1 2026:HHC:36557 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA FAO (MV)   No. :    24 of 2021 Reserved  on    :  05.08.2026 Decided on      :   27.08.2026 Uploaded on     :   27.08.2026 Ram Lal …Appellant Versus Shibi Devi and Others …..Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes ____________________________________________________________ For the Appellant : Mr. Vinay Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondents      : Mr.   Pramod   Singh   Thakur, Advocate for respondents No.1 & 2. None for respondent No.3(a). Mr.   Deepak   Bhasin,   Senior Advocate   with   Mr.   Sambhav Bhasin,   Advocate   for   respondent No.4. __________________________________________________________ Virender Singh, Judge Appellant­Ram Lal has filed the present appeal, under   Section   173   of   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act,   (hereinafter referred   to   as   the   ‘M.V.   Act’),   against   the   award   dated 06.11.2020,   passed   by   the   learned   Motor   Accident   Claims Tribunal­IV, Shimla, H.P., (hereinafter referred to as the ‘learned 1Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2026:HHC:36557 Tribunal’), in M.A.C.C. No.68­S/2 of 2015, titled as Shibi Devi & Another versus Ram Lal & Others. 2. By way of award dated 06.11.2020, the learned Tribunal has allowed the claim petition, filed by respondents No.1 and 2, and awarded a sum of Rs.8,26,000/­, along with interest @ 9% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition till the realization of the amount. However, the ultimate liability to pay the amount of compensation, along with interest, has been fastened upon respondent No.1 (appellant).   It has also been held that initially the amount of compensation will be paid by the insurer and thereafter, the Insurance Company has given the right to recover the same on the principle of pay and recover. 3. For   the   sake   of   convenience,   parties   to   the present appeal, are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned Tribunal. Brief Facts:­ 4. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present appeal, as borne out from the record, may be summed up, as under:­ 4.1. The   petitioners,   being   parents   of   deceased Sapna, have filed the claim petition, under Section 166 of M.V. Act, before the learned Tribunal, against the respondents, being 3 2026:HHC:36557 owner   and   insurer   of   vehicle   No.HP06A­4881,   (hereinafter referred to as ‘the offending vehicle’), seeking compensation on account of their daughter Sapna, aged about 16 years. 4.2. According   to   the   petitioners,   their   daughter Sapna was travelling in the offending vehicle and was on her way to her home in Village Baraoag. When the offending vehicle, being   driven   by   its   driver,   in   a   rash   and   negligent   manner, reached   at   Bhutti   Kainchi   near   Naula,   Kumarsain,   then,   he could not control the offending vehicle and the same met with an accident. In the accident, Sapna received fatal injuries and she died. 4.3. The matter was also reported to the police of Police   Station,   Kumarsain,   where,   FIR   No.28/15,   dated 30.03.2015, has been registered. 4.4. Since, the accident, in question, has solely been attributed to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle, as such, the petitioner has sought an amount of Rs.24,45,000/­, along with interest, as compensation from the respondents, by pleading their bright past and bleak future. Stand of the respondents before the learned Tribunal 5. When,   put   to   notice,   the   claim   petition   has been contested by the respondents. 4 2026:HHC:36557 5.1. Respondents No.1 and 2 have filed their joint reply,   in   which,   they   have   admitted   the   factum   of   accident, however,   according   to   them,   the   vehicle   was   insured   with respondent No.3. As such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the claim petition. 6. Respondent No.3­Insurance Company has filed its separate reply, by taking the preliminary objections that the claim petition is not maintainable; the driver of the offending vehicle was not holding a valid and effective license, at the time of   accident;   and   the   offending   vehicle   was   being   plied,   in violation of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy. 6.1. On   merits,   the   contents   of   the   claim   petition have   been   denied,   mainly   for   want   of   knowledge,   however, registration of the FIR has not been disputed. 7. Thus, the respondents have prayed for dismissal of the claim petition. 