2026:HHC:35783 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 41 of 2014 Reserved on: 18.8.2026 Date of Decision: 24.08.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Sanjeev Kumar ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr Anshuman Thakur, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 31.08.2013, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 01.04.2011, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-I, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court), were set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:35783 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 184 and 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that the informant Vipin Kumar (PW9) was talking to Balbir Singh (PW6) on 02.03.2004. Madan Kumar (since deceased) also came to the spot on his motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-36-7485 and started talking to them after parking his motorcycle. A truck bearing registration No. HP-36- 1819 came from Dehra at a high speed at about 02.15 p.m. and hit the motorcycle. The motorcycle and Madan Kumar were dragged for some distance. The driver identified himself as Sanjeev Kumar. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused Sanjeev Kumar. The injured was taken to the hospital, where he was declared brought dead. An intimation was given to the police, and an entry (Ex. P11/A) was recorded in the Police Station. HC Chuni Lal (PW14) went to the hospital for verification. He recorded the statement (Ex.PW9/A) of informant Vipin Kumar, which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW12/A) was registered. The photographs of the dead body 3 2026:HHC:35783 (Ex.P10 to Ex.P12) were taken. An application (Ex.PW14/A) was filed for the postmortem examination of the deceased. An inquest on the dead body was conducted, and a report (Ex.PW14/B) was prepared. Dr V.S. Chib (PW15) examined the accused Sanjeev Kumar and found that he had consumed alcohol. He retained the blood sample for chemical examination and issued the MLC (PW15/A). The report of postmortem examination (Ex.R1) of the dead body was obtained, which mentioned that the cause of death was head injury. HC Chuni Lal (PW14) investigated the matter. He went to the spot and took the photographs (Ex.P1 to Ex.P19), whose negatives are Ex.P13 to Ex.P24. He prepared the spot map (Ex.PW14/C). Motorcycle bearing registration No.HP36-7485 was extricated from beneath the truck and was seized vide memo (Ex.PW3/A). The truck was seized along with the documents vide memo (Ex.PW3/B). Arun Sethi (PW5) mechanically examined the vehicles and found that there was no mechanical defect in them that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ex.PW5/A and Ex.PW5/B). The documents of the motorcycle were seized vide memo (Ex.PW2/A). The blood sample of the accused was sent to the FSL, and as per the report of analysis (Ex.PW14/J), 126.5 mg% of alcohol was found in the 4 2026:HHC:35783 blood of the accused. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court, 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304A of IPC and Sections 184 and 185 of Motor Vehicle Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses to prove its case. Rajesh Kumar (PW1) did not support the prosecution case. Onkar Singh (PW2), Raj Kumar (PW3) and Ashish Kumar (PW4) witnessed the recoveries. Arun Sethi (PW5) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles. Balbir Singh (PW6) and Abhilash Singh (PW10) are eyewitnesses. Surinder Singh (PW7) is the owner of the truck, who proved that he had employed the accused as a driver. Dharam Pal (PW8) took the photographs. The informant Vipin Kumar (PW9) witnessed the accident and carried the injured to the hospital. ASI Onkar Chand (PW11) was working 5 2026:HHC:35783 as MHC, with whom the case property was deposited. ASI Hoshiar Singh (PW12) signed the FIR. HHC Narinder Mohan (PW13) carried the blood sample to FSL. HC Chuni Lal (PW14) investigated the matter. Dr V.S. Chib (PW15) examined the accused. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), admitted that he was driving the truck at the time of the accident. However, he subsequently stated that he was not driving the truck, but the owner of the truck was driving it. He admitted that Madan Kumar had sustained injuries in the accident and that he was taken to the hospital. He denied that he had consumed alcohol. He claimed that he had consumed some ayurvedic syrup. A false case was made against him at the instance of the owner, who was driving the truck at the time of the accident. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused admitted in response to Question No.2 that he was driving the truck at the time of the accident. However, he subsequently stated that the owner was driving the truck. The accused was identified by the 6 2026:HHC:35783 owner and Balbir Singh as the driver of the truck. The truck had hit a stationary motorcycle, which showed the negligence of the accused. The accused had consumed alcohol as per the report of analysis. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under:- Conviction Sentence Section 279 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. Section 304A of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹1,500/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Section 184 of MV Act To pay a fine of ₹700/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for fifteen days. Section 185 of MV Act To pay a fine of ₹1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for fifteen days. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7 2026:HHC:35783 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court held that the statements of the prosecution witnesses were not sufficient to prove that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. The truck had come from Dehra, and the witnesses had no opportunity to see the truck. They saw the truck after the accident, and they could not have deposed about the negligence. Learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Therefore, learned Appellate Court accepted the appeal, set aside the judgment and order passed by learned Trial Court and acquitted the accused. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. Balbir Singh (PW6) had specifically stated that the accused was driving the truck. The truck had hit a stationary motorcycle and dragged the motorcycle and its rider for some distance. Surinder Singh (PW7), owner of the truck, also stated that he had employed the accused as the driver. Dr V.S. Chib (PW15) had 8 2026:HHC:35783 examined the accused and found that he had consumed alcohol. The learned Appellate Court erred in holding that the accused was not driving the truck at the time of the accident. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Anshuman Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. The accused had admitted in response to question No.2 that he was driving the truck at the time of the accident. Surinder Singh (PW7) also stated that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. The name of the accused was mentioned in the initial statement made to the police. Balbir Singh identified the accused as the driver of the truck. There was overwhelming evidence to show that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. The truck had hit a stationary motorcycle and dragged it for a distance of 50 feet, which clearly showed the negligence 9 2026:HHC:35783 of the accused. The learned Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused, but the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting him. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 11. Mr Anshuman Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent/ accused, submitted that the statement of Surinder Singh (PW7) that three persons were present in the truck was contradicted by the statement of HC Chuni Lal, who stated that he found after the investigation that only the accused was present in the truck. Therefore, the presence of Surinder Singh (PW7) in the truck was doubtful. The witnesses had identified the accused in the Court. They did not know the name of the accused, and their identification in the Court without a previous Test Identification Parade cannot be relied upon. The learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the Court acquitting the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the appeal be dismissed. 