1 2026:CGHC:23800 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Reserved on 12-5-2026 Delivered on 15-06-2026 CRA No. 952 of 2005 1. Rajendra Aged About 30 Years R/o Nehru Chowk, Camp-I, Bhilai, District- Durg (C.G.) 2. Lilambar Singh Aged About 33 Years R/o Nehru Chowk, Camp-I, Bhilai, District- Durg (C.G. 3. Tameshwar Sinha, S/o Shri Hiralal Sinha Aged About 30 Years R/o Nehru Chowk, Camp- I, Bhilai, District- Durg (C.G.) ... Appellants versus • State of Chhattisgarh through the Police Station Chhawni, District Durg (CG)) ... Respondent(s) For appellants. : Mr. Pushpendra Kumar Patel and Ms. Kushbhoo Khunte, Advocates For Respondent/State : Mr. Siresh Tandon, Dy. Govt. Advocate (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas) C A V Judgment 1. The appellants have preferred this Criminal Appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25-11-2005 passed by 7th Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Durg in Sessions 2 Trial No. 135 of 2001, wherein the said Court convicted and sentenced the appellants as under:- Conviction Sentence 1) under Section 324 of IPC to all the appellants R.I. for one year. 2) under Section 27 (I) of the Arms Act. R.I. for 3 years and to pay fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo additional RI for three months only to appellant No.1. 2. As per case of the prosecution, Santosh Gupta (PW/4) who is brother of victim Harendra Gupta (PW/2), lodged Dehati Nalisi (Ex. P/4) on 26-11-2000 before the Police Station Chhawni, District Durg stating that he resides at Nehru Chowk and his brother Harendra Gupta resides at Subhash Chowk and was doing the business of Disc Antenna. On 26-11-2000 at about 10.00 pm, when he was at his house one boy residing at Subhash Chowk informed him that his brother has been fired and lying down near the scooter. The informant immediately rushed to Subhash Chowk where he found that the brother was lying down thereafter, informant with two other persons have taken him to the Police Station and to Durg Hospital where his brother told him that due to dispute with regard to property, Lilambar, Rajendra and Tameshwar have threatened him to kill. It has also been informed to the Police that the victim’s right thigh was injured by bullet and he was taken to Hospital. On the basis of Dehati Nalishi the Police started investigation, prepared the map of place of incident (Ex. P/2), seized the motor cycle bearing Registration No. MP-24-8-1925 (Ex. P/3) and also seized the clothes and undergarments of the victim (Ex. P/5), recorded the statements of the 3 witnesses, dying declaration (Ex. P/7). Thereafter, on the basis of Dehali Nalishi, FIR bearing Crime No. 1212/2000 was registered on 26.11.2000 against the appellants for commission of offence under Section 307/34 IPC (Ex. P/13). 3. The prosecution after usual investigation submitted the charge-sheet to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate who committed the trial for disposal of the case in accordance with law vide order dated 23.04.2001 and registered as Sessions Trial No. 135/2001. On the basis of the material contained in the charge-sheet, learned trial Court framed charges against the appellants for alleged commission of offence under Section 307 read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 27 (I) of the Arms Act. The accused appellants plead innocence and false implication. 4. In order to bring home the guilt, the prosecution has examined as many as 15 witnesses namely Dr. J.P. Meshram, Medical Officer (PW/1), Harendra Kumar Gupta (PW/2), Prem Bahadur Singh (PW/3), Santosh Kumar (PW/4), Dr. S.K. Rizvi, Joint Director H.O.D. Surgery (PW/5), Dr. R.K. Singh, Senior Consultant Surgery (PW/6), G.P. Sharma (PW/7), Murad Ali (PW/8), Manish Kumar (PW/9), V.C. Meshram (PW/10), Vali Ullah (PW/11), Suresh Pauranik, Thana In- charge (PW/12), G.P. Singh (PW/13), B.D. Dhupar, Sub-Inspector (PW/14), B.S. Tirkey, Thana In-charge (PW/15) and exhibited 19 documents I.e., memo of Mulahija report (Ex.P/1), Ex.P/1- A) Mulhaji report, spot map (Ex.P/2), seizure memo (Ex.P/3), Dehati Nalsi (Ex.P/4), seizure memo (Ex.P/5), Nazari naxa (Ex.P/6), statement of Santosh Kumar Gupta (Ex.P/7), dying declaration 4 (Ex.P/7), bed head ticket (Ex.P/8), x-ray report (Ex.P/8-A), x-ray plate (Ex.P/8-B), application for examination of pellets of bullet (Ex.P/9), seizure memo (Ex.P/10), memorandum of Rajendra Singh (Ex.P/11), statement of Walli Wullah Khan (Ex.P/12), FIR (Ex.P/13), property seizure memo (Ex.P/14), talasi panchnama (Ex.P/15), arrest memo (Ex.P/16 to Ex.P/18) and statement of G.P. Singh (Ex.P/19). 5. The appellants in order to prove their innocence have examined DW/1 Ashok Sahu, DW/2 Vinod Kumar, DW/3 B.R. Sahu, DW/4 Suresh Kumar Sahu. DW/5 Gopal Sahu and DW./6 Krishna Kumar Nag and exhibited documents ie., statement of Harendra Kumar Gupta (Ex.D/1) and photo copy of FIR (Ex.D/2). The appellants in their statements recorded before the trial Court under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. have stated that the victim and his brother have forcefully taken possession of the house and against them offence under Section 448/34 of IPC is pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate. The learned trial Court, after hearing the counsel for the respective parties and after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence has convicted and sentenced the accused/appellants as mentioned in inaugural para of this judgment. Hence, this present appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the impugned judgment is contrary to the facts, law and circumstances of the case. He would submit that the learned trial Court has totally ignored the deposition of PW-15 (B.S. Tirkey) Police Sub Inspector before whom the victim had stated for the first time that he sustained injuries by some known persons and on the basis of information given by the 5 victim, medical treatment form was filled up. He would further submit that no case is made out under Section 27(i) of the Arms Act as no arm has been recovered from the appellants. The learned Trial Court failed to consider that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and learned trial Court has grossly erred in holding the appellants guilty under Section 324 of IPC. Learned trial Court has not appreciated the prosecution evidence in accordance with the established principles of law relating to appreciation of evidence, the judgment of conviction and sentence of the trial Court is based on surmises and conjectures, as it has not appreciated the statement of doctor correctly. He would further submit that the learned trial Court should have acquitted the appellant No. 1 from commission of offence under the Arms Act as no sanction has been obtained by the prosecution before cognizance is taken up for the said offence under the Arms Act. He would further submit that as per Section 39 of the Arms Act sanction of the District Magistrate is essential before cognizance of offence which has not been obtained by the prosecution, therefore, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is liable to be set aside on this count alone. 7. Alternatively, he would submit that if this Court ultimately comes to the conclusion that the conviction of the appellants is proper, then, he would pray for reducing the sentence already undergone by them as the incident took place in the year 2000 and the appeal is pending since 2005, the appellants are now aged more than 56 years; the appellants remained in jail for one month and twenty one days and they did not misuse the liberty while being on bail, as such, he would 6 pray for reducing the sentence already undergone by them. 8. 8. Ex adverso, learned counsel for the respondent/State supporting the impugned judgment would submit that learned Trial Court after minutely appreciating the oral and documentary evidence has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellants, as such, there is no scope for interference by this Court. This appeal being without any merit is liable to be dismissed. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record including the impugned judgment with utmost circumspection. 10. From the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the point emerged for determination is whether the prosecution is able to prove the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt and finding of the conviction is liable to be interfered by this Court or the prayer of the appellants for reducing the sentence already undergone can be considered in view of the facts and circumstances of the case? 11. To appreciate the point emerged for determination, it is expedient for this Court to go through the evidence, material placed on record by the prosecution. 12. Dr. J.P. Meshram (PW/1) who has done the x-ray of the victim has deposed in his evidence that in the left and right hip of the victim he found 50-60 bullets and submitted his report Ex. P/1(A). The victim (PW/2) has stated that the accused came near to him about 10-15 feet and Rajendra fired him with Katta and Taleshwar had shown him sword and abused him and threatened him with regard to the 7 property purchased by his brother. The said witness was extensively cross-examined by the defense, but nothing has been elicited to rebut the evidence. On the contrary, in the cross-examination this witness has stated that he has informed to his brother, Shohrab and Shahid that appellants have assaulted him. 13. Santosh Kumar (PW/4) brother of the victim who in his examination- in-chief has reiterated the information given in the Dehati Nalishi (Ex. P/2). The witness was cross-examined by the prosecution as on some point he was not supporting the case of the prosecution and in cross-examination he has