8. From   the   pleadings   of   the   parties,   following issues were framed by the learned Tribunal, vide order dated 21.06.2017: 1) Whether   deceased   Sapna   died   in   a   motor vehicle   accident,   which   took   place   on 30.03.2015 at 6.10 p.m., at place near Bhatti Kainchi Tehsil Kumarsain, District Shimla, H.P., involving   vehicle   bearing   No.HP­06A­4881 owned by respondent No.1 and being driven by 5 2026:HHC:36557 its driver in a rash and negligent manner, as alleged? OPP 2) Whether   the   peittioners   are   entitled   for compensation, if so, then what should be the quantum  of compensation and  from  whom  of the respondent? OPP 3) Whether the petition is not maintainable, in the present form, as alleged? OPR 4) Whether  the  driver  was  driving  the   aforesaid vehicle without possessing valid and effective driving   license   at   the   time   of   accident,   as alleged? OPR 5) Whether the  vehicle  was being driven by the driver in violation of terms and conditions of the insurance   policy   and   in   contravention   of provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, as alleged? OPR­2 6) Relief. 9. Thereafter,   parties   to   the   lis   were   directed   to adduce evidence. 10. After   closure   of   the   evidence,   the   learned Tribunal,   upon   hearing   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,   has allowed the claim petition of the petitioners, by awarding the compensation,   as   referred   to   above. However,   the   Insurance company   has   been   directed   to   deposit   the   amount   of compensation with liberty to recover the same from the owner. Contentions of the appellant (Insured) 11. Aggrieved   from   the   said   award,   the   present appeal has been preferred by the owner of the offending vehicle, 6 2026:HHC:36557 before   this   Court,   mainly,   on   the   ground   that   the   learned Tribunal has erred in law while burdening the appellant with the liability to pay the amount of compensation, though with right of recovery. The award has also been assailed, on the ground, that the driver of the offending vehicle, at the relevant time, was having the driving   licence,   whereas,   the   Insurance   Company   could   not prove the same by examining witness and document from the office of District Transport Office, Tuensang, Nagaland. 13. The   award   has   further   been   assailed,   on   the ground, that the learned Tribunal has based its findings on the inadmissible   documents,   as  the   learned   Tribunal  has   issued summons to District Transport Office Tuensang, Nagaland, to prove on record that the license in question was, in fact, issued by the concerned office or not, however, on 12.04.2019, a letter was   written   to   the   Court   from   the   office   of   DTO   Tuensang, wherein, it was mentioned that the license in question was not issued from their office. 14. On the basis of the above grounds of appeal, Mr. Vinay   Thakur,   Advocate,   has   submitted   that   the   learned Tribunal has wrongly fastened the liability upon the appellant 7 2026:HHC:36557 and given the right to recover the amount, as, no willful violation has been proved by the insurer, in the present case. Contentions   of   learned   Counsel   for   the   respondents (petitioners before the Tribunal) 15. Per contra, Mr. Deepak Bhasin, learned Senior Counsel   assisted   by   Mr.   Sambhav   Bhasin,   Advocate   has supported   the   award,   by   virtue   of   which,   the   Insurance Company has been given the right to recover the amount and prayed that the learned Tribunal has rightly appreciated the evidence, so adduced by the parties. 16. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the appeal. Discussion and Analysis 17. In order to decide the controversy, involved in the present appeal, it would be just and appropriate for this Court to discuss the evidence, so adduced by the parties, before the learned Tribunal. 18. Considering   the   fact  that  the   award  has   not been assailed by the claimants and the same has only been assailed by the person, i.e., owner, who, as per the award of the learned Tribunal is liable to pay the amount of compensation, as 8 2026:HHC:36557 such, the evidence so adduced by the respondents is liable to be considered, in this case. 19. In this case, respondent No.1 Ram Lal appeared in the witness­box as RW­1 and has deposed that the offending vehicle was owned by him, which met with an accident. He has also proved the copy of RC Ex.RW­1/A, copy of Insurance Policy Ex.RW­1/B, copy of Driving Licence Ex.RW­1/C.  According to this witness, the accident, in question had taken place due to mechanical defect, which had occurred in the offending vehicle. He has further deposed that the Driving Licence of his son is valid. 