- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION NO. 17100 OF 2026 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: SRI MANJUNATH S/O. SHANKAR, AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO. 122, JAYARAM STREET, NEAR CORPORATION BANK RAMASWAMY PALYA, BENGALURU NORTH MARUTHI SEVA NAGAR, BENGALURU 560 033. PRESENTLY AT CENTRAL PRISON, KALABURAGI – 585 308. …PETITIONER (BY SRI SATISH K., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA HOME DEPARTMENT, THROUGH ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HGIH COURT OF KARNATAKA, HIGH COURT BUILDINGS BENGALURU – 560 001. Digitally signed by SANJEEVINI J KARISHETTY Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 2. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PRISONS AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, SHESHADRI ROAD, BENGALURU – 560 009. 3. CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL PRISON, BENGALURU – 560 100. 4. CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL PRISON, KALABURAGI – 585 308. 5. SMT.HEMALATHA P., W/O LATE D.KARTHIGEYAN AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.13, MUNIGOWDA ROAD R.S.PALYA, KAMMANAHALLI BENGALURU – 560 033. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1 TO R-4; NOTICE TO R-5 DISPENSED WITH V/O DATED 10.06.2026(MEMO FILED)) THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF THE BNSS, 2023 PRAYING TO A) CALL FOR RECORDS FROM THE RESPONDENT NOS. 2 AND 3 IN RESPECT OF THE REQUISITION DATED 15/05/2026 (ANNEXURE - D); B) ISSUE WRIT OR ORDER QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 19/05/2026 PASSED BY THE LEARNED PRINCIPAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND SPECIAL COURT FOR KCOCA ACT, BENGALURU (CCH-I) IN SPL. C.C. NO.2055/2024 PERMITTING TRANSFER OF THE PETITIONER FROM CENTRAL PRISON, BENGALURU TO CENTRAL PRISON, KALABURAGI (ANNEXURE C), AND REJECT THE REQUISITION DATED 15/05/2026 - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 3 (ANNEXURE –D) IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY; C) THE ISSUE A WRIT OF MANDAMUS DIRECTING RESPONDENTS TO FORTHWITH RE- TRANSFER THE PETITIONER FROM CENTRAL PRISON, KALABURAGI TO CENTRAL PRISON, BENGALURU, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner is before the Court calling in question an order of the concerned Court dated 19-05-2026 passed in Spl.C.C.2055 of 2024, by which the petitioner who was housed in the Central Prison at Bangalore is transferred to the Central Prison, Kalaburagi on the requisition made by the prosecution. 2. Heard Sri Satish K, learned counsel appearing for petitioner and Sri B N Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondents 1 to 4. 3. The petitioner is accused no. 3 who gets embroiled in a crime in Crime No.353 of 2024 initially for offence punishable under Sections 341, 302 and 34 of the IPC. During the - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 investigation, the offence under the Karnataka Control of Organized Crimes Act 2000 (‘KCOCA’ for short) and the Arms Act, 1959 are invoked. The petitioner, under-trial prisoner, is now facing trial after the police invoking KCOCA and filing the charge sheet before the concerned court. The issue in the lis does not relate to the merit of the matter. 4. It transpires that on 15-05-2026, during the pendency of the trial in Spl.C.C.2055 of 2024, a requisition springs from the Chief Superintendent of the Prison to the concerned court to transfer the petitioner from Central Prison, Bengaluru to Kalaburagi on the score of alleged prison administration and security concerns in the prison. The matter is advanced before the concerned Court and 4 days thereafter i.e., on 19-05-2026 the concerned Court passes the following order: “Case is advanced and taken on board. Learned P.P. is present. The Chief Superintendent of Central Prison, Bengaluru vide requisition dated 15.5.2026 has made a request to permit the shifting of A-3 - Manjunatha from the said prison to Central Prison, Kalburgi. Along with the said requisition, several other documents are appended, wherein it is stated that the said Accused in connivance with other inmates of the jail - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 has ganged up with them and thereby causing serious issues to the administration and security of the prison. It is also reported that the said Accused apart from other inmates, has admitted to the illegal use of mobile phones and indulging other unlawful activities in the prison. Further, it is also stated that the DGP, Prisons, has directed to shift the said Accused to Kalburgi after obtaining permission from the Court. On perusal of said requisition with the records, I am satisfied about the case made out for shifting of A-3 to Central Prison, Kalburgi in view of serious issues of administration and security in the prison. The request of the Chief Superintendent of Prisons, Bengaluru is approved and A-3 Manjunatha who is in the prison under UTP No. 4851/2024 is ordered to be shifted to Central Prison, Kalburgi, with immediate effect. Issue necessary directions to the concerned Prison Authorities at Bengaluru as well as Kalburgi and also to issue directions to the Kalburgi Prison to produce him through V.C. on the regular dates of hearing. Call on 22.05.2026.” A perusal at the aforesaid order would clearly indicate that it suffers from blatant non-application of mind, as to why the petitioner has to be shifted from Bangalore to Kalaburagi. 5. In identical circumstances, this Court while answering the similar issue in the case of PRADOSH S.RAO v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA1 has held that without cogent 1 W.P.No.23848/2024 disposed on 01.10.2024 - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 reasons, the under-trial prisoners cannot be shifted from one prison to another. This Court has held as follows: “…. …. …. ….It is not that the prisoner, can choose the prison. Once he is housed in a jurisdictional prison, as an under- trial, to shift him to any other prison there must be a cogent reason, and such orders of shifting must bear application of mind. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF MAHARATHTRA v. SAEED SOHAIL SHEIKH reported in (2012) 13 SCC 192, while answering an identical circumstance has held as follows: “25. The forensic debate at the Bar was all about the nature of the power exercisable by the court while permitting or refusing transfer. We have, however, no hesitation in holding that the power exercisable by the court while permitting or refusing transfer is “judicial” and not “ministerial” as contended by Mr Naphade. Exercise of ministerial power is out of place in situations where quality of life or the liberty of a citizen is affected, no matter he/she is under a sentence of imprisonment or is facing a criminal charge in an ongoing trial. That transfer of an undertrial to a distant prison may adversely affect his right to defend himself but also isolate him from the society of his friends and relations is settled by the decision of this Court in Sunil Batra (2) v. Delhi Admn.[(1980) 3 SCC 488 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 777 : AIR 1980 SC 1579] wherein this Court observed: (SCC p. 510, para 48) “48. Inflictions may take many protean forms, apart from physical assaults. Pushing the prisoner into a solitary cell, denial of a necessary amenity, and, more dreadful sometimes, transfer to a distant prison where visits or society of friends or relations may be snapped, allotment of degrading labour, assigning him to a desperate or tough gang and the like, may be punitive in effect. Every such affliction or abridgment is an infraction of liberty or life in its wider sense and cannot be - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 sustained unless Article 21 is satisfied. There must be a corrective legal procedure, fair and reasonable and effective. Such infraction will be arbitrary, under Article 14 if it is dependent on unguided discretion, unreasonable, under Article 19 if it is irremediable and unappealable, and unfair, under Article 21 if it violates natural justice. The string of guidelines in Batra [Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn., (1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 155] set out in the first judgment, which we adopt, provides for a hearing at some stages, a review by a superior, and early judicial consideration so that the proceedings may not hop from Caesar to Caesar. We direct strict compliance with those norms and institutional provisions for that purpose.” 26. The expressions “ministerial”, “ministerial office”, “ministerial act”, and “ministerial duty” have been defined by Black's Law Dictionary as under: “Ministerial, adj.—[16c] Of or relating to an act that involves obedience to instructions or laws instead of discretion, judgment, or skill the court clerk's ministerial duties include recording judgments on the docket. Ministerial office.—An office that does not include authority to exercise judgment, only to carry out orders given by a superior office, or to perform duties or acts required by rules, statutes, or regulations. Ministerial act.—An act performed without the independent exercise of discretion or judgment. If the act is mandatory, it is also termed a ministerial duty. Ministerial duty.—A duty that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.” 27. Prof. de Smith in his book on Judicial Review (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 6th Edn., 2007) refers to the meaning given by the courts to the terms “judicial”, “quasi-judicial”, “administrative”, “legislative” and “ministerial” for administrative law purposes and found them to be inconsistent. According to the author “ministerial” as a technical legal term has no single fixed meaning. It may describe any duty the discharge whereof requires no - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 element of discretion or independent judgment. It may often be used more narrowly to describe the issue of a formal instruction, in consequence of a prior determination which may or may not be of a judicial character. Execution of any such instructions by an inferior officer sometimes called ministerial officer may also be treated as a ministerial function. It is sometimes loosely used to describe an act that is neither judicial nor legislative. In that sense the term is used interchangeably with “executive” or “administrative”. The tests which, according to Prof. de Smith delineate “judicial functions”, could be varied some of which may lead to the conclusion that certain functions discharged by the courts are not judicial such as award of costs, award of sentence to prisoners, removal of trustees and arbitrators, grant of divorce to petitioners who are themselves guilty of adultery, etc. We need not delve deep into all these aspects in the present case. We say so because pronouncements of this Court have over the past decades made a distinction between quasi-judicial function on the one hand and administrative or ministerial duties on the other which distinctions give a clear enough indication and insight into what constitutes ministerial function in contradistinction to what would amount to judicial or quasi-judicial function. 28. In Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani [1950 SCC 551 : AIR 1950 SC 222] this Court had an occasion to examine the difference between a quasi-judicial order and an administrative or ministerial order. Kania, C.J. in his opinion, quoted with approval an old Irish case on the issue in the following passage: (AIR p. 224, para 5) “5. … the point for determination is whether the order in question is a quasi-judicial order or an administrative or ministerial order. In R. v. Dublin Corpn. [(1978) 2 LR Ir 371] LR Ir p. 376, May, C.J. in dealing with this point observed as follows: ‘It is established that the writ of certiorari does not lie to remove an order merely ministerial, such as a warrant, but it lies to remove and adjudicate upon the validity of acts judicial. In this connection, the term “judicial” does not necessarily mean acts of a judge or legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 law, but for the purpose of this question a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority, upon consideration of facts and circumstances, and imposing liability or affecting the rights of others.’ This definition was approved by Lord Atkinson in Frome United Breweries Co. Ltd. v. Bath JJ [1926 AC 586 : 1926 All ER Rep 576 (HL)] AC p. 602, as the best definition of a judicial act as distinguished from an administrative act.” 29. In Khushaldas Advani case [1950 SCC 551 : AIR 1950 SC 222] the Court was examining whether the act in question was a ministerial/administrative act or a judicial/quasi-judicial one in the context of whether a writ of certiorari could be issued against an order under Section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance, 1947. The Court cited with approval the observation of Atkin, L.J. in R. v. Electricity Commr., ex p London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd. [(1924) 1 KB 171 : 1923 All ER Rep 150 (CA)] that laid down the following test: (KB p. 205) “Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs.” (Khushaldas case [1950 SCC 551 : AIR 1950 SC 222] , AIR p. 225, para 6) The Court in Khushaldas case [1950 SCC 551 : AIR 1950 SC 222] quoted with approval the decision in R. v. London County Council ex p Entertainments Protection Assn. Ltd. [(1931) 2 KB 215 (CA)] according to which a rule of certiorari may issue; wherever a body of persons (1) having legal authority, (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects, and (3) having the duty to act judicially, (4) act in excess of their legal authority—a writ of certiorari may issue. (Khushaldas case [1950 SCC 551 : AIR 1950 SC 222] , AIR p. 225, para 6) 30. Fazl Ali, J. in his concurring opinion in Khushaldas case [1950 SCC 551 : AIR 1950 SC 222] made the following observations as regards judicial and quasi-judicial orders: (AIR pp. 228-29, paras 16 & 22) “16. Without going into the numerous cases cited before us, it may be safely laid down - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 that an order will be a judicial or quasi-judicial order if it is made by a court or a judge, or by some person or authority who is legally bound or authorised to act as if he was a court or a Judge. To act as a court or a Judge necessarily involves giving an opportunity to the party who is to be affected by an order to make a representation, making some kind of inquiry, hearing and weighing evidence, if any, and considering all the facts and circumstances bearing on the merits of a controversy, before any decision affecting the rights of one or more parties is arrived at. The procedure to be followed may not be as elaborate as in a court of law and it may be very summary, but it must contain the essential elements of judicial procedure as indicated by me. … *** 22. … The mere fact that an executive authority has to decide something does not make the decision judicial. It is the manner in which the decision has to be arrived at which makes the difference, and the real test is: Is there any duty to decide judicially?” The detailed concurrent opinion of Das, J. in the same case, also agreed with the above test for determining whether a particular act is a judicial or an administrative one. Das, J., observed: (Khushaldas case [1950 SCC 551 : AIR 1950 SC 222] , AIR p. 257, para 163) “163. … The real test which distinguishes a quasi-judicial act from an administrative act is the third item in Atkin, L.J.'s definition, namely the duty to act judicially.” 31. In State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei [AIR 1967 SC 1269] Shah, J. speaking for the Court observed that the duty to act judicially arose from the very nature of the function intended to be performed. It need not be shown to be superadded. The Court held: (AIR p. 1271, para 9) “9. … If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power.” 32. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262] , Hegde, J., as His Lordship then was, recognised that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power was fast vanishing. What was important, declared the Court, was the duty to act judicially which implies nothing but a duty to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The Court observed: (SCC pp. 268- 69, para 13) “13. The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. Under our Constitution the rule of law pervades over the entire field of administration. Every organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of quasi- judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power.” 33. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405] where Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Court observed: (SCC p. 434, para 48) “48. Once we understand the soul of the rule as fair play in action—and it is so—we must hold that it extends to both the fields. After all, administrative power in a democratic set up is not allergic to fairness in action and discretionary executive justice cannot degenerate into unilateral injustice. Nor is there ground to be frightened of delay, inconvenience and expense, if natural justice gains access. For fairness itself is a flexible, pragmatic and relative concept, not a rigid, ritualistic or sophisticated abstraction. It is not a bull in a china shop, nor a bee in one's bonnet. Its essence is good conscience in a given situation: nothing more—but nothing less. The ‘exceptions’ to the rules of natural justice are a misnomer or rather are but a shorthand form of expressing the idea that in those exclusionary cases nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case. Text