10 2026:HHC:35783 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be 11 2026:HHC:35783 established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a 12 2026:HHC:35783 substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis 13 2026:HHC:35783 of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Learned Appellate Court held in para 28 of the judgment that none of the prosecution witnesses had stated specifically that on the date of accident the offending vehicle was being driven by the accused and the identity of the accused has not been established by the prosecution. This conclusion is perverse. 16. Surinder Singh (PW7) stated that he is the owner of the truck bearing registration No. HP-36-1819 and he had employed the accused as the driver of the truck in the year 2004. The accused had caused an accident while going towards Dhalyara by hitting a motorcycle. He stated in his cross- examination that he had unloaded the bricks at Dehra and he was present at the time of unloading the bricks. Three persons were sitting in the truck. He denied that he was driving the truck. He 14 2026:HHC:35783 admitted that two persons were also sitting beside him, one of whom was Harbans, and the name of the other person was not known to him. He admitted that he had not disclosed the names of other persons to the police officials and the police had not recorded their statements. 17. HC Chuni Lal (PW14) stated in his cross-examination that it was not found by him after the investigation that no other person was travelling in the truck. It was submitted that the statement of HC Chuni Lal (PW14) made the statement of the owner highly doubtful. This submission is only stated to be rejected. The result of the investigation is inadmissible in evidence, and the same cannot be used to discard the statement of an eyewitness. In Kaptan Singh and Others Versus State of M.P. and Another (1997) 6 SCC 185, the trial Court had based its judgment on the result of an investigation conducted by an Inspector of CID. It was held that the court cannot base its judgment on the result of the investigation. It was observed:- “5….From the judgment of the trial Court, we find that one of the grounds that largely weighed with it for acquitting the appellants was that an Inspector of CID who had taken up the investigation of the case and was examined by the defence (D.W. 3) testified that during his investigation he found that the story as made out by the prosecution was 15 2026:HHC:35783 not true and on the contrary, the plea of the accused (appellants) that in the night of the incident, a dacoity with murder took place in the house of Baijnath by unknown criminals and the appellants were implicated falsely was true. It is trite that the result of investigation can never be legal evidence; and this Court in Vijender v. State of Delhi, (1997) 3 JT (SC) 131, made the following comments while dealing with this issue : "The reliance of the trial Judge on the result of the investigation to base his findings is again patently wrong. If the observation of the trial Judge in this regard is taken to its logical conclusion, it would mean that a finding of guilt can be recorded against an accused without a trial, relying solely upon the police report submitted under Section 173, Cr.P.C., which is the outcome of an investigation. The result of investigation under Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code is a conclusion that an Investigating Officer draws on the basis of materials collected during the investigation and such conclusion can only form the basis of a competent Court to take cognizance thereupon under Section 190(1)(b), Cr.P.C. and to proceed with the case for trial, where the materials collected during the investigation are to be translated into legal evidence. The trial Court is then required to base its conclusion solely on the evidence adduced during the trial, and it cannot rely on the investigation or the result thereof. Since this is an elementary principle of criminal law, we need not dilate on this point any further." The High Court was, therefore, fully justified in commenting upon the trial Court's impermissible and undue reliance on the evidence of DW 3 and, for that matter, the result of his investigation. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that, ignoring the report of investigation submitted by the Inspector, the Magistrate took cognisance of the offences alleged against the appellants and committed the case to the Court of Session.” 16 2026:HHC:35783 18. Similar is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 Cr.L.J. 2986, wherein it was held:- “27. Section 173(2) of the CrPC calls upon the investigating officer to file his final report before the court. It being a report is nothing but a piece of evidence. It forms a mere opinion of the investigating officer on the materials collected by him. He takes note of the offence and thereafter conducts an investigation to identify the offender, the truth of which can only be decided by the court." 19. Therefore, the result of the investigation is inadmissible in evidence, and the same cannot be used to discard the statement of an eyewitness. 20. The accused also admitted in response to Question No.2 of his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.PC that he was driving the truck bearing registration No. HP-36-1819 on 02.03.2004 at around 02.15 P.M. He denied this fact subsequently and claimed that the owner was driving the vehicle. However, there is no proof of this fact. Surinder Singh (PW7) categorically denied that he was driving the truck at the time of the accident. 21. Balbir Singh (PW6) stated that he was talking to Vipin Kumar. Madan Lal also came to the spot on his motorcycle bearing registration No.HP-36-7485 and he also started talking 17 2026:HHC:35783 to them. A truck came from Dehra and hit the stationary motorcycle. The truck dragged the motorcycle and Madan Lal. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the truck driver, who had hit the motorcycle on a kucha portion of the road. He could not find the name of the driver; however, the driver was present in the Court. He stated in his cross- examination that he had seen the truck hitting the motorcycle, and he had not mentioned the name of the driver to the police. 22. It was admitted that his testimony shows that he did not know the name of the accused and his identification in the Court for the first time without Test Identification Parade is valueless. This submission cannot be accepted. It is nobody's case that the driver had sped away from the spot. Therefore, this witness had ample opportunity to see the driver at the place of the accident. An accident is a traumatic event, and a person will not forget the details surrounding it; hence, his identification in the Court could not have been disbelieved. 23. It was submitted that he was contradicted with reference to the previous statements and his credibility is suspect. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by 18 2026:HHC:35783 the Bombay High Court about a century ago in Emperor vs. Vithu Balu Kharat (1924) 26 Bom. L.R. 965, that the previous statement has to be proved before it can be used. It was observed: “The words "if duly proved" in my opinion, clearly show that the record of the statement cannot be admitted in evidence straightaway but that the officer before whom the statement was made should ordinarily be examined as to any alleged statement or omitted statement that is relied upon by the accused for the purpose of contradicting the witness; and the provisions of Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act apply to this case, as well as to any other similar ease. Of course, I do not mean to say that, if the particular police officer who recorded the statement is not available, other means of proving the statement may not be availed of, e.g., evidence that the statement is in the handwriting of that particular officer.” 