19.1. In the cross­examination by learned counsel for the petitioner, this witness has admitted that in the accident, in question,   daughter   of   the   petitioners   had   expired   and information to this effect was given to the Police and the FIR was also registered, copy of which is Ex.PW­5/A.  However, he has denied that the accident, in question had taken place due to the rash and negligent driving of his son. 19.2. In the cross­examination by learned counsel for respondent No.3, this witness has deposed that Layak Ram is his son. At the time of the accident, he was 26 years of age. He has studied upto +2. On the day of accident, this witness was 9 2026:HHC:36557 at his home and admitted that in the accident, in question, his son was neither rash nor negligent. His son used to drive other vehicles of the villagers. He has also used to take apple loaded vehicles to Chandigarh. His Driving License was issued from Nagaland, however, he could not disclosed about the place in Nagaland, from where, the said licence was issued. He has admitted that the Licensing Authority is also there at Rampur and other places. He could not tell the year, in which, the license has been issued by the authority, but, he has disclosed that the same was issued from the Nagaland. Offending vehicle was purchased in the year 2013. 20. Insurance   Company   has   examined   Vivek Suman,   Administrative   Officer,   as   RW­2,   who   has   filed   his affidavit Ex.RW­2/A, which is based upon the stand, as taken by the Insurance Company. In addition to this, he has also deposed that the Insurance Company has deputed Shri Prittam Singh Chandel, Advocate, to verify the Driving License of Layak Ram. He had applied under the RTI from the office of DTO Tuensang,   Nagaland   on   08.08.2017. Vide   letter   dated 01.09.2017, the DTO Tuensang replied to their counsel that this driving licence is not issued by them and the learned counsel has sent this letter along with his letter dated 09.09.2017. 10 2026:HHC:36557 20.1. In   addition   to   this,   this   witness   has   also tendered,   in   evidence,   the   verification   report   Ex.RW­2/B, information received under RTI from DTO Tuensng, Nagaland, regarding   Driving   License   No.38619/TV/T/2010,   Ex.RW­2/C, copy   of   RTI   application,   Ex.RW­1/D,   receipt   of   Postal   Order amounting to Rs.10/­, Ex.RW­2/E, copy of authorization letter Ex.RW­2/F and copy of letter addressed to Ram Lal Ex.RW­2/G. 20.2. In the cross­examination by learned counsel for the petitioners, this witness had admitted that he is not the summoned   witness,  however,  according   to   him,   the  accident had   taken   place   on   30.03.2015,   regarding   which,   the   FIR, Ex,PW­5/A, was also registered. He has also admitted that the offending vehicle was insured with their company. 21. This   is   the   entire   evidence   adduced   by   the respondents, before the learned Tribunal. 22. In order to seek exoneration from paying the amount of compensation, it is incumbent upon the Insurance Company   to   plead   and   prove   that   the   owner   of   the   vehicle willfully and negligently handed over the offending vehicle to a person, who was not having a valid and effective driving licence. In other words, in order to prove the fundamental breach of the terms  and   conditions   of   the  insurance  policy,   the   Insurance 11 2026:HHC:36557 Company   has   to   probabilize   the   fact   that   the   owner   has knowingly handed over the vehicle to a person, whose licence is not valid. 23. Here, the driver of the offending vehicle is not a stranger, but, son of the owner. In his examination­in­chief, before the Court, he has produced the driving licence of his son and in the cross­examination, he has categorically stated that his son was also driving the pick­up vehicles of other villagers and also used to take apple loaded vehicles upto Chandigarh. He has also deposed that his driving licence was issued from Nagaland, however, he could not name the place, from where, the said licence has been issued. Even, a suggestion has not been given to this witness that he, being owner of the offending vehicle, despite knowing the fact that the licence of his son was not valid, handed over the vehicle to him. 24. Knowledge of the fake licence is  sine qua non for burdening the owner with the liability to pay the amount of compensation. In this case, it has not been suggested that the son of respondent No.1 was not having the valid and effective driving licence, what to talk about his knowledge, with regard to the fact that the licence, copy of which is Ex.RW­1/C, is not valid. 