Jane Madhura Bara W/o Shri Vijay Beck v. State of Jharkhand
2026-02-03
Ananda Sen
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : ANANDA SEN, J. 1. By filing this writ petition, the petitioner prays to quash the Office Order as contained in Memo No.433/ Simdega, dated 04.06.2020 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition), issued by the District Superintendent of Education, Simdega, whereby the petitioner was inflicted with the punishment of non-payment of salary for the period 21.04.2020 to 02.05.2020, on the principle of “No Work No Pay” and it was further ordered that the entry to that effect should be made in the service book. 1.1. The petitioner further prays to set aside the Appellate Order dated 28.01.2022 (Annexure-11 to the writ petition), whereby the Appeal preferred by the petitioner before the Appellate Authority was dismissed. 1.2. The petitioner also prays for a direction upon the respondents to consequently release the salary of the petitioner for the period 21.04.2020 to 02.05.2020. 2. Learned counsel representing the petitioner submits that there are several illegalities and irregularities in the departmental proceeding. He submits that the charge is vague. He contends that the charge memo was issued to the petitioner on 05.05.2020 and a purported enquiry report was submitted on 08.05.2020, based on which the punishment was inflicted. As per him, in fact no departmental enquiry was conducted, rather the report, based on which the petitioner has been punished, is a Spot Inspection Report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, which cannot be said to be the enquiry in the departmental proceeding. He also argues that the Enquiry Officer does not have any jurisdiction to propose the quantum of punishment which has been done in the instant case and his recommendation is absolutely bad and against the Law. He submits that the stoppage of eleven days’ salary on the basis of “No Work No Pay” is not a prescribed punishment under the Rules and the Disciplinary Authority rather has invented a punishment, which is illegal. He submits that no second show cause notice was ever issued to the petitioner before imposing punishment. 3. Learned counsel representing the respondent-State submits that the charge-sheet is specific and the petitioner participated in the enquiry, which is evident from the Spot Inspection Report, as the petitioner was present there. He submits that since the petitioner was present there, she cannot take a plea that no departmental proceeding was held.
3. Learned counsel representing the respondent-State submits that the charge-sheet is specific and the petitioner participated in the enquiry, which is evident from the Spot Inspection Report, as the petitioner was present there. He submits that since the petitioner was present there, she cannot take a plea that no departmental proceeding was held. In the Proceeding, there were several persons present who got their statements recorded and based on that the punishment was imposed upon the petitioner. He further submits that it was the duty of the petitioner to ensure proper distribution of foodgrain to the beneficiaries and stop black- marketing but the petitioner by not following the direction of her higher Authorities, remained absent from the Public Distribution Shop (PDS). He submits that at the relevant point of time because of COVID, it was the duty of the petitioner to ensure supply of food grains under the National Food Security Act (NFSA), 2013, but the petitioner failed to do so. 4. After hearing the parties and going through the records of this case, I find that admittedly the petitioner is an Assistant Teacher in the Government Upgraded Middle School, Birkera, in the District of Simdega. During COVID-19, to ensure supply of food grains under the Government Scheme, a letter was issued by the Deputy Collector, Simdega. As per the said letter, the petitioner was made the Supervisor and deputed as a Magistrate to ensure smooth supply of food grains to the residents, who are below the poverty line. It is the allegation that this petitioner did not comply the direction during that period. Because of the alleged dereliction of duty, a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner. 5. The charge-sheet has been brought on record as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. In the charge-sheet, it is mentioned that vide Memo dated 18.04.2020, as per the Scheme of the Central Government, 10 Kg of rice per person, is to be distributed free of cost. To prevent black-marketing and to bring transparency in such distribution process, this petitioner was deputed as a Magistrate in connection with the Public Distribution Shop bearing P.D.S. Licence No.50 of 1991, of Village Birkera. It is alleged that the petitioner did not remain present in the said Shop, thus there was irregularity in distribution of the food grains. 6.
