Page No.# 1/18 GAHC020000172026 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/7/2026 UNION OF INDIA AND 4 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS NEW DELHI-110001 2: THE DIRECTOR GENERAL ASSAM RIFLES SHILONG-793011 MEGHALAYA 3: THE RECORD OFFICER HQ DIRECTOR GENERAL ASSAM RIFLES SHILLONG 793011 MEGHALAYA 4: MAJOR OFFICER-IN-CHARGE DISABILITY PENSION NE RECORD BRANCH DIRECTOR GENERAL ASSAM RIFLES SHILLONG-793011 MEGHALAYA 5: THE COMMANDANT 32 ASSAM RIFLES C/O 99 AP VERSUS NO. 3201248, RFN/GD, SHRI IMKONGSANEN AO @ SANEN AO @ SANAM AO 32 ASSAM RIFLES PERMANENT ADDRESS- MANGMETONG VILLAGE MOKOKCHUNG NAGALAND PH.NO. 9378067943 Page No.# 2/18 Advocate for the Petitioner : YANGER WATI, Advocate for the Respondent : , BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MARLI VANKUNG ORDER 28.01.2026 (R. Phukan, J.) Heard Mr. Yanger Wati, learned CGSC for the applicants and Mr. I. Imti Longchar, learned counsel for the opposite party. 2. This interlocutory application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is preferred by the applicants for condoning the delay of 246 days in preferring the connected Writ Appeal, against the judgment and order dated 14.05.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge, in Writ Petition Nos. 314/2023 and 71/2024. 3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and order dated 14.05.2025, the learned Single Judge in Writ Petitions, No. 314/2023 and 71/2024, by setting aside and quashing the dismissal order dated 17.12.2019, the order of the court of inquiry dated 20.04.2017 and also the letter dated 29.09.2023, with a further direction to convene another fresh court of inquiry and to give due opportunity to participate in the said inquiry and thereafter to pass necessary orders after giving him an opportunity of being heard by following all procedures laid down in the Assam Rifles Rules, 2010 and the Assam Rifles Act, 2006. Page No.# 3/18 4. Mr. Yanger Wati, learned CGSC for the applicants submits that in this matter several offices are involved and the file moved from one table to another table and in that process, the delay of 246 days occurred and that the same is not intentional, rather it is circumstantial and the same is explained in the application. Mr. Yanger Wati further submits that there is merit in the writ appeal and if the delay is not condoned, an irreparable loss and prejudice will be caused the applicants. Under such circumstances, Mr. Yanger Wati has contended to condone the delay in preferring the connected writ appeal. 5. Per-contra, Mr. I. Imti Longchar, learned counsel for the opposite party, referring to the objection filed by the opposite party submits that the applicants, in the paragraph Nos. 10 & 11 of the interlocutory application for condoning the delay, have admitted that there is delay of 246 days in preferring the connected writ appeal and the applicants have made a vague statement in respect of preferring the writ appeal beyond the period of limitation. Mr. I. Imti Longchar further submits that the applicants have failed to disclose any ground to condone the delay and on such count, it is contended to dismiss this interlocutory application. 5.1. In support of his submission, Mr. I. Imti Longchar has referred to a decision of this Court in the case ofUnited India Insurance Company Limited vs. Sahadev Ghosh, reported in 2005 (3) GLT 80. 6. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, we have carefully gone through the petition as well as the documents placed on record and also gone through the Page No.# 4/18 decision referred by Mr. I. Imti Longchar, learned counsel for the opposite party. 7. Before directing a discussion into the points, referred by the learned counsel for both the parties, it would be in the interest of justice to go through the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in respect of condonation of delay, presently holding the field, so to deal with the issue with greater precision. 8. It is to be noted here that Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case ofCollector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Mst. Katiji, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107, has observed as under:- “The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian LimitationAct of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice - that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy, and such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. Page No.# 5/18 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for Page No.# 6/18 condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the "State" which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the "State" is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even- handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits.” 9. Again, in the case of N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123, Hon’ble Supreme Court went a step further and made the following observations:- Page No.# 7/18 “It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter; acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be un- condonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never Page No.# 8/18 revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finislitium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the Page No.# 9/18 applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 10. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon’ble Supreme Court, referring to its earlier authorities,broadly culled out the principles of condonation of delay as under:- “(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party Page No.# 10/18 seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. (x) If the explanation offered is Page No.