12 2026:HHC:36557 25. The tone and tenor of the cross­examination of RW­1   does   not   demonstrate   any   intention   of   the   Insurance Company, to even put a simple suggestion to the owner that he was having knowledge of the fact that the Driving licence, copy of which is Ex.RW­1/C, is not valid. 26. Now,   coming   to   the   evidence   of   RW­2/A, admittedly, this witness has never seen the accident, nor, his statement   falls   within   the   definition   of   Section   60   of   the Evidence Act (Section 55 of BSA). Furthermore, this evidence also does not fall within the definition of the exception to the direct evidence, i.e., hear say evidence or res gestae. 27. Moreover, whatsoever, he has deposed, that has been   stated   on   the   basis   of   the   report   Ex.RW­2/C,   which, admittedly, has not been submitted by him. The person, who has submitted the said report, in which, it has been mentioned that   as   per   the   verification   report,   DTO   Tuensang,   Driving Licence No.38619/TV/T/2010, is fake, is not the one, who has prepared it. The report Ex.RW­2/C, purported to be signed by District Transport Officer, Nagaland, addressed to Mr. Pritam Singh   Chandel,   Advocate,   has   not   duly   been   proved   by summoning the person, who has issued the same. 13 2026:HHC:36557 28. Learned   Tribunal,   in   the   present   case,   has exonerated the Insurance Company from paying the amount of compensation,   on   the   basis   of   the   report,   submitted   by   the District Transport Officer, in pursuance of the summons, which were   issued   to   the   District   Transport   Officer   Tuensang, Nagaland, calling upon him to put appearance, as witness, on behalf of the Insurance Company. The procedure, which has been adopted by the learned Tribunal is not known to the law. 29. Merely,   because   the   proceedings   before   the learned Tribunal, are not governed by the strict rule of evidence, does not authorize the learned Tribunal to adopt any method to collect evidence, which is, in violation of the principles of natural justice. No opportunity to rebut the report has been given to respondent No.1, as well as, to the claimants. 30. Moreover, when, a witness has been summoned by the learned Tribunal to depose, it was incumbent upon the said witness to put appearance and to depose, on oath, and in that   process,   the   deposition/assertion   is   to   be   subjected   to cross­examination by the adverse party, in order to elicit the truth. 31. It   is   the   deposition   of   the   District   Transport Officer, which would be having evidentiary value, and not his 14 2026:HHC:36557 report, which has been submitted to the Court, in response to the   summons   issued   to   the   said   authority. Along   with   the report, the Notarized affidavit of District Transport Officer has also been annexed. Neither in the CPC, nor Cr.PC, permits that the   witness,   instead   of   appearing   in   the   witness­box,   may submit his deposition, by way of affidavit, as well as, in the shape of report. Such a practice is unknown to law. 32. The learned Tribunal, in the present case, has placed much reliance on the deposition of RW­2, as well as, documents submitted by this witness, during his examination­ in­chief. Even, the report, which has been obtained, under the Right to Information Act, by the learned counsel representing the Insurance Company, would prove that the driving licence was not issued by the said authority. However, this does not, in any manner, attribute the knowledge to respondent No.1, qua the fact that the driving licence of his son was fake and he, knowing the said fact, had handed over the offending vehicle to him. 33. The   documents   Ex.RW­2/B   and   Ex.RW­2/C have been objected to, by the learned counsel appearing  for respondent   No.1   and   without   deciding   those   objections,   the learned Tribunal has relied upon those documents. 15 2026:HHC:36557 34. The approach of the learned Tribunal, in not deciding the objections, raised to the documents, would go to the   roots   of   the   case,   as   the   party,   in   case,   objections   are decided, in a particular manner, may take steps to prove the said documents, by leading some other evidence. 