Judgment : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant appeal is directed against the Judgment of conviction dated 03.07.1998 and Order of sentence dated 04.07.1998 passed by learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Godda, in Sessions Case No.138 of 1997/43 of 1997 by which the appellant has been convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and has been directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. Factual Matrix 2. This Court, before proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, deems it fit and proper to refer the background of institution of prosecution case. The prosecution story in brief as per the allegation made in the First Information Report reads hereunder as :- The informant Marangmai Hanada, widow of late Lopsa Soren of village Harkatte, gave her fardbeyan on 14.04.97 at 7:00 A.M. alleging that there is no male member in her house and she along with her widowed daughter Balamai Soren and her four children live in the house. For last 2 to 3 years, she had kept Basta Murmu(deceased) as servant. In the last night Basta Murmu had slept in the Verandah. At about 12 to 1 ‘O' clock in the night she woke-up hearing sound of "Khat Khat" then she heard the sound of somebody fleeing away. Thereafter, she saw Basta Murmu lying senseless and found that his head was smashed and blood was oozing out. The villagers came there on hulla and the injured Basta Murmu was being taken for treatment and the in the way the Officer-in-charge, Lalmatia Police Station reached near Mohanpur Chowk and there she gave her fardbeyan which was recorded by Sri N.K. Soren, S.I., Lalmatia Police Station. This fardbeyan has been marked as Ext.-3 in this case. The second fardbeyan which was recorded by S.I. Sri Nageshwar Das P.W. -15, on 14.04.1997 at 12:00 at Sadar Hospital which has been marked as Ext.-5. In this exhibit-5 the said Marangmai Hansda, informant has stated that in the night Basta Murmu was sleeping with Dhena Marandi. 3. On the basis of fardbeyan of the informant, Boarijore (Lalmatia) P.S. Case No.22 of 1997 dated 14.04.1997 (G.R. No.230 of 1997) was registered against the unknown accused persons under Section 307 of the I.P.C. which was subsequently converted to a case U/s 302 I.P.C. 4. After investigation, the police submitted charge sheet against the appellant. 5. 3. On the basis of fardbeyan of the informant, Boarijore (Lalmatia) P.S. Case No.22 of 1997 dated 14.04.1997 (G.R. No.230 of 1997) was registered against the unknown accused persons under Section 307 of the I.P.C. which was subsequently converted to a case U/s 302 I.P.C. 4. After investigation, the police submitted charge sheet against the appellant. 5. After cognizance of the offence, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. Charge under Sections 302 I.P.C. was framed to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. The prosecution has altogether examined 15 witnesses, namely, P.W.-1 Chotta Shyamlal Tudu P..-2 Dez Marandi, P.W.-3 Sanjhla Tudu, P.W.-4 Anup Murmu P.W.-5 Marangmai Murmu, P.W.-6 Bahamai Marandi, P.M.-7 Betka Hansda, P.W.-8 Balemai Soren, P.W.-9 Marangmai Hansda (informant), P.W.-10 Ram Soren, P.W.-11 Dhena Murmu, P.W.-12 Dr. Arvind Kr.Singh, P.W-13 Nav Kr. Soren (I.O.), P.W.-14 Dr. Ajay Kr. Jha, who has performed postmortem examination and P.W.-15 Nageshwar Das. 7. The Defence has not examined any witness in support of his case. 8. The trial Court, after recording the evidence of witnesses, examination-in-chief and cross-examination, recorded the statement of the accused person, found the charges levelled against the appellant proved beyond all reasonable doubts. 9. Accordingly, the appellant has been found guilty and convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 10. The aforesaid order of conviction and sentence is subject matter of instant appeal. Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant: 11. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the impugned Judgment of conviction and Order of sentence passed by the trial court cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 12. The following grounds have been taken by the learned counsel for the appellant in assailing the impugned judgment of conviction: - (i) The appellant has been falsely implicated in this case and the prosecution case suffers from several infirmities and improbabilities. (ii) The ground has been taken that the conviction is based upon the evidence of self-proclaimed eye witness i.e. PW.2 without having been fully corroborated by the other evidences and as such conviction cannot be said to be based on sound reasoning. (iii) There are material contradictions in the testimonies of the witnesses. (ii) The ground has been taken that the conviction is based upon the evidence of self-proclaimed eye witness i.e. PW.2 without having been fully corroborated by the other evidences and as such conviction cannot be said to be based on sound reasoning. (iii) There are material contradictions in the testimonies of the witnesses. (iv) Further, no concrete motive has been brought forward by the prosecution and in the absence of any motive it is not safe to rely upon the evidence of witnesses. (v) Further, as per the opinion of the doctor who had conducted postmortem upon the dead body of the deceased persons, the injuries were caused by hard and blunt substance like lathi and rod etc. and that he has not found any injury caused by sharp cutting weapon but the PW-2 has stated in his deposition that he has seen the appellant assaulting the deceased with sharp cutting weapon. (vi) The learned trial court should have acquitted the appellant because P. W. 2, who claims to be the eye witness, did not disclose the name of the appellant when the Fardbeyan was recorded and, as such, the F.I.R. was instituted against unknown. (vii) The learned trial court should not have convicted the appellant because prosecution story is that no male members were present at the time of occurrence but PW-2, in his evidence, has stated that he was sleeping with the deceased. (viii) The informant is not the eye witness in this case. According to First Information Report no male members were in her house. The Fardbeyan was recorded at 14.04.1997 at 7:00 A.M. The informant again developed the prosecution story stating that on fateful night Dhena Murmu (P.W.11) was sleeping with the deceased Basta Murmu but Dhena Murmu has not supported this statement, rather, he has stated in his evidence that he had gone to the village and stayed there only for 10 minutes. (ix) It has been submitted that Dez Marandi (P.W. 2) claims to be sleeping in the house of the informant alongwith others and had seen the accused assaulting to the deceased with sharp cutting weapon, but surprisingly P.W.2 did not disclose the name of the appellant to the informant or to any other persons sleeping in the night or when the Fardbeyan was recorded. Therefore, the story of the prosecution appears to be doubtful, thus, on the basis of statement of P. W.-2, the appellant should not have been convicted. (x) It has come in testimonies of witnesses that P. W.2 had gone to other village i.e. Gobra, to inform the death of Basta Murmu to uncle of the deceased but therein also he did not disclose the name of the appellant to uncle of the deceased. The brother of the deceased was not present in the house, so he went to other village i.e. Basant Roy, but there also PW-2 did not disclose the name of the appellant/accused. (xi) The occurrence took place on 13.04.1997 and PW- 2 was examined by the police on 16.04.1997, but prior to 16.04.1997 he did not disclose the name of the appellant while he claims to be the eye witness. The appellant should have been acquitted on this ground alone. (xii) There are inter-se vital contradiction in the statement of PW-2 who, in his deposition, has stated that the appellant assaulted the deceased with Lathi but same time he says that the appellant assaulted the deceased with sharp cutting weapon. (xiii) P.W. 2 in his deposition has stated that P.W.7 Betka Hansda, P.W.3 Sanjhla Tudu and P. W. 4 Anup Murmu were also sleeping in the house but none of these witnesses has supported the prosecution story. (xiv) None of the witness except P.W.2, have seen the occurrence and the witness who claims to be the eye witness cannot be said to be the eye witness to the offence. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that, it is a case where the benefit of doubt should be given to the accused and thus, the judgment of conviction which has been passed against the appellant is fit to be interfered with. Submission of the learned counsel for the State: 14. Per contra, Mr. Abhay Kumar Tiwari, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State, has submitted by taking the following grounds in defending the impugned judgment: (i) It is a case where the prosecution has been able to prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt, since as per the eyewitnesses the assault was inflicted upon the deceased person by this appellant. (ii) The prosecution witnesses have conclusively supported the prosecution version. (ii) The prosecution witnesses have conclusively supported the prosecution version. (iii) Learned counsel for the State has further submitted that the eye witness since has made meticulous description of the occurrence, which has been corroborated by medical evidence and other witnesses, as such the evidence of eye witness is to be fully relied upon while proving the charge against accused person. (iv) The occurrence has been corroborated by the medical evidence wherein the Doctor has found the nature of injuries having been caused by hard and blunt substance as narrated by the eye witness. 15. Learned counsel for the State respondent, on the basis of the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned judgment suffers from no infirmity and needs no interference. Analysis 16. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the trial court in the impugned judgment. 17. We have also gone through the testimonies of the witnesses as available in the trial court records as also the exhibits. 18. This Court before considering the argument advanced on behalf of the parties is now proceeding to consider the deposition of witnesses, as per the testimony as recorded by learned trial Court. 19. In this case the prosecution has examined altogether 15 witnesses. The extracts of their depositions are being referred herein :- P.W.-1 Chotta Shyamlal Tudu has stated that on the day of occurrence, he along with Basta Murmu (deceased) had gone to the house of Bahamai Hembram. Basta Murmu and Bahamai Hembram were in Love, but Bahamai was not found in her house so they returned. He went to his house and Banta Murmu went to his house. At about 12 o'clock in the night on hearing halla this witness went to the place, that is, the house of informant and saw Basta Murmu senseless and blood was oozing out from his head. At paragraph-23 he has stated that Bahamai is Saali of Mohanlal Tudu, the accused, and at paragraph-4 he has stated that Mohanlal Tudu resides in his Sasural. So the evidence of this witness is on the point of love affairs of the deceased with the Saali of the accused Mohanlal Tudu namely with Bahamai Hembrum. He had only seen Basta Murmu injured and in a state of senselessness. P.W-2 Dez Marandi . So the evidence of this witness is on the point of love affairs of the deceased with the Saali of the accused Mohanlal Tudu namely with Bahamai Hembrum. He had only seen Basta Murmu injured and in a state of senselessness. P.W-2 Dez Marandi . This witness is aged about 18 years and is unable to understand Hindi and knows only Santhal language, therefore and interpreter was appointed to interpret the Santhal language. This witness has stated that on the day of occurrence, that is, in the night of Sunday, Basta Murmu, Betka Hansda P.W.-7 and this witness were sleeping on the ground together and Sanjhla Tudu P.W.-3 and Anup Murmu P.W.-4 were sleeping on a Chowki. At paragraph-2 he has stated that he had seen a man assaulting Basta Murmu by Kulhari and seeing the incident he became frightened. At paragraph-13 this witness has clarified and stated that he had seen Beta Ram Tudu assaulting Basta Murmu with lathi and pointing the accused he has stated that he knows the accused in the name of Beta Ram Tudu. At paragraph-5 he has stated that Mohanlal Tudu (accused) called him to his house and told him not to disclose his name to any one because he had seen him assaulting Basta Mummu, but this witness disclosed the name of accused before his sister Bahamai Marandi P.W.-6 and told her that Mohanlal Tudu has asked him not to disclose his name. At paragraph-6 this witness has stated when the accused assaulted Basta Murmu he was not asleep as such he saw and recognised the accused. At paragraph-8 he has identified the accused in the dock and said that this is the person whom, he had seen on the day of occurrence assaulting with lahti. P.W-3 Sanjhla Tudu has stated that in the night of Sunday in the month of April 1997 he was sleeping on Chowki with Anup Murmu in the house of Marangmai Hansda, the informant. He has stated that hearing halla he woke-up and saw there was bleeding from the head of Basta Murmu who was senseless. P.W.-4 Anup Murmu has stated that he was sleeping on a Chowki with Sanjhla Tudu (P.W.-3). This witness has further stated that Dez Marandi (P.W.-2), Basta Murmu (deceased) and Betka Hansda P.W.-7 were sleeping on the ground. In paragraph-2 he has stated that he woke-up hearing the shouting of Dez Marandi. P.W.-4 Anup Murmu has stated that he was sleeping on a Chowki with Sanjhla Tudu (P.W.-3). This witness has further stated that Dez Marandi (P.W.-2), Basta Murmu (deceased) and Betka Hansda P.W.-7 were sleeping on the ground. In paragraph-2 he has stated that he woke-up hearing the shouting of Dez Marandi. At paragraph-3 he has stated that there was much bleeding from the head of Basta Murmu. This witness has stated that Basta Murmu was servant of Marangmai Hansda since last 2 years. This witness, at paragraph-5, has stated that Marangmai Hansda, the informant, is his mother-in-law. Basta Murmu was taken to Mahgama Hospital from where he was referred to Godda Hospital where he died. At paragraph-9 in his cross-examination this witness has stated that deceased resides in the house of informant since last one and half years and on that day Dez Marandi P.W.2 had come for sleeping. In paragraph-10 he has repeated that he and Sanjhla were sleeping on a Chowki and Dez Marandi, Basta Murmu and Betka Murmu were sleeping on the ground in Varandha. In paragraph-11 of cross- examination this witness has stated that it was a moon day night, so the evidence of this witness is corroborative of the fact that on the day of occurrence Dez Marandi, Basta Murmu, Sanjhla Tudu, Anup Murmu and Betka Hansda were present in the house of the informant. Further, at paragraph-2 he has stated that Dez Marandi had seen the person who had assaulted Basta Murmu. P.W.-5 Marangmai Murmu. This witness has stated at paragraph-2 that 15 days before the incident Basta Murmu had told her that there was a quarreled between Basta Murmu and Mohanlal Tudu because of Bahamai Marandi with whom Basta Murmu had love affairs. In para-3 has she has stated that Basta Murmu told her that Mohanlal Tudu had threatened (intimidated) to kill him. In paragraph-10 this witness has stated that the head was smashed. P.W.