1 2026:CGHC:23724-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 793 of 2025 Mukesh Ram Yadav S/o Keshbo Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Danimuda, Barnipur, Police Station Farsabahar, District Jashpur (C.G.) ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station, Excise Department, Divisional Flying Squade, Division Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G.) ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Sudeep Verma, Advocate For State/Respondent : Ms. Vaishali Mahilong, Deputy Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 15.06 .2026 1 Heard Mr. Sudeep Verma, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Ms. Vaishali Mahilong, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent. 2 The appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.06.15 18:03:28 +0530 2 short, ‘BNSS’), assailing the legality and correctness of the impugned judgment dated 06.03.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge (N.D.P.S. Act), Surguja, Ambikapur (C.G.), in Special Criminal (N.D.P.S.) Case No.21/2024. By the said judgment, the appellant has been held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, ‘NDPS Act’) and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 14 years along with a fine of Rs.1,00,000/-, with a stipulation that in default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years. 3 The prosecution story of the case, as unfolded before the learned Trial Court, is that on 07.04.2024, the Investigating Officer, Shri Ranjeet Kumar Gupta (PW-7), who was then posted as Assistant District Excise Officer, Excise Flying Squad, Ambikapur, received a secret information through a reliable informer that one person was standing near Smriti Vatika, Sandbar, in a Ford EcoSport vehicle and was carrying a huge quantity of contraband ganja for the purpose of sale and was waiting for prospective customers. Upon receipt of the said information, the Investigating Officer reduced the information into writing and initiated proceedings for its verification. Independent witnesses namely Pankaj Chauhan (PW-1) and Krishna Chauhan (PW-2) were called by serving notices upon them and were informed about the secret information. 3 4 Both witnesses agreed to participate in the proposed search and seizure proceedings. The Investigating Officer also informed his superior officer, namely the Deputy Commissioner, Excise Division, Surguja, through telephone regarding the secret information and, as directed, proceeded to verify the same. Since obtaining a search warrant was not feasible in the prevailing circumstances, a memorandum to that effect was prepared. 5 Thereafter, accompanied by the independent witnesses, members of the Excise Flying Squad, necessary seizure materials and weighing instruments, the Investigating Officer proceeded towards the spot in a government vehicle. Upon reaching near Smriti Vatika, Sandbar, another independent witness, Trilochan Singh (PW-3), was associated with the proceedings by serving a notice upon him. At the spot, a Ford EcoSport vehicle bearing registration No. CG-10-AC-1447 was found parked in the manner indicated in the secret information. 6 A person standing near the vehicle was questioned and he disclosed his identity as Mukesh Ram Yadav, the present appellant. The appellant was informed about the information received against him and was apprised of his legal and constitutional rights regarding search. Necessary memoranda in this regard were prepared. The appellant allegedly consented to the search of the vehicle being conducted by the Investigating Officer and furnished his consent in writing. 4 7 Before conducting the search of the appellant and the vehicle under his control, the Investigating Officer offered himself, the accompanying staff members and the government vehicle for search to eliminate any possibility of false implication. A memorandum regarding such proceedings was prepared. Thereafter, the Ford EcoSport vehicle was searched in the presence of the witnesses. During the search, two white sacks were found in the luggage compartment (dickey) of the vehicle. Upon opening the sacks, a substance resembling ganja was found stored therein. A search and seizure memorandum was prepared at the spot and the recovered substance was identified as ganja. 8 According to the prosecution, the entire recovered substance was emptied onto a plastic sheet and mixed together so as to make it homogeneous. Thereafter, its weight was measured with the aid of a weighing machine and the total quantity was found to be 40 kilograms. The seized contraband was then repacked into the same two sacks in equal quantities of 20 kilograms each and both sacks were duly sealed. A specimen seal was also prepared. The two sealed sacks containing the alleged contraband ganja, along with the Ford EcoSport vehicle bearing registration No. CG-10- AC-1447, were seized under a seizure memorandum. The appellant was asked to produce any valid licence, permit or authority for possession and transportation of the said contraband; however, he failed to produce any such document. 5 9 On finding that the appellant was allegedly in conscious and exclusive possession of 40 kilograms of ganja kept in the vehicle under his control, he was arrested and the necessary arrest memorandum was prepared. A spot map of the place of occurrence was also drawn. After completion of the proceedings at the scene, the seized contraband, the vehicle and the appellant were brought back by the raiding team. Subsequently, an offence was registered against the appellant under the provisions of the NDPS Act and the requisite formalities were undertaken. 10 The prosecution further alleges that after registration of the crime, the Investigating Officer made arrangements for safe custody of the seized contraband and the seized vehicle. Since the concerned police station expressed its inability to accommodate the seized material in the malkhana due to lack of space, an application was moved on 08.04.2024 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambikapur, for conducting proceedings under Section 52-A of the NDPS Act. Pursuant thereto, proceedings under Section 52-A of the NDPS Act were carried out before the competent Magistrate on the same day. 11 During such proceedings, three representative samples weighing 50 grams each were drawn from each of the two sacks, resulting in six sealed sample packets. The remaining contraband was resealed separately in the respective sacks. Out of the six sample packets so prepared, four sealed sample packets were forwarded 6 to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Ambikapur, for chemical examination. The report received from the Forensic Science Laboratory confirmed that the samples sent for examination contained ganja (cannabis). Upon completion of investigation and after collecting the relevant material, a charge-sheet came to be filed against the appellant before the Special Court for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act. 12 The learned Special Judge framed charge against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act. The appellant denied the charge and claimed to be tried. In his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’), the appellant pleaded innocence and asserted that he had been falsely implicated. No evidence was adduced in defence. 