35. The learned Tribunal has given no reason as to how   the   report   submitted   by   the   District   Transport   Officer, Tuensang,   Nagaland,   in   pursuance   of   the   summons   issued against him, can be taken into consideration, that too, without giving any opportunity to respondent No.1 to rebut the contents of the same. 36. This   Court   deprecates   the   said   approach adopted   by   the   learned   Tribunal,   by   holding   that   such   an approach is converse to the principles governing the proceedings under the M.V. Act. 37. Another   unusual   approach,   which   has   been adopted by the learned Tribunal, in the present case, is that when, the learned counsel representing respondent No.1, relied upon   the   decision   of   learned   MACT,   Kinnaur   at   Rampur Bushehar, dated 18.08.2018, arising out of the said accident, the learned Tribunal has simply discarded the said document, by observing that the same is not binding upon the learned 16 2026:HHC:36557 Tribunal. To that extent, the learned Tribunal was correct, but, the persuasive value of that document has not been considered. 38. The   learned   Tribunal   failed   to   distinguish between the fact that merely because the licence of the deceased driver was not proved, the same does not exonerate the insurer from liability, unless or until, it has been proved that there was a   breach   of   contract   of   insurance,   between   the   insurer   and insured. Sine qua non, is the knowledge of the insured that he, despite being aware that the driving licence, copy of which is Ex.RW­1/C,   is   fake   and   despite   knowing   that   fact,   he   had handed over the offending vehicle to such person. 39. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nirmala Kthari versus United India Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 2020 SC 1193 has held that employer, while hiring a driver, is required to see if driver has a driving licence, prima facie, appearing genuine and he is not expected to ascertain veracity of the same. Relevant paragraphs   11   and   12   of   the   judgment,   are   reproduced,   as under:­ “11. While   hiring   a   driver   the   employer   is expected to verify if the driver has a driving licence. If the driver produces a licence which on the face of it looks genuine, the employer is not expected   to   further   investigate   into   the authenticity of the licence unless there is cause to believe otherwise. If the employer finds the driver to be competent to drive the vehicle and 17 2026:HHC:36557 has   satisfied   himself   that   the   driver   has   a driving   licence   there   would   be   no   breach   of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) and the Insurance Company would be liable under the policy. It would be unreasonable to place such a high onus on the insured to make enquiries with RTOs all over the   country   to   ascertain   the   veracity   of   the driving   licence. However,   if   the   Insurance Company   is   able   to   prove   that   the owner/insured was aware or had notice that the   licence   was   fake   or   invalid   and   still permitted   the   person   to   drive,   the   insurance company would no longer continue to be liable. 12. On   facts,   in   the   instant   case,   the Appellant/Complainant   had   employed   the Driver,   Dharmendra   Singh   as   driver   after checking his driving licence. The driving licence was   purported   to   have   been   issued   by   the licencing   authority,   Sheikh   Sarai,   Delhi, however, the same could not be verified as the concerned   officer   of   the   licencing   authority deposed that the record of the licence was not available with them. It is not the contention of the Respondent/ Insurance Company that the Appellant/complainant   is   guilty   of   willful negligence   while   employing   the   driver. The driver had been driving competently and there was no reason for the Appellant/Complainant to doubt the veracity of the driver’s licence. In view   of   above   facts   and   circumstances,   the impugned judgment is not liable to be sustained and   is   hereby   set   aside. The   appeals accordingly   stand   allowed. The   respondent/ Insurance Company is held liable to indemnify the appellant. 40. Similar   view   has   again   been   taken   by   the Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in  Civil   Appeal   No.4919   of   2022 (arising out of SLP (Civil) No.24933 of 2019), titled as Rishi Pal Singh versus New India Assurance Co. Ltd & Others, 18 2026:HHC:36557 Relevant paragraphs 3 to 9 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: ­ “3. Before this Court, learned counsel for the appellant   relied   upon   United   India   Insurance Co. Ltd  v. Lehru  & Ors. as  also  three­Judge Bench judgment reported as National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and Others that the owner has no mean to verify the genuineness of driving license produced before him, provided that the owner finds the driver is competent to drive the vehicle. Hence, once the appellant has deposed that he had taken test of the driver before employing him, he has taken sufficient precaution before employment. Therefore, there could not be any direction to recover the amount from the appellant. 