-6 Bahamai Marandi, sister of Dez Merandi (P.W. -2). This witness is unable to speak or understand the local language or hindi as such an interpreter was appointed. This witness at paragraph-1 has stated that the occurrence took place in the night of Sunday and Dez Marandi that is, (her brother) had told her that acused had assaulted the servant of Marangmai Hansda. This witness is unable to speak or understand the local language or hindi as such an interpreter was appointed. This witness at paragraph-1 has stated that the occurrence took place in the night of Sunday and Dez Marandi that is, (her brother) had told her that acused had assaulted the servant of Marangmai Hansda. In the same paragraph she has stated that she is not remembering the name of servant of Marangmai Hansda and also she is unable to say as to where he was treated. In paragraph-4 this witness has stated that Dez Marandi had told her that accused had called him and told him not to disclose his name. In para-5 she has stated that on that day Dez Mamandi was sleeping with Basta Murmu. In the same paragraph again she has repeated that Dez Marandi had told her that he had recognized the accused when the accused was fleeing away. P.W.-7 Betka Hansda. This witness has only stated that he had gone to the house of Marangmai Hansda to invite her in Sradh. In the night Basta Murmu, this witness and Dez Marandi were sleeping on the ground. In the night hearing halla of Dez Marandi, he woke-up and saw the injury on the head of Basta Murmu. Dez Marandi told this witness that this accused had assaulted. There was severe bleeding from the head of Basta Murmu. This witness has further stated that he had heard in the village that Mohanlal Tudu was saying Dez Marandi not to disclose his name before police. In para-6 he has stated that Dez Harandi had recognized the accused and had told him his name and also Dez Marandi had told him that the accused had called him in his house and asked him not to disclose his name before police. In the village this witness had heard about love of Basta Murmu and Bahamai and there was a quarrel between the accused and the deceased. In the same paragraph-8 this witness has stated that he had seen Dez Marandi for the first time and after that he had no talk with Dez Marandi. P.W.-8 Balemai Soren, the daughter of the informant. This witness at paragraph-4 has stated that he had seen Mohanlal Tudú assaulting Basta Murmu and she had recognized him while he was assaulting Basta Murmu. P.W.-8 Balemai Soren, the daughter of the informant. This witness at paragraph-4 has stated that he had seen Mohanlal Tudú assaulting Basta Murmu and she had recognized him while he was assaulting Basta Murmu. At paragraph-2 she has stated that Basta Murmu, Dez Marandi and Betka Murmu were sleeping. Anup Murmu and Sanjhla Tudu were sleeping on a chowki. At paragraph-11 she has stated that with Basta Murmu, Betka Hanada, Anup Murmu and her mother had gone to hospital. At paragraph-5 this witness has stated that Marangmai Murmu (P.W.-5) had told her that there was a quarrel between Mohanlal Tudu and Basta Murmu 10 to 15 days before. In cross-examination at paragraph-19 this witness has repeated the same thing. A suggestion has been given to this witness that she is deposing falsely at the instance of Mukhia but she denied. PW-9 Marangmai Hasda, the informant. This witness is unable to speak and understand either local language or Hindi as such interpreter was appointed. This witness has stated that since last 2 years she had kept Basta Murmu as servant. Basta Murmu belonged to village Gobra. Basta Murmu, Botka Hansda and Dez Marandi were sleeping with him in the Varandha. Anup and Sanjhla Tudu slept on a chowki. On hearing hulla she and her daughter both woke up and this witness saw Mohanlal Todu running. She sent Dez Marandi to village Gobra. From Mahgama Hospital Basta Murmu was referred to Godda Hospital where he died. In para-7 she has stated that she knows about the love affair of Basta Murmu, Bahamai Hembram and Mohanlal Tudu. At paragraph-10 of her cross-examination she has stated that she had not seen assaulting and had only seen running Mohanlal Tudu. At paragraph-14 she has stated that Anup Murmu was living since last 2 years in her house. A suggestion has been given to this witness that at the instance of Robin (Mukhia) she has falsely implicated the accused Mohanlal Tudu to which, she had denied. P.W.-10 Ram Soren. The evidence of this witness is only to the effect that one boy had gone to him for informing him about the assaulting of Basta Murmu. He had gone along with Dhena Murmu to see the dead body of Basta Murmu. PW.-11 Dhena Murmu. The evidence of P.M.-11 is also to the effect that he accompanied PW-10. P.W.-10 Ram Soren. The evidence of this witness is only to the effect that one boy had gone to him for informing him about the assaulting of Basta Murmu. He had gone along with Dhena Murmu to see the dead body of Basta Murmu. PW.-11 Dhena Murmu. The evidence of P.M.-11 is also to the effect that he accompanied PW-10. Both the witnesses P.W.-10 and 11 belonged to Gobra village, that is, the village of the deceased Basta Murmu. So the evidence of these two witnesses is not matrial either on the point of identification or manner of occurrence. P.W.-12 Dr. Arvind Kumar Singh is the doctor who examined Basta Murmu before his death. He has found three injuries on the person of Basta Murmu. The injury no.1 was grossly lacerated wound on the frontal bone of right side of bone, the brain matter was coming out of wound. The wound was 1½" ½" bone deep. The second injury was one lacerated wound stellate shape measuring about 3” x 3” with fracture of parital bone with brain material procuring through the wound and the 3 rd injury was bruise on the right eye with eccligmosis. Out of these three injuries the injury number one and two is said to be grievous in nature caused by hard and blunt substance and the injury number three was simple. This witness at paragraph-3 of his cross examination has stated that he had not found any sharp cutting injury. P.W.-13 Nav Kumar Soren is the I.O. He has proved Sanha entry no.218 dt.14.04.1997 which was written at 5.45 ?.?. which has been marked as Ext.-2. This witness has also proved Sanha entry no.228 which has been marked Ext.2/a. This witness has proved the ferdbeyan of Marangmai Hansda which has been marked Ext.-3. Thereafter he recorded the statement of Tala Marandi, Balemai Soren, Marangmai Murmu, Chotta Shyamlal Tudu, Dez Marandi, Bhahamai Marandi, Dhena Murmu and other witnesses. At paragraph-9 of his cross-examination a suggestion has been given to this witness that he has obtained the name of accused by giving pressure upon Dez Marandi. At paragraph-12 another suggestion has been given to this witness that he had given the name of the accused on the pressure of Mukhia. This witness has denied both the suggestions. P.W.-14 Dr. At paragraph-9 of his cross-examination a suggestion has been given to this witness that he has obtained the name of accused by giving pressure upon Dez Marandi. At paragraph-12 another suggestion has been given to this witness that he had given the name of the accused on the pressure of Mukhia. This witness has denied both the suggestions. P.W.-14 Dr. Ajay Kumar Jha is the doctor who has performed the post-mortem and the postmortem report has been proved by him which has been marked as Ext.-4. In anti- mortem injury this witness has found four injuries. The extra injury, that is Injury no.4 the bruise 4” x 4” on left parital area has been found by this witness. This P.W.-14 has opined that the injuries were caused by hard and blunt substance and in cross-examination at paragraph-7 he has stated that he had not detected any injury on the body of Basta Murmu caused by sharp cutting weapon. P.W.-15 Nageshwar Das on 14.04.1997 had prepared the inquest report which has also been wrongly marked as Ext.4. This witness has further proved the ferdbeyan of Marangmai Hansda which, he had recorded after the death of Basta Murmu in the Sadar Hospital Godda which has been marked as Ext.-5. 