stated that the Police have seized clothes belonging to his brother which have been seized before him only by the Police. He has also stated that in the seized clothes and pant, the pant was torn from the left thigh due to shot by bullets. The witness after seeing the pant has deposed that small hole was caused due to bullet shot. The witness was cross-examined by the defense but nothing has been brought on record and in the cross-examination he has stated that he has already informed the Police in his statement (Ex. P/7) regarding dispute with Lilambar and Rajendra regarding their threat to kill him, but this fact is not written in his statement before Police then he cannot give any explanation for it. 14. Dr. R.K. Singh (PW/6) who has examined the victim has stated that in the body of the injured the bullets were found and in the cross- examination he has stated that in the Ex. P/8 which is bed sheet (record pertaining to medical treatment given to victim) of the victim wherein he has not written the numbers of bullets removed from the body of the injured, but voluntarily stated that because their numbers 8 are more. 15. B.D. Dhupar, Investigating Officer (PW/14) who has in his evidence stated that he has collected the material and recorded statement as per their version only and no manipulation has been done on it. 16. During investigation, dying declaration (Ex.P/7) of the victim was recorded in presence of Dr. S.K. Rizvi, Senior Medical Officer (PW/5) on duty by the S.R. Mandavi, Executive Magistrate, wherein he has replied to the query that he had known the present appellants by name and there was land dispute between and present appellants and him and Lilambar had taken possession of the of shop and they forced him to vacate the same, thereafter they assaulted him. Dr. S.K. Rizvi (PW/5) in his evidence before the trial Court has stated that the patient was able to give his statement and to that effect he has issued the certificate (Ex. P/7). 17. The accused in their defense have examined the witness namely Ashok Sahu (DW/1) to substantiate his plea of alibi regarding Lilambar Singh and stated that Lilambar has gone to attend some function at his house and remained there upto 12- 1:30 in the midnight and thereafter, he left to his home and the appellant Lilambar was not present at the place of occurrence. The said witness was cross-examined wherein he has stated that Lilambar was his relative. Vinod Kumar (DW/2) has stated that the victim has threatened Lilambar Singh regarding property dispute, therefore, FIR has been lodged against him. The other defence witnesses ie., (DW/3), (DW/4), (DW/5) and (DW/6) have stated regarding registration of criminal case against the victim and his brother. 9 18. From the evidence brought on record, it is quite vivid that the victim was fired by the country made pistol as bullets were found in his body. The statement of the victim (PW/2) supported by the (PW/4) brother of the victim corroborated by the medical evidence of Dr. R.K. Singh (PW/6) who has deposed that bullets were found in the body of the victim. The dying declaration of the victim was recorded vide Ex. P/7 wherein he has clearly deposed that he was fired by the bullet by Rajendra due to property dispute. Learned trial Court appreciating this evidence has recorded its finding that the victim was injured by the bullets. This finding does not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting any interference by this Court. 19. The victim (PW/2) in clear terms has proved that he sustained injury by the fire arms which is supported by medical evidence and presence of the accused at the place of occurrence is not disputed by the appellants through cogent evidence though they have taken plea of alibi, but the same has not been proved by them. Considering the well settled position of law that an accused can be convicted on the basis of the sole testimony of the victim, provided the Court finds the testimony to be credible, trustworthy and of sterling quality. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has examined the evidentiary value of injured witness in case of Balu Sudam Khalde and Another vs State of Maharashtra {2023 (13) SCC 365} wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- "26. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be appreciated, the under- noted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind:- 10 (a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition. (b) Unless, it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused. (c) The evidence of injured witness has greater evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly. (d) The evidence of injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions. (e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of injured, but not the whole evidence. (f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded." 20. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that Lilambar was not available at the place of occurrence of crime, as such he has been falsely implicated has now been considered by this Court. The defense to prove this fact has examined DW/1 who has stated that this accused was attending some family function at his home, thus he was not available at the place of occurrence. The submission is now being considered by this Court deserves to be rejected as the burden heavily lies upon him to prove the same by cogent evidence. From perusal of the evidence of DW/1, it is quite vivid that bald statement regarding the present of the appellant No. 2 Lilambar was taken, but no evidence to substantiate this evidence like photographs showing the presence of the appellant No. 2 was placed on record by the defense. Even from bare perusal of the evidence, it is quite vivid that the place of offence and the place where accused was allegedly present, the distance between these two places was not far away, 11 therefore, reaching to place of occurrence cannot be ruled out in absence of cogent evidence led by the appellants, as such the defense taken by the appellant No. 2 deserves to be rejected and accordingly it is rejected. 21. The trial Court has also recorded its finding in paragraph 29 of his judgment that the prosecution has also not lodged any evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the injuries caused to the victim are sufficient to kill, accordingly, it has convicted the appellants for commission of offence under Section 324 of IPC. The finding of the learned trial Court does not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court. Thus, the conviction of the appellants under Section 324 of IPC cannot be found faulty. 22. So far as further submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the weapon alleged to have been used in the offence has not been seized and the permission from the District Magistrate has not been obtained, therefore, the conviction of the appellant No. 1 under Section 27 of the Arms Act deserves to be set aside by this Court is being considered now. To consider these submissions, it is expedient for this Court to go through the relevant provisions of Arms Act, 1959. 23. Section 2(C) defines arms, Section 5 provides license for manufacture sale etc. of arms and ammunition and Section 27 and 39 which reads as under: 2(c) - “arms” means articles of any description designed or adapted as weapons for offence or defence, and includes firearms, sharpedged and other deadly weapons, and parts of, and machinery for manufacturing, arms, but does not include articles designed solely for domestic or agricultural uses such as a lathi or an ordinary walking stick and weapons incapable of being used otherwise than as toys or 12 of being converted into serviceable weapons. 5. 5. Licence for manufacture, sale, etc., of arms and ammunition.―1[(1)] No person shall— (a) 2[use, 3[manufacture, obtain, procure]] sell, transfer, convert, repair, test or prove, or (b) expose or offer for sale or transfer or have in his possession for sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof, any firearm or any other arms of such class or description as may be prescribed or any ammunition, unless he holds in this behalf a licence issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder: 4* * * * * 5[(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a person may, without holding a licence in this behalf, sell or transfer any arms or ammunition which he lawfully possesses for his own private use to another person who is entitled by virtue of this Act or any other law for the time being in force to have, or is not prohibited by this Act or such other law from having in his possession such arms or ammunition: Provided that no firearm or ammunition in respect of which a licence is required under section 3 and no arms in respect of which a licence is required under section 4 shall be so sold or transferred by any person unless— (a) he has informed in writing the district magistrate having jurisdiction or the officer in charge of the nearest police station of his intention to sell or transfer such firearms, ammunition or other arms and the name and address of the person to whom he intends to sell or transfer such firearms, ammunition or the other arms, and (b) a period of not less than forty-five days has expired after the giving of such information.] 27. Punishment for using arms, etc.―(1) Whoever uses any arms or ammunition in contravention of section 5 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. (2) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition in contravention of section 7 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. (3) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition or does any act in contravention of section 7 and such use or act results in the death of any other person, [shall be punishable with imprisonment for life, or death and shall also be liable to fine.] 1 Section 5 re-numbered as sub-section (1) thereof by Act 25 of 1983, s. 4 (w.e.f. 22-6-1983) 2 Subs. by Act 42 of 1988, s. 3, for “manufacture” (w.e.f. 27-5-1988) 3 Subs. by Act 48 of 2019, s. 4, for “manufacture” (w.e.f. 14-12-2019). 4 The proviso omitted by Act 25 of 1983, s. 4 (w.e.f. 22-6-1983). 5 Ins. by s. 4, ibid. (w.e.f. 22-6-1983) 13 39. Previous sanction of the district magistrate necessary in certain cases.―No prosecution shall be instituted against any person in respect of any offence under section 3 without the previous sanction of the district magistrate.” 24. From the statement of the victim (PW/2) and the Medical Officer (PW/6), it is quite vivid that the injuries sustained by the victim were caused by means of fire arm i.e. country made pistol though the said weapon was not seized by the prosecution, but the availability of the bullets on the body of the victim is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. The credibility of medical evidence has been examined by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Nagindra Bala Mitra Vs. Sunil Chandra Roy [AIR 1960 SC 706] wherein it has been held in paragraph 43 as under:- “……..the value of a medical witness is not merely a check upon the testimony of eyewitnesses; it is also independent testimony, because it may establish certain facts, quite apart from the other oral evidence. If a person is shot, at close range, the marks of tattooing found by the medical witness would show that the range was small, quite apart from any other opinion of his. Similarly, fractures of bones, depth and size of the wounds would show the nature of the weapon used. It is wrong to say that it is only opinion evidence; it is often direct evidence of the facts found upon the victim's person.” 25. Nagindra Bala Mitra (supra) has been followed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Machindra Vs. Sajjan Galfa Rankhamb and others, reported (2017) 13 SCC 491. 26. In such contingencies, non-seizure of used weapon does not weaken the case of the prosecution. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while examining the issue of non recovery of weapon of crime has held that it is not sine qua non for conviction if there is direct reliable 14 witness available on record. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Goverdhan vs. The State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2025 (3) SCC 378 has examined this issue and held in paragraphs 83 to 85 as under: “83. It is now well settled that non recovery of the weapon of crime is not fatal to the prosecution case and is not sine qua non for conviction, if there are direct reliable witnesses as held in Rakesh v. State of U.P., (2021) 7 SCC 188, wherein it was observed as follows: “12. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that as per the ballistic report the bullet found does not match with the firearm/gun recovered and therefore the use of gun as alleged is doubtful and therefore benefit of doubt must be given to the accused is concerned, the aforesaid cannot be accepted. At the most, it can be said that the gun recovered by the police from the accused may not have been used for killing and therefore the recovery of the actual weapon used for killing can be ignored and it is to be treated as if there is no recovery at all. For convicting an accused recovery of the weapon used in commission of offence is not a sine qua non. PW 1 and PW 2, as observed hereinabove, are reliable and trustworthy eyewitnesses to the incident and they have specifically stated that A-1 Rakesh fired from the gun and the deceased sustained injury. The injury by the gun has been established and proved from the medical evidence and the deposition of Dr Santosh Kumar, PW 5. Injury 1 is by gunshot. Therefore, it is not possible to reject the credible ocular evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 — eyewitnesses who witnessed the shooting. It has no bearing on credibility of deposition of PW 1 and PW 2 that A-1 shot deceased with a gun, particularly as it is corroborated by bullet in the body and also stands corroborated by the testimony of PW 2 and PW 5. Therefore, merely because the ballistic report shows that the bullet recovered does not match with the gun recovered, it is not possible to reject the credible and reliable deposition of PW 1 and PW 2. (emphasis added) 84. In this context one may also refer to the decision of this Court in Karamjit Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (2003) 5 SCC 291 in which it was observed that the testimony of the police personnel involved in recovery of articles need not be disbelieved and testimony of police personnel is to be treated similarly as testimony of any other witness. It was held that, “8. Shri