JUDGMENT : DEEPAK ROSHAN, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The present writ petition has been filed with a prayer to show cause as to how and under what circumstances the respondent authorities have arbitrarily withheld the amount payable to the petitioner and the same has not been released even after repeated request being made on behalf of the petitioner and further to direct the respondent authorities to immediately and forthwith release the amount payable to the petitioner along with statutory interest payable to the petitioner from the date on which the right had accrued. 3. The factual matrix is that the petitioner was appointed on 18.01.1889 as Clerk cum Cashier. On the basis of a complaint, a trap was laid against the petitioner in furtherance of which one Regular CBI Case bearing R.C Case No. 16(A) of 2003(R) was registered against the petitioner and other accused persons. After the aforementioned FIR, the petitioner preferred Regular Bail wherein the Court of Learned Special Judge granted regular bail to the petitioner whereafter the suspension of the petitioner was revoked. The Court of Learned Special Judge (CBI), Ranchi upon conclusion of trial, had pronounced the judgement vide order of conviction and sentence dated 24.04.2012 wherein the concerned Court has found the petitioner to be guilty of offences punishable under sections section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and sections 7, 12(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Petitioner preferred an appeal before this Court. Upon hearing the parties, this Court by terms of judgement dated 31.10.2012 held that the trial court seems to have committed illegality in holding the petitioner herein guilty for charges levelled and consequently acquitted the petitioner and allowed the appeal preferred by the petitioner. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner was re-instated in services of the respondents with effect from date of discharge i.e., 28.08.2012 which was communicated by way of letter contained in memo no. RM/12-13/DPD/1193 dated 15.02.2013. 4. The petitioner vide letter dated 30.10.2018 represented to the respondent no. 2 to 4 with a prayer for payment of the amount due under following heads: i. Annual increment for the period February 2004, February 2005, February 2006 and February 2013; ii. Promotion to the post of Senior Assistant with effect from April 2004; iii. Annual Medical Quota for the period of January 2004, January 2005 and January 2006; iv. 2 to 4 with a prayer for payment of the amount due under following heads: i. Annual increment for the period February 2004, February 2005, February 2006 and February 2013; ii. Promotion to the post of Senior Assistant with effect from April 2004; iii. Annual Medical Quota for the period of January 2004, January 2005 and January 2006; iv. Grant of Emergency Leave for the period from 2004 to 2006 and from September 2012 to February 2013; v. Grant of PL for the period from 2004 to 2006 and from September 2012 to February 2013; vi. Grant of promotion to the post of JGMS(I) from the period 2006 for which the undersigned appeared in the exam but the result was not disclosed to the undersigned; vii. Benefits on completion of 25 years of satisfactory service; viii. Grant of benefit on regular basis to Scale I, II, III & IV as the undersigned was prohibited to appear in the exams. 5. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner had made twofold argument: a. The petitioner had represented vide letters dated 12.08.2014 and 27.11.2014 respectively, which the respondent authorities acknowledged and accordingly one letter contained in memo no. HR/IR/AKM/3156 dated 06.12.2014 was addressed to respondent no. 3 wherein the Assistant General Manager (HR) had quoted the relevant clause mentioned at page 95 of the Book of Discipline and Disciplinary Proceedings. b. Petitioner had also relied upon Rule 3(d) of Bipartite Settlements in terms of which the respondents were required to pass order with regard to the amounts payable which has not been passed. Rule 3(d) reads as hereunder: 3(d) If he prefers appeal or a revision application against his conviction and is acquitted, in case he had already been dealt with as above and he applies to the management for reconsideration of his case, the management shall review his case and may either reinstate him or proceed against him under the provisions set out below in paragraphs 11 & 12 relating to discharges and the provision set out above as to pay, allowances and the period of suspension will apply, the period up to date for which full pay and allowances have not been drawn being treated as one of suspension. In the event of the management deciding, after enquiry, not to continue him in service, the employee shall be liable only for termination with three months pay and allowances in lieu of notice, as directed above. 6. In crux, the submission on behalf of the petitioner is that no decision has been taken with regard to the payment to be made to the petitioner. 