20. The statement of the accused person/appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he had denied the allegation alleged against him. 21. After due appreciations of evidences the Learned trial court had found the charge was proved beyond reasonable doubt against the present appellant and accordingly he was convicted under section 302 IPC against which the instant appeal has been preferred. 22. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspects and testimonies of prosecution witnesses and arguments, of the learned counsel for the parties, this Court in the instant case is to consider following issues: - (i) Whether the material as has come in course of trial is sufficient to attract the offence alleged to be committed under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code? (ii) Whether the only testimony of an eyewitness i.e. P.W.2 is sufficient enough to prove the alleged charge against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. (iii) Whether the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt in light of inter-se and intra-se contradictions in testimonies of the prosecution witnesses? 23. Since all the aforesaid issues are inextricably interlinked, the same are being decided hereinbelow by considering them together. (iii) Whether the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt in light of inter-se and intra-se contradictions in testimonies of the prosecution witnesses? 23. Since all the aforesaid issues are inextricably interlinked, the same are being decided hereinbelow by considering them together. 24. This Court, in order to appreciate the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant with respect to the culpability of the appellant, for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code vis-à-vis the evidences adduced on behalf of the parties, and further answering the issues as referred above, deems it fit and proper to discuss settled position of law which has been by settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 25. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that there are contradiction and improvement in the testimony of the informant(P.W.9) vis-à-vis the fardbeyan. 26. In the aforesaid context this court is conscious with the settled position of law that minor discrepancy cannot vitiate the prosecution story, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai Vs. State of Gujrat [ (1983) 3 SCC 217 ], in particular at paragraph nos. 5 which reads as under: "5. ...The finding of guilt recorded by the Sessions Court as affirmed by the High Court has been challenged mainly on the basis of minor discrepancies in the evidence. We do not consider it appropriate or permissible to enter upon a reappraisal or reappreciation of the evidence in the context of the minor discrepancies painstakingly highlighted by learned Counsel for the appellant. Overmuch importance cannot be attached to minor discrepancies. The reasons are obvious : "(1) By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. (2) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprised. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.(3) The powers of observation differ from person to person.What one may notice, another may not. (2) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprised. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.(3) The powers of observation differ from person to person.What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.(4) By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape-recorder. (5) In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess- work on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals which varies from person to person. (6) Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which takes place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.(7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination made by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The sub conscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him -- Perhaps it is a sort of a psychological defence mechanism activated on the spur of the moment." 27. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mukesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) , reported in (2015) 17 SCC 694 , at paragraph-8, it has been held as under: "8. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mukesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) , reported in (2015) 17 SCC 694 , at paragraph-8, it has been held as under: "8. While the slight difference in the initial version of the prosecution and the FIR version has been reasonably explained by the cross-examination of PW 6, it is our considered view that minor discrepancies, embellishments and contradictions in the evidence of the eyewitnesses do not destroy the essential fabric of the prosecution case, the core of which remains unaffected. Even if we have to assume that there are certain unnatural features in the evidence of the eyewitnesses the same can be reasonably explained on an accepted proposition of law that different persons would react to the same situation in different manner and there can be no uniform or accepted code of conduct to judge the correctness of the conduct of the prosecution witnesses i.e. PWs 1 and 2. The relation between PWs 5 and 6 and PWs 1 and 2 and the deceased, in our considered view, by itself, would not discredit the testimony of the said witnesses. There is nothing in the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 which makes their version unworthy of acceptance and their testimony remains unshaken in the elaborate cross-examination undertaken." 28. Thus, from the aforesaid proposition of law it is evident that minor discrepancies, embellishments and contradictions in the evidence of the eyewitness do not destroy the essential fabric of the prosecution case, the core of which remains unaffected. But at the same time, it is equally settled that the discrepancies which go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses that can be annexed with due importance. More so when there is need of corroboration of the testimony of eyewitness from other available evidences, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S. Govindaraju v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 15 SCC 315 . For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under: “23. It is well settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions were of such magnitude so as to materially affect the trial. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under: “23. It is well settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions were of such magnitude so as to materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements in relation to trivial matters, which do not affect the core of the case of the prosecution, must not be made a ground for rejection of evidence in its entirety. The trial court, after going through the entire evidence available, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses, and the appellate court in the normal course of action, would not be justified in reviewing the same, without providing justifiable reasons for doing so. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of a witness, and the other witnesses also make material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it would not be safe to rely upon such evidence. The discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if found not to be minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, the witnesses may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict and contradiction with the other evidence available or with a statement that has already been recorded, then in such a case, it cannot be held that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.” 