2026:CGHC:23799 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 6453 of 2021 Reserved on : 13.05.2026 Delivered on : 15.06.2026 Sarswati Patwa, W/o Ramgovind Patwa Aged About 22 Years R/op Village Mahuli Tehsil Wadrafnagar, District Balrampur Ramanujganj (C.G.) --- Petitioner versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary Women And Child Develpment Department Mantralaya Atal Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.) 2. Commissioner Surguja Division Ambikapur District Surguja (C.G.) 3. The Collector Balrampur Ramanujganj District Balrampur Ramanujganj (C.G.) 4. Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Wadrafnagar, District Balrampur Ramanujganj (C.G.) 5. Program Officer Integrated Women And Child Development Department Wadrafnagar, District Balrampur Ramanujganj (C.G.) 6. Pramila, W/o Devkumar, Aged About 44 Years Caste Chamar, Village - Mahuli Tehsil Wadrafnagar, District Balrampur Ramanujganj (C.G.) --- Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Nishikant Sinha, Advocate. For State : Mr. Khulesh Sahu, Panel Lawyer. For CEO/Resp. No. 4 : Ms. Priyanka Rai, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Advocate. For Res. No. 6 : Mr. Shishir Dixit, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Narendra Kumar Vyas, J. CAV ORDER 1. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing order dated 25.10.2021 (Annexure P/1) ARUN KUMAR DEWANGAN Digitally signed by ARUN KUMAR DEWANGAN Date: 2026.06.15 16:59:55 +0530 passed by respondent No. 2/Commissioner Surguja Division Ambikapur, District- Surguja (C.G.) by which revision filed by respondent No. 6 has been allowed by setting aside the order dated 06.01.2021 passed by the Collector, Balrampur-Ramanujganj whereby the appointment of respondent No. 6 was cancelled and the petitioner was directed to be appointed in place of the respondent No. 6. 2. The brief facts as reflected from records are that:- (i) An advertisement was issued by respondent No. 4/Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Wadrafnagar, District- Balrampur- Ramanujganj (for short “the CEO”) for appointment on the post of Anganbadi Worker at Mahuli Centre in District- Balrampur- Ramanujganj. The petitioner being qualified applied for the said post and secured 44.16 marks in the provisional merit list. However, her address proof certificate was objected on the ground that it was issued only by signature of Sarpanch and not jointly by the Sarpanch and Secretary of Gram Panchayat. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted address proof certificate issued by the competent authority on 13.11.2017 before publication of final selection list, but the same was not considered and respondent No.6 who secured 44.20 marks, was selected and appointed. (ii) Being aggrieved with the appointment of respondent No. 6, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Collector, who vide order dated 06.01.2021 allowed the appeal and cancelled appointment of respondent No. 6. Accordingly, the appointment order dated 12.01.2021 (Annexure P/6) was issued in favour of the petitioner. Respondent No.6 thereafter preferred revision before the Commissioner, Surguja who vide impugned order dated 25.10.2021 allowed the revision preferred by respondent No. 6 and restored her appointment order by canceling appointment of the petitioner. (iii) Learned Commissioner while allowing the revision has recorded its finding regarding verification of residential proof of the petitioner that the same was issued by Sarpanch only which is against the direction of the State Government, therefore, her residential certificate is not acceptable. So far as correction in the card issued in favour of respondent No. 6 under below the poverty line scheme, the Commissioner has recorded its finding that there is no correction in the card as the card was issued in the name of Fulmatiya W/o Ramkeshwar and in the name of Pramila/ respondent No. 6 has been recorded being daughter-in-law of Fulmatiya, as such there is no fraud committed by respondent No. 6 while submitting the card under below the poverty line scheme, therefore, respondent No. 6 is entitled to be appointed. Hence, this writ petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing order dated 25.10.2021 (Annexure P/1) issued by respondent No. 2. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner had initially submitted residential certificate in terms of Clause 3 of the advertisement and there was no allegation of forgery or fabrication against her. He would further submit that during objection stage and before publication of final selection list, the petitioner had submitted proper residential certificate issued by competent authority, which ought to have been considered. He would further submit that Clause 1.5 of Government Circular dated 02.04.2008 itself provides that in case objection arises regarding residential proof, certificate issued by competent authority shall be accepted. He would further submit that the Commissioner while passing the impugned order considered only the requirement of joint signatures of Sarpanch and Secretary, but ignored the latter part of Clause 1.5 permitting submission of certificate issued by competent authority, therefore, the order passed by the Commissioner is arbitrary and liable to be quashed by this Court and would pray for allowing the instant writ petition. 4. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposing the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order dated 25.10.2021 is just and proper and does not warrant any interference by this Court. He would further submit that the appointment on the post of Anganbadi Worker is governed strictly by policy dated 02.04.2008 issued by the State Government and the petitioner did not submit requisite valid residential certificate before the cut-off date, therefore, the documents submitted after the last date could not have been considered by the authorities. He would further submit that respondent No.6 secured higher marks i.e. 44.20 marks as against 44.16 marks secured by the petitioner and mere inclusion in provisional merit list does not confer any indefeasible right of appointment in favour of the petitioner. He would further submit that the Commissioner has passed a reasoned order after considering all aspects of the matter which does not warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by this Court and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for respondent No. 4/CEO would submit that the appointment process for the post of Anganbadi Worker was conducted strictly in accordance with the Government Circular/Policy dated 02.04.2008 and the terms and conditions contained in the advertisement dated 07.07.2017. She would further submit that as per Clause 1.5 of the Government Circular dated 02.04.2008, the residential certificate was required to be issued jointly by the Sarpanch and Secretary of the Gram Panchayat and the applications/documents were required to be submitted within the prescribed time. She would further submit that upon scrutiny of the applications submitted by the candidates, it was found that the petitioner had not submitted the residential certificate in the prescribed manner along with her application form before the cut-off date. She would further submit that after evaluation of the eligible candidates, the merit list was prepared by the Selection Committee wherein respondent No. 6 secured 44.20 marks and the petitioner secured 44.16 marks. Respondent No.6 being higher in merit and fulfilling eligibility requirements, was selected and appointed in accordance with law. 6. She would further submit that the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Collector, who passed order dated 06.01.2021 interfering with the selection process. Respondent No.6 thereafter preferred revision before the Commissioner, Surguja Division, who after considering the entire material on record and applicable policy provisions, allowed the revision vide order dated 25.10.2021 and restored the appointment of respondent No.6. She would further submit that the authorities concerned acted strictly in discharge of statutory and administrative duties and there is no arbitrariness, malafide or procedural irregularity in the process. She would further submit that it is settled law that submission of requisite documents after the cut-off date ordinarily cannot cure an initial defect in eligibility unless specifically permitted under the governing rules and no vested right accrued in favour of the petitioner merely because her name appeared in the provisional merit list, therefore, the writ petition being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed. 7. Learned counsel for respondent No.6 supporting the submissions made by the State as well as respondent No. 4/CEO would submit that that the recruitment process was governed by Government Circular dated 02.04.2008 which specifically required residential certificate jointly signed by Sarpanch and Secretary whereas that the petitioner admittedly failed to submit such valid certificate within prescribed time. He would further submit that respondent No.6 secured higher marks than the petitioner and was rightly appointed. He would further submit that the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.429/2021 had already vacated interim protection granted to the petitioner while noticing that respondent No.6 had secured higher marks, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to get any relief by this Court and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 8. I have learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction. 9. On above factual foundation and submissions made by the respective counsel for the petitioner and respondents, following Points emerged for determination of this Court are :- Point No. 1 : Whether the petitioner was eligible for consideration on the basis of residential certificate submitted by her after cut-off date notified in the advertisement? Point No. 2 : Whether appreciation of facts by the authorities can be interfered by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ? 10. This Court has called upon the records of selection process for appointment of Anganbadi Worker at Anganbadi Centre Mahuli-II and following facts are revealed:- (i) The advertisement was issued on 07.07.2017 and the last date for submission of application form was 21.07.2017 thereafter list was prepared and as per the direction No. 2.24 of Circular dated 02.04.2008, the provisional valuation chart was prepared. (ii) The meeting of valuation committee was conducted on 05.10.2017 and thereafter provisional list was issued and objections were called. The committee has given time from 07.11.2017 to 16.11.2017 for inviting objections. (iii) The objections were called upon and were decided on 03.01.2018 thereafter the meeting of valuation committee was conducted on 22.01.2018 and final select list was prepared and published on 22.01.2018. Thereafter, the appointment in favour of Respondent No. 6 was issued on 07.04.2018 appointing her on the post of Anganbadi Worker. (iv) The petitioner has submitted her application as Appendix-III wherein it has been specifically mentioned that the candidate should submit the residential certificate jointly signed by the Sarpanch & Secretary of the Gram Panchayat or Patwari and for appointment in the Corporation area, the residential certificate should be issued by Patwari or by the Ward Member. In the direction attached with the application, it has been specifically directed that so far as residential certificate is concerned, the certificate should be attached as per Clause 7 of the form wherein it has been specifically directed that the residential certificate should be signed jointly by the Sarpanch & Secretary Panchayat but from perusal of the application submitted by the petitioner, it is quite vivid that the residential certificate of the petitioner was signed by the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat- Mahuli only. Thus, admittedly, at the time of submission of form and before cut-off date, the petitioner has not submitted the residential certificate jointly signed by the Sarpanch & Secretary Panchayat as required under the instruction, application form and the circular dated 02.04.2008 issued by the Government of Chhattisgarh. 