4. The   record   of   the   Tribunal   was requisitioned. A perusal thereof shows that the claimants have produced a driving licence of the driver   before   the   Tribunal. The   said   driving licence is available at page 502 of the paper book. The genuineness of the said licence was investigated and in the report Ex. R3W2/D, the same   was   found   to   be   not   issued   by   the Licensing   Authority   Mandi   in   the   State   of Himachal Pradesh. 5. Thus,   it   was   the   claimant   alone   who relied   upon   the   license   issued   by   Licensing Authority Mandi. The same was not found to be genuine. The statement of the owner, that the license   was   from   Nagaland   is   without   any supporting   documents   and   is   thus   meaning less. The fact remains, having appointing driver after   taking   test,   the   appellant   was   not expected to make enquiries from the licensing authority as to whether driving license shown to him is valid or not. 6. If the owner has stated that driver had produced the driving license from Nagaland but no such license was produced on record, it is obviously a mistake on the part of the owner. 19 2026:HHC:36557 However, such aspect cannot be used to grant liberty to the Insurance Company to recover the amount from the owner when the driving license actually produced by the claimant themselves was from Una, Himachal Pradesh. It may be stated that falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not the principle applicable in India. Therefore, even if a part of the statement that the driver has produced the license from Nagaland is not correct, it is wholly inconsequential. 7. To   appreciate   the   contention   of   the appellant,   the   observations   of   this   Court   in Lehru (supra) have been reproduced as under: "20. When an owner is hiring a driver he will therefore have to check whether the driver has a driving licence. If the driver produces a driving licence which on the face of it looks genuine, the owner is not expected to find out whether the licence has in fact been issued by a competent authority  or  not. The   owner  would   then take the test of the driver. If he finds that the driver is competent to drive the vehicle, he will hire the driver. We find it rather strange that insurance companies expect owners   to   make   enquiries   with   RTOS, which   are   spread   all   over   the   country, whether the driving licence shown to them is valid or not. Thus where the owner has satisfied   himself   that   the   driver   has   a licence   and   is   driving   competently   there would be no breach of Section 149(2)(a)(ii). The insurance company would not then be absolved of liability. If it ultimately turns out   that   the   licence   was   fake,   the insurance   company   would   continue   to remain liable unless they prove that the owner/insured was aware or had noticed that   the   licence   was   fake   and   still permitted   that   person   to   drive. More importantly,   even   in   such   a   case   the insurance company would remain liable to the innocent third party, but it may be able to recover from the insured. This is the law 20 2026:HHC:36557 which   has   been   laid   down   in   Skandia [(1987)   2   SCC   654],   Sohan   Lal   Passı [(1996) 5 SCC 21: 1996 SCC (Cri) 871] and Kamla [(2001) 4 SCC 342: 2001 SCC (Cri) 701] cases. We are in full agreement with the views expressed therein and see no reason to take a different view." 8. The issue has been examined by a larger Bench in Swaran Singh (supra) wherein it was argued that the observations in Lehru were in conflict with the earlier judgment in New India Assurance Co. v. Kamla and Ors.. This Court held as under: "92. It may be true as has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that a fake or forged licence is as good as no licence but the   question   herein,   as   noticed hereinbefore, is whether the insurer must prove   that   the   owner   was   guilty   of   the wilful   breach   of   the   conditions   of   the insurance   policy   or   the   contract   of insurance. In   Lehru   case   [(2003)   3  SCC 338: 2003 SCC (Cri) 614) the matter has been considered in some detail. We are in general  agreement  with the approach of the Bench but we intend to point out that the   observations   made   therein   must   be understood to have been made in the light of  the  requirements of  the law in terms whereof the insurer is to establish wilful breach on the part of the insured and not for the purpose of it's disentitlement