2026:HHC:36906 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 788 of 2024 Reserved on: 21.08.2026 Date of Decision: 01.09.2026 Amit Lakhani ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. and another ...Respondents ______________________________________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Ankush Dass Sood, Senior Advocate, with Ms Ragini Dogra, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1. Ms Swati Sharma, Advocate, vice Mr Anubhav Chopra, Advocate, for respondent No.2. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No.129/2023 dated 12.09.2023, registered at Police Station Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P., for the commission 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 of offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 406, 323, 504, 506, 469, 120-B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petitions are that the informant/respondent No.2 made a complaint to the Police that she was married to the petitioner, Amit Lakhani, on 10.02.2012. She came in contact with the petitioner when she was pursuing her MD (Medicine) course in IGMC, Shimla. The petitioner was a senior resident in the Department of Orthopaedics. The petitioner’s mother explicitly stated that she did not believe in dowry before the marriage. The petitioner and the informant started residing together at Lower Jakhu after the marriage. The petitioner resigned from his job on 31.03.2012 without informing the informant. The informant made inquiries from petitioner No.1, but he became aggressive. The informant told the petitioner’s mother about his decision to leave the job, and she stated that the informant was obstructing the petitioner’s progress. The petitioner joined Fortis Hospital at Mohali and stopped visiting Shimla on one pretext or another. He also blocked the informant from his social media account by claiming that he had deleted the accounts because of media fatigue. The petitioner shifted to MMU Sultanpur, and the informant expressed her desire to join 3 him in the same hospital, but he refused. When the informant inquired about the reason for refusal, he assaulted her. Petitioner’s mother started taunting the informant for bringing insufficient dowry and regarding the quality of gifts provided to her at the time of marriage. She demanded a luxury car and money, and when the informant told her about her mother's financial condition, petitioner’s mother called the informant’s family beggars. She taunted the informant by saying that the informant was a rural girl with no understanding of city life. She undermined the informant’s culinary skills and household abilities. She repeatedly humiliated the informant on one pretext or the other. She demanded the jewellery of the informant, citing frequent thefts in the area. When the informant demanded the jewellery, the petitioner’s mother did not return it to the informant. The petitioner’s mother also retained the informant’s shagun money and invested it in her name. The books, clothes and photographs of the informant’s spiritual guru were placed outside the house by the petitioner’s mother, and when the informant made inquiries, the petitioner’s mother told her (the informant) that she had no place in the home. The informant was turned out of her matrimonial home and had to seek accommodation in 4 Government flats during her pregnancy. The petitioner came to the informant’s house in September 2013 and gave her beatings on the encouragement of his mother. The informant was not provided any support at the time of the birth of her child. The petitioner and his family members taunted the informant for giving birth to a female child. The petitioner’s mother refused to keep the child with her when the informant was nominated to attend a conference in Delhi. The petitioner repeatedly beat the informant in a state of intoxication. The informant gave birth to a female child on 09.08.2018, which displeased the petitioner. The petitioner published the informant’s research in his name and in the name of another Doctor, who was a Dental Surgeon and had no experience in medicine. The petitioner filed repeated complaints against the informant. Therefore, it was prayed that action be taken against the petitioner. 3. The Police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. 4. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioner has approached this Court for quashing of the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of it. 5 5. It has been asserted that the matter was compromised twice between the parties: once before the Police and a second time before the pre-Lok Adalat organised by District Legal Services Authority, Nahan. No preliminary enquiry was conducted by the Police before the registration of the FIR. The allegations made in the FIR are vague, general and sweeping. The informant has concealed material facts and has made false allegations. The informant left her matrimonial home in 2019 and shifted to Nahan. She filed a complaint before the Police Station, Nahan, on 07.07.2022. The matter was resolved, and the statements of the parties were recorded on 01.10.2022. The petitioner received a notice for appearance from the District Legal Services Authority. The petitioner appeared before the authority, and the matrimonial dispute was resolved. A compromise dated 09.06.2023 was effected between the parties. The informant made the present complaint after three months of the compromise. She had narrated the incidents, which had taken place 11 years ago. There is a delay in reporting the matter to the Police. The informant has raised questions regarding the informant’s professional competence. The informant had wrongly resorted to the provision of Section 498A of the IPC to put pressure 6 upon the petitioner. The allegations in the FIR, even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 6. Respondent No. 1 opposed the petition by filing a reply denying the contents of the petition. It was asserted that the petitioner and the co-accused had sent multiple complaints against the informant to the Vigilance Department and higher officials to harass her. The co-accused failed to produce the mobile phone, and Section 201 of the IPC was added. The documents related to the informant were found in the hard disk of the laptop seized from the petitioner and the co- accused. The petitioner has not arrayed the co-accused as parties. The investigating agency acted as per the law. The allegations in the complaint disclose the commission of cognizable offences, and it was not necessary to carry out a preliminary inquiry. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. The petition is opposed by filing a reply by respondent No.2 making a preliminary submission regarding the lack of maintainability and the present petition being an 7 abuse of the process of the law. It was asserted that the present petition is premature as the investigation has not been concluded. The contents of the FIR are self-explanatory, and the averments made in the FIR are sufficient to constitute the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 406, 323, 504, 506, 469 and 120-B read with Section 34 of the IPC. The informant withdraw the complaint after the petitioner had assured her that he would not remain in touch with the co- accused. The petitioner failed to honour the assurance extended by him. He and the co-accused filed multiple complaints against the informant. The Police are investigating the matter. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have heard Mr Ankush Dass Sood, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms Ragini Dogra, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State and Ms Swati Sharma, learned vice counsel representing respondent No.2-informant. 9. Mr Ankush Dass Sood, learned Senior Advocate, for the petitioner, submitted that the matter was reconciled between the petitioner and the informant before the Police and the District Legal Services Authority; the petitioner is adhering 8 to the terms and conditions of the compromise effected between the parties and the informant had no cause to file the complaint against the petitioner. She had merely repeated the earlier allegations, which she had withdrawn after the compromise, and the FIR is not maintainable. The Police have not conducted the preliminary inquiry before the registration of the FIR, which is necessary in a matrimonial offence as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2014) 2 SCC 1. The registration of the FIR is bad. He prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 10. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State, submitted that the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Police had rightly registered the FIR. The Police conducted the investigation and found the allegations to be correct. The matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, and this Court should relegate the petitioner to his remedies available under the law. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9 11. Ms Swati Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant, submitted that the Court quashing the FIR has to take the averments of the FIR as correct and it is not permissible to conduct a mini trial to determine the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations contained in the FIR. The contents of the FIR disclose the commission of cognizable offences. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR. Hence, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed. She relied upon the judgments of Dr Ena Sharma Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & others, 2025 HHC 19863, Laxman and others Vs. State of H.P. and another, 2025 HHC 23330 and Muskan Vs. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and others, 2025 INSC 1287 in support of her submissions. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - 10 “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence 11 collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4), and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. 12 As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 14. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations: (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus 13 allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 15. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. It was submitted that the Police had not conducted the preliminary investigation before the registration of the FIR and the registration of the FIR is not proper. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 999 that where the information discloses the commission of a cognisable offence, the registration of the FIR is mandatory. It was observed: 49. Consequently, the condition that is sine qua non for recording an FIR under Section 154 of the Code is that there must be information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence. If any information disclosing a cognizable offence is led before an officer in charge of the police station satisfying the requirement of Section 154(1), the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information. The provision of Section 154 of the Code is mandatory, and the officer concerned is duty-bound to register the case on the basis of information disclosing a cognizable offence. Thus, the plain words of Section 154(1) of the Code have to be given their literal meaning. xxxx 14 84. The insertion of sub-section (3) of Section 154, by way of an amendment, reveals the intention of the legislature to ensure that no information of commission of a cognizable offence must be ignored or not acted upon, which would result in unjustified protection of the alleged offender/accused. xxx 105. Therefore, reading Section 154 in any other form would not only be detrimental to the scheme of the Code but also to the society as a whole. It is thus seen that this Court has repeatedly held in various decided cases that registration of FIR is mandatory if the information given to the police under Section 154 of the Code discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. 17. It was held that the police can conduct the preliminary inquiry where no cognisable offence is disclosed. It was observed at page 60: 119. Therefore, in view of various counterclaims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately, and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such as whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible, etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the 15 commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR. 18. In the present case, the information disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence, and there was no requirement to conduct a preliminary investigation as per the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari (supra). 19. It was submitted that the contents of the FIR are vague and they do not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. This submission cannot be accepted. The FIR mentions the series of events that had taken place before the marriage, after the marriage and the details of the harassment with specific particulars of the names of the persons involved in the harassment and the dates. These averments are quite detailed and show that the petitioner had harassed the victim repeatedly. He subjected her to cruelty and physical assault in a state of intoxication; the informant’s jewellery was retained by the co-accused and was not returned to her despite her demand; therefore, the allegations in the FIR cannot be set to be vague and insufficient to invoke the provisions of the criminal law. 20. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false, and that the FIR was filed by the victim to harass the 16 petitioner and the co-accused. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 21. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the 17 accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joseph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 18 22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’. 23. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: - 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini- trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient 19 material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons…” 24. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. 25. It was submitted that the parties had compromised the matter before the Police and the District Legal Services Authority and it is impermissible for the informant to proceed further with the FIR. This submission will not help the petitioner. The informant specifically stated that the petitioner continued to harass her; he filed the complaints against the informant. Thus, as per the averments in the FIR, the petitioner had not adhered to the terms and conditions of the compromise, and it is impermissible to fall back upon the compromise effected between the parties. 26. It was submitted that the Court has to read the FIR carefully because if a person decides to falsely implicate another, he will draft the FIR in such a manner as would 20 disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahmood Ali & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. 2023 INSC 684 in support of this submission. This submission will not help the petitioner, as the allegations in the FIR, even if seen in the light of the discord between the parties, are detailed, which could not have been prima facie fabricated. Therefore, even if the contents of the FIR are seen with utmost care and caution, still they disclose the commission of the cognizable offence. 27. It is undisputed that the investigation has been completed and the charge-sheet has been filed before the Court. This fact was brought on record by filing an application for placing the copies of the charge-sheet and the other statements on record. Therefore, it was rightly submitted on behalf of the respondents that the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter and it should be left to decide the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge 21 sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 28. No other point was urged. 29. In view of the above, there is insufficient material at this stage to exercise the extra-ordinary jurisdiction vested in the Court. Hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 30. The observations made hereinabove shall remain confined to the disposal of the present petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. 31. The present petition stands disposed of and so are the miscellaneous application(s), if any. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 01.09.2026 (Kiran)