13 In support of its case, the prosecution examined seven witnesses, namely Pankaj Chauhan (PW-1), Krishna Chauhan (PW-2), Trilochan Singh (PW-3), Kumaru Ram Khairwar (PW-4), Ranvijay Kumar (PW-5), Ramadhar Chaurasia (PW-6) and the Investigating Officer Ranjeet Kumar Gupta (PW-7), and also exhibited various documents connected with the search, seizure and investigation such as Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/38. 14 The defence, however, denied all allegations, pleaded false implication, and claimed that the entire case was fabricated, but did not adduce any defence evidence. 7 15 After due appreciation and critical evaluation of the entire oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned Trial Court has held the appellant guilty of the charges levelled against him. The learned Court below, relying upon the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as well as the documentary exhibits brought on record, has proceeded to convict the appellant and has sentenced him in the manner as indicated in the earlier part of this judgment. 16 Being aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellant has preferred the present appeal questioning the correctness, legality, and propriety of the impugned judgment. Hence, this appeal. 17 Mr. Sudeep Verma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, would submit that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Special Judge is wholly unsustainable in law as well as on facts and suffers from serious infirmities which go to the root of the prosecution case. He would contend that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence available on record in its correct perspective and has recorded the finding of guilt merely on surmises and conjectures. According to him, the prosecution evidence, when examined in its entirety, does not establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the conviction recorded against him deserves to be set aside. 8 18 Mr. Verma would further submit that the prosecution has utterly failed to establish that the alleged contraband was recovered from the conscious, exclusive and lawful possession of the appellant. It is argued that mere presence of the appellant near the vehicle in question would not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that he was in conscious possession of the alleged contraband, particularly when the prosecution has not adduced any cogent and reliable evidence connecting the appellant with the seized substance. He would submit that the foundational facts necessary to attract the statutory presumptions under the NDPS Act have not been established and, therefore, the burden could not have been shifted upon the appellant. According to learned counsel, the learned trial Court overlooked these material aspects while recording the conviction. 19 Mr. Verma would next contend that the alleged seizure itself has not been proved in accordance with law. He would submit that the independent seizure witnesses have not supported the prosecution case in material particulars and their evidence does not inspire confidence. It is argued that the prosecution has mainly relied upon the testimony of official witnesses and the evidence of such witnesses is not free from doubt. Learned counsel would further submit that there are material omissions, contradictions and inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses with regard to the receipt of information, conduct of search, seizure proceedings and preparation of 9 documents. These discrepancies, according to him, strike at the very foundation of the prosecution case and create serious doubt regarding the genuineness of the alleged recovery. 20 It is contended by Mr. Verma that the mandatory safeguards incorporated under the NDPS Act have not been complied with by the investigating agency. According to him, the prosecution has failed to establish due and strict compliance of the provisions contained in Sections 42 and 50 of the NDPS Act. He would argue that in view of the stringent punishments prescribed under the NDPS Act, strict adherence to the statutory requirements is mandatory and any violation thereof vitiates the entire prosecution. It is further contended that the learned trial Court committed a grave error in placing implicit reliance upon the statements of the official witnesses without first satisfying itself regarding compliance with the mandatory procedural safeguards envisaged under the Act. 21 Lastly, Mr. Verma would submit that even if the entire prosecution story is accepted at its face value, the ingredients necessary to bring home the charge under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act are not established beyond reasonable doubt. He would contend that the prosecution evidence suffers from serious legal and factual deficiencies and, therefore, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. It is submitted that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are contrary to the evidence available on 10 record and suffer from material illegality and perversity. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel prays that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set aside and the appellant be acquitted of the charge levelled against him. 22 On the other hand, Ms. Vaishali Mahilong, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State, has vehemently opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and has supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court. Learned State counsel would submit that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based upon a meticulous and proper appreciation of the entire evidence available on record and do not suffer from any illegality, perversity or infirmity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. According to her, the prosecution has succeeded in establishing all the essential ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the conviction of the appellant is fully justified on the basis of the evidence adduced during trial. 