2026:HHC:36275 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 4261 of 2013 Reserved on: 20.8.2026 Date of Decision: 26.08.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Fagu @ Kasam Deen & another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondents : Ms Tejasvi Thakur, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 17.06.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indora, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 429, and 201 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 11 of Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. (The 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:36275 parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 429 and 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. It was asserted that the informant Hans Raj (PW1) and Pawan Kumar (PW3) went to their fields on 28.09.2006 at about 11.30 P.M. They saw the light of the scooter at some distance. They went to the spot. One person fled away from the spot on the scooter towards Indora. Two persons picked up a gunny bag and started running away. The informant and Pawan Kumar apprehended them, and they revealed their names as Jeeta Masih and Fagu alias Kasam Deen. They disclosed the name of the person who had fled from the spot as Manga. The informant checked the gunny bag and found two cow hides and one calf hide. One dead cow was also lying at some distance, whose hide was being removed. The matter was reported to the police, and the informant's statement (Ex.PW1/A) was recorded, which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW6/A) was registered. 3 2026:HHC:36275 HC Budhi Singh (PW6) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW6/C). He seized the cow and calf hide vide memo (Ex.PW3/A). He interrogated the accused Fagu, who made a disclosure statement (Ex.PW6/D) leading to the recovery of a plastic bag containing ropes (Ex. P6), Darat (Ex. P3), Takora (Ex. P4) and Stone (Ex. P5). The bag was sealed with Seal ‘T’, and the site plan (Ex.PW6/E) was prepared. Roshan Lal (PW4) took the photographs (Ex.PW4/A1 to Ex.PW4/A5), whose negatives are Ex.PW4/A6 to Ex.PW4/A10. Dr Rajesh Singh (PW2) conducted the postmortem examination of the cow and found that the cause of death was cutting of the jugular vein and trachea. He issued the report (Ex.PW2/A). Manga made a disclosure statement leading to the recovery of a knife. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 421 and 201 of the IPC and Section 11 of the Prevention 4 2026:HHC:36275 of Cruelty to Animals Act, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 09 witnesses to prove its case. The informant Hans Raj (PW1) and Pawan Kumar (PW3) are eyewitnesses. Dr Rajesh Singh (PW2) conducted the postmortem examination of the cow. Roshan Lal (PW4) took the photographs. Ranjeet Singh (PW5) and Budhi Singh (PW6) are the witnesses to the disclosure statement and consequent recoveries. Ramesh Kumar (PW7) and Ashwani Kumar (PW9) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case in its entirety. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that no witness had seen the accused killing the cattle. The prosecution relied upon the disclosure statement and consequent recoveries. However, these were not sufficient to prove that the accused had killed the cows and the calf. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under 5 2026:HHC:36275 Sections 429, 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the prosecution version is duly corroborated by the statements of Has Raj and Pawan Kumar. Their statements were duly corroborated by the recovery of the cow and calf hide. Dr Rajesh Sharma proved that the cow was killed by cutting of the jugular vein and trachea and such injuries could have been caused by means of a knife shown to him. The learned Trial Court failed to consider the evidence properly. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State, and Ms Tejasvi Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of the informant and Pawan Kumar proved that they had found the 6 2026:HHC:36275 accused with the cow and calf hides. The police interrogated the accused, and they made a disclosure statement leading to the recovery of various articles. Dr. Rajesh Singh stated that the cow could have been killed by using the knife recovered at the instance of the accused. All these circumstances proved the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt, and learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Ms Tejasvi Thakur, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, submitted that there is no evidence that the accused had killed, maimed or caused cruelty to any animal. Hence, the essential ingredients of Section 429 of the IPC and Section 13 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act have not been proved. Mere possession of the cow and calf hides does not prove the ingredients of the commission of these offences. The knife was not sent to the Forensic Laboratory to determine that it contained the blood of the cow or calf, and the mere opinion of the Doctor is not sufficient to convict the accused. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that was possible based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court and this Court 7 2026:HHC:36275 should not interfere with the findings of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Hence, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: 8 2026:HHC:36275 “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie 9 2026:HHC:36275 trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that 10 2026:HHC:36275 when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. Section 429 of the IPC punishes a person who commits a mischief by killing, poisoning, maiming or rendering useless any animal specified in the Section. Section 13 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act punishes a person who treats an animal with cruelty specified in the Section. Therefore, it was essential for the prosecution to prove that the accused had killed the animal or treated it with cruelty. Informant Hans Raj (PW1) stated that accused Manga, Fagu and Jeeta were present near the khad with a scooter. Two persons hid in the bushes, and one person sped away on the scooter after seeing him and Pawan 11 2026:HHC:36275 Kumar. He and Pawan apprehended two persons and found a gunny bag containing cow hides and cow meat. The statement made by this witness that the bag contained cow meat is a clear improvement because no such fact was stated by him in his statement (Ex.PW1/A). Similarly, Pawan Kumar (PW3) also did not state that any cow meat was recovered. He only stated that two cow hides and one calf hide were recovered from the bag. Therefore, the statements of these witnesses merely show the possession of the cow and calf hides and do not show that the accused had killed the animal or treated her with cruelty. 15. HC Budhi Singh recorded a disclosure statement and recovered two ropes, one darat, one takora and one stone. However, there is no evidence that these were used for the commission of any offence. Hence, the recovery of these articles does not show the petitioners' involvement in the commission of the crime. 16. Inspector Ramesh Kumar (PW7) arrested Manga and recovered a knife. He admitted in his cross-examination that these knives are commonly available. The knife was not sent to the FSL to determine that it contained the blood of the cow. 12 2026:HHC:36275 Therefore, the recovery of the knife would not connect the accused to the commission of the crime. 17. A heavy reliance was placed upon the statement of Dr Rajesh Singh (PW2), who conducted the postmortem examination of the cow and found that it had died by cutting of the jugular vein and trachea. The injury could have been caused by the knife shown to him. This statement also does not prove the involvement of the accused. Mere opinion that the knife could have been used for the commission of the crime can lead to a suspicion, but suspicion does not amount to any proof. It was for the prosecution to prove that the knife was used for the commission of the crime by the forensic analysis, which it had failed to do. 18. There is no other evidence to connect the accused to the commission of the crime, and the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. This Court will not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 19. No other point was urged. 13 2026:HHC:36275 20. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. The appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 21. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents/accused are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 22. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 26th August, 2026 (Chander)