Sinha, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, has vehemently urged that all the witnesses of recovery examined by the prosecution are police personnel and in the absence of any public witness, their testimony alone should not be held sufficient for sustaining the conviction of the 15 appellant. In our opinion the contention raised is too broadly stated and cannot be accepted. The testimony of police personnel should be treated in the same manner as testimony of any other witness and there is no principle of law that without corroboration by independent witnesses their testimony cannot be relied upon. The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a police personnel as of other persons and it is not a proper judicial approach to distrust and suspect them without good grounds. It will all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no principle of general application can be laid down. ……………………..” (emphasis added). 85. Thus, we do not find any reason to doubt the testimony of the police/I.O. (PW-15).” 27. Thus, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants that due to non-seizure of used weapon in commission of offence the prosecution case should have been negatived by the trial Court is misconceived and deserves to be rejected and accordingly it is rejected. 28. Learned counsel for the appellants has also taken a plea that sanction before cognizance of offence from District Magistrate has not been taken, therefore, the prosecution and conviction of the appellant No. 1 for commission of offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 deserves to be set aside, is being considered by this Court. 29. From perusal of Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, it is quite vivid that it punishes use of fire arm in contravention of Section 5 and 7 of the Arms Act, 1959. Section 5 provides license for use, manufacture, sale etc. of arms and ammunition and Section 7 provides prohibition of acquisition or possession or of manufacture or sale of prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition. This Section provides that no person shall use, manufacture, sale, transfer, convert, repair, test or prove or 16 acquire, have in possession or carry or expose or offer for sale or transfer or have in his possession for sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or prove any prohibited arms or ammunition unless he has been specially authorized by the Central Government in this behalf. Thus, it is clear that for the prosecution under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 previous sanction of the District Magistrate is not a condition precedent for the reason that Section 39 is not applicable with regard to the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. 30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Surinder Singh vs. State (UT of Chandigarh) reported in 2021 (20) SCC 24 has examined the provisions of Section 5 and 27 of the Arms Act before amendment and past amendment in the Arms Act and has held in paragraphs 29 and 31 as under: “29. Adverting to the conviction of the Appellant under Section 27 of the Arms Act, it appears to us that the Trial Court has erred in arriving at his culpability. There is no gainsay that in order to prove a charge under Section 27 of the Arms Act, the prosecution must necessarily demonstrate contravention of either Section 5 or Section 7 of the Act. In the instant case, although not explicitly stated, it appears that the Trial Court has held it to be a case of breach of Section 5 of the Arms Act, which stipulates that no person shall use, possess, manufacture, etc. any firearms, unless such person holds a license in this behalf, and prescribes a minimum punishment of 3 years of imprisonment. 31. True it is that prior to the amendment of Section 27 of the Arms Act, vide Arms (Amendment) Act 1988, the said provision penalized the use of any arms and ammunitions for any ‘unlawful purpose’. However, post its amendment, Section 27 of the Arms Act is strictly confined to violation of conditions mentioned either under Section 5 or 7 of the Arms Act and the ‘unlawful purpose’ of using arms and ammunitions is no longer an inseparable component of the delinquency.” 31. In light of the above legal position and considering the law on this subject, I am of the view that the learned trial Court has not committed any illegality in rejecting the contention of the appellants 17 regarding setting aside of the conviction on the count that no sanction has been obtained by the prosecution before cognizance is taken deserves to be rejected and accordingly, it is rejected. 