29. At this juncture it requires to refer herein the settled proposition of law that evidence of an eye-witness should be of very sterling quality and caliber and it should not only instil confidence in the court to accept the same but it should also be a version of such nature that can be accepted at its face value. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rai Sandeep @ Deepu alias Deepu V. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 21 has observed that the “sterling witness” should be of very high quality and Caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. What would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. What would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution of the accused. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid Judgment is being quoted as under: “22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.” 30. Learned counsel for the appellant has further contended that as per the opinion of the doctor who had conducted postmortem upon the dead bodies of the deceased has not found any injury caused by sharp cutting weapon and has opined that the injuries were caused by hard and blunt substance like lathi and rod etc. but the self-proclaimed eyewitness PW-2 has stated in his deposition that he has seen the appellant assaulting the deceased with sharp cutting weapon, therefore the testimony of P.W.2 is not fit to be accepted. 31. In the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein that wherever there is a gross contradiction between medical evidence and ocular evidence, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved. Further if there is gross contradiction between medical evidence and oral evidence, and if the medical evidence makes the ocular evidence improbable and rules out all possibility of ocular evidence being true the ocular evidence may be disbelieved. 32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana , reported in (2011) 7 SCC 421 has held as under: 38. 32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana , reported in (2011) 7 SCC 421 has held as under: 38. Thus, the position of law in such a case of contradiction between medical and ocular evidence can be crystallised to the effect that though the ocular testimony of a witness has greater evidentiary value vis- à-vis medical evidence, when medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable, that becomes a relevant factor in the process of the evaluation of evidence. However, where the medical evidence goes so far that it completely rules out all possibility of the ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved. 33. In the case of CBI v. Mohd. Parvez Abdul Kayuum, (2019) 12 SCC 1 the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the same view, for ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid order is being quoted as under: “The witness is not supposed to give all these minute details. It is not a case where medical evidence completely improbabilises the ocular evidence; only in that case the ocular evidence has to be discarded, not otherwise. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the accused on Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. [Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1262] thus: (SCC p. 274, para 39) “39. Thus, the position of law in cases where there is a contradiction between medical evidence and ocular evidence can be crystallised to the effect that though the ocular testimony of a witness has greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence, when medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable, that becomes a relevant factor in the process of the evaluation of evidence. However, where the medical evidence goes so far that it completely rules out all possibility of the ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved.” 65. Even otherwise as submitted on behalf of the prosecution that in case of any discrepancy between the ocular or medical evidence, the ocular evidence shall prevail, as observed in Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh [Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh, (2017) 11 SCC 195 : (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 257] : (SCC pp. 217-18, para 43) “43. Even otherwise as submitted on behalf of the prosecution that in case of any discrepancy between the ocular or medical evidence, the ocular evidence shall prevail, as observed in Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh [Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh, (2017) 11 SCC 195 : (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 257] : (SCC pp. 217-18, para 43) “43. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents has then tried to create a dent in the prosecution story by pointing out inconsistencies between the ocular evidence and the medical evidence. However, we are not persuaded with this submission since both the courts below have categorically ruled that the medical evidence was consistent with the ocular evidence and we can safely say that to that extent, it corroborated the direct evidence proffered by the eyewitnesses. We hold that there is no material discrepancy in the medical and ocular evidence and there is no reason to interfere with the judgments [Mahabeer Singh v. State of U.P., 2012 SCC OnLine All 4428] of the courts below on this ground. In any event, it has been consistently held by this Court that the evidentiary value of medical evidence is only corroborative and not conclusive and, hence, in case of a conflict between oral evidence and medical evidence, the former is to be preferred unless the medical evidence completely rules out the oral evidence. In any event, it has been consistently held by this Court that the evidentiary value of medical evidence is only corroborative and not conclusive and, hence, in case of a conflict between oral evidence and medical evidence, the former is to be preferred unless the medical evidence completely rules out the oral evidence. [See Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat [Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 2 SCC 174 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 379] , Mani Ram v. State of Rajasthan [Mani Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 18 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 853] , State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal [State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC 302 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 928] , State of Haryana v. Bhagirath [State of Haryana v. Bhagirath, (1999) 5 SCC 96 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 658] , Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat [Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat, (2003) 9 SCC 322 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1809] , Thaman Kumar v. State (UT of Chandigarh) [Thaman Kumar v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2003) 6 SCC 380 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1362] , Krishnan v. State [Krishnan v. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1577] , Khambam Raja Reddy v. Public Prosecutor [Khambam Raja Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, (2006) 11 SCC 239 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 431] , State of U.P. v. Dinesh [State of U.P. v. Dinesh, (2009) 11 SCC 566 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1484] , State of U.P. v. Hari Chand [State of U.P. v. Hari Chand, (2009) 13 SCC 542 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1112] , Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. [Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1262] and Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana [Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 421 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 241 : (2011) 7 SCR 1 ] .]” 