11. On the above factual matrix, the Court is now examining the Points to be determined by this Court. Discussion & Finding on Point No. 1 12. From perusal of record, it is quite vivid that the petitioner had initially submitted residential certificate issued only by the Sarpanch whereas as per Clause 1.5 of Government Circular dated 02.04.2008 as well as Clause 7 of the application form and direction attached with the application form which provides that the residential certificate should be issued by the Sarpanch and Secretary of Gram Panchayat jointly but she did not submit such certificate within cut-off date along with her application. As such, she was rightly declared ineligible at the time of calling of the objections, therefore, she has subsequently submitted certificate issued by competent authority during objection stage which the selection committee has rightly not considered as it has been submitted after cut-off date declared in the advertisement. Thus, the rejection of the candidature of the petitioner on this count cannot be found faulty but it is in accordance with the well settled position of law that eligibility conditions are to be fulfilled and required documents are to be submitted within the cut-off date prescribed in the advertisement unless rules specifically permit subsequent rectification of the mistake. As such, this Court is unable to hold that rejection of petitioner’s candidature suffers from illegality or irregularity warranting any interference by this Court. 13. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Sakshi Arha Vs. The Rajasthan High Court & others [2025 INSC 463] has held in paragraph 27, 28 & 32 as under:- “27. On the subject of absence of last date to showcase their eligibility by a candidate apropos their equivalent claim, this Court clarified the correct position of law in its decision in Bhupinderpal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others11, where, while upholding the view taken by High Court of Punjab and Haryana, held that the eligibility criteria for candidates aspiring 11 (2000) 5 SCC 262 public employment shall be determined pertaining to the cut-off date as outlined in the applicable rules of their respective service. In case the rules are silent, the decisive date is, ideally, indicated in the advertisement for recruitment. However, in case of absence of specifications in both context, the eligibility is to be adjudged in lieu of the last date of submission of applications before the concerned authority or institute. This, thereby, ensures a clear temporal reference point for evaluating qualifications of a candidate as per the concerned advertisement. 28. This derivation of the position of law was from the decision of this Court in Rekha Chaturvedi (Smt) v. University of Rajasthan and Others12 wherein the Bench explicitly observed that the proposition of assessing a candidate’s qualification with reference to the date of selection, as opposed to the last date of applications is untenable and must be unequivocally dismissed. The indeterminate nature of the date of selection renders it impracticable for applicants to ascertain whether they meet the prescribed qualifications, particularly if such qualifications are yet to be attained. The relevant paragraph is reproduced as follows: “10. The contention that the required qualifications of the candidates should be examined with reference to the date of selection and not with reference to the last date for making applications has only to be stated to be rejected. The date of selection is invariably uncertain. In the absence of knowledge of such date the candidates who apply for the posts would be unable to state whether they are qualified for the posts in question or not, if they are yet to acquire the qualifications. Unless the advertisement mentions a fixed date with reference to which the qualifications are to be judged, whether the said date is of selection or otherwise, it would not be possible for the candidates who do not possess the requisite qualifications in praesenti even to make applications for the posts. The uncertainty of the date may also lead to a contrary consequence, viz., even those candidates who do not have the qualifications in praesenti and are likely to acquire them at an uncertain future date, may apply for the posts thus swelling the number of applications. But a still worse consequence may follow, in that it may leave open a scope for malpractices. The date of selection may be so fixed or manipulated as to entertain some applicants and reject others, arbitrarily. Hence, in the absence of a fixed date indicated in the advertisement/notification inviting applications with reference to which the requisite qualifications should be judged, the only certain date for the scrutiny of the qualifications will be the last date for making the applications. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that when the Selection Committee in the present case, as argued by Shri Manoj Swarup, took into consideration the requisite qualifications as on the date of selection rather than on the last date of preferring applications, it acted with patent illegality, and on this ground itself the selections in question are liable to be quashed. Reference in this connection may also be made to two recent decisions of this Court in A.P. Public Service Commission, Hyderabad v. B. Sarat Chandra [(1990) 2 SCC 669 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 377 : (1990) 4 SLR 235 : (1990) 13 ATC 708] and District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi [(1990) 3 SCC 655 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 520 : (1990) 4 SLR 237 : (1990) 14 ATC 766] .” xxx xxx xxx 32. The well-read legal minds, as the Appellants before us, cannot certainly, escape from the clutches of the principle laid down through the Latin maxim of ignorantia juris non excusat, which translates in literal English to “ignorance of the law is no excuse”. The Advertisement certainly required them to produce a valid certificate to their claim as per rules and instructions, and in the prescribed format. ” 14. From perusal of the record of the case and the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner, it is quite vivid that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any provision in the advertisement or policy mandating consideration of documents submitted after the prescribed date. In absence of any enabling provision of allowing the candidate to submit the residential certificate signed by joint signature of the Sarpanch and the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat after the cut-off date, declaring the petitioner to be ineligible for consideration on the post of Anganbadi Worker by the selection committee cannot be said to be found faulty. As such, the Collector has committed material irregularity and illegality in interfering with the selection process adopted by the committee and by quashing the appointment of respondent No. 6 which has been rightly interfered by the Commission, Surguja Division vide impugned order dated 25.10.2021 (Annexure P/1). Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered against the petitioner and in favour of respondent No. 6. Discussion & Finding on Point No. 2 15. From perusal of the records of the selection process as well as from the order of the Commissioner, Surguja Division dated 25.10.2021 (Annexure P/2), it is quite vivid that the order dated 06.01.2021 issued by the Collector, Balrampur- Ramanujganj suffers from perversity, illegality, non-speaking order without taking into consideration the entire records of the selection process which has been rightly interfered by the Commissioner, Surguja Division in its order dated 25.10.2021. Thus, there is no perversity or illegality in the impugned order or in the decision making process followed by the Commissioner warranting interference by this Court. Even otherwise, the interference by this Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited unless the petitioner is able to demonstrate that the authorities have committed patent or gross illegality in deciding the matter or transgressed its jurisdiction or exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it then only scope of interference is available to this Court. 16. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Ajay Singh Vs. Khacheru & others [2025 INSC 9] has examined the power of interference by the High Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and has held in paragraphs 17, 18, 19 & 20 as under:- “17. It is a well-established principle that the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot reappreciate the evidence and arrive at a finding of facts unless the authorities below had either exceeded its jurisdiction or acted perversely. 18. On the said settled proposition of law, we must make reference to the judgment of this Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram5. The relevant portion thereof reads as under: “16. … It is well settled that the High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of fact of an appropriate court if there was no evidence to justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the courts below have come or in other words a finding which was perverse in law. This principle is well settled. In D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee [(1952) 2 SCC 619] it was laid down by this court that unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention it was not for the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere. If there is evidence on record on which a finding can be arrived at and if the court has not misdirected itself either on law or on fact, then in exercise of the power under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court should (1986) 4 SCC 447 refrain from interfering with such findings made by the appropriate authorities. …” (Emphasis Supplied) 19. The above said proposition of law was reiterated in Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj6, wherein it was observed that: “38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law.” 20. Observations similar in nature were made in Krishnanand v. Director of Consolidation7, wherein it was held that: “12. The High Court has committed an error in reversing the findings of fact arrived at by the authorities below in coming to the conclusion that there was a partition. No doubt, the High Court did so in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is a settled law that such a jurisdiction cannot be exercised for reappreciating the evidence and arrival of findings of facts unless the authority which passed the impugned order does not have jurisdiction to render the finding or has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or the finding is patently perverse. …” (Emphasis Supplied)” 17. Considering the aforesaid well settled provisions of law and also considering the fact that the Commissioner Surguja Division while allowing the revision petition has considered the applicable policy and the material available on record and thereafter passed a well reasoned order and further considering the fact that respondent No.6 has admittedly secured higher marks than the petitioner, as such her appointment cannot be said to be illegal, therefore, no case for interference is made out by the petitioner either in the selection process or in the appointment of respondent No. 6 on the post of Anganbadi Worker, as such no case for interference is warranted by this Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, Point No. 2 is also answered against the petitioner. 18. Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge Arun