24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muthu Naicker and Others, etc. Versus State of T.N. (1978) 4 SCC 385, that if the witness affirms the previous statement, no proof is necessary, but if the witness denies or says that he did not remember the previous statement, the investigating officer should be asked about the same. It was observed: - “52. This is the most objectionable manner of using the police statement, and we must record our emphatic disapproval of the same. The question should have been framed in a manner to point out that, from amongst those accused mentioned in examination-in-chief, there were some whose names were not mentioned in the police statement and if the witness affirms this, no further proof 19 2026:HHC:35783 is necessary and if the witness denies or says that she does not remember, the investigating officer should have been questioned about it.” 25. The Gauhati High Court held in Md. Badaruddin Ahmed v. State of Assam, 1989 SCC OnLine Gau 35: 1989 Cri LJ 1876, that if the witness denies having made the statement, the portion marked by the defence should be put to the investigating officer and his version should be elicited regarding the same. It was observed at page 1880: - “13. The learned defence counsel has drawn our attention to the above statement of the Investigating Officer and submits that P.W. 4 never made his above statement before the police and that the same, being his improved version, cannot be relied upon. With the utmost respect to the learned defence counsel, we are unable to accept his above contention. Because, unless the particular matter or point in the previous statement sought to be contradicted is placed before the witness for explanation, the previous statement cannot be used in evidence. In other words, drawing the attention of the witness to his previous statement sought to be contradicted and giving all opportunities to him for explanation are compulsory. If any authority is to be cited on this point, we may conveniently refer to the case of Pangi Jogi Naik v. State reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 205: (1965 (2) Cri LJ 661). Further, in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1959 SC 1012: (1959 Cri LJ 1231), it was also held that the statement not reduced to writing cannot be contradicted and, therefore, in order to show that the statement sought to be contradicted was recorded by the police, it should be marked and exhibited. However, in the case at hand, there is nothing on the record to show that the previous statement of the witness was placed before 20 2026:HHC:35783 him and that the witness was given the chance for explanation. Again, his previous statement was not marked and exhibited. Therefore, his previous statement before the police cannot be used. Hence, his evidence that when he turned back, he saw the accused Badaruddin lowering the gun from his chest is to be taken as his correct version. 14. The learned defence counsel has attempted to persuade us not to rely on the evidence of this witness on the ground that his evidence before the trial Court is contradicted by his previous statement made before the police. However, in view of the decisions made in the said cases we have been persuaded irresistibly to hold that the correct procedure to be followed which would be in conformity with S. 145 of the Evidence Act to contradict the evidence given by the prosecution witness at the trial with a statement made by him before the police during the investigation will be to draw the attention of the witness to that part of the contradictory statement which he made before the police, and questioned him whether he did, in fact, make that statement. If the witness admits having made the particular statement to the police, that admission will go into evidence and will be recorded as part of the evidence of the witness and can be relied on by the accused as establishing the contradiction. However, if, on the other hand, the witness denies to have made such a statement before the police, the particular portions of the statement recorded should be provisionally marked for identification as B-1 to B-1, B-2 to B-2 etc. (any identification mark) and when the investigating officer who had actually recorded the statements in question comes into the witness box, he should be questioned as to whether these particular statements had been made to him during the investigation by the particular witness, and obviously after refreshing his memory from the case diary the investigating officer would make his answer in the affirmative. The answer of the Investigating Officer would prove the statements B-1 to B-1, B-2 to B-2, which 21 2026:HHC:35783 are then exhibited as Ext. D. 1, Ext. D. 2, etc. (exhibition mark) in the case and will go into evidence, and may, thereafter, be relied on by the accused as contradictions. In the case in hand, as was discussed in above, the above procedure was not followed while cross-examining the witness on his previous statements, and, therefore, we have no alternative but to accept the statement given by this witness before the trial Court that he saw the accused Badaruddin lowering the gun from his chest to be his correct version.” 26. Andhra Pradesh High Court held in Shaik Subhani v. State of A.P., 1999 SCC OnLine AP 413: (1999) 5 ALD 284: 2000 Cri LJ 321: (1999) 2 ALT (Cri) 208 that putting a suggestion to the witness and the witness denying the same does not amount to putting the contradiction to the witness. The attention of the witness has to be drawn to the previous statement, and if he denies the same, the same is to be proved by the investigating officer. It was observed at page 290: - “24… As far as the contradictions put by the defence are concerned, we would like to say that the defence Counsel did not put the contradictions in the manner in which they ought to have been put. By putting suggestions to the witness and the witness denying the same will not amount to putting a contradiction to the witness. The contradiction has to be put to the witness as contemplated under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. If a contradiction is put to the witness and it is denied by him, then his attention has to be drawn to the statement made by such witness before the Police or any other previous statement and he must be given a reasonable opportunity to explain as to why such contradiction appears and he may give any 22 2026:HHC:35783 answer if the statement made by him is shown to him and if he confronted with such a statement and thereafter the said contradiction must be proved through the Investigation Officer. Then, it only amounts to putting the contradiction to the witness and getting it proved through the Investigation Officer.” 27. The Calcutta High Court took a similar view in Anjan Ganguly v. State of West Bengal, 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 22948: (2013) 2 Cal LJ 144 and held at page 151: - “21. It was held in State of Karnataka v. Bhaskar Kushali Kothakar, reported as (2004) 7 SCC 487, that if any statement of the witness is contrary to the previous statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. or suffers from omission of certain material particulars, then the previous statement can be proved by examining the Investigating Officer who had recorded the same. Thus, there is no doubt that to prove the previous statement, the Investigating Officer ought to be examined, and the statement of the witness recorded by him can only be proved by him, and he has to depose to the extent that he had correctly recorded the statement, without adding or omitting, as to what was stated by the witness. 23. Proviso to Section 162(1), Cr.P.C. states in clear terms that the statement of the witness ought to be duly proved. The words, if duly proved, cast a duty upon the accused who wants to highlight the contradictions by confronting the witness to prove the previous statement of a witness through the police officer who has recorded the same in the ordinary way. If the witness in the cross-examination admits contradictions, then there is no need to prove the statement. But if the witness denies a contradiction and the police officer who had recorded the statement is called by the prosecution, the previous statement of the witness on this point may be proved by the police officer. In case the prosecution fails to call the police officer in a given 23 2026:HHC:35783 situation, the Court can call this witness, or the accused can call the police officer to give evidence in defence. There is no doubt that unless the statement as per proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 162, Cr.P.C. is duly proved, the contradiction in terms of Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be taken into consideration by the Court. 