book excerpts and ratios from rulings can be heaped, but they all converge to the same point that audi alteram partem is the justice of the law, without, of course, making law lifeless, absurd, stultifying, self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation.” - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 34. Recently this Court in Jamal Uddin Ahmad v. Abu Saleh Najmuddin [(2003) 4 SCC 257] dealt with the nature of distinction between judicial or ministerial functions in the following words: (SCC p. 270, para 14) “14. The judicial function entrusted to a Judge is inalienable and differs from an administrative or ministerial function which can be delegated or performance whereof may be secured through authorisation. ‘The judicial function consists in the interpretation of the law and its application by rule or discretion to the facts of particular cases. This involves the ascertainment of facts in dispute according to the law of evidence. The organs which the State sets up to exercise the judicial function are called courts of law or courts of justice. Administration consists of the operations, whatever their intrinsic nature may be, which are performed by administrators; and administrators are all State officials who are neither legislators nor judges.’ (See Constitutional and Administrative Law, Phillips and Jackson, 6th Edn., p. 13.) P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon defines judicial function as the doing of something in the nature of or in the course of an action in court. (p. 1015) The distinction between ‘judicial’ and ‘ministerial acts’ is: If a Judge dealing with a particular matter has to exercise his discretion in arriving at a decision, he is acting judicially; if on the other hand, he is merely required to do a particular act and is precluded from entering into the merits of the matter, he is said to be acting ministerially. (pp. 1013-14) Judicial function is exercised under legal authority to decide on the disputes, after hearing the parties, may be after making an enquiry, and the decision affects the rights and obligations of the parties. There is a duty to act judicially. The Judge may construe the law and apply it to a particular state of facts presented for the determination of the controversy. A ministerial act, on the other hand, may be defined to be one which a person performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to, or the exercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety of the act done. (Law Lexicon, ibid., p. 1234.) In ministerial duty nothing is left to discretion; it is a simple, definite duty.” 35. Applying the above principles to the case at hand and keeping in view the fact that any order that the Court may make on a request for transfer of a prisoner is bound to affect him prejudicially, we cannot but hold that it is obligatory for the court to apply its mind fairly and - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 objectively to the circumstances in which the transfer is being prayed for and take a considered view having regard to the objections which the prisoner may have to offer. There is in that process of determination and decision- making an implicit duty to act fairly, objectively or in other words to act judicially. It follows that any order of transfer passed in any such proceedings can be nothing but a judicial order or at least a quasi-judicial one. Inasmuch as the trial court appears to have treated the matter to be administrative and accordingly permitted the transfer without issuing notice to the undertrials or passing an appropriate order in the matter, it committed a mistake. A communication received from the prison authorities was dealt with and disposed of at an administrative level by sending a communication in reply without due and proper consideration and without passing a considered judicial order which alone could justify a transfer in the case. Such being the position the High Court was right in declaring the transfer to be void and directing the re-transfer of the undertrials to Bombay jail. It is common ground that the stay of the proceedings in three trials pending against the respondents has been vacated by this Court. Appearance of the undertrials would, therefore, be required in connection with the proceedings pending against them for which purpose they have already been transferred back to the Arthur Road Jail in Bombay. Nothing further, in that view, needs to be done by this Court in that regard at this stage. 36. That leaves us with the only other aspect, namely, whether the High Court was justified in directing the Government to hold an inquiry against those responsible for using excessive force and for dereliction of duty by the medical officer. 37. As noticed earlier by us the said direction has been issued entirely on the basis of the report submitted by the Sessions Judge. That report besides being preliminary is flawed in many respects including the fact that the same does not comply with the basic requirement of a fair opportunity of hearing being given to those likely to be affected. It is true that the statements of some of the jail officials have also been recorded in the course of the inquiry but that is not enough. Those indicted in the report were entitled to an opportunity to cross-examine those who alleged misconduct against them. Not only that the Sessions Judge has not named the officers responsible for the alleged use of excessive force which was essential for any follow-up or further action in the matter. The Sessions Judge has observed: “I am avoiding naming the officers of the jail against whom allegations of use of force are made as I am expected to give findings only on the aforesaid five points and as officers who took part in the action, officers who gave orders of or the officers who did not oppose the action cannot be segregated.” 