66. The ocular evidence to prevail has also been observed in Sunil Kundu v. State of Jharkhand [Sunil Kundu v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 4 SCC 422 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 427] thus: (SCC p. 432, para 24) “24. The ocular evidence to prevail has also been observed in Sunil Kundu v. State of Jharkhand [Sunil Kundu v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 4 SCC 422 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 427] thus: (SCC p. 432, para 24) “24. In Kapildeo Mandal v. State of Bihar [Kapildeo Mandal v. State of Bihar, (2008) 16 SCC 99 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 203] , all the eyewitnesses had categorically stated that the deceased was injured by the use of firearm, whereas the medical evidence specifically indicated that no firearm injury was found on the deceased. This Court held that while appreciating variance between medical evidence and ocular evidence, oral evidence of eyewitnesses has to get priority as medical evidence is basically opinionative. But, when the evidence of the eyewitnesses is totally inconsistent with the evidence given by the medical experts then evidence is appreciated in a different perspective by the courts. It was observed that when medical evidence specifically rules out the injury claimed to have been inflicted as per the eyewitnesses' version, then the court can draw adverse inference that the prosecution version is not trustworthy. This judgment is clearly attracted to the present case.” 34. Thus, from the aforesaid settled position of law, it is evident that in any event, unless the oral evidence is totally irreconcilable with the medical evidence, it has primacy and when it comes to Ocular Evidence and Medical Evidence being inconsistent with each other, the settled law is that the ocular evidence must be given primacy, unless medical evidence completely overrules the ocular evidence. 35. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law and in view of material evidence available on record this Court is now going to appreciate the issues as referred hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs. 36. Further, this Court has given its thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have carefully re-analysed the evidence available on record wherefrom some undisputed fact has been emerged which are as follows: (i) The factum of the death of Basta Murmu being homicidal is not in dispute, which stands established from the testimony of the medical jurist Dr. Ajay Kr. Jha (PW-14). (ii) Further, as per the opinion of the doctor who had conducted postmortem upon the dead body of the deceased persons, the injuries were caused by hard and blunt substance like lathi and rod etc. Ajay Kr. Jha (PW-14). (ii) Further, as per the opinion of the doctor who had conducted postmortem upon the dead body of the deceased persons, the injuries were caused by hard and blunt substance like lathi and rod etc. and that he has not found any injury caused by sharp cutting weapon. (iii) Neither informant nor P. W. 2, who claims to be the eye witness, did not disclose the name of the appellant when the Fardbeyan was recorded and, as such, the F.I.R. was instituted against unknown. (iv) Herein two fardbeyan has been recorded i.e. Ext. 3 and Ext.5 respectively and in second fardbeyan informant has added a new factual aspect that on fateful night Dhena Murmu (P.W.11) was sleeping with the deceased Basta Murmu. (v) Dez Marandi (P.W. 2) claims to be sleeping in the house of the informant alongwith others and had seen the accused assaulting to the deceased with sharp cutting weapon, but P.W.2 did not disclose the name of the appellant to the informant or to any other persons when the Fardbeyan was recorded and P.W.2 had stated the name of the appellant to the police on 16.04.1997 i.e. after three days of alleged occurrence. (vi) It has come in the testimony of P. W.2, that he had gone to other village i.e. Gobra, to inform the death of Basta Murmu to uncle of the deceased but therein also he did not disclose the name of the appellant to uncle of the deceased. The brother of the deceased was not present in the house, so he went to other village i.e. Basant Roy, but there also PW-2 did not disclose the name of the appellant/accused. 37. The learned counsel for the appellant has emphatically contended that there are inter-se and intra-se contradiction in the testimony of prosecution witnesses. In the light of aforesaid contention this Court has again revisited the testimony of the witnesses particularly informant and P.W.2. 38. The informant has been examined as P.W.9 and she had stated in her testimony that after hearing hulla she got up and came out and saw that Mohan Tudu (appellant herein) running. But from the fardbeyan it is evident that this witness has not mentioned the said factual aspect in her farbeyan. Further from the aforesaid it is apparent that this witness is not an eyewitness of the alleged occurrence. 39. But from the fardbeyan it is evident that this witness has not mentioned the said factual aspect in her farbeyan. Further from the aforesaid it is apparent that this witness is not an eyewitness of the alleged occurrence. 39. Further in the First fardbeyan she had stated that no male members were in her house but in 2nd fardbeyan (Ext.5) she had improved her version and had stated that Dhena Marandi (P.W.11) was sleeping with the Basta Murmu (deceased) at fateful night but the said Dhena Marandi (P.W.11) did not corroborate the aforesaid version and had stated that he had gone to Harkatta with Ram Soren and saw the dead body. 40. P. W, 2 claims to be sleeping alongwith others and had seen the accused assaulting to the deceased with sharp cutting weapon, but surprisingly this witness did not disclose the name of the appellant to the informant or to any other persons sleeping with in the night or when the fardbeyan was recorded. Further this is not a prosecution story of the informant because in the fardbeyan she had stated that no male members were in her house. 41. Further as per the evidence, the P.W.2 after witnessing the alleged occurrence had gone to other village i.e. Gobra, to inform the death of Basta Murmu to uncle of the deceased but therein also he did not disclose the name of the appellant to uncle of the deceased. The brother of the deceased was not present in the house, so he went to other village i.e. Basant Roy, but there also PW-2 did not disclose the name of the appellant/accused. 42. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid it is considered view of this Court that the said conduct of P.W.2 cannot said to be natural conduct rather it will be come under the purview of the un-natural conduct. 43. In almost similar circumstances which is available herein, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Mr. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid it is considered view of this Court that the said conduct of P.W.2 cannot said to be natural conduct rather it will be come under the purview of the un-natural conduct. 