24. To elaborate on this further, it will be necessary to reproduce Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. “S. 145. A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” 25. Therefore, it is appropriate that before the previous statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. is proved, the attention of the witness must be drawn to the portion in the statement recorded by the Investigating Officer to bring to light the contradiction, a process called confrontation. 26. Let us first understand what the proper procedure is. A witness may have stated in the statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. that ‘X murdered Y’. In court, the witness states ‘Z murdered Y’. This is a contradiction. Defence Counsel or the Court, and even the prosecution if the witness is declared hostile, having resiled from a previous statement, is to be confronted to bring the contradiction on record. The attention of the witness must be drawn to the previous statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C., where it was stated that ‘X murdered Y’. Since Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act uses the word being proved, therefore, in the course of examination of the witness, a previous statement or a statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. will not be exhibited but shall be assigned a mark, and the portion contradicted will be 24 2026:HHC:35783 specified. The trial court, in the event of contradiction, has to record as under. 27. The attention of the witness has been drawn to portions A to A of the statement marked as 1, and confronted with the portion where it is recorded that ‘X murdered Y’. In this manner, by way of confrontation, contradiction is brought on record. Later, when the Investigating Officer is examined, the prosecution or defence may prove the statement after the Investigating Officer testifies that the statement assigned the mark was correctly recorded by him; at that stage, the statement will be exhibited by the Court. Then the contradiction will be proved by the Investigating Officer by stating that the witness had informed or told him that ‘X murdered Y’ and he had correctly recorded this fact. 28. Now, a reference to the explanation to Section 162, Cr.P.C., which says that an omission to state a fact or circumstance may amount to contradiction. Say, for instance, if a witness omits to state in Court that ‘X murdered Y’, what he had stated in a statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C., will be material? Contradiction, for the Public Prosecutor, as the witness has resiled from the previous statement, or if he has been sent for trial for the charge of murder, omission to state ‘X murdered Y’ will be a material omission, and amount to contradiction so far as the defence of ‘W is concerned. At that stage, the attention of the witness will also be drawn to a significant portion of the statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., which the witness had omitted to state, and note shall be given that the attention of the witness was drawn to the portion A to A wherein it is recorded that ‘X murdered Y’. In this way, the omission is brought on record. The rest of the procedure stated earlier, qua confrontation, shall be followed to prove the statement of the witness and the fact stated by the witness. 29. Therefore, to prove the statement for the purpose of contradiction, it is necessary that the contradiction or omission must be brought to the notice of the witness. His 25 2026:HHC:35783 or her attention must be drawn to the portion of the previous statement (in the present case, statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C)” 28. A similar view was taken in Alauddin v. State of Assam, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 760, wherein it was observed: “7. When the two statements cannot stand together, they become contradictory statements. When a witness makes a statement in his evidence before the Court which is inconsistent with what he has stated in his statement recorded by the Police, there is a contradiction. When a prosecution witness whose statement under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC has been recorded states factual aspects before the Court which he has not stated in his prior statement recorded under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC, it is said that there is an omission. There will be an omission if the witness has omitted to state a fact in his statement recorded by the Police, which he states before the Court in his evidence. The explanation to Section 162 CrPC indicates that an omission may amount to a contradiction when it is significant and relevant. Thus, every omission is not a contradiction. It becomes a contradiction provided it satisfies the test laid down in the explanation under Section 162. Therefore, when an omission becomes a contradiction, the procedure provided in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 162 must be followed for contradicting witnesses in the cross- examination. 8. As stated in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 162, the witness has to be contradicted in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Section 145 reads thus: “145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.—A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being 26 2026:HHC:35783 proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” The Section operates in two parts. The first part provides that a witness can be cross-examined as to his previous statements made in writing without such writing being shown to him. Thus, for example, a witness can be cross-examined by asking whether his prior statement exists. The second part is regarding contradicting a witness. While confronting the witness with his prior statement to prove contradictions, the witness must be shown his prior statement. If there is a contradiction between the statement made by the witness before the Court and what is recorded in the statement recorded by the police, the witness's attention must be drawn to specific parts of his prior statement, which are to be used to contradict him. Section 145 provides that the relevant part can be put to the witness without the writing being proved. However, the previous statement used to contradict witnesses must be proved subsequently. Only if the contradictory part of his previous statement is proved can the contradictions be said to be proved. The usual practice is to mark the portion or part shown to the witness of his prior statement produced on record. Marking is done differently in different States. In some States, practice is to mark the beginning of the portion shown to the witness with an alphabet and the end by marking with the same alphabet. While recording the cross-examination, the Trial Court must record that a particular portion marked, for example, as AA was shown to the witness. Which part of the prior statement is shown to the witness for contradicting him has to be recorded in the cross-examination. If the witness admits to having made such a prior statement, that portion can be treated as proved. If the witness does not admit the portion of his prior statement with which he is confronted, it can be proved through the Investigating Officer by asking 27 2026:HHC:35783 whether the witness made a statement that was shown to the witness. Therefore, if the witness is intended to be confronted with his prior statement reduced to writing, that particular part of the statement, even before it is proved, must be specifically shown to the witness. After that, the part of the prior statement used to contradict the witness has to be proved. As indicated earlier, it can be treated as proved if the witness admits to having made such a statement, or it can be proved in the cross- examination of the concerned police officer. The object of this requirement in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, of confronting the witness by showing him the relevant part of his prior statement, is to give the witness a chance to explain the contradiction. Therefore, this is a rule of fairness. 