32. The learned trial Court on appreciation of evidence and considering the material on record, particularly the statement of victim (PW/2) who has stated in his evidence before the trial Court that Rajendra fired him, has convicted the appellant No. 1 Rajendra for commission of offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. The finding of the learned trial Court convicting the appellant No. 1 for commission of offence under the Arms Act is in accordance with the provisions of Section 25 and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Mohmed Rafiq Abdul Rahim Sheikh vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2018 (10) SCC 501 has examined the provisions of Section 25 and 27 of the Arms Act and has held that Section 25(1)(a) essentially makes a person who is found to be in possession for sale, transfer etc. of any prohibited arms in contravention of Section 5 of the Arms Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 8 and 10 has held as under: “8. Section 25 (1)(a) essentially makes a person who is found to be in possession for sale, transfer etc. of any prohibited arms or ammunition in contravention of Section 5 punishable with imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. 10. We have no hesitation in saying that the conviction of this Accused under Section 25 (1AA) is wholly unwarranted since he was not in possession of the prohibited ammunition at all, much less for the purpose of sale which is a requirement for attracting the provision of Section 25 (1AA). It reads as follows: “25. (1-AA) Whoever manufactures, sells, transfers, converts, repairs, tests or proves, or exposes or offers for sale or transfer or has in his possession for sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof any prohibited arms or 18 prohibited ammunition in contravention of Section 7 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.” 33. Thus, the conviction of the appellant No. 1 for commission of offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act is legal, justified and does not warrant interference by this Court. 34. Considering the evidence and material on record, I am of the view that the learned trial Court has recorded its finding of conviction on proper appreciation of evidence, material on record which does not suffer from perversity and illegality warranting interference by this Court. Consequently the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 35. Now this Court is examining the alternate submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants for reducing the sentence already undergone by them. It is well settled legal position of law that before imposition of punishment this Court has to consider the aggravating and mitigating factors by strike a fair balance between the aggravating and the mitigating factors. The appellant No. 1 was convicted for commission of offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act where the minimum sentence of three years have been prescribed, as such, in view of well settled position of law that where the minimum sentence has been provided under the Code, then the Court cannot reduce the sentence below the minimum sentence provided under the Code. Thus, this Court cannot reduce the sentence so far as conviction of appellant No. 1 under Section 27 of the Arms Act accordingly it remains intact. In light of these parameters, this Court is considering the sentence to be imposed upon the appellants for conviction under Section 324/34 of the IPC. 19 From the record, it is quite vivid, that the incident pertains to year 2000 and more than 25 years have already been lapsed, and the prosecution has not been able to place any past criminal antecedents of the appellants except this, they have not misused the liberty of bail granted to them during the trial and even during pendency of the appeal, I am of the view that the appellants sentence for conviction under Section 324 IPC is reduced to R.I. for 04 months to each of the appellants and the sentence awarded to the appellant No. 1 Rajendra for commission of offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act remains intact. It is also directed that all the sentence so far as appellant No. 1 are directed to run concurrently. 36. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part. The appellants are reported to be and their bail bonds and surety bonds are cancelled. They are directed to surrender before the trial Court within two months from the date of judgment passed by this Court to serve out the remaining part of jail sentence as reduced by this Court. The appellants are entitled to get set off, of the period of sentence already undergone by them as per provision of Section 428 CrPC/468 of BNSS. In case, the appellants fail to surrender within time period as given by this Court, the trial Court will proceed against them in accordance with law and send compliance report to this Court. 37. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for compliance. Sd/- (Narendra Kumar Vyas) JUDGE Raju RAVVA SATYANARAYANA RAJU Digitally signed by RAVVA SATYANARAYANA RAJU Date: 2026.06.15 18:27:37 +0530