from raising any defence or for the owners to be absolved   from   any   liability   whatsoever. We would be dealing in some detail with this aspect of the matter a little later. xxx xxx xxx 99. So far as the purported conflict in the judgments of Kamla [(2001) 4 SCC 342: 2001 SCC (Cri) 701] and Lehru [(2003) 3 SCC   338:   2003   SCC   (Cri)   614]   is concerned, we may wish to point out that 21 2026:HHC:36557 the defence to the effect that the licence held by the person driving the vehicle was a   fake   one,   would   be   available   to   the insurance companies, but whether despite the same, the plea of default on the part of the   owner   has   been   established   or   not would be a question which will have to be determined in each case. 100. 100. This Court, however, in Lehru [(2003) 3 SCC 338: 2003 SCC (Cri) 614] must not be read to mean that an owner of a vehicle can   under   no   circumstances   have   any duty to make any enquiry in this respect. The   same,   however,   would   again   be   a question   which   would   arise   for consideration in each individual case." 9. Similar   question   again   came   up   for consideration before a three­Judge Bench in a judgment reported as Pappu and Ors. v. Vinod Kumar Lamba and Anr.5 wherein it was held that   the   onus   would   shift   on   the   Insurance Company   after   the   owner   of   the   offending vehicle pleads and proves the basic facts within his knowledge that the driver of the offending vehicle   was   authorized   by   him   to   drive   the vehicle and was having a valid driving license at the relevant time. The valid driving license is the license which is produced before the owner. This Court held as under: "12. This Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd.   [National   Insurance   Co. Ltd.   v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297: 2004 SCC (Cri) 733] has noticed the defences available to the insurance company under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act,   1988. The   insurance   company   is entitled   to   take   a   defence   that   the offending   vehicle   was   driven   by   an unauthorised person or the person driving the vehicle did not have a valid driving licence. The   onus   would   shift   on   the insurance company only after the owner of the  offending  vehicle   pleads  and   proves 22 2026:HHC:36557 the basic facts within his knowledge that the   driver   of   the   offending   vehicle   was authorised by him to drive the vehicle and was having a valid driving licence at the relevant time. xxx xxx xxx 17. This   issue   has   been   answered   in National   Insurance   Co. Ltd.   [National Insurance   Co. Ltd.   v.   Swaran   Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297: 2004 SCC (Cri) 733) In that   case,   it   was   contended   by   the insurance company that once the defence taken by the insurer is accepted by the Tribunal,   it   is   bound   to   discharge   the insurer   and   fix   the   liability   only   on   the owner   and/or   the   driver   of   the   vehicle. However, this Court held that even if the insurer   succeeds   in   establishing   its defence,   the   Tribunal   or   the   court   can direct the insurance company to pay the award amount to the claimant(s) and, in turn, recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. The three­Judge Bench, after analysing   the   earlier   decisions   on   the point, held that there was no  reason to deviate   from   the   said   well­   settled principle. In   para   107,   the   Court   then observed thus: (SCC p. 340) "107. We   may,   however,   hasten   to   add that   the   Tribunal   and   the   court   must, however,   exercise   their   jurisdiction   to issue such a direction upon consideration of   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   each case and in the event such a direction has been issued, despite arriving at a finding of fact to the effect that the insurer has been able to establish that the insured has committed   a   breach   of   contract   of insurance as envisaged under sub­clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub­section (2) of Section 149   of   the   Act,   the   insurance   company shall  be  entitled to realise  the  awarded amount  from the  owner or driver of  the 23 2026:HHC:36557 vehicle, as the case may be, in execution of the same award having regard to the provisions of Sections 165 and 168 of the Act. However, in the event, having regard to   the   limited   scope   of   inquiry   in   the proceedings before the Tribunal it had not been able to do so, the insurance company may   initiate   a   separate   action   therefor against   the   owner   or   the   driver   of   the vehicle or both, as the case may be. Those exceptional   cases   may   arise   when   the evidence becomes available to or comes to the notice of the insurer at a subsequent stage or for one reason or the other, the insurer was not given an opportunity to defend at all. Such a course of action may also   be   resorted   to   when   a   fraud   or collusion   between   the   victim   and   the owner of the vehicle is detected or comes to the knowledge of the insurer at a later stage." 