1 2026:CGHC:23743 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 4272 of 2026 1 - Ghanshyam Prasad Banarjee (G.P. Banarjee) S/o Late Shiv Lal Banarjee Aged About 61 Years Presently Working As Principal, Govt. Boys Higher Secondary School, Nawagarh, Block Nawagarh, District Bemetara Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, School Education Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Director Public Instructions, Indrawati Bhawan, Naya Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 3 - Commissioner Durg Division Durg, District Durg Chhattisgarh 4 - Collector Kabirdham District Kabirdham Chhattisgarh 5 - District Education Officer Bemetara, District Bemetara Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. C. Jayant K. Rao, Advocate. For Respondents/State : Mr. Shahil Singh, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Order on Board 15/06/2026 1. By way of the present petition, the petitioner is challenging the order dated 10/03/2026, whereby the order of stoppage of one AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2026.06.16 16:45:16 +0530 2 increment without cumulative effect has been passed against the petitioner by the respondent No.3, Commissioner, Durg Division, Durg. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent No.3 i.e the Divisional Commissioner is not competent authority to pass or impose any punishment upon the petitioner. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner holding the post of Principal and the competent authority to impose the penalty against the petitioner, is the Sate Government. Learned counsel further submits that the similar issue as far as the competency of the Divisional Commissioner to suspend or terminate an employee i.e. Principal, has been decided by this Court in WA No.531/2025 on 28/07/2025, which held that only the authority empowered under the statute is competent to exercise disciplinary powers. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that petitioner is inflicted with minor punishment and therefore respondent authorities after issuing show cause notice, considering reply submitted by petitioner, has passed the impugned order of punishment against the petitioner, which is just and proper. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties perused the pleadings and the order passed in WA No.531/2025. 3 5. The relevant paras i.e. 15 and 16 of WA No.531/2025 are reads as under:- 15. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Others, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 held in paragraph 15 as under:- “15.……… that the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point, but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.” 16. Applying the well-settled principles of law to the facts of the present case, and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned suspension order dated 4 06.06.2025 passed by respondent No. 4, having been issued by an incompetent authority, is hereby set aside. However, the respondent No. 3 shall be at liberty to pass a fresh order on the issue, in accordance with law, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. 6. It is the trite law that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. In the case at hand, the prescribed authority is the State Government, whereas the order impugned has been passed by the Divisional Commissioner, who is not a competent authority. 7. Having considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material available on record, it is evident that respondent No.3, the Commissioner, Durg Division, is not the competent authority to impose any penalty upon the petitioner, in terms of the Chhattisgarh School Education Services (Educational and Administrative Cadre) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2019. 8. In view of the aforesaid statutory provisions, the impugned order passed by respondent No.3 is without jurisdiction and is contrary to the Rules of 2019. Moreover, the issue has already been decided by this Court in W.A. No. 531/2025. Hence, the impugned order dated 10.03.2026 passed by respondent No.3, 5 i.e. the Commissioner, Durg Division, being issued by an incompetent authority, is hereby set aside. 9. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed to the extent indicated herein above. However, it is made clear that the State shall be at liberty to pass a fresh order in accordance with law, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order, if so advised. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Amardeep