To prevent black-marketing and to bring transparency in such distribution process, this petitioner was deputed as a Magistrate in connection with the Public Distribution Shop bearing P.D.S. Licence No.50 of 1991, of Village Birkera. It is alleged that the petitioner did not remain present in the said Shop, thus there was irregularity in distribution of the food grains. 6. The second charge against the petitioner is that the petitioner has disobeyed the order of her superior and the third charge is that in spite of being deputed as a Magistrate in respect of the PDS in Birkera, the petitioner was not present there and was unauthorizedly absent. The charge Nos.2 and 3 are related and interconnected with charge No.1. 7. From perusal of the aforesaid allegation, I find that there is no specific date and time mentioned in the charge sheet as to when the petitioner supposed to be present in the said Shop to oversee proper supply of food grains. 8. Further, I find that the Office Order dated 18.04.2020 was issued during COVID-19 with instructions to remain present at the PDS and ensure that the beneficiaries receive foodgrains in the prescribed quantity and at a fixed rate, but it does not reflect as to when the petitioner supposed to visit the place. Further, as noticed above, it is also not mentioned in the charge-sheet as to when the petitioner supposed to visit the place for the aforesaid duty. Be it noted that the said period was during the COVID-19 when in the entire Country there was lockdown and no mode of transportation was available. 9. From perusal of the charge-sheet, it gives an impression that the petitioner never at all went to the Shop but this fact is not correct as in the Spot Inspection Report submitted by the Enquiry Officer (Annexure-B to the counter affidavit), it was clearly mentioned that on 20.04.2020, the petitioner was present there at 09:00 A.M. and on 03.05.2020, the petitioner was present in the Shop at 12’ Noon, but prior to that the Shopkeeper had distributed food grains to 57 beneficiaries. Thus, from the report, it cannot be said that the petitioner was unauthorizedly absent for the entire period. As mentioned earlier, in the charge-sheet there is no specific date and time to suggest as to when the petitioner was absent and when she had to remain present.
Thus, from the report, it cannot be said that the petitioner was unauthorizedly absent for the entire period. As mentioned earlier, in the charge-sheet there is no specific date and time to suggest as to when the petitioner was absent and when she had to remain present. Thus, in my opinion the charge is absolutely vague. 10. Admittedly, the petitioner was proceeded against in terms of the “Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2016” (hereinafter referred to as “Rules of 2016”). Part-VI of the Rules of 2016, provides for the procedure for imposing major penalties, which starts from Rule 17 onwards. As per clause- 17 (3) of the Rules of 2016, where it is proposed to hold an enquiry against the Government servant, the Disciplinary Authority shall draw up the charge containing the substance of imputation of misconduct; and the charge should be definite and there should be distinct article of charge. Further, the statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each charge shall contain the statement of all relevant facts including admission or confession made by the Government servant, list of such document and list of such witnesses by whom the article of charge is proposed to be sustained. It is necessary to quote Rule 17 (3) & (4) of the Rules of 2016, which reads as hereunder:- “ 17. Procedure for imposing major penalties :- 1) …………… 2) …………… 3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a Government Servant under this rule, the Disciplinary Authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up: i. The substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour as a definite and distinct article of charge. ii. A statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge, which shall contain :- a) A statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the Government Servant; b) A list of such document by which, and a list of such witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained.
4) The Disciplinary Authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Government Servant a copy of the articles of charge, such statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained and shall require the Government Servant to submit, within such time as may be specified, a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person.” 10.1. As per Rule 17 (3) (ii) (b) of the Rules of 2016, the Article of Charge must contain the list of documents and list of witnesses by which the Authority wants to prove the charge and list of witnesses also. 10.2. Further, Rule 17 (4) provides that once the charge- sheet is drawn along with the imputations, the same has to be served upon the delinquent-employee and thereafter the Government servant shall be given sufficient opportunity to submit written statement in his / her defence. 11. In this case, none of the aforesaid conditions i.e. drawing up of the imputations and definite & distinct article of charge in details, was followed nor the statement of imputation or article of charge was forwarded to the petitioner. This is a clear glaring illegality committed by the respondents, which is against the provisions of Rule 17 (3) (i) of the Rules of 2016. 12. Further, after going through the aforesaid charge-sheet dated 05.05.2020, I find that one week’s time was granted to the petitioner to file the reply. The period of one week expired on 12 nd May, 2020. In the meantime, the Spot Inspection Report dated 08.05.2020 was placed before the Authorities. Thereafter again on 13.05.2020, based on the Spot Inspection Report, the petitioner was asked to show cause as to why not appropriate action may be taken. Again, a reminder on 18.05.2020 was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner ultimately on 19.05.2020 gave a detailed reply, which was received by the Authority on 20.05.2020. Thereafter, as per the records, the impugned order of punishment was issued on 04.06.2020. 13. From the procedure which has been followed, it is quite clear that no departmental proceeding was ever held. Only on the basis of the Spot Inspection Report, the petitioner has been punished.
