14) also establish that the Darat (Ex. P-1) was the same, which was recovered at the instance of the accused. Therefore, in these circumstances, not much advantage can be derived from the statement that Darat was not the same, which was got recovered by the accused-Ranjeet. 37. It was submitted that the victim was contradicted with her previous statement and the learned Trial Court erred in relying upon her testimony. This submission is not acceptable. The victim was confronted about the fact whether she had disclosed about pulling her from her shoulder, which is a minor detail and does not affect the core of her testimony. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Matadin v. State of U.P., 1980 Supp SCC 157, that the statement under Section 161 CrPC is not detailed and is meant to be brief. It does not contain all the details. It was observed at page 158: “3. The learned Sessions Judge had rejected the evidence of the eyewitnesses on wrong, unconvincing and unsound reasons. The Sessions Judge appears to have been swayed by some insignificant omissions made by some of the witnesses in their statements before the police, and on the basis of these omissions, dubbed the witnesses as liars. The Sessions Judge did not realise that the statements given by the witnesses before the police were meant to be brief statements and 25 could not take the place of evidence in the Court. Where the omissions are vital, they merit consideration, but mere small omissions will not justify a finding by a court that the witnesses concerned are self-contained liars. We have carefully perused the judgment of the Sessions Judge, and we are unable to agree that the reasons that he has given for disbelieving the witnesses are good or sound. The High Court was, therefore, fully justified in reversing the judgment passed by the trial court. We are satisfied that this is a case where the judgment of the Sessions Judge was manifestly wrong and perverse and was rightly set aside by the High Court. It was urged by Mr Mehta that, as other appellants except Matadin and Dulare do not appear to have assaulted the deceased, they should be acquitted of the charge under Section 149. We, however, find that all the appellants were members of the unlawful assembly. Their names find a place in the FIR. For these reasons, we are unable to find any ground to distinguish the case of those appellants from that of Matadin and Dulare. The argument of the learned counsel is overruled. The result is that the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. The appellants who are on bail will now surrender to serve out the remaining portion of their sentence.” 38. Similar is the judgment in Esher Singh v. State of A.P., (2004) 11 SCC 585: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 320, wherein it was held at page 601: “23. So far as the appeal filed by accused Esher Singh is concerned, the basic question is that even if the confessional statement purported to have been made by A-5 is kept out of consideration, whether residuary material is sufficient to find him guilty. Though it is true, as contended by learned counsel for the accused- appellant Esher Singh, that some statements were made for the first time in court and not during the investigation, it has to be seen to what extent they diluted the testimony of Balbeer Singh and Dayal Singh (PWs 16 and 32) used to bring home the accusations. A 26 mere elaboration cannot be termed a discrepancy. When the basic features are stated, unless the elaboration is of such a nature that it creates a different contour or colour of the evidence, the same cannot be said to have totally changed the complexion of the case. It is to be noted that in addition to the evidence of PWs 16 and 32, the evidence of S. Narayan Singh (PW 21) provides the necessary links and strengthens the prosecution’s version. We also find substance in the plea taken by learned counsel for the State that evidence of Amar Singh Bungai (PW 24) was not tainted in any way, and should not have been discarded and disbelieved only on surmises. Balbir Singh (PW 3), the son of the deceased, has also stated about the provocative statements in his evidence. Darshan Singh (PW 14) has spoken about the speeches of the accused Esher Singh, highlighting the Khalistan movement. We find that the trial court had not given importance to the evidence of some of the witnesses on the ground that they were relatives of the deceased. The approach is wrong. The mere relationship does not discredit the testimony of a witness. What is required is careful scrutiny of the evidence. If, after careful scrutiny, the evidence is found to be credible and cogent, it can be acted upon. In the instant case, the trial court did not indicate any specific reason to cast doubt on the veracity of the evidence of the witnesses whom it had described as the relatives of the deceased. PW 24 has categorically stated about the provocative speeches by A-1. No definite cross- examination on the provocative nature of speech regarding the Khalistan movement was made, so far as this witness is concerned.” 39. This position was reiterated in Shamim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 10 SCC 509: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1559, where it was held at page 513: “12. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, inspires confidence. Once that 27 impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly, keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, and attaching importance to some technical error without going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. Minor omissions in the police statements are never considered to be fatal. The statements given by the witnesses before the police are meant to be brief statements and cannot take the place of evidence in court. Small/trivial omissions would not justify a finding by the court that the witnesses concerned are liars. The prosecution’s evidence may suffer from inconsistencies here and discrepancies there, but that is a shortcoming from which no criminal case is free. The main thing to be seen is whether those inconsistencies go to the root of the matter or pertain to insignificant aspects thereof. In the former case, the defence may be justified in seeking advantage of incongruities obtained in the evidence. In the latter, however, no such benefit may be available to it.” 40. Similar is the judgment in Kalabhai Hamirbhai Kachhot v. State of Gujarat, (2021) 19 SCC 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 347, wherein it was observed at page 564: “22. We also do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel that there are major contradictions in the deposition of PWs 18 and 19. The contradictions that are sought to be projected are minor contradictions that cannot be the basis for discarding their evidence. The judgment of this Court in Mohar [Mohar v. State of U.P., (2002) 7 SCC 606: 2003 28 SCC (Cri) 121], relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent State, supports the case of the prosecution. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness. Para 11 of the judgment reads as follows: (SCC p. 611) “11. The testimony of an injured witness has its own efficacy and relevancy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries on his body would show that he was present at the place of occurrence and had seen the occurrence by himself. Convincing evidence would be required to discredit an injured witness. Similarly, every discrepancy in the statement of a witness cannot be treated as fatal. A discrepancy that does not affect the prosecution’s case materially cannot create any infirmity. In the instant case, the discrepancy in the name of PW 4 appearing in the FIR and the cross-examination of PW 1 has been amply clarified. In cross-examination, PW 1 clarified that his brother Ram Awadh had three sons: (1) Jagdish, PW 4, (2) Jagarnath, and (3) Suresh. This witness, however, stated that Jagarjit had only one name. PW 2 Vibhuti, however, stated that at the time of occurrence, the son of Ram Awadh, Jagjit alias Jagarjit, was milking a cow, and he was also called as Jagdish. Balli (PW 3) mentioned his name as Jagjit and Jagdish. PW 4 also gave his name as Jagdish.” 23. The learned counsel for the respondent State has also relied on the judgment of this Court in Naresh [State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 216]. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that the evidence of injured witnesses cannot be brushed aside without assigning cogent reasons. Paras 27 and 30 of the judgment, which are relevant, read as under: (SCC pp. 333-34) “27. The evidence of an injured witness must be given due weight, being a stamped witness; thus, his presence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable, and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The 29 testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, and this lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. The witness would not like or want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to implicate a third person falsely for the commission of the offence. Thus, the evidence of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. (Vide Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107], Balraje v. State of Maharashtra [Balraje v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 211] and Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. [Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1262]) *** 30. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental dispositions such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness, and other witnesses also make material improvements while deposing in court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witness and record a finding as to whether his deposition inspires confidence. ‘9. Exaggerations, per se, do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to 30 test the credibility of the prosecution version when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility.’ [Ed.: As observed in Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh, (2004) 9 SCC 186, p. 192, para 9: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1435] Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a witness cannot be dubbed as improvements, as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars, i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited. (Vide State v. Saravanan [State v. Saravanan, (2008) 17 SCC 587: (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 580], Arumugam v. State [Arumugam v. State, (2008) 15 SCC 590: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. [Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., (2009) 11 SCC 334: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1352] and Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra [Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 375]” 24. Further, in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], this Court has considered the effect of the minor contradictions in the depositions of witnesses while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial. In the aforesaid judgment, it is held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under: (SCC p. 483) “42. Only such omissions that amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness 31 unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses, as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness.” 41. Thus, the victim’s testimony cannot be discarded because of the minor discrepancy in her statement. 42. Dr M.P. Singh (PW-4) specifically stated that the injuries were dangerous to life because they would have led to death had they not been treated in time. The injuries were caused to a vital part of the body, namely the head, with a sharp-edged weapon, namely Darat. Therefore, the opinion of the Medical Officer that the nature of injury was dangerous is acceptable, and there is no infirmity in accepting the statement of the Medical Officer regarding this fact. 43. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the accused-Ranjeet came to the kitchen armed with Darat. Therefore, accused Suneeta would have been aware of the fact that Darat can be used during the incident and both the 32 accused shared the common intention even if Suneeta had not inflicted any injury by means of Darat. Therefore, both the accused would be liable by virtue of Section 34 of the IPC. 44. Thus, there is no infirmity in the judgment of learned Trial Court convicting the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 307, 452, and 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 45. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karamjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 178: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 330: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1233 that where the accused had caused grave injuries to the victim, the benefit of Probation cannot be granted. It was observed at page 185: 26. In Manjappa v. State of Karnataka [(2007) 6 SCC 231 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 76: JT (2007) 7 SC 226] this Court considered the scope of grant of relief under the provisions of Section 361 CrPC or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 reconsidering earlier judgment of this Court in Om Prakash v. State of Haryana [(2001) 10 SCC 477: 2003 SCC (Cri) 799], and held that such a relief should be granted where the offence had not been of a very grave nature and in certain cases where mens rea remains absent as in a case of rash and negligent driving under Section 279 read with Section 304-A IPC. 33 Where the High Court itself reduces the sentence substantially, such beneficial provisions should not be given effect to. 27. In the instant case, the High Court reduced the sentence from three years to one year, and as the instant case is of a very grave nature as there had been a large number of injuries, we are not inclined to grant leave sought by the appellant. 46. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused- Ranjeet Singh and Kamlesh @ Suneeta to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months with a fine of ₹ 1,000/- with default clause for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 323 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for 1 year, fine of ₹ 1,000/- with default clause for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 452 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of ₹30,000/- with default clause for the commission of offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC. Considering the nature of the offence, the relationship between the parties, and the manner of causing the injury, the sentence of 3 years for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC cannot be said to be excessive, requiring any interference from the Court. 47. No other point was urged. 34 48. In view of the above, the present appeals fail, and the same are dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 49. The record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 01.09.2026 (Kiran)