1 2026:CGHC:23618 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 1271 of 2026 United India Insurance Company Ltd. Through Branch Manager/Divisional Manager, 1st Floor Krishna Complex Katchari Chowk, Raipur, Tahsil Ns District- Raipur (C.G.) (Insurer of Vehicle Bus Bearing Registration No. C.G.-19-A F- 0272) (Insurance Policy No. 2703003122P108962722) (Insurance Period From 08-12-2022 to 07-12- 2023) (Non-Appellant No. 3) ... Appellant versus 1 - Smt. Savitri Bai Sahu W/o- Late Nohar Lal Sahu Aged About 40 Years Cast- Teli, Res.- Ward No. 03 Gurur, Thana and Tahsil- Gurur, District- Balod (C.G.) (Claimant) 2 - Jharokh Ram Sahu S/o- Khelan Ram Sahu Aged About 49 Years Res. Ramnagar, Shilalapara, P.S. Gudhiyari, Tahsil and District- Raipur (C.G.) (Driver of Vehicle Bus Bearing Registration No. C.G.19-AF-0272) 3 - Gappu Mahindra Travels Private Limited, By, Ajay Singh Gill S/o- Satvan Singh Gill, Age- Approx. 37 Years. Res. New Bus Stand Raipur, P.S. Tahsil and District- Raipur (C.G.) (Owner of Vehicle Bus Bearing Registration No. C.G. 19-A F-0272) ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, Advocate. For Respondents : None. PREETI KUMARI Digitally signed by PREETI KUMARI Date: 2026.06.15 16:20:52 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board 11.06.2026 1. Heard Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant. 2. The present is a miscellaneous appeal under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the impugned order dated 01.03.2025 passed by learned First Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Balod, District – Balod (C.G.) in Claim Case No. 42/2023, whereby an amount of Rs.12,55,720/- has been awarded in favour of the claimant towards compensation on account of death of Nohar Lal Sahu in a motor accident that occurred on 16.02.2023. The liability to pay compensation is fastened upon the non-applicant No.3/Insurance Company. The award was passed on 01.03.2025 and the present appeal has been filed on 01.06.2026 along with the application for condonation of delay stating therein that the appeal is barred by 21 days that may be condoned. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that there is various grounds in the appeal with respect to contributory negligence, quantum of compensation as well as liability to pay compensation upon the appellant. The learned Claims Tribunal has not considered the evidence in its true aspect and without considering the defence of the non-applicant No. 3/Insurance 3 Company the award has been passed and excessive compensation has been awarded. In the accident, the deceased was contributory negligent and that the plea of contributory negligence ought to have been considered by the learned Claims Tribunal and should have directed the owner and Insurance Company of the vehicle driven by the deceased should also have been made as a party/non-applicant in the claim application. Therefore, there are considerable grounds in the appeal. He would further submit that after obtaining certified copy of award and necessary sanction for filing of the appeal, the same has been filed on 01.06.2026 which is delayed by 358 days though by typographically error in the application for condonation of delay, the delay of 21 days is mentioned. The appellant is a multi-functioning body and for filing of the appeal necessary sanction is required to be obtained from the authorities of the appellant which takes some time in movement of the file from one office to another, therefore, the appeal has been suffered from delay which is bona fide and not deliberate. Therefore, by condoning the delay occurred in filing the appeal, notices may be issued to the respondents. 4. I have heard learned counsel for appellant and perused the documents annexed with the appeal as well as gone through the averments of the application for condonation for delay (IA No. 4 02/2026). 5. In the application for condonation of delay, the appellant has averred the movement of the file from one office to another and it was submitted that the second opinion was taken by the company on 21.04.2025, which was received to the company's office, Raipur on 24.04.2025, whereas the application for approval for filing the appeal was obtained on 09.02.2026. Except the movement of the file from one office to another, the appellant has not explained the reasons for the delay. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subha Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 while dealing with issue of limitation in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 & 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- "19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors., A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the 5 court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., [2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds." 7. In para 26, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- "26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident 6 that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision." 8. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Chaudhary, 2024 INSC 932, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the delay, issued certain directions and observed as follows:- "5. The legal position is that where a case has been 7 presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows: "13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: "15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature." 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake 8 in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: 24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while 9 considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xxx xxx xxx 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were 10 reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case. 36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs." Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold. 6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are the officer(s) responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the 11 limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733)." 9. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the departments are under a special obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception, not a rule, and cannot be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by the Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a select few. 10. Upon considering the matter in its entirety, I find that the appellant 12 has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the present appeal. The only reason cited is that the movement of file from one office to another. However, from perusal of the record and the application for condonation of delay, it transpires that the appellant has averred in the application regarding movement of the file for obtaining necessary sanction from 20.03.2025 till 21.04.2026, however, it transpires that for filing of the appeal, the appellant has applied for certified copy of the impugned award on 27.04.2026 which was delivered on 05.05.2026. However, the sequence of events, lacking in specificity or justifiable cause, does not amount to a cogent or acceptable explanation. Thus, the appellant has miserably failed to demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an inordinate delay of 358 days. 11. Consequently, this Court is not inclined to exercise its discretionary power under the appellate jurisdiction to condone such extraordinary delay. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to establish any convincing or bona fide reason for the delay. Therefore, there is no justification for condoning the delay of 358 days in filing the appeal against the impugned award dated 01.03.2025. 12. In view of the above, I.A. No.02/2026, application for condonation 13 of delay is rejected. As a corollary consequence, the appeal is also dismissed. 13. The interim applications I.A. No.1/2026, I.A. No.3/2026 and I.A. No.4/2026 stand disposed of. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Preeti