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2026 DAILYLAW 21239 (JHR)

Babulal Marandi v. State of Jharkhand

2026-02-17

Anil Kumar Choudhary

body2026
JUDGMENT : ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J. Heard the parties. 2. Though, notice has validly been served upon the opposite party no.2 yet no one turns up on behalf of the opposite party no.2 in spite of repeated calls. 3. This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the prayer to quash and set aside the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Ramgarh P.S. Case No.196 of 2023 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 153-A, 500, 504 & 505 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner. 4. The brief fact of the case is that the informant has submitted a written report to the Officer-in-charge of Ramgarh Police Station alleging therein that the petitioner being the leader of the BJP and the State President of BJP has made a statement that “Soren Family are the born looters since their birth”. It is alleged that the said statement was made against the leaders of the petitioner namely Sibu Soren and Hemant Soren. 5. On the basis of the written report submitted by the informant police registered Ramgarh P.S. Case No.196 of 2023 and took up investigation of the case. 6. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the investigation of the case is still going on and charge sheet has not yet been submitted. 7. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner next relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of S. Khushboo vs. Kanniammal & Another reported in (2010) 5 SCC 600 and submits that in para-37 of that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has reiterated that in respect of the offence of defamation, Section 199 CrPC mandates that the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence only upon receiving a complaint by a person who is aggrieved and this limitation on the power to take cognizance of defamation serves the rational purpose of discouraging the filing of frivolous complaints which would otherwise clog the Magistrate’s Court. 8. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next submits that an FIR that too by a person other than the person aggrieved is not maintainable in respect of the offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. 8. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next submits that an FIR that too by a person other than the person aggrieved is not maintainable in respect of the offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. In this respect, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner also relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India, Ministry of Law & Others reported in (2016) 7 SCC 221 and submits that in para-207 of which the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has in no uncertain manner held that Section 199 of CrPC envisages filing of a complaint in court. In case of criminal defamation neither can any FIR be filed nor can any direction be issued under Section 156(3) of CrPC, hence, it is submitted that FIR in respect of offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code is not maintainable. 9. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Manzar Sayeed Khan vs. State of Maharashtra & Another with allied cases reported in (2007) 5 SCC 1 and submits that in para-16 of which it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that in respect of the offence punishable under Section 153-A of IPC, the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused and in para-17 of that judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has relied upon its own judgement in the case of Ramesh vs. Union of India reported in (1988) 1 SCC 668 which in turn relied upon the judgment in the case of Bhagwati Charan Shukla vs. Provincial Govt. reported in AIR 1947 Nag 1 , wherein the court observed that the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. It is the standard of ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law, ‘the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus’. 10. It is the standard of ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law, ‘the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus’. 10. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Patricia Mukhim vs. State of Meghalaya & Others reported in (2021) 15 SCC 35 and submits that in that case in para-12, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India relied upon its own judgement in the case of Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan vs. Union of India reported in (2014) 11 SCC 477 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India referred to a judgement of the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) vs. William Whatcott reported in 2013 1 SCR 467 , wherein in order to find out whether there is any hate speech, three main prescriptions have been laid down; firstly, the courts must to apply the hate speech prohibition objectively and in so doing, ask whether a reasonable person, aware of the context and circumstances, would view the expression as exposing the protected group to hatred and the second test was to restrict interpretation of the legislative term “hatred” to those extreme manifestations of the emotion described by the words “detestation” and “vilification”. This would filter out and protect speech which might be repugnant and offensive, but does not incite the level of abhorrence, delegitimization and rejection that risks causing discrimination or injury. 11. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that altogether six FIRs have been registered against the petitioner, the details of which has been mentioned in para-5 of this Cr.M.P. It is then submitted that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety, still neither the offence punishable under Section 153-A of the IPC nor the offence punishable under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code is made out. 12. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next submits that the petitioner’s statement has been blown out of proportion by the informant for political motives. It is next submitted that the petitioner has never used the word “family” (Parivaar) in his entire speech. 12. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next submits that the petitioner’s statement has been blown out of proportion by the informant for political motives. It is next submitted that the petitioner has never used the word “family” (Parivaar) in his entire speech. It is next submitted that the present criminal proceeding has been instituted for the purpose of wreaking vengeance, therefore, it is lastly submitted that the prayer as prayed for in this Cr.M.P., be allowed. 13. Learned Spl.P.P. appearing for the State on the other hand vehemently opposes the prayer of the petitioner made in the instant Cr.M.P and submits that if the allegations made in the FIR are considered to be true in their entirety, then each of the offences in respect of which the FIR has been registered is made out and since the investigation of the case is going on at this nascent stage, the entire criminal proceeding ought not to be nipped in the bud. Therefore, it is submitted that this Cr.M.P., being without any merit, be dismissed. 14. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials available in the record, so far as the offences punishable under Sections 500 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, it is pertinent to mention here that Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure debars any court from taking cognizance of the offences punishable under Chapter-XXI of the Indian Penal Code except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence except for the persons aggrieved, some specified category of other person can also file complaints, but the fact remains that the complaint is to be filed. 15. Now it is needless to mention that Section 500 of the IPC falls under Chapter-XXI of the IPC, therefore, registration of the FIR in respect of the offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code is not permissible in law as has categorically been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in para-207 of the Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India, Ministry of Law & Others (supra). 16. 16. So far as the offence punishable under Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the essential ingredients to constitute the said offences are:- (a) the accused must by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities; mens rea is essential ingredients of the offences. 17. Now coming to the facts of the case, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioner that the statement of the petitioner even if assumed to be true that he has stated that “Soren Family are the born looters since their birth” but this itself, in the considered opinion of this Court is not sufficient to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, hence, in the considered opinion of this Court even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety still, the offence punishable under Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code is not made out. 18. So far as the offence punishable under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, it is pertinent to mention here that as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vikram Johar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2019) 14 SCC 207 paragraph no.24 of which reads as under :- “24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the complaint against the appellant. The allegation is that the appellant with two or three other unknown persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant's house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault him and when some neighbours arrived there the appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation taking on its face value does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The above allegation taking on its face value does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that the appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients as laid down in para 13 of the judgment of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] . that the intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. 19. Now coming to the facts of the case, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioner of perpetrating any intentional insult to any person of such a degree that should provoke that person to break public peace or to commit any other offence and in the absence of this essential ingredient, this Court is of the considered view that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety, still the offence punishable under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out. 20. So far as the offence punishable under Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the essential ingredients to constitute the said offence are as under:- (1) The accused made, published or circulated any statement, rumour or report; (2) He did so- i. With intent to cause or which he knew to be likely to cause any officer, soldier, sailor or airman to mutiny or otherwise disregard or fail in his duty; ii. With intent to cause or which he knew to be likely to cause fear or alarm to the public thereby inducing any person to commit an offence against the State or public tranquillity; iii. With intent to incite or which he knew to be likely to incite any class or community to commit any offence against any other class or community. 21. With intent to incite or which he knew to be likely to incite any class or community to commit any offence against any other class or community. 21. Now coming to the facts of the case, in the considered opinion of this Court, the allegation is that “Soren Family are the born looters since their birth” is insufficient to fulfil the essential ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code. 22. In view of the discussions made above, since none of the offences in respect of which the FIR has been registered, is made out against the petitioner; even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety, so this Court is of the considered view that the continuation of this criminal proceeding against the petitioner will amount to abuse of process of law and this is a fit case where the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Ramgarh P.S. Case No.196 of 2023 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 153-A, 500, 504 & 505 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner, be quashed and set aside. 23. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Ramgarh P.S. Case No.196 of 2023 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 153-A, 500, 504 & 505 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner, is quashed and set aside. 24. In the result, this Cr.M.P., stands allowed.