23 Ms. Mahilong would further submit that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, particularly that of the Investigating Officer and the members of the raiding party, is cogent, consistent and trustworthy. Merely because some of the independent witnesses have not fully supported the prosecution case, the entire prosecution case cannot be discarded, especially when the 11 testimony of the official witnesses inspires confidence and remains substantially unshaken during cross-examination. It is contended that there is no rule of law that the evidence of official witnesses is to be viewed with suspicion merely on account of their official status and, in the absence of any material suggesting animosity or motive for false implication, their testimony deserves full evidentiary value. 24 It is submitted by Ms. Mahilong that the prosecution has duly established the recovery of 40 kilograms of ganja from the vehicle which was under the control and possession of the appellant at the relevant point of time. The seizure proceedings were conducted in the presence of independent witnesses and all necessary documents were prepared contemporaneously during the course of the investigation. It is further submitted that the contraband was duly weighed, sealed and seized in accordance with law and thereafter samples were drawn under the supervision of the competent Magistrate in proceedings conducted under Section 52-A of the NDPS Act. The samples so drawn were sent for chemical examination and the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory unequivocally confirms that the seized substance was ganja. According to learned State counsel, the chain of custody of the seized contraband has been duly proved and there is no material on record to create any doubt regarding the identity or integrity of the seized substance. 12 25 Ms. Mahilong would next contend that there has been substantial as well as effective compliance with all the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act. The information received by the Investigating Officer was duly reduced into writing, the superior authorities were informed, and the subsequent search and seizure proceedings were conducted in accordance with the statutory requirements. It is submitted that the provisions relied upon by the appellant have not been violated in any manner and the alleged procedural lapses highlighted by the defence are either non-existent or are of a trivial nature which do not affect the core of the prosecution case. According to her, no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the appellant on account of any alleged irregularity. 26 Ms. Mahilong would further submit that the learned Trial Court has carefully examined the evidence of all the witnesses and has assigned cogent and convincing reasons while recording the finding of guilt against the appellant. The minor discrepancies, omissions or variations pointed out by the defence are natural in human testimony and do not affect the substratum of the prosecution case. It is argued that the prosecution evidence, when read as a whole, clearly establishes that the appellant was found in conscious possession of commercial quantity of ganja and, therefore, the presumption available under the NDPS Act rightly operates against him. Since the appellant has failed to rebut the said presumption by leading any acceptable evidence, the learned Trial Court has rightly convicted him. 13 27 On the aforesaid grounds, Ms. Mahilong submits that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt and that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are fully in accordance with law. It is, therefore, prayed that the present criminal appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed and the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant be affirmed. 28 We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also carefully perused the entire record of the case, including the impugned judgment, oral and documentary evidence adduced before the learned Trial Court, as well as the material placed on record in the present appeal. 29 After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length, perusing the record of the case and carefully examining the evidence available on record, the following point arises for determination in the present appeal: "Whether the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that on 07.04.2024 at about 1:05 p.m., near Smriti Vatika, Sandbar, within the jurisdiction of Police Station Manipur, District Surguja (C.G.), the appellant was found in conscious and exclusive possession of 40 kilograms of ganja, a commercial quantity of contraband, allegedly kept in two white sacks stored in the luggage compartment (dickey) of the Ford 14 EcoSport vehicle under his control and possession, in contravention of the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and the Rules, Orders or licence conditions framed thereunder, thereby committing an offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii) (c) of the NDPS Act?" 30 At this stage, it would also be apposite to examine the applicability of the provisions contained under Section 43 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, which deals with the powers of seizure and arrest in a public place. Section 43 of the NDPS Act confers authority upon officers empowered under Section 42 of the Act to seize any narcotic drug, psychotropic substance or controlled substance in any public place or while the same is in transit, if the officer has reason to believe that an offence punishable under the Act has been committed. The said provision further authorises the officer to detain and search any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed such offence and, if such person is found to be in unlawful possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, to arrest him. The explanation appended to Section 43 clarifies that the expression “public place” includes any public conveyance, hotel, shop or any other place intended for use by, or accessible to, the public at large. Section 43 of the NDPS Act provides the powers of seizure and arrest in public place which reads as under: 15 “43. Power of seizure and arrest in public place- Any officer of