# 11/18 concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” 11. To the aforesaid principles, Hon’ble Supreme Court also added some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario, in the said case. They are:- “(a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. (b) An application for condonation of delay Page No.# 12/18 should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 12. Again in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and Another, reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448, while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. Page No.# 13/18 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner sub-serves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/ resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest. 31. It is true that when the State and its Page No.# 14/18 instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. The Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings.” 13. It is to be noted here that in the case of Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, reported in AIR 1962 SC 361, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “In construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding Page No.# 15/18 between the parties and this legal right which has accured to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause of excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. It is further necessary to emphasize that event if the sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage the diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration.” 14. The legal proposition, which can be crystallized from the aforesaid decisions and discussion, is that courts are not supposed to legalize injustice, but are obliged to remove injustice. Therefore, liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach has to be adopted while dealing with an application for condonation of delay if ‘sufficient cause’ is being shown. The terms ‘sufficient cause’ should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose and regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. The paramount and pivotal consideration is substantial justice; the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. In respect of deliberate causation of delay the presumption is not available but, gross negligence on Page No.# 16/18 the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of, besides lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay, which is a significant and relevant fact. The courts should not adhere to strict proof, but required to be vigilant so that there is no real failure of justice. The approach of the court must be liberal but at the same time it must be reasonable also. In case of inordinate delay, strict approach is required to be taken while in case of delay of short duration, a liberal delineation is required. The fundamental principle, being weighing the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. While condoning delay the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. In the case of the explanation, being offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such litigation. The entire gamut of facts is to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. The State or a public body or an entity, representing a collective cause, should be given some acceptable latitude. But, the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. 15. Thus, having informed ourselves about the proposition of law presently holding the field in respect of condonation of delay, now an endeavour will be made to ascertain how far the applicants herein have been able to explain the delay of 246 days in preferring the connected Writ Appeal. Page No.# 17/18 16. A careful perusal of the interlocutory application, so filed by the applicant, reveals that no reason, not to speak of a plausible one, for delay of 246 days in preferring the connected writ appeal is assigned by the applicants in the same.In paragraph No. 10 of the application it is stated that the applicants had received the judgment and order, dated 14.05.2025, on the same date, i.e. on 14.05.2025 and thereafter, they had immediately forwarded the matter to the Head Officer for necessary action. In paragraph No. 11 it is stated that on instructions, being received from the Head Office, the writ appeal has been filed, but in the process, the delay of 246 days occurred. But, not a single averment is made in the application that on account of moving the file from one table to another table, the said delay of 246 days had occurred as submitted by learned counsel for the CGSC. Thus, the said submission is found to be not based on any materials. Mr. I. Imti Longchar, learned counsel for the opposite party, has rightly pointed out this during his argument and we find force in the same. 17. Thus, having examined the explanation, so forthcoming for the delay of 246 days in preferring the connected writ appeal and also the submissions so advanced by learned counsel for both the parties, we are of the considered opinion that the applicants are not diligent in availing the remedy of appeal and the statements so made in the application and the submission of Mr. Yanger Wati, learned counsel for the applicants, for condoning the delay in filing the connected writ appeal, do not show any acceptable cause, much or less sufficient cause, to exercise the discretion of this Court. 18. Under such circumstances, we find no merit in this interlocutory application and consequently, the same stands Page No.# 18/18 dismissed. 19. In view of above, the connected interlocutory application and the writ appeal, being I.A. (Civil) No. 08/2026 and Writ Appeal No. 02/2026, respectively, also dismissed. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant