1 2026:CGHC:23673 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CR No. 18 of 2025 Judgment Reserved on 9.4.2026 Judgment Pronounced on 15.06.2026 Sanjay Goel S/o Shri Bramhaprakash Ji Goel, Aged About 58 Years R/o Kailash Nagar, Rajnandgaon, Tahsil And District Rajnandgaon (Chhattisgarh) (Def. No. 01) ... Applicant(s) versus 1 - Satnandan Verma (Died Through LRs) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 03-12-2025 1 - (A) Parakh Verma S/o Late Satnandan Verma, Aged About 50 Years R/o Village Mohtara, Tehsil Khairagarh, District K.C.G. (C.G.) 1 - (B) Narottam Verma S/o Late Satnandan Verma, Aged About 48 Years R/o Village Mohtara, Tehsil Khairagarh, District K.C.G. (C.G.) 1 - (C) Chagan Verma S/o Late Satnandan Verma, Aged About 46 Years R/o Village Mohtara, Tehsil Khairagarh, District K.C.G. (C.G.) 1 - (D) Ramesh Verma S/o Late Satnandan Verma Aged About 44 Years SHYNA AJAY Digitally signed by SHYNA AJAY Date: 2026.06.15 18:26:40 +0530 2 R/o Village Mohtara, Tehsil Khairagarh, District K.C.G. (C.G.) 1 - (E) Nandrika Janghel D/o Satnandan Verma, Aged About 47 Years W/o Deeplal Janghel, R/o Village Pahadi Lodhi Para, Tehsil And District Raipur (C.G.) 1 - (F) Chandrika Janghel D/o Late Satnandan Verma, Aged About 45 Years W/o Devanand Janghel, R/o Village Pahadi Lodhi Para, Tehsil And District Raipur (C.G.) 1 - (G) Chameli Janghel D/o Late Satnandan Verma, Aged About 43 Years W/o Kamal Janghel, R/o Village Mohtra, Tehsil Saja District Bemetara 2 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Collector, Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh (Def. No. 02) ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title downloaded from CIS Periphery) For Applicant(s) : Mr. Karthik Khathuriya, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Kshitij Sharma, Advocate For Respondent/ State For Respondents 1-(A) to 1(G) : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate Mr. Deepak Diwakar, Advocate SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad C A V Judgment 1. This Revision is directed against the order dated 7.12.2024 passed in Civil Suit No.41-A/2022 by the Civil Judge Junior 3 Division, Khairagarh, District Rajnandgaon, whereby an application filed by the applicant (defendant No.1) under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the plaint was dismissed. The concerned Court held that the suit is not liable to be rejected at the threshold on the ground of limitation, observing that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. The concerned Court further held that in a suit for specific performance, where no specific date for performance is fixed, limitation is to be reckoned from the date when the execution of the sale-deed is denied. As such, this issue cannot be adjudicated at such preliminary stage and it requires a full trial on merits. 2. The facts germane to this case are that a suit for specific performance was filed by the plaintiff, averring that an agreement dated 9.12.2002 was executed between the parties for the sale of the suit property. The property in question comprises Khasra No.712 and 713 admeasuring 2.34 and 2.53 hectares respectively (total 8.47 hectares) situated at Village Singhauri, Tehsil Khairagarh, District Rajnandgaon (CG). It was alleged in the plaint that the suit property is in the permissive possession of the plaintiff, who has been cultivating the said land since the time of his predecessors for the last 40-50 years. It is further alleged that despite execution of the agreement to sale, the defendant did not execute the sale-deed. Thus, the plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance only when performance was refused by the defendant. Conversely, the present applicant (defendant No.1) filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, contending 4 that the suit is barred by limitation as the agreement to sale was executed way back on 9.12.2002, while the suit was filed on 29.9.2022. As such, the applicant contends that apparently, the suit is barred by time. The said application was dismissed by the impugned order. Hence, this Revision. 3. Mr Karthik Kathuriya, learned counsel for the applicant/defendant No.1 submits that though the issue of limitation was raised before the trial Court by filing an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the plaint, but the concerned Court did not appreciate the plea in its proper perspective and erroneously dismissed the said application. It was contended by the defendant that the agreement was executed on 9.12.2002 and the prescribed period of limitation is three years. Therefore, the suit is barred by time and ought to have been rejected under the provisions of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short “the Act”). However, the trial Court did not consider this aspect and dismissed the application, which is not in accordance with law. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the applicant would place reliance upon the judgments rendered in the matters of Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Hede & Co., reported in (2007) 5 SCC 614, Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, reported in (2020) 7 SCC 366 and Uma Devi and others Vs. Anand Kumar and others, reported in (2025) 5 SCC 198. 4. Mr. Dipak Diwakar, learned counsel for respondents 1- (A) to 1(G) submits that in a suit for specific performance of contract where 5 time is not of the essence, the suit cannot be dismissed only on the ground of limitation period of three years. He submits that for the purpose of computing the limitation period, the date of refusal to execute the sale deed is the relevant factor. Since the period of limitation commences only from the date performance is denied, the defendant’s contention that the suit is barred by limitation is per se illegal and misconceived. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record with utmost circumspection. 6. A bare perusal of the record reveals that the agreement was executed on 9.12.2002. A further examination of the subject agreement clarifies that no time limit was fixed for its performance. It is the plaintiff’s case that he has been in permissive possession of the suit property for about 40-50 years, since the time of his predecessors. Given this continuous permissive possession, the plaintiff frequently approached the defendant to request the execution of the sale-deed. However, the cause of action arose only when proceedings were initiated by the defendant before the Revenue Court, bringing the order dated 8.7.2021 to the knowledge of the plaintiff. This adverse order made it evident to the plaintiff that the defendant was no longer ready and willing to execute the sale-deed. Hence, the period of limitation commenced from 8.7.2021, being the date the plaintiff first had notice of the defendant’s refusal to perform the contract. 7. It is a well-settled principle of law that while adjudicating an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, the Court must 6 confine itself to the averments made in the pliant. The contents of the written statement or the grounds raised in the defendant’s application cannot be taken into consideration at this stage and further, the merit of the application must be decided only on the basis of the case pleaded by the plaintiff. 8. Admittedly, the limitation for filing a suit for specific performance in terms of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, is three years from the date fixed for the performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. Thus, when no specific time is fixed for performance, the Courts must determine the exact date on which the plaintiff received notice of the defendant’s refusal to perform the contract. In the present case, the date is ‘8.7.2021’. 9. For the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that for the purpose of deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, the date of notice for refusal must prima facie be taken as ‘8.7.2021’. Therefore, it cannot be held at this stage that the suit is ex facie barred by limitation and the plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the CPC. When computed from the date of refusal to execute the sale-deed, the suit is prima facie well within the limitation period. Ultimately, since the issue of limitation in this matter constitutes a mixed question of fact and law, it requires adjudication upon evidence. Furthermore, the judgments cited by learned counsel for the applicant (defendant No.1) is distinguishable on facts and are not applicable to the present case. 7 10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in the opinion of this Court, the trial Court has not committed any illegality or irregularity in rejecting the subject application preferred by the applicant (defendant No.1). 11. Resultantly, the Revision being devoid of merits is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Shyna Ajay