any of the departments mentioned in section 42 may:- (a) seize in any public place or in transit, any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance in respect of which he has reason to believe an offence punishable under this Act has been committed, and, along with such drug or substance, any animal or conveyance or article liable to confiscation under this Act, any document or other article which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the commission of an offence punishable under this Act or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act; (b) detain and search any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed an offence punishable under this Act, and if such person has any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance in his possession and such possession appears to him to be unlawful, arrest him and any other person in his company. Explanation- For the purposes of this section, the expression public place" includes any public conveyance, hotel, shop, or other place intended for use by, or accessible to, the public.” 31 In the matter of Firdoskhan Khurshidkhan v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 680, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the issue regarding Section 42 of the NDPS Act, has held in paragraph 18, which reads as under :- "18. Section 42 of the NDPS Act deals with search and seizure from a building, conveyance or enclosed place. When the search and 16 seizure is effected from a public place, the provisions of Section 43 of the NDPS Act would apply and hence, there is no merit in the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that non-compliance of the requirement of Section 42(2) vitiates the search and seizure. Hence, the said contention is noted to be rejected." 32 Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana v. Jarnail Singh and Others, 2004 (5) SCC 188 has held in paragraphs 9 and 10 of its judgment by observing as follows :- "9. Sections 42 and 43, therefore, contemplate two different situations. Section 42 contemplates entry into and search of any building, conveyance or enclosed place, while Section 43 contemplates a seizure made in any public place or in transit. If seizure is made under Section 42 between sunset and sunrise, the requirement of the proviso thereto has to be complied with. There is no such proviso in Section 43 of the Act and, therefore, it is obvious that if a public conveyance is searched in a public place, the officer making the search is not required to record his satisfaction as contemplated by the proviso to Section 42 of the NDPS Act for searching the vehicle between sunset and the sunrise. 10. In the instant case there is no dispute that the tanker was moving on the public highway when it was stopped and searched. Section 43 therefore clearly applied to the facts of this case. Such being the factual position there was no requirement of the officer conducting the search to record the grounds of his belief as contemplated by the proviso to Section 42. Moreover it cannot be lost sight of that the Superintendent of Police was also a member of 17 the searching party. It has been held by this Court in M. Prabhulal vs. Assistant Director, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence : (2003) 8 SCC 449 that where a search is conducted by a gazetted officer himself acting under Section 41 of the NDPS Act, it was not necessary to comply with the requirement of Section 42. For this reason also, in the facts of this case, it was not necessary to comply with the requirement of the proviso to Section 42 of the NDPS Act." 33 In the matter of Kallu Khan vs. State of Rajasthan, 2021 (19) SCC 197, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :- "12. After hearing and on perusal of record and the evidence brought, it is apparent that on apprehending the accused, while making search of the motor cycle, 900 gm of smack was seized to which seizure and sample memos were prepared, as proved by the departmental witnesses. In the facts of the case at hand, where the search and seizure was made from the vehicle used, by way of chance recovery from public road, the provisions of Section 43 of the NDPS Act would apply. In this regard, the guidance may be taken from the judgments of this Court in S. K. Raju (supra) and S.K. Sakkar (supra). However, the recovery made by Pranveer Singh (PW6) cannot be doubted in the facts of this case. 13. Now reverting to the contention that the motor cycle seized in commission of offence does not belong to accused, however seizure of the contraband from the motor cycle cannot be connected to prove the guilt of accused. The Trial Court on appraisal of the testimony of witnesses, Constable Preetam Singh (PW1), Constable Sardar Singh (PW2), S.I. Pranveer Singh (PW6) and ConstableRajendra Prasad (PW8), who were members of the patrolling team and the witnesses of the seizure, proved beyond reasonable doubt, when they were on 18 patrolling, the appellant came driving the seized vehicle from opposite side. On seeing the police vehicle, he had taken back the motor cycle which he was riding. However, the police team apprehended and intercepted the accused and made the search of vehicle, in which the seized contraband smack was found beneath the seat of the vehicle. However, while making search at public place, the contraband was seized from the motor cycle driven by the accused. Thus, recovery of the contraband from the motor cycle of the appellant was a chance recovery on a public road. As per Section 43 of NDPS Act, any officer of any of the departments, specified in Section 42, is having power of seizure and arrest of the accused from a public place, or in transit of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance. The said officer may detain in search any person whom he has reason to believe that he has committed an offence punishable under the provisions of the NDPS Act, in case the possession of the narcotic drug or psychotropic substance appears to be unlawful. Learned senior counsel representing the appellant is unable to show any deficiency in following the procedure or perversity to the findings recorded by the Trial Court, affirmed by the High Court. The seizure of the motor cycle from him is proved beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the question of ownership of vehicle is not relevant. In the similar set of facts, in the case of Rizwan Khan (supra), this Court observed the ownership of the vehicle is immaterial. Therefore, the argument as advanced by learned senior counsel is of no substance and meritless." 