JUDGMENT : ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 with the prayer to quash the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Complaint Case being C/1 Case No. 1587 of 2024 of the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Jamshedpur including the order dated 12.09.2024 whereby and where under the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Jamshedpur has found prima facie case for the offences punishable under Sections 288, 420, 406, 465, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The brief fact of the case is that the petitioners installed a mobile tower on the roof of the house of the complainant in terms of the agreement entered into between them dated 08.08.2009. The petitioners paid the monthly rental amount for installing the said mobile tower as per the said agreement dated 08.08.2009 till July, 2019. It is the undisputed fact that with effect from 8th August, 2021, the agreement has been cancelled by the petitioners in terms of clause-9 of the agreement. 4. Alleging therein that the complainant has been cheated and by the negligent conduct of the petitioners and they have made the building of the complainant dilapidated; the complainant filed the complaint. Basing upon the complaint, the statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation and the statement of the inquiry witnesses, the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Jamshedpur has found prima facie case in respect of the said offences and passed the summoning order. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that since in this case, no pulling down or repairing any building is involved nor is there any allegation against the petitioners of knowingly or negligently omitted to take such order with that the building to be pulled down or repaired which is sufficient to guard any probable danger to human life from the fall of that building or any part thereof, the offence punishable under Section 288 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out against the petitioners. It is next submitted that in the absence of any allegation against the petitioners of playing deception since the very inception, the offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out against the petitioners. It is next submitted that in the absence of any allegation against the petitioners of playing deception since the very inception, the offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out against the petitioners. It is next submitted that in the absence of any allegation against the petitioners of being entrusted with any property or committing dishonest misappropriation, the offence punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out against the petitioners. It is then submitted that in the absence of any allegation of creation of any false document by the petitioners, the offence punishable under Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out against the petitioners. It is then submitted that in the absence of any allegation that the petitioners ever intentionally insulted the complainant, the offence punishable under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out. It is then submitted that in the absence of any allegation of criminal intimidation against the petitioners, the offence punishable under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out against the petitioners even if the entire allegations made against the petitioners in the complaint, the statement of the complainant on the solemn affirmation and the statement of the inquiry witnesses are considered to be true in their entirety. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submits that the allegations against the petitioners are false. It is then submitted that the petitioners are still ready and willing to pay the monthly license fee at the rate stipulated in the agreement dated 08.08.2009 for the period till August, 2021, when the agreement was cancelled, subject to the condition that the complainant allows the petitioners to remove the mobile tower and machinery thereof fixed by the petitioners on the roof of the house of the complainant. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners relies upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Abhishek Sinha & Others Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Another passed in W.P. (Cr.) No. 982 of 2024 dated 12.02.2025 and submits that therein, this Court relied upon the Order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Nitu Singh & Others Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Another passed in W.P. (Cr.) No. 982 of 2024 dated 12.02.2025 and submits that therein, this Court relied upon the Order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Nitu Singh & Others Vs. State of U.P. & Others, 2022 Live Law (SC) 281, therein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that failure to pay rent is not an offence. It is next submitted that therein, this Court also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Manik Taneja & Another Vs. State of Karnataka & Another, (2015) 7 SCC 423 , paragraph No.12 of which reads as under:- “12. In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the mind of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of the appellants posting a comment on Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.” and submits that in order to constitute the offence of criminal intimidation, the threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the person or to cause that person to do or omit to do any work and mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm could not be sufficient to bring in the application of Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code. 8. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners next relies upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Ajay Kumar & Another Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Another, 2024:JHHC:22666 and submits that therein, this Court relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Uma Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar & Another, (2005) 10 SCC 336 , paragraph No.6 of which reads as under:- “6. xxxxx It is well settled that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In the present case it has nowhere been stated that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC.” (Emphasis supplied) and submits that therein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the accused persons must play deception since the beginning. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners next relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, (2024) 10 SCC 690 and submits that therein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held in no uncertain terms, that for the self-same occurrence, both the offence punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code and the offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code cannot happen, as they are mutually exclusive. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners then relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vikram Johar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, (2019) 14 SCC 207 para-24 and 25 of which reads as under:- “24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the complaint against the appellant. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners then relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vikram Johar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, (2019) 14 SCC 207 para-24 and 25 of which reads as under:- “24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the complaint against the appellant. The allegation is that the appellant with two or three other unknown persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant's house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault him and when some neighbours arrived there the appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation taking on its face value does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that the appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients as laid down in para 13 of the judgment of this Court in [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715]. “25. Now, reverting back to Section 506, which is offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] has also to be applied when question of finding out as to whether the ingredients of offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal&Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edn. with regard to proof of offence states the following: “… The prosecution must prove: (i) That the accused threatened some person. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal&Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edn. with regard to proof of offence states the following: “… The prosecution must prove: (i) That the accused threatened some person. (ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested; (iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.” (Emphasis supplied) A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above.’’ (Emphasis supplied) and submits that in order to constitute the offence punishable under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code, the intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. In the absence of the same, the mere allegation that the accused came and abused the complainant, does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code as has been laid down in para-13 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 . 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Mohammed Ibrahim & Others vs. State of Bihar & Another, (2009) 8 SCC 751 , paragraph-14 of which reads as under:- “14. An analysis of Section 464 of the Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories: 1. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed. 2. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed. 2. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person. 3. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. In short, a person is said to have made a “false document”, if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses.” and submits that therein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India made the analysis of Section 464 of the Indian Penal Code and it is submitted that in this case, there is absolutely no allegation of committing forgery by the petitioners. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners lastly relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case M.N.G. Bharateesh Reddy Vs. Ramesh Ranganathan & Another, (2022) 16 SCC 210 and submits that therein in para-19, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has reiterated that the offence of criminal breach of trust contains two ingredients:- (i) entrusting any person with property, or with any dominion over property. (ii) the person entrusted dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property to the detriment of the person who entrusted it. 13. Hence, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the prayer as prayed for in this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition be allowed. 14. (ii) the person entrusted dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property to the detriment of the person who entrusted it. 13. Hence, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the prayer as prayed for in this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition be allowed. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the State and the learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 on the other hand vehemently oppose the prayer of the petitioners made in this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition and submit that if the allegations made against the petitioners in the Complaint, the statement of the complainant on the solemn affirmation and the statement of the inquiry witnesses are considered to be true in their entirety, then all of the offences in respect of which the prima facie case has been found by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Jamshedpur, is in fact made out against the petitioners. Hence, it is submitted that this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition, being without any merit, be dismissed. 15. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials available in the record, it is pertinent to mention here that the essential ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 288 of the Indian Penal Code are as under:- (i) The accused was pulling down or repairing the building; (ii) The accused omitted to take such order with that the building to be pulled down or repaired as is sufficient to guard any probable danger to human life from the fall of that building or any part thereof; 16. Now coming to the facts of the case, the first essential ingredient to constitute the offence punishable under Section 288 of the Indian Penal Code is ‘the accused was pulling down or repairing the building’. But there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioners of either pulling down any building or repairing any building. So, in the absence of the said essential ingredient as also the other ingredients of the said offence; as already indicated above, this Court is of the considered view that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioners in the complaint, the statement of the complainant on the solemn affirmation and the statement of the inquiry witnesses are considered to be true in their entirety still the offence punishable under Section 288 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out against the petitioners. 17. So far as the offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Uma Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar & Another (supra) that the accused must play deception since the very inception. 18. Now coming to the facts of the case, the admitted case of the complainant is that for over a decade, the petitioners have been paying the license fee at the stipulated rate to the complainant. So, this is not a case where it can be said that the petitioners played deception since very inception. Hence, this Court has no hesitation in holding that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioners are considered to be true in their entirety, still the offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out against the petitioners. 19. So far as the offence punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the essential ingredient to constitute the said offence is that the petitioners must be entrusted with the property or be given dominion over any property. 20. Now coming to the facts of the case, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioners of either having been entrusted with any property or having dominion over any property. Moreover, there is no allegation against the petitioners of dishonest misappropriation of any entrusted property or using any entrusted property to his own use or use in violation of legal contract. Under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioners are considered to be true in their entirety, still the offence punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out against the petitioners. 21. So far as the offence punishable under Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the essential ingredient to constitute the said offence is ‘creation of a false document’. 22. 21. So far as the offence punishable under Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the essential ingredient to constitute the said offence is ‘creation of a false document’. 22. Now coming to the facts of the case, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioners of creation of any false document and in the absence of the same, this Court has no hesitation in holding that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioners are considered to be true in their entirety, still the offence punishable under Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out against the petitioners. 23. So far as the offence punishable under Section 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vikram Johar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (supra), there is absolutely no allegation about the essential ingredients either to constitute the offence punishable under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code or the offence punishable under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code. 24. Under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioners are considered to be true in their entirety, still neither the offence punishable under Section 504 nor Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioners. 25. In view of the discussions made above, as none of the offences in respect of which the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Jamshedpur has found prima facie case, is made out against the petitioners even if the entire allegations made against them are considered to be true in their entirety. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that the continuation of the criminal proceeding against the petitioners will amount to abuse of process of law. Therefore, this is a fit case where the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Complaint Case being C/1 Case No. 1587 of 2024 of the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Jamshedpur including the order dated 12.09.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Jamshedpur, be quashed and set aside against the petitioners named above. 26. Therefore, this is a fit case where the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Complaint Case being C/1 Case No. 1587 of 2024 of the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Jamshedpur including the order dated 12.09.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Jamshedpur, be quashed and set aside against the petitioners named above. 26. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Complaint Case being C/1 Case No. 1587 of 2024 of the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Jamshedpur including the order dated 12.09.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate-1st Class, Jamshedpur, is quashed and set aside against the petitioners named above. 27. In the result, this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is allowed. 28. In view of disposal of this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition, the interim relief granted earlier vide order dated 25.03.2025 is vacated. 29. The Registry is directed to intimate the court concerned forthwith.