( 2026:HHC:36646 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMP(M) No. 1355 of 2026 in LPA No. 502 of 2026 Decided on : 25.08.2026 Rajesh Kumar ...Appellant Versus State of HP and another …Respondents. Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellant: Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr. Pranay Pratap Singh, Additional Advocate General, for the respondents/State. G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral) CMP No. 21562 of 2026 For the reasons given in the application, duly supported by an affidavit of the applicant, delay in re-filing the appeal is condoned. The application stands disposed of. CMP(M) No. 1355 of 202 Keeping in view of the averments made in the application, duly supported by an affidavit of the applicant, delay of 52 days in filing the appeal is condoned. The Application stands disposed of. LPA No. 502 of 2026 1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes -2- The present appeal arises out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No. 6378 of 2025 titled Rajesh Kumar Patil vs. State of H.P. and another, whereby the writ petition was dismissed on the principle of delay and laches. Since the relief had been claimed on the basis of earlier judgments, the applicability whereof had been restricted only to the petitioners therein, in those cases and the relief granted was confined to the grant of higher pay scales, the claim was accordingly rejected by the learned Single Judge. 2. Counsel for the petitioner has taken us through the record and submitted that the petitioner had been making representations since way back on 5th January, 2004 (Annexure P-1), seeking revision of the pay scale attached to the post of Project Officer/Adult Education Officer on the Punjab Pay Scale pattern adopted by the State with effect from 01.01.1986 and 01.01.1996. It is thus submitted that the petitioner had raised a grievance regarding the grant of the benefit of revision of pay scales and thus had prayed for appropriate interference by setting aside the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. 3. A perusal of the judgment shows that the learned Single Judge had primarily adjudicated the matter since the basis of the claim was the decision passed in CWP(T) No. 6082 of 2008 dated 26.08.2011, which had arisen out of proceedings instituted in the year 1999 before the erstwhile Tribunal in O.A. No. 2652 of 1999. Accordingly, it was -3- noticed that the claim of the petitioners was rejected on 28th February, 2025, notwithstanding the representation made by appellant on 23rd January, 2025. It was further noticed that, initially, while granting the relief, the learned Single Judge had restricted the same only to the petitioners therein. Thereafter, Letters Patent Appeal No. 339 of 2012 was filed by the State, which was dismissed on 24.8.2021 wherein the benefit of the judgment was also confined to the parties. 4. The Apex Court eventually had decided the matter on 10th September, 2024 in SLP No. 5565 of 2022, wherein it was noticed that there were only five employees holding the post of Project Officer who were seeking parity, all of whom had superannuated, and the Apex Court, therefore, did not find it appropriate to interfere, while leaving the question of law open. 5. It was accordingly noticed that the judgment had already been implemented on 20th June, 2023 and that the petitioner thereafter had submitted his representation on 23rd January, 2025, seeking the benefit thereof, which came to be rejected. 6. Reliance was placed upon the judgment in Vijenderan Nandran Dera v. State of Odisha and others, (2023) 1 SCC 647, to come to the conclusion that the petitioner was only a fence-sitter and was guilty of delay and laches, and no independent submission was made to establish any enforceable right of the petitioner to claim the higher pay scale. -4- 7. We have gone through the paper book. In such circumstances, we have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the representation had been pending since 5th January, 2004 (Annexure P-1, page 37 of the paper book). The original order whereby the benefit was granted, would go on to show that a certain set of employees namely Project Officers, as such, had initially filed Civil Writ Petition No. 586 of 1984 before this Court seeking the pay scale of Rs. 1200-1700 from the due date, and the same had been allowed. 8. The petitioners in Kurmo Devi v. State of H.P. and another had filed O.A No. 1254 of 1991 claiming the benefit of the judgment passed in the said proceedings, which was thereafter transferred to the erstwhile Tribunal and registered as T.A. No. 662 of 1986 and had been allowed on 04.06.1990. Accordingly, in Kurmo Devi’s case (supra), the claim was treated as a representation to be decided, which came to be rejected on 8th December, 1995. 9. In such circumstances, since in the earlier matter, the Apex Court had held that the petitioners therein were entitled to the pay scale, Kurmo Devi etc. had filed another O.A. in the year 1997, which was numbered as O.A. No. 375 of 1997 and was decided on 28.02.1997. The case of the petitioners in Kurmo Devi’s case was recommended on 02.02.1999 but not implemented. In such circumstances, the learned Single Judge had allowed the writ petition arising out of the transferred proceedings on 26th August, 2011, which eventually came to be -5- considered by the Division Bench in LPA No. 339 of 2012 on 24th August, 2021 and thereafter by the Apex Court on 10th September, 2024. 