34 Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that the alleged recovery of contraband was effected from a Ford EcoSport vehicle parked near Smriti Vatika, Sandbar, 19 which is admittedly a place accessible to the public. The prosecution case itself reveals that the appellant was found standing near the said vehicle and, upon search of the vehicle, the contraband was allegedly recovered from its luggage compartment (dickey). Thus, the search and seizure in the present case were not conducted in any private building, house or enclosed premises, but at a public place. In such circumstances, the provisions of Section 43 of the NDPS Act would be attracted and not the provisions contained under Section 42 of the Act. Therefore, the principal contention advanced on behalf of the appellant regarding non-compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS Act does not merit acceptance. 35 Even otherwise, a careful scrutiny of the evidence available on record would show that the prosecution has led evidence to establish that prior to proceeding to the spot, the Investigating Officer, Ranjeet Kumar Gupta (PW-7), had reduced the secret information into writing, informed his superior officer regarding the information received and thereafter proceeded for verification and further action. The documentary evidence brought on record, particularly Ex.P-22 and the testimony of PW-5 Ranvijay Kumar and PW-6 Ramadhar Chaurasia, lend support to the prosecution version that the information was duly communicated to the superior authorities. Thus, even if the matter is examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance, the prosecution has been able to demonstrate that the information received by the 20 Investigating Officer was not kept confined to himself and was duly communicated to his superior officers before the search operation was undertaken. 36 The next aspect which requires consideration is whether the prosecution has been able to establish the factum of recovery and seizure of the contraband from the possession of the appellant. It is true that the independent witnesses namely Pankaj Chauhan (PW-1), Krishna Chauhan (PW-2) and Trilochan Singh (PW-3) have not supported the prosecution case and were declared hostile. However, it is equally well settled that the evidence of official witnesses cannot be discarded merely because they belong to the investigating agency. The law is by now settled that where the testimony of official witnesses is found to be trustworthy, reliable and inspires confidence, conviction can safely be based upon such evidence even in the absence of corroboration from independent witnesses. 37 In the present case, evidence of Ranjeet Kumar Gupta (PW-7), who conducted the search and seizure proceedings, finds substantial corroboration from the evidence of Kumaru Ram Khairwar (PW-4), Ranvijay Kumar (PW-5) and Ramadhar Chaurasia (PW-6), as also from the contemporaneous documentary evidence prepared during the course of investigation. Nothing substantial has been elicited in their cross- examination to show that they were actuated by any animosity 21 against the appellant or had any reason to falsely implicate him in a serious offence carrying stringent punishment. Their testimony on material particulars has remained consistent and inspires confidence. 38 The evidence on record further reveals that during the search of the Ford EcoSport vehicle bearing registration No. CG-10-AC- 1447, two sacks containing suspected ganja were recovered from the luggage compartment of the vehicle. The contraband was weighed and found to be 40 kilograms. The same was seized under a duly prepared seizure memorandum and thereafter sealed in accordance with the procedure adopted by the investigating agency. The appellant has not been able to point out any material discrepancy in the evidence regarding the actual recovery of the contraband from the vehicle in question. 39 The prosecution has also led evidence to establish the safe custody and subsequent sampling of the seized contraband. The record shows that proceedings under Section 52-A of the NDPS Act were conducted before the competent Magistrate on 08.04.2024. During the said proceedings, representative samples were drawn from the seized contraband and were duly sealed. The samples were thereafter forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical examination. The FSL report unequivocally confirms that the samples contained ganja. The defence has not been able to demonstrate any break in the chain 22 of custody or any circumstance creating doubt regarding the identity of the samples examined by the laboratory. 40 So far as the argument regarding non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is concerned, the same also deserves to be rejected. The recovery in the present case was not effected from the personal search of the appellant but from the vehicle under his control. 41 It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act are attracted only in cases involving personal search of a person and not in cases where recovery is made from a vehicle, container, bag or other article. Therefore, the alleged non-compliance of Section 50 does not render the recovery illegal. The legal position in this regard has been authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court. In Madan Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2003) 7 SCC 465, the Supreme Court has explained the concept of possession under the NDPS Act and has held that once possession of a contraband article is established, the burden shifts upon the accused to explain that such possession was not conscious and held as under :- “16. A bare reading of Section 50 shows that it only applies in case of personal search of a person. It does not extend to search of a vehicle or a container or a bag, or premises.(See Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (JT 1999 (8) SC 293), The State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (JT 1999 (4) SC 595), Gurbax 23 Singh v. State of Haryana (2001(3) SCC 28). The language of Section 50 is implicitly clear that the search has to be in relation to a person as contrasted to search of premises, vehicles or articles. This position was settled beyond doubt by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh's case (supra). Above being the position, the contention regarding non-compliance of Section 50 of the Act is also without any substance. *** 21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with requisite mental element, i.e. conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted. 22. The expression 'possession' is a polymorphous term which assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja and Ors. (AIR 1980 SC 52), to work out a completely logical and precise definition of "possession" uniformally applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes. 23. The word 'conscious' means awareness about a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended. 