43. In almost similar circumstances which is available herein, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Mr. Brahmananda Nanda) (1976) 4 SCC 288 while taking note of delay of one and half day in disclosure of the name of accused has observed that this is a very serious infirmity which destroys the credibility of the evidence of this witness, for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under: "The evidence suffers from serious infirmities which have been discussed in detail by the High Court. It is not necessary to reiterate them, but it will be sufficient if we refer only to one infirmity which, in our opinion, is of the most serious character. Though according to this witness, she saw the murderous assault on Hrudasnanda by the respondent and she also saw the respondent coming out of the adjoining house of Nityanandal where the rest of the murders were committed, she did not mention the name of the respondent as the assailant for a day and a half. The murders were committed in the night of 13th June, 1969 and yet she did not come out with the name of the respondent until the morning of 15th June, 1969. It is not possible to accept the explanation sought to be given on behalf of the prosecution that she did not disclose the name of the respondent as the assailant earlier than 15th June, 1969 on account of fear of the respondent. There could be no question of any fear from the respondent because in the first place, the respondent was not known to be a gangster or a confirmed criminal about whom people would be afraid, secondly, the police had already arrived at the scene and they were stationed in the Club House which was just opposite to the house of the witness and thirdly, A.S.I. Madan Das was her nephew and he had come to the village in connection with the case and had also visited her house on 14th June, 1969. It is indeed difficult to believe that this witness should not have disclosed the name of the respondent to the police or even to A.S.I. Madan Das and should have waited till the morning of 15th June, 1969 for giving out the name of the respondent. This is a very serious infirmity which destroys the credibility of the evidence of this witness." 44. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narendrasinh Keshubhai Zala v. State of Gujarat , (2023) 18 SCC 783 while noting the conduct of the alleged eyewitness is suspicious has discarded the testimony of the Sole eyewitness and has observed which reads as under: 11. PW 3 states that the incident left him shocked and stunned. He was so scared that he ran towards the society where he met his uncle Harshad Veljibhai (PW 9) and his friend Manish Natvarlal Trivedi (PW 8) whom he informed of the incident. Seeing his condition, he was asked by his uncle to go home and sleep. Next morning, he went to the house of Ram and narrated the incident to his mother and sister Heenaba Pradipsinh Zala (PW 2). Thereafter he went to the hospital and informed Ram's father (PW 1) of the incident. Further, PW 3's credit stands impeached in the cross- examination part of his testimony. The witness is an adult, mature and worldly wise. He is aged 24 years and runs a grocery shop. He is not illiterate, yet he chose to not take any action, even to save the life of his friend. His explanation that he went home and slept is uninspiring in confidence for the incident took place in his presence and in close proximity of habitation, more specifically at a short distance i.e. just 3-4 minutes of walking distance from the Police Headquarters where constables are posted round the clock. He left his friend profusely bleeding on the spot but did not seek any help and immediately did not report the incident to the family members of the deceased whose house he visited only the following day at around 8.00-9.00 a.m. His conduct of going off to sleep, having seen his friend being murdered right before his eyes and then not visiting the hospital forthwith is quite unnatural. Also he did not inform the incident to his parents. It was only when the police interrogated him that he named the accused. Also he did not inform the incident to his parents. It was only when the police interrogated him that he named the accused. His testimony is not free from embellishments, nor is not corroborated by any other evidence. Also, he admits not to have any information of any monetary transactions between the accused and the deceased. 45. Herein, for over 3 days from the date of incident, P.W.2 did not disclose the incident to the informant. The prosecution sold out a reason, explaining such a conduct of this witness that the appellant/accused had stated him not to disclose the incident to anyone but this Court is not impressed with the said reason. From record it is evident that on the next day of the incident, the police had come in village. In our view, if this witness mustered courage to disclose to the police the incident after 3 days, he could have very well mustered courage to disclose it on the following day. Further there remains no justification for his having not informed to the informant about the incident. 46. The conduct of PW-2 is un-natural and unbelievable and his version appears to be doubtful reason being that an eyewitness waiting 3 days to disclose an appellant's name to others and the said delay has not been explained satisfactorily casts serious doubt on the prosecution case. Further in the instant case, it is apparent from record that immediately after the alleged occurrence the informant has given fardbeyan to police based upon which FIR was lodged but at that time neither the informant and nor the P.W.2 has taken name of the present appellant before the police. 47. Further at paragraph 13 of his testimony this witness has clarified and stated that he had seen Beta Ram Tudu assaulting Basta Murmu with Lathi and pointing the accused he has stated that he knows the accused in the name of Beta Ram Tudu. At paragraph-5 he has stated that Mohanlal Tudu(accused) called him to his house and told him not to disclose his name to any because he had seen him one assaulting Basta Murmu, but this witness disclosed the name of accused before his sister Bahamai Marandi P.W.6 and told her that Mohanial Tudu has asked his not to disclose his name. At paragraph-5 he has stated that Mohanlal Tudu(accused) called him to his house and told him not to disclose his name to any because he had seen him one assaulting Basta Murmu, but this witness disclosed the name of accused before his sister Bahamai Marandi P.W.6 and told her that Mohanial Tudu has asked his not to disclose his name. At paragraph 6 this witness has stated when the accused assaulted Basta Murmu he was not sleep as such he saw and recognised the accused. At paragraph 8 he has identified the accused in the dock and said that this is the person whom he had seen on the day of occurrence assaulting with lathi. 48. As discussed hereinabove this witness had not disclosed the name of the accused/appellant immediately after the occurrence. Further at paragraph 12 of his testimony this witness has stated that after the occurrence he had not met the accused and for the first time he is seeing him in the court and further that he had not talked with his sister about the incident in the house, and therefore it is evident that this witness had not met accused then how Mohanlal Tudu(appellant herein) and called him and asked not to disclose his name. Further, if he had not talked with his sister in the house then there is not question of disclosing the name of accused to his sister arises. Further, at one place paragraph 2 this witness has stated that accused assaulted with Kulhari whereas in paragraph-8 and 13 he has stated that accused assaulted with lathi. 49. It is further evident that paragraph -12 of the evidence of this witness wherein he has stated that in the house of Marangmai Hansda her father-in-law Balemai soren, Basta Murmu and Marangmai Hansda herself were residing which is not the case of the prosecution because in the fardbeyan, it is stated that the informant was living with her widowed daughter Palemai soren and as there were no male member she had kept Basta Murmu as servant. 50. 50. Thus, on the basis of the discussion made herein above this Court is of the considered view that testimony of the prosecution witnesses has full with the vital contradictions and further it is also evident that the testimony of the alleged eyewitness P.W.2 is not fully reliable and trustworthy and as such benefit of doubt might be extended to the appellant. 51. It needs to refer herein that the law is well settled that in the case of eye witness, who, if supports the prosecution version, the conviction is to be there, but the law is equally settled that it is the duty of the prosecution to substantiate the charge said to be proved without any iota of doubt and if there is any doubt, then the benefit of such doubt is to be given to the accused person. 