10. Apparently, the petitioner, who had retired on 31st December, 2008, filed further representations dated 11/18th August, 2023, claiming the benefit of parity, and thereafter submitted another representation on 23rd January, 2025, after dismissal of the SLP on 10th September, 2024. 11. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the finding of the learned Single Judge, to the extent that the petitioner had, for the first time, represented on 23rd January, 2025, may not be correct. However, it is not in dispute that the petitioner was very much in service in the year 1973 as he was appointed as Adult Literacy Supervisor on 12.03.1973. He was promoted on 26.02.1978 and thereafter promoted on ad hoc basis as District Adult Education Officer. His grievance is that he was similarly situated to the Project Officers in the Department and was, therefore, entitled to the benefit of the Punjab State pattern of pay scales with effect from 01.01.1986. 12. However, the petitioner made no effort to file any writ petition or application before the Tribunal for redressal of his grievance and, therefore, he can safely be termed a fence-sitter. It is well settled that merely by filing representations, the period of limitation does not get extended. The petitioner had retired on 31st December, 2008 and took no steps thereafter also whereas similarly situated persons had been -6- fighting for their rights since 1984 and 1999 onwards. He, therefore, cannot claim parity merely on that basis. 13. The Apex Court in Surjeet Singh Sahni v. State of U.P. and others, (2022) 15 SCC 536, has held that mere representation does not extend the period of limitation and that the aggrieved person has to approach the Court expeditiously and within a reasonable time. 14. The further principle of estoppel, which may be tacit or passive acceptance and amounts to reluctant consent to act, would also apply. Such neglect on the part of a party to assert his right and take appropriate steps within a reasonable period would stand in the way of such party in seeking relief at a belated stage. The relevant portion of the judgment in Union of India and others v. N. Murugesan and others, (2022) 2 SCC 25, reads as under:- DELAY, LACHES AND ACQUIESCENCE: 20.The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the Court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the Court. LACHES: 21. The word laches is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving -7- an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22.Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the Court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy to a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the Court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. 23.A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence. ACQUIESCENCE : 24.We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other. 25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that -8- the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis. 15. The principle has been further enunciated in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others (2015) 1 SCC 347, wherein the issue as to whether the judgment is in personam or in rem was also elaborated, and whether a policy matter or a scheme of regularization, etc., would constitute a judgment in rem. The Court, however, held that there is a recognized exception in the form of delay and laches, and fence-sitters cannot be allowed the benefit and relief can be denied, even where there may have been a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The relevant portion reads as under:- “22.1. Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2 However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.2 However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all -9- similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India (supra). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence”. 23. Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled vide orders dated June 22, 1987. The respondents before us did not chalelnge these cancelleation orders till the year 1996, i.e. for a period of 9 years. It means that they had accepted the cancellation of their appointments. They woke up in the year 1996 only after finding that some other persons whose appointment orders were also cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine years had passed. The earlier judgment had granted the relief to the parties before the Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight that these respondents have not joined the service nor working like the employees who succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal. As of today, 27 years have passed after the issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore, not only there was unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to direct the appointment to give them the appointment as of today, i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above. 16. Accordingly, the said principles would also apply in the present case, as the relief in question had been time and again restricted to the original petitioners and even the Apex Court had upheld the judgment only on this basis, keeping in view the fact that the question of law was left open. In such circumstances, apparently, the petitioner, having not pursued his claim after his retirement in 2008 till 2025 and having not taken his first representation to its logical end, cannot now -10- seek to get up and claim the benefit at such a belated stage. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, along with the pending miscellaneous applications, if any. (G.S. Sandhawalia) Chief Justice (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge 25th August, 2026 (Tarun Singh)