7. Submission have been made on behalf of the respondent to the effect that the claim of petitioner is hit by delay and latches and is thus time barred. The due admissible arrears of salary were calculated and paid to the petitioner to which the petitioner has accorded satisfaction vide letter of satisfaction dated 10.01.2017 which is annexed as Annexure A. 8. The respondents have further stated that full claim of salary is misconceived as the petitioner was not on duty. The management in view of institution of criminal case was constrained to invoke Clause 3(a) of Memorandum of Bipartite settlement and as such the petitioner was put under suspension. Further upon conviction Clause 3(b) was invoked and petitioner was discharged from service on 28.08.2012. 9. It has also been contended that clause 3(d) has been referred which provides that if employee is acquitted by giving benefit of doubt, the employee may be paid such portion of pay and allowances as the management deem proper and the period of his absence shall not be treated as a period spent on duty, unless the management so directs. 10. The petitioner was reinstated in service w.e.f. date of discharge i.e. 28.08.2012 vide letter dated 15.02.2013 without directing that the period of absence shall be treated as on duty and accordingly in terms of applicable rules, the petitioners’ absence from duty during the period of suspension was not treated as period spent on duty. 11. With regard to payment to be made, Para 13 of Counter Affidavit has been relied upon. 12. Having heard Ld. Counsel for the rival parties, it is clear & evident that the only issue to be decided is to the effect that whether the authority was required to pass any order in terms of Clause 3(d) with regard to payment and also with regard to fact whether the period of suspension was to be treated as period on duty. Counsel for the rival parties, it is clear & evident that the only issue to be decided is to the effect that whether the authority was required to pass any order in terms of Clause 3(d) with regard to payment and also with regard to fact whether the period of suspension was to be treated as period on duty. As per the records, it is clear and evident that no order has been passed in terms of Clause 3(d) with regard to absence and also with regard to admissible pay; rather the respondents have stated in counter affidavit that the letter of reinstatement has been issued on 15.02.2013 without directing that the period of absence shall be treated as on duty and accordingly in terms of applicable rules, the petitioners’ absence from duty during the period of suspension was not treated as period spent on duty is misconceived as the respondents were required to pass order to that effect. 13. The letter contained at Annexure 2 indicates that the petitioner was reinstated with effect from date of discharge i.e., 28.08.2012 and also the letter at Annexure 4 issued by Respondents states that decision had to be taken. 14. In case of P. Ramaswamy v. General Manager, Canara Bank & Another, 1997 SCC OnLine Kar 649, the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court has held as hereunder: 10. In this case the respondent Bank did not proceed against the appellant departmentally, after his acquittal by the Court. He was reinstated in service without further action. Under such circumstances, under sub-clause 3(b) of Regulation 21, employee is deemed to have been on duty from period of suspension and was entitled to full pay and allowance during the period of suspension. The learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate this aspect of the matter Regulation 21 was not taken note of while dismissing the writ petition. Therefore, the learned Single Judge fell into an error on record. 11. In view of this the appellant was entitled to the difference in the full wages and the subsistence allowance which had been paid to him during the period of suspension. 15. Similarly in the case in hand, the respondent bank did not choose to procced against the petitioner departmentally and the petitioner was reinstated in service with effect from date of discharge i.e., 28.08.2012 which was communicated by way of letter contained in memo no. 15. Similarly in the case in hand, the respondent bank did not choose to procced against the petitioner departmentally and the petitioner was reinstated in service with effect from date of discharge i.e., 28.08.2012 which was communicated by way of letter contained in memo no. RM/12-13/DPD/1193 dated 15.02.2013. Furthermore, the respondents took no further action. 16. Having regards to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, when no decision has been taken with regard to the payment to be made to the petitioner; accordingly, the instant writ application stands disposed of by directing the Respondent Bank to take a final decision on the claim of the petitioner by passing a specific order in accordance with the applicable Rules and regulation of the Bank and the same shall be communicated to the Petitioner. The entire exercise shall be completed by the concerned respondent within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. Pending I.A.s, if any, also stands disposed of.