41. Judging   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the present case, in light of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as referred to above, read   with   the   discussion   made hereinabove, the findings of the learned Tribunal, to that extent are not sustainable and the Insurance Company has miserably failed to prove the fundamental breach of Insurance Policy. As such, the learned Tribunal has wrongly burdened respondent No.1 to pay the amount of compensation. 42. Although, in this case, claimants have not filed appeal or cross­objections, for enhancement of compensation, but during the course of arguments, it has been argued by Shri 24 2026:HHC:36557 Pramod   Singh   Thakur,   Advocate,   appearing   for   respondents No.1 and 2 that the amount of compensation may kindly be enhanced so that the same could fall within the definition of ‘just compensation’. 44. It is no longer res integra that the endeavour of the Court/Tribunal, while deciding the claim petition, should be to grant ‘just compensation’ as the M.V. Act, is a beneficial piece of legislation. 44. In   order   to   achieve   the   said   goal,   now   this Court would proceed further to determine whether the amount of compensation, awarded by the learned Tribunal, falls within the definition of ‘just compensation’ or not. 45. Learned Tribunal has taken the age of deceased Sapna, as 15 years, at the time of her death and taken the contribution   towards   her   family   as   Rs.5,000/­. The   said findings   of   the   learned   trial   Court,   do   not   require   any interference by this Court as the petitioners are from a rural background. In rural areas, young girl of 15 years ordinarily contributes to her family income, by way of manual work. In the   agricultural   based   society,   young   girls   in   the   family   are engaged in  multifarious activities to support their household. 25 2026:HHC:36557 46. The   learned   Tribunal   has   rightly   given   the addition of 40%  on the established income of the deceased on account of future prospects. 47. Learned Tribunal has also deducted 50% of the income of deceased, towards her personal expenses, had she been   alive. The   learned   Tribunal,   in   the   present   case,   has applied the multiplier of ‘18’, which is the appropriate multiplier, in   view   of   the   decision   of   Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in  Sarla Verma  versus  Delhi   Transport   Corporation   and   Another, (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 121. 48. Thus,   the   learned   Tribunal   has   rightly calculated   the   amount   of   Rs.7,56,000/­   towards   ‘loss   of contribution’. The   said   findings   also   do   not   require   any interference by this Court. However, the learned Tribunal has awarded   a   sum   of   Rs.40,000/­,   under   the   head   ‘loss   of consortium’,   whereas,  in   view   of   the   decision   of   Hon’ble Supreme   Court   in  Magma   General   Insurance   Company Limited vs. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130, all the petitioners are entitled to the compensation, under the head ‘loss of consortium’. 26 2026:HHC:36557 49. Thus,   the   entitlement   of   the   petitioners,   is ascertained, as under:­ 1. Loss of contribution  = `7,56,000/­ 2. Loss of estate = `15,000/­ 3. Funeral expenses = `15,000/­ 4. Loss of consortium  = `80,000/­ Total =`8,66,000/­ (`7,56,000 +  `15,000 + `15,000+ `80,000) 50. So far as the rate of interest is concerned, the same   is   also   required   to   be   reduced   to   7.5   %   per   annum, keeping   in   view   the   prevailing   rates   of   interest   of   the nationalized banks. 51. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed. The awarded amount is enhanced from `8,26,000/­ to `8,66,000/­, however, with interest @ 7.5%. The ultimate liability to pay the amount, with interest, is on the Insurance Company. 52. The award passed by the learned Tribunal is modified, in the above terms. 53. Memo of costs be prepared. 54. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of. Record be sent back. (Virender Singh) Judge August 27, 2026 (ps)