9. If a former statement of the witness is inconsistent with any part of his evidence given before the Court, it can be used to impeach the credit of the witness in accordance with clause (3) of Section 155 of the Evidence Act, which reads thus: “155. Impeaching credit of the witness. — The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him— (1) ….…………………………………… (2) ……………………………………… (3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted.” It must be noted here that every contradiction or omission is not a ground to discredit the witness or to disbelieve his/her testimony. A minor or trifle omission or contradiction brought on record is not sufficient to disbelieve the witness's version. Only when there is a material contradiction or omission can the Court disbelieve the witness's version either fully or partially. What is a material contradiction or omission, depending 28 2026:HHC:35783 upon the facts of each case? Whether an omission is a contradiction also depends on the facts of each case. 10. We are tempted to quote what is held in a landmark decision of this Court in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875. Paragraph 13 of the said decision reads thus: “13. The learned counsel's first argument is based upon the words “in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872” found in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act, it is said, empowers the accused to put all relevant questions to a witness before his attention is called to those parts of the writing with a view to contradicting him. In support of this contention, reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Shyam Singh v. State of Punjab [(1952) 1 SCC 514: 1952 SCR 812]. Bose, J. describes the procedure to be followed to contradict a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, thus at p. 819: Resort to Section 145 would only be necessary if the witness denies that he made the former statement. In that event, it would be necessary to prove that he did, and if the former statement was reduced to writing, then Section 145 requires that his attention must be drawn to these parts which are to be used for contradiction. But that position does not arise when the witness admits the former statement. In such a case, all that is necessary is to look to the former statement of which no further proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made.” It is unnecessary to refer to other cases wherein a similar procedure is suggested for putting questions under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, for the said decision of this Court and similar decisions were not considering the procedure in a case where the statement in writing was intended to be used for 29 2026:HHC:35783 contradiction under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is in two parts: the first part enables the accused to cross-examine a witness as to a previous statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing without such writing being shown to him; the second part deals with a situation where the cross-examination assumes the shape of contradiction: in other words, both parts deal with cross-examination; the first part with cross-examination other than by way of contradiction, and the second with cross-examination by way of contradiction only. The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The proviso to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only enables the accused to make use of such a statement to contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It would be doing violence to the language of the proviso if the said statement be allowed to be used for the purpose of cross- examining a witness within the meaning of the first part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Nor are we impressed by the argument that it would not be possible to invoke the second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act without putting relevant questions under the first part thereof. The difficulty is more imaginary than real. The second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act clearly indicates the simple procedure to be followed. To illustrate: A says in the witness box that B stabbed C; before the police, he had stated that D stabbed C. His attention can be drawn to that part of the statement made before the police, which contradicts his statement in the witness box. If he admits his previous statement, no further proof is necessary; if he does not admit it, the practice generally followed is to admit it subject to proof by the police officer. On the other hand, the procedure suggested by the learned counsel may be illustrated thus: If the witness is asked, “Did you say before the police officer that you saw a gas light?” and he answers “yes”, then the statement 30 2026:HHC:35783 which does not contain such recital is put to him as a contradiction. This procedure involves two fallacies: one is that it enables the accused to elicit, by a process of cross-examination, what the witness stated before the police officer. If a police officer did not make a record of a witness's statement, his entire statement could not be used for any purpose, whereas if a police officer recorded a few sentences, by this process of cross-examination, the witness's oral statement could be brought on record. This procedure, therefore, contravenes the express provision of Section 162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that, by the illustration given by the learned counsel for the appellants, there is no self-contradiction of the primary statement made in the witness box, for the witness has not yet made on the stand any assertion at all which can serve as the basis. The contradiction, under the section, should be between what a witness asserted in the witness box and what he stated before the police officer, and not between what he said he had stated before the police officer and what he actually said before him. In such a case, the question could not be put at all: only questions to contradict can be put, and the question here posed does not contradict; it leads to an answer which is contradicted by the police statement. This argument of the learned counsel based upon Section 145 of the Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in considering the express provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (emphasis added) This decision is a locus classicus, which will continue to guide our Trial Courts. In the facts of the case, the learned Trial Judge has not marked those parts of the witnesses' prior statements based on which they were sought to be contradicted in the cross-examination.” 29. The previous statement was not proved by HC Chuni Lal (PW14), and the contradiction has not been proved, and no 31 2026:HHC:35783 advantage can be derived from putting the previous statement to the witness. 30. Abhilash Singh (PW10) stated that he had gone to a shop to make a call. Madan and Vipin Kumar were talking to each other. A truck hit the motorcycle and dragged the motorcycle and Madan Kumar for a distance of about 50 ft. The truck was bearing registration No.HP-36-1819. The name of the driver was found to be Sanjeev Kumar, who was present as an accused in the Court. He stated in his cross-examination that he was talking to someone inside the STD Booth at the time of the accident. Three persons were sitting inside the truck. He denied that the accident had occurred because of the brake failure. He admitted that the accident occurred ahead of the curve, and the road goes uphill after the place of the accident. He admitted that he is the brother of the deceased. He denied that he was not present at the spot and that he was making a false statement. 31. This witness has also identified the accused as the driver of the truck. It was submitted that the testimony of this witness is not believable because he was present inside the STD Booth at the time of the accident and he could not have witnessed 32 2026:HHC:35783 the accident. This submission will not help the accused. This witness has identified the accused as the driver of the vehicle. He could have noticed that the motorcycle was parked and the truck had hit a stationary motorcycle. Therefore, his testimony cannot be discarded because he was inside the STD Booth at the time of the accident. 32. It was submitted that he is the brother of the deceased and his testimony cannot be accepted. This submission is only stated to be rejected. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laltu Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2019) 15 SCC 344that a related witness is not an interested witness, and his testimony cannot be rejected on the ground of interestedness. It was observed: “12. As regards the contention that the eyewitnesses are close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that a related witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim. This Court has elucidated the difference between “interested” and “related” witnesses in a plethora of cases, stating that a witness may be called interested only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would mean that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in seeing the accused punished due to prior enmity or other reasons, and thus has a motive to falsely implicate the accused (for instance, see State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752: 1981 SCC (Cri) 593; Amit v. State of U.P., (2012) 4 SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 590 and Gangabhavani v. 33 2026:HHC:35783 Rayapati Venkat Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 298 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 182). 13. Recently, this difference was reiterated in Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793, in the following terms, by referring to the three-Judge Bench decision in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752: 1981 SCC (Cri) 593 : (Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793), SCC p. 555, para 14) “14. “Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A witness may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be “interested”.… 14. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose presence on the scene of the offence would be natural. The evidence of such a witness cannot automatically be discarded by labelling the witness as interested. Indeed, one of the earliest statements with respect to interested witnesses in criminal cases was made by this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145: AIR 1953 SC 364: 1953 Cri LJ 1465, wherein this Court observed: (AIR p. 366, para 26) “26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted, and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person.” 15. In the case of a related witness, the Court may not treat his or her testimony as inherently tainted and needs to ensure only that the evidence is inherently reliable, probable, cogent and consistent. We may refer to the 34 2026:HHC:35783 observations of this Court in Jayabalan v. State (UT of Pondicherry), (2010) 1 SCC 199; (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 966: (SCC p. 213, para 23) “23. We are of the considered view that in cases where the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court, while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses, must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses, but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.” 33. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thoti Manohar vs State of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 7 SCC 723 that the court cannot discard the testimony of a witness on the ground of a relationship. It was observed: “31. In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision of this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 364, wherein Vivian Bose, J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows: - “We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased, we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this 35 2026:HHC:35783 Court endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan (1952) SCR 377 at p. 390 = (AIR 1952 SC 54 at page 59).” 32. In the said case, it was further observed that: “A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted, and that usually means unless the witness has a cause, such as an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true that when feelings run high, and there is a personal cause for enmity, there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but the foundation must be laid for such criticism, and the mere fact of relationship, far from being a foundation, is often a sure guarantee of truth.” 33. In Masalti v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 202, it has been ruled that normally close relatives of the deceased would not be considered to be interested witnesses who would also mention the names of the other persons as responsible for causing injuries to the deceased. 34. In Hari Obula Reddi and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 82, a three-judge Bench has held that evidence of interested witnesses is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even partisanship by itself is not a valid ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony. It can be laid down as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of interested witnesses should be subjected to scrutiny and accepted with caution. If, on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient, in the 36 2026:HHC:35783 circumstances of the particular case, to base a conviction thereon. 35. In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar (1996) 1 SCC 614, it has been opined that a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness, for the term ‘interested’ postulates that the witness must have some interest in having the accused, somehow or other, convicted for some animus or some other reason. 36. In Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2006 SC 3010, while dealing with the liability of interested witnesses who are relatives, a two- judge Bench observed that: “It is well settled that evidence of a witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that he is either partisan or interested or close relative to the deceased if it is otherwise found to be trustworthy and credible.” The said evidence only requires scrutiny with more care and caution, so that neither the guilty escapes nor the innocent is wrongly convicted. If, on such scrutiny, the evidence is found to be reliable and probable, then it can be acted upon. “If it is found to be improbable or suspicious, it ought to be rejected. Where the witness has a motive to falsely implicate the accused, his testimony should have corroboration in regard to material particulars before it is accepted.” 34. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Yadav vs. State of Bihar 2022 Cr.L.J. 2986 (SC) as under: “28. A related witness cannot be termed as an interested witness per se. One has to see the place of occurrence along with other circumstances. A related witness can also be a natural witness. If an offence is committed within the precincts of the deceased, the presence of his family members 37 2026:HHC:35783 cannot be ruled out, as they assume the position of natural witnesses. When their evidence is clear, cogent and withstands the rigour of cross- examination, it becomes sterling, not requiring further corroboration. A related witness would become an interested witness only when he is desirous of implicating the accused in rendering a conviction, on purpose. 29. When the court is convinced of the quality of the evidence produced, notwithstanding the classification as quoted above, it becomes the best evidence. Such testimony being natural, adding to the degree of probability, the court has to rely upon it in proving a fact. The aforesaid position of law has been well laid down in Bhaskarrao v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 591: “32. Coming back to the appreciation of the evidence at hand, at the outset, our attention is drawn to the fact that the witnesses were interrelated, and this Court should be cautious in accepting their statements. It would be beneficial to recapitulate the law concerning the appreciation of evidence of a related witness. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145: AIR 1953 SC 364: 1953 Cri LJ 1465, Vivian Bose, J., for the Bench, observed the law as under (AIR p. 366, para 26) “26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted, and that usually means unless the witness has a cause, such as an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true when feelings run high, and there is a 38 2026:HHC:35783 personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but the foundation must be laid for such a criticism, and the mere fact of relationship, far from being a foundation, is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.” 33. In Masalti v. State of U.P., (1964) 8 SCR 133: AIR 1965 SC 202: (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226, a five-judge Bench of this Court has categorically observed as under (AIR pp. 209-210, para 14) “14. … There is no doubt that when a criminal court has to appreciate evidence given by witnesses who are partisan or interested, it has to be very careful in weighing such evidence. Whether or not there are discrepancies in the evidence, whether or not the evidence strikes the court as genuine, whether or not the story disclosed by the evidence is probable, are all matters that must be taken into account. But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. Often enough, where factions prevail in villages and murders are committed as a result of enmity between such factions, criminal courts have to deal with 39 2026:HHC:35783 evidence of a partisan type. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to the failure of justice. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. The judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence, but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.” 34. In Darya Singh v. State of Punjab [(1964) 3 SCR 397: AIR 1965 SC 328: (1965) 1 Cri LJ 350], this Court held that evidence of an eyewitness who is a near relative of the victim should be closely scrutinised, but no corroboration is necessary for acceptance of his evidence. In Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana [(2005) 9 SCC 195: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1213: 2005 Cri LJ 2199], this Court observed that: (SCC p. 227, para 6) “6. There is no proposition in law that relatives are to be treated as untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, reason has to be shown when a plea of partiality is raised to show that the witnesses had reason to shield the actual culprit and falsely implicate the accused.” 35. The last case we need to concern ourselves with is Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 14 SCC 150: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 773, wherein this Court, after observing previous precedents, has summarised the law in the following manner: (SCC p. 164, para 38) “38. … It is clear that a close relative cannot be characterised as an “interested” witness. He is a “natural” witness. His evidence, however, must be scrutinised carefully. If, on such scrutiny, his evidence is found to be intrinsically reliable, inherently probable and wholly trustworthy, a conviction can be based 40 2026:HHC:35783 on the “sole” testimony of such a witness. A close relationship of the witness with the deceased or the victim is no ground to reject his evidence. On the contrary, a close relative of the deceased would normally be most reluctant to spare the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent one.” 36. From the study of the aforesaid precedents of this Court, we may note that whoever has been a witness before the court of law, having a strong interest in the result, if allowed to be weighed in the same scales with those who do not have any interest in the result, would be to open the doors of the court for perverted truth. This sound rule, which remains the bulwark of this system and which determines the value of evidence derived from such sources, needs to be cautiously and carefully observed and enforced. There is no dispute about the fact that the interest of the witness must affect his testimony is a universal truth. Moreover, under the influence of bias, a man may not be in a position to judge correctly, even if they earnestly desires to do so. Similarly, he may not be in a position to provide evidence in an impartial manner when it involves his interests. Under such influences, man will, even though not consciously, suppress some facts, soften or modify others, and provide favourable colour. These are the most controlling considerations in respect to the credibility of human testimony, and should never be overlooked in applying the rules of evidence and determining its weight in the scale of truth under the facts and circumstances of each case.” 30. Once again, we reiterate with a word of caution that the trial court is the best court to decide on the aforesaid aspect, as no mathematical calculation or straightjacket formula can be made on the assessment of a witness, as the journey towards the truth can be seen better through 41 2026:HHC:35783 the eyes of the trial judge. In fact, this is the real objective behind the enactment itself, which extends the maximum discretion to the court.” 35. Similar is the judgment in M Nageswara Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2022 (5) SCC 791, wherein it was observed: “10. Having gone through the deposition of the relevant witnesses -eye-witnesses/injured eye-witnesses, we are of the opinion that there are no major/material contradictions in the deposition of the eye-witnesses and injured eye-witnesses. All are consistent insofar as accused Nos. 1 to 3 are concerned. As observed hereinabove, PW6 has identified Accused Nos. 1 to 3. The High Court has observed that PW1, PW3 & PW5 were planted witnesses merely on the ground that they were all interested witnesses, being relatives of the deceased. Merely because the witnesses were the relatives of the deceased, their evidence cannot be discarded solely on the aforesaid ground. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has materially erred in discarding the deposition/evidence of PW1, PW3, PW5 & PW6 and even PW7.” 36. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Jabbar Ali v. State of Assam, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1440, that relationship is no reason to discard the witnesses’ testimonies. The Court is required to see their testimonies with due care and caution. It was observed: 55. It is noted that great weight has been attached to the testimonies of the witnesses in the instant case. Having regard to the aforesaid fact, this Court has examined the credibility of the witnesses to rule out any tainted evidence given in the court of Law. It was contended by learned 42 2026:HHC:35783 counsel for the appellant that the prosecution failed to examine any independent witnesses in the present case and that the witnesses were related to each other. This Court, in a number of cases, has had the opportunity to consider the said aspect of related/interested/partisan witnesses and the credibility of such witnesses. This Court is conscious of the well-settled principle that just because the witnesses are related/interested/partisan witnesses, their testimonies cannot be disregarded; however, it is also true that when the witnesses are related/interested, their testimonies have to be scrutinised with greater care and circumspection. In the case of Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381, this Court held that the testimony of such related witnesses should be analysed with caution for its credibility. 