24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. The State of M.P. (AIR 1972 SC 1756) possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the article in case in question, while the person whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power or control. 25. The word 'possession' means the legal right to possession (See Health v. Drown (1972) (2) All ER 561 (HL). In an interesting case it was observed that where a person keeps his fire arm in his mother's flat which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of 24 Caithness (1976 (1) All ER 844 (QBD). 26. Once possession is established the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it, because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54 where also presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles” 42 Similarly, in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar, (2005) 4 SCC 350, it has been held that the search of a bag, briefcase or container carried by the accused cannot be treated as a personal search and therefore the provisions of Section 50 would not apply in such a situation and observed as under :- “11. A bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc. can, under no circumstances, be treated as body of a human being. They are given a separate name and are identifiable as such. They cannot even remotely be treated to be part of the body of a human being. Depending upon the physical capacity of a person, he may carry any number of items like a bag, a briefcase, a suitcase, a tin box, a thaila, a jhola, a gathri, a holdall, a carton, etc. of varying size, dimension or weight. However, while carrying or moving along with them, some extra effort or energy would be required. They would have to be carried either by the hand or hung on the shoulder or back or placed on the head. In common parlance it would be said that a person is carrying a particular article, specifying the manner in which it was carried like hand, shoulder, back or head, etc. Therefore, it is not possible to include these articles within the ambit of the word "person" 25 occurring in Section 50 of the Act. 12. An incriminating article can be kept concealed in the body or clothings or coverings in different manner or in the footwear. While making a search of such type of articles, which have been kept so concealed, it will certainly come within the ambit of the word "search of person". One of the tests, which can be applied is, where in the process of search the human body comes into contact or shall have to be touched by the person carrying out the search, it will be search of a person. Some indication of this is provided by Sub-section (4) of Section 50 of the Act, which provides that no female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female. The legislature has consciously made this provision as while conducting search of a female, her body may come in contact or may need to be touched and, therefore, it should be done only by a female. In the case of a bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc., they would not normally move along with the body of the human being unless some extra or special effort is made. Either they have to be carried in hand or hung on the shoulder or back or placed on the head. They can be easily and in no time placed away from the body of the carrier. In order to make a search of such type of objects, the body of the carrier will not come in contact of the person conducting the search. Such objects cannot be said to be inextricably connected with the person, namely, the body of the human being. Inextricable means incapable of being disentangled or untied or forming a maze or tangle from which it is impossible to get free. 13. The scope and ambit of Section 50 of the Act was examined in considerable detail by a Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh 1999 (6) SCC 172 and para 12 of the reports is being reproduced below : "12. On its plain reading, Section 50 would come into play only in the case of a search of 26 a person as distinguished from search of any premises etc. However, if the empowered officer, without any prior information as contemplated by Section 42 of the Act makes a search or causes arrest of a person during the normal course of investigation into an offence or suspected offence and on completion of that search, a contraband under the NDPS Act is also recovered, the requirements of Section 50 of the Act are not attracted." The Bench recorded its conclusion in para 57 of the reports and sub- paras (1), (2), (3) and (6) are being reproduced below : “57. On the basis of the reasoning and discussion above, the following conclusions arise: (1) That when an empowered officer or a duly authorized officer acting on prior information is about to search a person, it is imperative for him to inform the person concerned of his right under sub-section (1) of Section 50 of being taken to the nearest gazetted officer or the nearest Magistrate for making the search. However, such information may not necessarily be in writing. (2) That failure to inform the person concerned about the existence of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate would cause prejudice to an accused. (3) That a search made by an empowered officer, on prior information, without informing the person of his right that if he so requires, he shall be taken before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate for search and in case he so opts, failure to conduct his search before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate may not vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction and sentence of an accused, where the conviction has been recorded only on the basis of the possession of the illicit article, recovered from his person, during a search 27 conducted in violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the Act. *** (6) That in the context in which the protection has been incorporated in Section 50 for the benefit of the person intended to be searched, we do not express any opinion whether the provisions of Section 50 are mandatory or directory, but hold that failure to inform the person concerned of his right as emanating from sub-section (1) of Section 50, may render the recovery of the contraband suspect and the conviction and sentence of an accused bad and unsustainable in law." 14. The above quoted dictum of the Constitution Bench shows that the provisions of Section 50 will come into play only in the case of personal search of the accused and not of some baggage like a bag, article or container, etc. which he may be carrying.” 