1 2026:CGHC:23619 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 645 of 2026 Vishnu Kumar Gupta S/o Late Bhimsen Gupta, Aged About 54 Years, R/o Main Road Near Central Bank, Kargi Road Kota, Tahsil- Kota, Distt. Bilaspur (C.G.), ... Petitioner versus 1 - Amarnath S/o Late Vijay Kumar Gupta Aged About 60 Years, 2 - Santosh Kumar S/o Late Vijay Kumar Gupta Aged About 58 Years, 3 - Kamla W/o Late Vijay Kumar Gupta Aged About 79 Years, 4 - Annapurna D/o Late Vijay Kumar Gupta Aged About 56 Years, All are R/o Near Durga Mandir, Attabirra (Bargarh), Distt. Bargarh (Odisha), 5 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Bilaspur, Tahsil and Distt. Bilaspur (C.G.), 6 - Vishal S/o Manendra Bahadur Singh R/o House No. 53, Ward No. 13, Station Road, Kargi Road, Kota, Tahsil- Kota, Distt. Bilaspur (C.G.), 7 - Anwar Ali S/o Abid Ali R/o Ward No. 12, Masjid Gali, Kargi Road Kota, Tahsil- Kota, Distt. Bilaspur (C.G.), ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. H.B. Agrawal, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent No.5/State : Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, Govt. Advocate PREETI KUMARI Digitally signed by PREETI KUMARI Date: 2026.06.15 16:00:01 +0530 2 Hon'ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board 11.06.2026 1. Heard Mr. H.B. Agrawal, learned Senior Advocate along with Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, Government Advocate, learned counsel for respondent No.5/State. 2. The present is a writ petition filed by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the impugned order dated 20.03.2026 passed by 9th District Judge, Bilaspur in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 10/2024 whereby the Miscellaneous Appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed and the order dated 29.01.2024 passed by learned 2nd Civil Judge, Class-II, Kota, District – Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 41-A/2021, rejecting the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) has been affirmed. 3. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is plaintiff before the learned Trial Court and prosecuting the suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction with respect to the suit property of schedule ‘A’ annexed with the plaint. The suit property is the house situated over the Nazul land Khasra No. 588, Plot No. 353, area 325 square meter situated at Village Kargi Road, Tehsil - Kota, District – Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. The plaintiff has pleaded that after the death of his father, the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property for more than 30 years. The defendants are his cousin brothers and the suit property was the joint property of the father of the plaintiff and defendants. The defendants without noticing to the plaintiff, get their names mutated over the revenue records of the suit property and get the lease under Bhumiswami Rights. The plaintiff is in possession of the suit property and considering the interference over his possession and action taken by the 3 defendants, he filed this civil suit in which he also made an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for temporary injunction against the defendants from interference in the suit property. The said application of the plaintiff was dismissed by the learned Trial Court holding that the plaintiff has no prima facie case and irreparable loss. Against the order passed by learned Trial Court dated 29.01.2024, the plaintiff has filed miscellaneous appeal before the learned appellate Court, which has also been dismissed vide impugned order dated 20.03.2026. He further submits that defendants have no right over the suit property and their interference on the basis of the mutation of their names in the revenue records as well as lease executed in their favour should be restrained. He would further submit that while considering the application of the plaintiff, learned Trial Court as well as Appellate Court has not considered the relevant documents filed by the plaintiff with respect to the suit property. Learned Senior Advocate also submits that that the possession of the plaintiff be protected during the pendency of this civil suit. The parties have vehemently contested their suit, therefore, temporary injunction should have been granted by the learned Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court, but the same has been rejected. Learned Senior Advocate relied upon the judgment of the Rame Gowda vs. M. Varadappa Naidu reported in 2004 (II) M.P. Weekly Notes, 25. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned orders, pleadings and documents annexed with the petition. 5. While considering the application filed by the plaintiff before the learned Trial Court, the learned Trial Court has considered that the plaintiff has pleaded that the suit property is the ancestral property and the defendants are in possession of the suit property, their possession has 4 been overlapped in the year 2021 and the plaintiff and his family members forcefully trying to enter into physical possession of the suit property, and his family members have also raised dispute with the defendants and thereafter, a police report was lodged and the defendants are in possession of the suit property. The names of the defendants have also been mutated in the revenue records of the suit property and the plaintiff has no prima facie case. The learned Trial Court has also considered that the tax receipt would not hold the physical possession and title of the suit property. The reports submitted by the Revenue Inspector has also been considered by the learned Trial Court and found that the plaintiff has no prima facie case, and, therefore, rejected the application of the plaintiff. The Appellate Court while considering the appeal, has also elaborately considered the facts of the case and materials available in the record, and with the concurrence of the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court, dismissed the appeal vide its order dated 20.03.2026. 6. When the learned Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court concurrently rejected the application filed by the plaintiff, the interference of this Court by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited as the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 in para 42 to 45 and 49 and reproduced herein-below:- “42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in Lonard Grampanchayat vs. Ramgiri Gosavi, AIR 1968 SC 222, (see AIR pp. 222-34, para 5 of the report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre vs. Pathankhan, (1970) 2 SCC 717. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215 about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ram Tahel Ramnand (1972) 1 SCC 898. 5 43. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675, a two judge Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai (supra) this Court held that a writ of Certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil Court, subordinate to the High Court (SCC p. 688, para 19 of the report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath, (2009) 5 SCC 616 and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But in so far as the formulation of the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views. 44. In para 38 sub-para (4) at SCC p. 695 of the report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai (supra) and they are set out: “38 (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." 45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below: (Surya Dev Rai case (supra), SCC pp. 695-96 38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) * * * (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected 6 at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character." 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of 7 this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered 8 power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 7. In the case of Garment Craft Vs. Prakash Chand Goel, reported in (2022) 4 SCC 181, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraphs Nos. 15 and 16 as under: “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental 9 principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd, (2001) 8 SCC 97 has observed: (SCC pp. 101-102, para 6) “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” 8. In view of the submission made by the parties and the concurrently rejection of the application of the plaintiff by the learned Trial Court as well the Appellate Court and also the aforesaid judgment of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) and Garment Craft (supra), I do not find any scope of interference in the present writ petition filed by the plaintiff in the impugned order. The judgment of Rame Gowda (supra) cited by the 10 learned Counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff is distinguishable on the facts and consideration of the present petition, therefore, no benefit could be extended to him. 9. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed. 10. It is made clear that the learned Trial Court shall decide the civil suit on its own merits without being influenced by any observation made by this Court in this order. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Preeti