Thereafter, as per the records, the impugned order of punishment was issued on 04.06.2020. 13. From the procedure which has been followed, it is quite clear that no departmental proceeding was ever held. Only on the basis of the Spot Inspection Report, the petitioner has been punished. The Spot Inspection Report, which the counsel representing the respondent wants to project as an enquiry report, cannot be accepted. From the said Spot Inspection Report, it is clear that the petitioner was present on two dates to perform her duty as the Magistrate. The report clearly suggest that on 20.04.2020 at 09:00 A.M. and on 03.05.2020 at 12 Noon, the petitioner had gone to the Shop to discharge her duty. Further, the said report cannot be taken to be an enquiry report in a Disciplinary Proceeding because there is nothing to suggest that the petitioner was given an opportunity to cross-examine any witness who was examined by the Enquiry Officer. Every charge, which is sought to be proved, must be proved by an evidence, either oral or documentary. In this case, there is no oral evidence in support of the charge framed against the petitioner. 14. The report which the respondents are projecting as a report of the Enquiry Officer in an Enquiry Proceeding, is in fact a Spot Verification Report. The purpose of holding Spot Verification (preliminary enquiry) in respect of a particular alleged misconduct is only for finding particular fact and prima facie to know as to whether the alleged misconduct has been committed or not. Thus, I find that in fact there was no Disciplinary Proceeding held in the instant case and thus naturally there is no enquiry report; and on the basis of the findings recorded in Spot Verification Report, no order of punishment can be passed. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (2013) 4 SCC 301 has held that holding a preliminary inquiry in respect of a particular alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of finding particular fact and prima facie to know the misconduct which has been committed; and the findings recorded in the preliminary inquiry cannot form a basis to pass any order of punishment. Para-42, 43, 44 and 45 of the said judgment reads as hereunder:- “42.
Para-42, 43, 44 and 45 of the said judgment reads as hereunder:- “42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway [ AIR 1960 SC 992 ], held that the purpose of holding a preliminary inquiry in respect of a particular alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of finding a particular fact and prima facie, to know as to whether the alleged misconduct has been committed and on the basis of the findings recorded in preliminary inquiry, no order of punishment can be passed. It may be used only to take a view as to whether a regular disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent is required to be held. 43. Similarly in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India [ AIR 1964 SC 1854 ] a Constitution Bench of this Court while taking a similar view held that preliminary inquiry should not be confused with regular inquiry. The preliminary inquiry is not governed by the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Preliminary inquiry may be held ex parte, for it is merely for the satisfaction of the Government though usually for the sake of fairness, an explanation may be sought from the government servant even at such an inquiry. But at that stage, he has no right to be heard as the inquiry is merely for the satisfaction of the Government as to whether a regular inquiry must be held. The Court further held as under : (AIR p. 1862, para 12) “12. … There must therefore be no confusion between the two enquiries and it is only when the government proceeds to hold a departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting on the government servant one of the three major punishments indicated in Article 311 that the government servant is entitled to the protection of that article [, nor prior to that].” (Emphasis added) (See also Govt. of India v. Tarak Nath Ghosh) 44. In Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra [ (1997) 1 SCC 299 ] this Court dealt with the issue and held as under: “… a preliminary inquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after issue of charge- sheet. The preliminary enquiry is only to find out whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent.
In Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra [ (1997) 1 SCC 299 ] this Court dealt with the issue and held as under: “… a preliminary inquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after issue of charge- sheet. The preliminary enquiry is only to find out whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent. Once regular enquiry is held under the Rules, the preliminary enquiry loses its importance and, whether preliminary enquiry was held strictly in accordance with law or by observing principles of natural justice of (sic) nor, remains of no consequence.” (Emphasis added) 45. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to cross-examine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice.” 16. Further, from the documents and materials placed before this Court, I find that punishment which has been imposed upon the petitioner is stoppage of her salary from the period 21.04.2020 to 02.05.2020. 17. This Court fails to understand as to why the salary of the petitioner was stopped on the principle of “No Work No Pay” from 21.04.2020 to 02.05.2020. From the charge-sheet, I don’t find a single whisper of allegation that the petitioner was supposed to be present at the PDS from 01.04.2020 to 03.05.2020, as no dates have been mentioned in the charge-sheet. Be it noted that as held earlier, the charge-sheet is absolutely vague and there is no instances given in the charge-sheet nor the statement of imputation against this petitioner is specific with date and time. 18. Part-V of the Rules of 2016 prescribes the penalties which can be imposed upon a Government servant. Rule 14 of the Rules of 2016 classified the penalties in two categories i.e. Minor Penalties and Major Penalties. 19. There are four types of penalties, which are classified as minor penalties, but the stoppage of salary for any period does not find place there. So far as major penalties are concerned, which are prescribed under Rule 14 (v) to (xi), the said punishment also does not find place. Thus, in this case, the Disciplinary Authority has invented a punishment which has not been prescribed in the Rules. 20.
So far as major penalties are concerned, which are prescribed under Rule 14 (v) to (xi), the said punishment also does not find place. Thus, in this case, the Disciplinary Authority has invented a punishment which has not been prescribed in the Rules. 20. Learned counsel representing the respondent – State at this stage submits that the Disciplinary Authority has a power to impose any other penalty in terms of the proviso of Rule 14. 21. It is true that the Disciplinary Authority has power to impose any other penalty but that should be in an exceptional case and for special reasons to be recorded in writing. This is the mandate of the proviso to Rule 14. In the impugned order, I find that neither the reasons for imposing these penalties have been mentioned, nor it has been mentioned that what is the exceptionality of this case, which attracts imposing such penalty. Thus, the punishment which has been imposed in this case, is not in accordance with Rule 14 of the Rules of 2016. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2012) 5 SCC 242 has held that imposing the punishment is regulated and controlled by the Statutory Rules. It has been further held that the order of punishment being outside the purview of the Statutory Rules is a nullity and cannot be enforced against the delinquent-employee. Para-15 of the said judgment is as follows:- “ 15. Imposing the punishment for a proved delinquency is regulated and controlled by the statutory rules. Therefore, while performing the quasi-judicial functions, the authority is not permitted to ignore the statutory rules under which punishment is to be imposed. The disciplinary authority is bound to give strict adherence to the said rules. Thus, the order of punishment being outside the purview of the statutory rules is a nullity and cannot be enforced against the appellant.” 23. The punishment which has been imposed upon the petitioner will have an effect of break in service, as it has been mentioned in the impugned order that during the period which she has not worked, she will not be paid her salary but nothing has been mentioned as to how the said period will be treated.
The punishment which has been imposed upon the petitioner will have an effect of break in service, as it has been mentioned in the impugned order that during the period which she has not worked, she will not be paid her salary but nothing has been mentioned as to how the said period will be treated. Thus, in this case, a second show cause notice should have been given to the petitioner, but this aspect has not been taken note of by the Disciplinary Authority. 24. Considering what has been discussed above, I find merit in this writ petition. The order of punishment imposed upon the petitioner is illegal, thus the impugned Office Order as contained in in Memo No.433/ Simdega, dated 04.06.2020 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition), is hereby set aside. 24.1. Further, once the primary order of punishment is set aside, consequently whatever may be the nature of the Appellate Order, the same also needs to be quashed. Thus, the Appellate Order dated 28.01.2022 (Annexure-11 to the writ petition), is also hereby set aside. 24.2. The respondents are directed to grant consequential benefits to the petitioner by paying salary for the period 21.04.2020 to 02.05.2020. 25. Accordingly, this writ petition stands allowed . No order as to costs. 26. Pending interlocutory application, if any, stands disposed of.