43 The same principle has been reiterated in Ajmer Singh v. State of Haryana, (2010) 3 SCC 746, wherein the Supreme Court held that recovery of contraband from a bag carried by the accused does not amount to personal search of the accused. The Supreme Court has again reiterated the said principle in Arif Khan @ Agha Khan v. State of Uttarakhand, (2018) 18 SCC 380 and Baljinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2019) 10 SCC 473, holding that the requirement of informing the accused of his right under Section 50 arises only in cases of personal body search and not when the recovery is made from a bag, container or other article carried by the accused. In such circumstances, the search is treated as search of an article and not of the person of the accused. The Supreme Court has held as follows :- 28 “13. The law is thus well settled that an illicit Article seized from the person during personal search conducted in violation of the safe-guards provided in Section 50 of the Act cannot by itself be used as admissible evidence of proof of unlawful possession of contra-band. But the question is, if there be any other material or Article recovered during the investigation, would the infraction with respect to personal search also affect the qualitative value of the other material circumstance ? 14. At this stage we may also consider following observations from the decision of this Court in Ajmer Singh v. State of Haryana [(2010) 3 SCC 746]: "15. The learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that the provision of Section 50 of the Act would also apply, while searching the bag, briefcase, etc. carried by the person and its non-compliance would be fatal to the proceedings initiated under the Act. We find no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel. It requires to be noticed that the question of compliance or non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act is relevant only where search of a person is involved and the said Section is not applicable nor attracted where no search of a person is involved. Search and recovery from a bag, briefcase, container, etc. does not come within the ambit of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, because firstly, Section 50 expressly speaks of search of person only. Secondly, the Section speaks of taking of the person to be searched by the gazetted officer or a Magistrate for the purpose of search. Thirdly, this issue in our considered opinion is no more res Integra in view of the observations made by this Court in Madan Lal v. State of H.P. [(2003) 7 SCC 465]. The Court has observed: (SCC p. 471, para 16) 16. A bare reading of Section 50 shows that it only applies in case of personal search of a 29 person. It does not extend to search of a vehicle or a container or a bag or premises (see Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra [(1999) 8 SCC 257], State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh-[(1999) 6 SCC 172] and Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana [(2001) 3 SCC 28]). The language of Section 50 is implicitly clear that the search has to be in relation to a person as contrasted to search of premises, vehicles or articles. This position was settled beyond doubt by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh case (1999) 6 SCC 172 Above being the position, the contention regarding non-compliance with Section 50 of the Act is also without any substance." 15. As regards applicability of the requirements Under Section 50 of the Act are concerned, it is well settled that the mandate of Section 50 of the Act is confined to "personal search" and not to search of a vehicle or a container or premises. 16. The conclusion (3) as recorded by the Constitution Bench in Para 57 of its judgment in Baldev Singh clearly states that the conviction may not be based "only" on the basis of possession of an illicit Article recovered from personal search in violation of the requirements Under Section 50 of the Act but if there be other evidence on record, such material can certainly be looked into.” 44 Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid settled legal principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned decisions, it is quite vivid that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant regarding non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is wholly misconceived and devoid of substance. A careful scrutiny of the prosecution evidence reveals that the alleged recovery was not 30 effected from the personal search of the appellant, but from the Ford EcoSport vehicle bearing registration No. CG-10-AC-1447 which was found parked near Smriti Vatika, Sandbar. The prosecution case consistently remains that upon search of the said vehicle, two white sacks containing contraband ganja were recovered from the luggage compartment (dickey) of the vehicle. Thus, the recovery in the present case was from a conveyance and not from the body or person of the appellant. 45 The testimony of Ranjeet Kumar Gupta (PW-7), the Investigating Officer, duly corroborated by the evidence of Kumaru Ram Khairwar (PW-4), Ranvijay Kumar (PW-5) and Ramadhar Chaurasia (PW-6), as well as the contemporaneously prepared documentary evidence relating to the search, seizure and recovery proceedings, clearly establishes that the contraband was recovered from the vehicle allegedly under the control and possession of the appellant. The evidence further demonstrates that before undertaking the search, the appellant was informed about the proposed search proceedings and thereafter the vehicle was subjected to search, resulting in recovery of two sacks containing 40 kilograms of ganja. At no stage was any narcotic substance recovered from the physical person of the appellant. 