56. In Raju alias Balachandran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 12 SCC 701, this Court observed: “29. The sum and substance is that the evidence of a related or interested witness should be meticulously and carefully examined. In a case where the related and interested witness may have some enmity with the assailant, the bar would need to be raised, and the evidence of the witness would have to be examined by applying a standard of discerning scrutiny. However, this is only a rule of prudence and not one of law, as held in Dalip Singh [AIR 1953 SC 364] and pithily reiterated in Sarwan Singh [(1976) 4 SCC 369] in the following words: (Sarwan Singh case [(1976) 4 SCC 369, p. 376, para 10) “10. … The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as such, but the courts require, as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested witnesses has a ring of truth, such evidence 43 2026:HHC:35783 could be relied upon even without corroboration.” 57. Further delving into the same issue, it is noted that in the case of Ganapathi v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2018) 5 SCC 549, this Court held that in several cases when only family members are present at the time of the incident and the case of the prosecution is based only on their evidence, Courts have to be cautious and meticulously evaluate the evidence in the process of trial. 37. This position was reiterated in Baban Shankar Daphal v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 137, wherein it was observed: “27. One of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the eyewitnesses to the incident were all closely related to the deceased, and for prudence, the prosecution ought to have examined some other independent eyewitnesses as well who were present at the time of the unfortunate incident. This was also the view taken by the Trial Court, but the High Court has correctly rejected such an approach and held that merely because there were some more independent witnesses, who had also reached the place of the incident, the evidence of the relatives cannot be disbelieved. The law nowhere states that the evidence of the interested witness should be discarded altogether. The law only warrants that their evidence should be scrutinised with care and caution. It has been held by this Court in the catena of judgments that merely because a witness is a relative, their testimony cannot be discarded on that ground alone. 28. In criminal cases, the credibility of witnesses, particularly those who are close relatives of the victim, is often scrutinised. However, being a relative does not automatically render a witness “interested” or biased. The term “interested” refers to witnesses who have a personal stake in the outcome, such as a desire for revenge or to 44 2026:HHC:35783 falsely implicate the accused due to enmity or personal gain. A “related” witness, on the other hand, is someone who may be naturally present at the scene of the crime, and their testimony should not be dismissed simply because of their relationship to the victim. Courts must assess the reliability, consistency, and coherence of their statements rather than labelling them as untrustworthy. 29. The distinction between “interested” and “related” witnesses has been clarified in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145: AIR 1953 SC 364: 1953 Cri LJ 1465, where this Court emphasised that a close relative is usually the last person to falsely implicate an innocent person. Therefore, in evaluating the evidence of a related witness, the court should focus on the consistency and credibility of their testimony. This approach ensures that the evidence is not discarded merely due to familial ties, but is instead assessed based on its inherent reliability and consistency with other evidence in the case. This position has been reiterated by this Court in: i. Md. Rojali Ali v. The State of Assam, Ministry of Home Affairs through Secretary (2019) 19 SCC 567; ii. Ganapathi v. State of T.N. (2018) 5 SCC 549; iii. Jayabalan v. Union Territory of Pondicherry (2010) 1 SCC 199. 30. Though the eyewitnesses who have been examined in the present case were closely related to the deceased, namely his wife, daughter and son, their testimonies are consistent with respect to the accused persons being the assailants who inflicted wounds on the deceased. As is revealed from the sequence of events that transpired, one of the family members was subjected to an assault. It was thus quite natural for the other family members to rush on the spot to intervene. The presence of the family members on the spot and thus being eyewitnesses has been well established. In such circumstances, merely because the eyewitnesses are family members, their testimonies cannot be discarded solely on that ground. 45 2026:HHC:35783 38. Therefore, the testimony of a related witness cannot be rejected because of the relationship with the victim. The court is required to see the testimony with due care and caution. In the present case, there is nothing to show that Abhilash Singh is making an incorrect statement. His testimony is duly corroborated by the testimony of Balbir Singh. Hence, the statement of Abhilash Singh cannot be rejected because of relationship alone. 39. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had wrongly observed that no person had identified the accused as the driver of the truck. The identification of the accused as the driver of the truck was duly established, and the learned Appellate Court had drawn a conclusion which could not have been drawn by any reasonable person. 40. The witnesses consistently stated that the truck had hit a stationary motorcycle. The site plan (Ex.PW14/C) shows the place of accident as the kucha portion of the road, and that the motorcycle was dragged for 48 ft. The photographs (Ex.P3, Ex.P4, and Ex.P6) show the truck towards the extreme left side of the road on the kucha portion. The whole metalled road is available 46 2026:HHC:35783 towards the right side of the truck. The motorcycle is shown trapped in the truck in the photograph (Ex.P7), which corroborates the prosecution’s version that the truck had dragged the motorcycle. Taking the truck towards the kucha portion of the road while the metalled portion was available shows the negligence of the truck driver, and the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the truck. 41. The accused admitted the postmortem report which mentions that the cause of death was head injury that could have been caused in a roadside accident. Therefore, it was proved that the death was caused because of the negligence of the accused. 42. Dr V.S. Chib (PW15) retained the blood sample of the accused, which was sent to the FSL. As per the report of the FSL, 126.5 mg% alcohol was found in the blood. Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act punishes a person who drives a vehicle having alcohol in his blood exceeding 30 mg%. The accused claimed that he had taken some ayurvedic medicine, but there is no proof of it. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the 47 2026:HHC:35783 accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 43. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months and to pay a fine of ₹1,000/- with default sentence for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC; to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months and pay a fine of ₹1,500/- with default for the commission of offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC, which cannot be said to be excessive because a precious life was lost. Therefore, the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was adequate. 44. Thus, the learned Appellate Court had taken a view that could not have been taken by any reasonable person, and the judgment of the learned Appellate Court is liable to be interfered with. 45. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed, the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court is ordered to be set aside, and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court are ordered to be restored. The accused shall surrender within a month before the Learned Trial Court to 48 2026:HHC:35783 undergo the sentence, failing which the learned Trial Court shall proceed as per the law to execute the sentence awarded by it. 46. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 24th August, 2026 (Chander)