Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
W P (C) 14612/2026
$~103 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI # CNR No. DLHC010474422026 + W.P.(C) 14612/2026 & CM APPL. 68351/2026, CM APPL. 68352/2026
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
.....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Jivesh Kr. Tiwari, CGSC, Ms. Nandini Aggarwal, Ms. Samiksha, Mr. Akshay Chopra, Advs.
versus
MANOJ KUMAR & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Ankur Chhibber, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Yogesh Kumar Mahur with Mr. Harkesh Parashar, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NIVEDITA ANIL SHARMA
JUDGMENT (ORAL) %
30.09.2026
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1. This writ petition assails order dated 16 September 2026 passed by the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal1 in MA 4242/2026 in OA 2647/2026. 2. MA 4242/2026 was filed by the Director, National Fire Service College, Nagpur, seeking vacation of order dated 21 July 2026 passed
1 “the Tribunal” hereinafter Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:07.10.2026 15:54:20 Signature Not Verified
W P (C) 14612/2026
by the Tribunal, whereby the respondent was permitted to participate provisionally in the 93rd Station Officers and Instructor Course, subject to the final outcome of the OA. 3. Mr. Jivesh Kumar Tiwari, learned CGSC for the petitioners, advances two submissions by way of challenge to the said order. 4. The first is that, the OA was not maintainable before the Principal Bench of the Tribunal in view of the following exclusive jurisdiction clause contained in the application form for departmental nominated candidates, who desired to apply for the National Fire Service College:
“7. Any disputes arising and leading to legal proceedings at any stage shall be within the jurisdiction of the courts in Nagpur City only.”
5. In this context, Mr. Tiwari relies on a judgment of the High Court of Gujarat in Yuvrajsingh Dilipsingh Zala v. Union of India2. According to Mr. Tiwari, applying the law laid down in the said decision, the respondent would have necessarily to move the Tribunal at Ahmadabad seeking the relief he seeks before the Principal Bench. 6. The second submission of Mr. Tiwari is that, if the respondent is allowed to provisionally appear, and completes the course, an irreversible situation may emerge at the end, as it would not be possible in equity to reverse the position at that stage. 2 Special Civil Application No. 4528/2016 dated 14 June 2016 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:07.10.2026 15:54:20 Signature Not Verified
W P (C) 14612/2026
7. Neither of these submissions, to our mind, merit acceptance. 8. The second submission is obviously without any substance. 9. The permission granted by the Tribunal is only to provisionally appear in the course. It cannot be said, by any stretch of imagination, that the court cannot permit provisional appearance in a course, where the merits of the case call for such an order. 10.
The appearance would obviously be subject to the outcome of the OA and, in the event that the respondent fails in the OA, the respondent would not be able to gain anything by the fact that he is permitted provisionally to appear in the course. 11. The misgiving of Mr. Tiwari that the grant of permission to the respondent to provisionally appear in the course may result in an irreversible situation later, is, therefore, misconceived. 12. Besides, Courts regularly pass orders permitting candidates to provisionally appear in courses and undertake examinations. This is in
order to ensure that, at a later date, the candidate is not faced with a fait accompli even if he succeeds in the litigation as, by then, it may be too late for the candidate to either appear in the course or the examination, as the case may be. It is for this purpose that orders of provisional appearance are passed, which balance equities on both sides and do not result in any irreversible harm. 13. In so far as territorial jurisdiction is concerned, the reliance, by Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:07.10.2026 15:54:20 Signature Not Verified
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Mr. Tiwari, on Clause 7 of the application form is also clearly misconceived. 14. Clause 7 is a jurisdictional clause which states that disputes arising out of the application form would be urged before courts at Nagpur. 15. In the first place, there is no Bench of the Administrative Tribunal, which could entertain the present dispute. The clause is, therefore, not intended to deal with a dispute of this kind, and is essentially intended at dealing with civil disputes which may arise between the parties. 16. Besides, the clause cannot take away the statutory right of the respondent available under Rule 6(1)(i)3 of the Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, whereunder the OA may be filed by an applicant wherever the applicant is posted for the time being. It is not in dispute that the respondent is presently posted at Delhi. 17. Under Rule 6, therefore, the OA was maintainable at Delhi. The plea of want of territorial jurisdiction is also, therefore, devoid of merit. 3 6. Place of filing application.— (1) An application shall ordinarily be filed by an applicant with the Registrar of the Bench within whose jurisdiction— (i) the applicant is posted for the time being, or (ii) the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen: Provided that with the leave of the Chairman the application may be filed with the Registrar of the Principal Bench and subject to the orders under Section 25, such application shall be heard and disposed of by the Bench which has jurisdiction over the matter. Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:07.10.2026 15:54:20 Signature Not Verified
W P (C) 14612/2026
18. No cause, therefore, arises for us to entertain the present writ petition. It is therefore dismissed in limine.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
NIVEDITA ANIL SHARMA, J.
SEPTEMBER 30, 2026/ dsn
Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:07.10.2026 15:54:20