38. So also the report clearly states the officials concerned have not been allowed to examine any witness - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 although a request was made by them to do so. Such being the position, some of the observations made by the High Court that give an impression as though the misdemeanour of the jail officers had been proved, do not appear to be justified. It was at any rate not for the High Court to record a final and authoritative finding that the force used by the jail authorities was excessive or that it was used for any extraneous purpose. It was a matter that could be determined only after a proper inquiry was conducted and an opportunity afforded to those who were accused of using such excessive force or abusing the power vested in them. Consequential directions issued by the High Court in directing the State Government to initiate disciplinary inquiry against all the officers involved in the incident were, therefore, premature. We say so because the question whether any disciplinary inquiry needs to be instituted against the jail officials would depend upon the outcome of a proper investigation into the incident and not a preliminary enquiry in which the investigating officer, apart from statements of the respondents, makes use of information discreetly collected from the jail inmates. The report of the Sessions Judge could in the circumstances provide no more than a prima facie basis for the Government to consider whether any further investigation into the incident was required to be conducted either for disciplinary action or for launching prosecution of those found guilty. Beyond that the preliminary report could not in view of what we have said above serve any other purpose. 39. In a country governed by the rule of law police excesses whether inside or outside the jail cannot be countenanced in the name of maintaining discipline or dealing with anti-national elements. Accountability is one of the facets of the rule of law. If anyone is found to have acted in breach of law or abused his position while exercising powers that must be exercised only within the parameters of law, the breach and the abuse can be punished. That is especially so when the abuse is alleged to have been committed under the cover of authority exercised by people in uniform. Any such action is also open to critical scrutiny and examination by the courts.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court considers an identical act of the concerned Court in shifting prisoners and holds that shifting of prisoners is neither an administrative act nor ministerial act, it is either a judicial order or a quasi- judicial order. The Apex Court further holds that if it is a judicial order or a quasi-judicial order, the prisoner against whom a request for transfer is made, it is obligatory on the part of the Court, to apply its mind fairly, and objectively, to the circumstances in which the - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 transfer is prayed for and take a considered view, having regard to the objections the prisoner may have to offer. The Apex Court thus, held that prior to the passing of the order, the prisoner must be given an opportunity of being heard, as it would undoubtedly cause prejudice to the said prisoner. The other tenet is that, the order cannot suffer from non-application of mind. The impugned order is undoubtedly passed without giving any opportunity to the petitioner, the under-trial prisoner to file his objections, if any, nor the order impugned does bear even a semblance of application of mind. 11. The unmistakable inference that can be drawn from what the Apex Court has elucidated and such elucidation being pitted to the facts of the case, is unsustainability of the order of shifting of the petitioner/accused No.14 from Bangalore, Central Prison to Belagavi, Central Prison, as it is done without any basis as there was no allegation against the petitioner that he had indulged in certain acts making himself the reason for such transfer, and is in violation of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of SAEED SOHAIL (supra). 12. The axe that needed to be fallen on accused No.2 – Darshan, has stretched to the petitioner as well, though he was far away from the company of accused No.2. There was no independent reason to shift the petitioner particularly to an Andheri Cell, as is alleged, and the allegations somewhat appear to be correct. It has, therefore, undoubtedly affected the right of the under-trial prisoner and requires to be reversed. The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment holds that in such cases, the under-trial prisoner who is shifted, should be directed to be re-shifted. I deem it appropriate to follow suit, which would mean that the order of shifting of the petitioner from Bangalore Central Prison to Belagavi Central Prison, being rendered unsustainable and as a consequence of such un-sustainability, a direction to re- shift the petitioner to Bangalore Central Prison.” In the light of the issue standing completely answered by this Court in the aforesaid petition, the petition deserves to - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:27968 WP No. 17100 of 2026 succeed, however, reserving liberty to the State to act in accordance with law, if need so arises. 6. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Writ Petition is allowed. (ii) Order impugned dated 19-05-2026 passed by the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Court for KCOCA Act, Bengaluru in Spl.C.C.No.2055 of 2024 stands quashed. (iii) The consequence of the order shall be implemented without brooking any delay. (iv) It is made clear that this order would not enure to the benefit of any other accused in the crime. The observations made are applicable only to the case of the petitioner and not to any other accused. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE BKP List No.: 2 Sl No.: 52