52. Further, Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that may be proved, and something that will be proved. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason that the mental distance between “may be” and “must be” is quite large, and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. 53. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between “may be true” and “must be true”, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between “`may be true” and “must be true”, the court must maintain the vital distance between mere conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny, based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided, and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sujit Biswas vs State of Assam; 2013 Cri.LJ 3140) (SC). 54. The law is also settled that merely on the basis of presumption and conjecture, there cannot be conviction of a person snatching away the right to life as directed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, rather the principle is that the conviction is to be based upon the evidence as produced by the prosecution witness if found to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. 55. The Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of decision has propounded the proposition that in the criminal trial, there cannot be any conviction if the charge is not being proved beyond all reasonable doubts, as has been held in the case of Rang Bahadur Singh & Ors. Vrs. State of U.P., reported in (2000) 3 SCC 454 , wherein, at paragraph-22, it has been held as under:- "22. The amount of doubt which the Court would entertain regarding the complicity of the appellants in this case is much more than the level of reasonable doubt. We are aware that acquitting the accused in a case of this nature is not a matter of satisfaction for all concerned. At the same time we remind ourselves of the time-tested rule that acquittal of a guilty person should be preferred to conviction of an innocent person. Unless the prosecution establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt a conviction cannot be passed on the accused. A criminal court cannot afford to deprive liberty of the appellants, lifelong liberty, without having at least a reasonable level of certainty that the appellants were the real culprits. We really entertain doubt about the involvement of the appellants in the crime." 56. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnegowda & Ors. Vrs. State of Karnataka , (2017) 13 SCC 98 has held at paragraph-26 as under:- "26. We really entertain doubt about the involvement of the appellants in the crime." 56. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnegowda & Ors. Vrs. State of Karnataka , (2017) 13 SCC 98 has held at paragraph-26 as under:- "26. Having gone through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the findings recorded by the High Court we feel that the High Court has failed to understand the fact that the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and this is a classic case where at each and every stage of the trial, there were lapses on the part of the investigating agency and the evidence of the witnesses is not trustworthy which can never be a basis for conviction. The basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is that the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt." 57. Further, it needs to refer herein the principle of 'benefit of doubt' belongs exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of 'benefit of doubt' can be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Bhagirath & Ors ., reported in (1999) 5 SCC 96 , wherein, it has been held at paragraph-7 as under: - "7. The High Court had failed to consider the implication of the evidence of the two eyewitnesses on the complicity of Bhagirath particularly when the High Court found their evidence reliable. The benefit of doubt was given to Bhagirath "as a matter of abundant caution". Unfortunately, the High Court did not point out the area where there is such a doubt. Any restraint by way of abundant caution need not be entangled with the concept of the benefit of doubt. Abundant caution is always desirable in all spheres of human activity. But the principle of benefit of doubt belongs exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of benefit of doubt can be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. It is the reasonable doubt which a conscientious judicial mind entertains on a conspectus of the entire evidence that the accused might not have committed the offence, which affords the benefit to the accused at the end of the criminal trial. It is the reasonable doubt which a conscientious judicial mind entertains on a conspectus of the entire evidence that the accused might not have committed the offence, which affords the benefit to the accused at the end of the criminal trial. Benefit of doubt is not a legal dosage to be administered at every segment of the evidence, but an advantage to be afforded to the accused at the final end after consideration of the entire evidence, if the Judge conscientiously and reasonably entertains doubt regarding the guilt of the accused." 58. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat reported in (2002) 3 SCC 57 has laid down the principle that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted, for reference, paragraph 6 thereof requires to be referred herein which reads hereunder as :- “6. ------The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. —" 59. It needs to refer herein before laying down the aforesaid view, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 has already laid down the same view at paragraph 163 which is required to be referred which read hereunder as: “163. We then pass on to another important point which seems to have been completely missed by the High Court. It is well settled that where on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecution and the other which benefits an accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt.---" 60. We then pass on to another important point which seems to have been completely missed by the High Court. It is well settled that where on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecution and the other which benefits an accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt.---" 60. This Court, after having discussed the factual aspect and legal position as discussed hereinabove is of the view that there are vital intra-se and inter-se contradiction in the testimony of the prosecution witness and further on the basis of testimony of self-pro-claimed eyewitness P.W.2 based upon which order of sentence and conviction has been passed, it cannot be stated that the charge against the appellant under Section 302 has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt, as such the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence requires interference by this Court. 61. In the result, the Judgment of conviction dated 03.07.1998 and Order of sentence dated 04.07.1998 passed by learned 2 nd Additional Sessions Judge, Godda, in Sessions Case No.138 of 1997/43 of 1997, is hereby quashed and set aside. 62. Consequently, the appellant is hereby discharged from all criminal liabilities. Since the aforesaid appellant is on bail, he is discharged from the liability of the bail bonds 63. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands allowed. 64. Let the Lower Court Records be sent back to the Court concerned forthwith, along with the copy of this Judgment. 65. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stands disposed of. I agree. (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)