46 It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the safeguards contemplated under Section 50 of the NDPS Act become applicable only when the search is of 31 the person of the accused and not when the recovery is effected from a vehicle, container, bag, suitcase or any other article carried by or found in the possession of the accused. Since the recovery in the present case was effected from the dickey of the Ford EcoSport vehicle and not from the personal search of the appellant, the provisions contained in Section 50 of the NDPS Act are not attracted to the facts of the present case. 47 In view of the aforesaid factual position and the settled legal principles governing the field, this Court is of the considered opinion that the alleged non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act does not arise for consideration in the present case. Consequently, the challenge laid by the appellant on the ground of violation of Section 50 of the NDPS Act deserves to be rejected and the same cannot be made a basis either to doubt the prosecution case or to vitiate the conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court. 48 Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and upon a careful re-appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, this Court finds no reason to take a view different from that taken by the learned Trial Court. The evidence adduced by the prosecution, when examined in its entirety, clearly establishes that the appellant was found in conscious and exclusive possession of 40 kilograms of ganja, which falls within 32 the category of commercial quantity under the provisions of the NDPS Act. The recovery of the contraband from the Ford EcoSport vehicle under the control of the appellant stands duly proved by the cogent and reliable testimony of the official witnesses, which is fully supported by the contemporaneous documentary evidence brought on record. 49 This Court is also satisfied that the prosecution has successfully established the chain of events commencing from receipt of secret information, conduct of search and seizure proceedings, sealing of the seized contraband, preparation of representative samples under the supervision of the competent Magistrate under Section 52-A of the NDPS Act, forwarding of the samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory and receipt of the FSL report confirming the seized substance to be ganja. The integrity and identity of the seized contraband have remained intact throughout the investigation and no material has been brought on record by the defence to create any reasonable doubt regarding the same. 50 The contention of the appellant that the independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution case also does not persuade this Court to discard the otherwise reliable prosecution evidence. It is well settled that conviction can be recorded on the basis of trustworthy and credible testimony of official witnesses, provided their evidence inspires confidence and is free from material infirmities. In the present case, nothing substantial has emerged 33 in the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses to demonstrate any motive for false implication of the appellant or to discredit the core of the prosecution case. Merely because the independent witnesses turned hostile would not by itself render the entire prosecution case doubtful, particularly when the evidence of the official witnesses remains cogent, consistent and reliable. 51 Equally devoid of merit is the contention regarding alleged non- compliance of Sections 42 and 50 of the NDPS Act. As discussed hereinabove, the recovery was effected from a vehicle situated at a public place and, therefore, the provisions of Section 43 of the NDPS Act would govern the field. Moreover, the evidence available on record demonstrates substantial compliance even with regard to communication of the secret information to the superior authorities. Likewise, since the recovery was not effected from the personal search of the appellant but from the dickey of the vehicle under his control, the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act are wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. Consequently, the challenge founded upon the alleged violation of the aforesaid provisions cannot be accepted. 52 The learned Trial Court has meticulously examined the entire evidence available on record and has assigned cogent, convincing and legally sustainable reasons while recording the finding of guilt against the appellant. This Court does not find any 34 perversity, illegality, misreading of evidence or material irregularity in the appreciation of evidence undertaken by the learned Trial Court warranting interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are fully supported by the evidence available on record and are in consonance with the settled principles governing prosecutions under the NDPS Act. 53 The prosecution having successfully established the foundational facts regarding recovery and possession of commercial quantity of ganja from the vehicle under the control of the appellant, the statutory presumptions available under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act stand attracted. The appellant has failed to rebut the said presumptions either through defence evidence or by eliciting any material circumstance from the prosecution witnesses. In the absence of any plausible explanation regarding possession of the contraband, the finding of conscious possession recorded by the learned Trial Court cannot be faulted. 54 In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the appellant was in conscious possession of 40 kilograms of ganja in contravention of the provisions of the NDPS Act and has rightly been held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act. The conviction recorded by the learned Special Judge (N.D.P.S. Act), Surguja, 35 Ambikapur, is thus found to be legal, proper and fully justified on the basis of the evidence available on record. 55 Consequently, the present criminal appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. The judgment of conviction dated 06.03.2025 and the order of sentence passed by the learned Special Judge (N.D.P.S. Act), Surguja, Ambikapur (C.G.) in Special Criminal (N.D.P.S.) Case No.21/2024 are hereby affirmed. 56 The appellant is reported to be in custody. He shall continue to undergo the sentence awarded to him by the learned Trial Court. 57 Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail, where the appellant is undergoing their jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring the appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 58 Let a copy of this judgment and the original records be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu