Judgment : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant appeal has been filed challenging the legality and propriety of impugned judgment passed ex-parte on 18.04.2024 and decree signed on 02.05.2024 by learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court-II, Dhanbad whereby and whereunder the Original Suit No. 545 of 2023 filed by the respondent-husband under Section 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for a decree of divorce has been allowed and marriage solemnized between both the parties has been dissolved. 2. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties by referring the order dated 17.02.2026 passed by this Court by which the matter was sent for mediation under the “Mediation for the Nation Drive 2.0”, the mediation has failed, as per the report available on record. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the parties have jointly submitted that the matter now needs to be heard on merit. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the appeal has been filed after delay of 204 days and for condoning the aforesaid delay, application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. I.A. No.2923 of 2025 5. The instant appeal is barred by delay of 204 days, therefore, the instant Interlocutory Application has been filed for condoning the aforesaid delay. 6. Mr. Aditya Baneerjee, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the judgment passed by he learned Additional Family Judge, which is impugned in the present appeal, is ex-parte and the appellant has not been provided an opportunity to contest the case. 7. It has been submitted that somehow the appellant came to know about the impugned judgment. Thereafter, the copy of the judgment has been obtained along with the order-sheets of the suit. 8. It has been submitted that learned Principal Judge, Family Court has directed for filing requisites for appearance of the respondent through Nazarat, Speed post and WhatsApp or e-mail, if any and the office has been directed to issue the same and also intimate the respondent about the case over mobile phone call, what's app or SMS if it be possible. 9. Thereafter, the case was transferred in the court of learned Additional Principal Judge-II, Additional Family Court No-II, Dhanbad for final disposal fixing the case on 11.07.2023. 10. 9. Thereafter, the case was transferred in the court of learned Additional Principal Judge-II, Additional Family Court No-II, Dhanbad for final disposal fixing the case on 11.07.2023. 10. On 11.07.2023, the petitioner-husband filed postal receipt, track report of the notice sent through Speed post and a petition for paper publication. 11. The notice upon the present appellant has been deemed to be accepted after paper publication. 12. It has been contended that so far as the issue of communicating about the pending proceeding through Speed post, an order was passed by the learned Family Judge on 05.06.2023 to issue notice also over mobile phone call, what's app or SMS, if it is possible. 13. It has been submitted that the leaned Family Judge has not bothered to consider the issue of sending the notice either through mobile phone call, what's app or SMS since there is no reference in the order-sheet said to be made by the office clerk. 14. It has been submitted by referring the order dated 11.07.2023 that the learned Family Judge has passed an order after filing of the postal receipt and track report and simultaneously the petition for paper publication was also filed. An order was passed on that date i.e., on 11.07.2023 that by granting liberty to the petitioner to file draft notice with a direction upon the office to issue the same after verification. 15. It has further been submitted by referring to the order dated 18.08.2023 that the newspaper cutting has been filed and based upon the same, the notice upon the appellant, the defendant to the suit, has been deemed to be accepted by posting the proceeding for the ex-parte hearing vide order dated 14.12.2023. 16. It has been contended that since the vital right to contest the suit was there and, as such, it was the bounden duty of the learned Family Judge to meticulously follow the process of service of notice for securing the appearance of the defendant to the suit, the appellant herein. 17. 16. It has been contended that since the vital right to contest the suit was there and, as such, it was the bounden duty of the learned Family Judge to meticulously follow the process of service of notice for securing the appearance of the defendant to the suit, the appellant herein. 17. It has been submitted that merely on the basis of an order of sending the notice either through speed post or mobile phone call, what's app or SMS and thereafter switching over to the paper publication, the notice upon the appellant has been deemed to be accepted which cannot be said to be observance of the proper process to secure the appearance of the defendant to the suit. 18. It has further been submitted that the learned Family Judge ought to have taken steps before posting the proceeding for ex-parte hearing only after ascertaining himself that the steps have been taken for service of notice upon the defendant either through electronic mode or the notice sent through post, but there is no reference to that effect if the entire order-sheet will be taken into consideration. 19. It has also been submitted that on the same date i.e., on 11.07.2023 the learned Family Judge has accepted the postal receipt and track report filed on behalf of the respondent- husband and on the same date the requisition which was made for granting leave to the petitioner to switch over to the alternative mode of notice, i.e., through paper publication, has been accepted which itself suggests that the learned Family Judge was also not satisfied on that date from the postal receipt and track report, otherwise there would not have been an order for paper publication. 20. In addition to the aforesaid ground, the other grounds have been taken that the respondent -husband has also played mischief that even during pendency of the suit, i.e., on 17.01.2024, a mutual understanding has been tried to be reached by bringing the terms and conditions in a bond paper which was signed by the respondent-husband as well as his mother, namely, Parwati Devi, but the fact about the pending suit has purposely been suppressed on that date. 21. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that due to the aforesaid sufficient cause, she has been prevented from filing the instant appeal within the time. 22. Mr. 21. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that due to the aforesaid sufficient cause, she has been prevented from filing the instant appeal within the time. 22. Mr. Awnish Shankar, learned counsel for the respondent, has contested the case by referring to the statement inter alia made in the counter affidavit. 23. The order passed by the learned Family Judge has been defended by making a ground that all the processes to secure the appearance of the appellant has been taken into consideration and even thereafter the substituted mode of service of notice as provided under Order V Rule 20 CPC has been taken recourse thereof. 24. The learned counsel thereafter has shifted on the issue of the conduct of the present appellant, i.e., on merit of the issue. 25. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties on the issue of delay condonation. 26. The law is well settled that the delay in filing the appeal is to be condoned irrespective of the period of delay on consideration of the ‘sufficient cause’ if it is being shown on behalf of the applicant which is seeking to condone the delay. 27. It requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [ (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] , wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:- “ 9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [ AIR 1964 SC 993 ] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “ 605. Policy of the Limitation Acts .—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [ (2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 ] . 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 28. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336 , Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770 , Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 . 29. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336 , Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770 , Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 . 29. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SC 195 , wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:- “ 12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over- jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.” 30. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein, expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with which means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. 31. Adverting to the grounds agitated in the instant interlocutory application, this Court, in order to appreciate the same for the purpose of coming to the conclusion as to whether the grounds which have been shown to be sufficient cause to condone the delay of 204 days, has gone through the orders passed by the learned Family Judge as available in the trial court record. 32. It is evident from the order dated 05.06.2023 that while hearing the petitioner on the point of admission the notice was issued after admitting the suit with a direction upon the petitioner to file requisites for appearance of the defendant- appellant through Nazarat, Speed Post and WhatsApp or e- mail, if any. Office was directed to issue the same and also intimate the respondent about the case over mobile phone call, WhatsApp or SMS, if it be possible. 33. The matter was posted before the court on 11.07.2023. The petitioner has filed postal receipt and track report and simultaneously also filed petition for paper publication. The court has heard on the issue of substituted mode of service of notice through paper publication in the daily local newspaper. 33. The matter was posted before the court on 11.07.2023. The petitioner has filed postal receipt and track report and simultaneously also filed petition for paper publication. The court has heard on the issue of substituted mode of service of notice through paper publication in the daily local newspaper. The court has allowed the same as would be evident from the order dated 11.07.2023. Thereafter, on 14.12.2023, the proceeding has been held to be ex-parte by accepting non- appearance of the respondent-appellant even in spite of the paper publication. 34. The question which has been considered by this Court is that the reference of the steps to be taken by making communication through electronic mode, as has been referred in the order dated 05.06.2023. 35. It is surprising and not acceptable procedure adopted for the purpose of securing appearance that on 11.07.2023 the postal receipt and track report was filed on behalf of the petitioner and simultaneously the leave was also sought for switching over to the substituted mode of service of notice by way of paper publication, which has been allowed. 36. Furthermore, as has been stated in paragraph 7 of the delay condonation application that during the pendency of the appeal, the respondent-husband was well aware with respect to the residential address of the present appellant since the specific statement has been made in paragraph 7 to the delay condonation application that on 17.01.2024 there was a mutual understanding between the parties by putting a joint signature on the bond paper in front of the mother of the respondent-husband, namely, Smt. Parwati Devi, but cunningly the issue of pending suit has not been disclosed to the appellant-wife. 37. Disclosure is not material but material is that the respondent-husband was well aware that the location of the residential address of the appellant-wife which he has suppressed from the court and the learned Family Judge has simply accepted without taking further steps to secure the appearance. 38. The statement which has been made at paragraph 7 however has been denied by the respondent-husband. But denial of the said statement as per the ground taken in the counter affidavit that there is manipulation by cutting the date as referred in the bond. 38. The statement which has been made at paragraph 7 however has been denied by the respondent-husband. But denial of the said statement as per the ground taken in the counter affidavit that there is manipulation by cutting the date as referred in the bond. The same cannot be accepted due to the reason that if any agreement by way of any mode, whether it is simple agreement or in the bond paper or it is before the public notary, both the parties are to keep the document independently. 39. The denial of the statement which has been made at paragraph 7 on behalf of the respondent-husband, therefore, must be based upon the document which was available in order to justify the statement made regarding committing manipulation by the appellant-wife. But no such document has been made available in the counter affidavit. 40. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the proceeding being an ex-parte and the learned Family Judge ought to have taken sincere endeavour to secure the appearance but having not taken, as it appears from the face of the order passed, particularly order dated 11.07.2023 and 14.12.2023, which is sufficient, according to our considered view, to condone the delay of 204 days being the cause shown to be sufficient one. 41. Accordingly, the delay condonation application being I.A. No. 2923 of 2025 is hereby, allowed and disposed of. F.A. No.74 of 2025 42. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant: 43. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that while passing the judgment and decree, the learned family judge has not followed the settled procedure in entirety in relation to service of summon in order to secure the presence of defendant/appellant/wife and as such no opportunity has been provided to the defendant/appellant to defend the case as she has never received any notice and she had no knowledge about the present case. 44. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no service report of the Nazarat Notice as well as the registered notice, thus there is no sufficient notice to the appellant. 45. It has further been contended that the suit fixed for ex-parte hearing against this appellant without even due compliance of the provisions and procedures contained in Order V of the Code of Civil Procedure. 46. 45. It has further been contended that the suit fixed for ex-parte hearing against this appellant without even due compliance of the provisions and procedures contained in Order V of the Code of Civil Procedure. 46. It has been contended that the finding of valid service in paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment is also not inconsonance to the record and appears to be perverse. 47. It has further been contended that the learned Family Judge has taken the issue very casually and without ascertaining the due course of service of notice has held the proceeding to be ex-parte and passed the impugned judgment/decree contrary to her interest and, as such, vital rights have been taken away from the defendant-appellant to defend herself. Therefore, the impugned judgment/decree is fit to be quashed and set-aside. Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent/ husband 48. While on the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-husband has submitted that in terms of order dated 14.12.2023 passed by Learned Trial Court, the notice was issued to the appellant through registered post and through Nazarat and notice was also published in the daily newspaper, but the appellant did not appear to contest the suit as such the case was posted ex-parte. 49. It is further stated and submitted that the order dated 14.12.2023 was never challenged by the appellant before any superior court and thus the same is legal and valid in the eyes of law. 50. It has further been stated that since all possible steps as per law have been taken by the learned family judge and accordingly the learned Family Judge has accepted the notice to be validly served, hence, held the proceeding to be ex- parte and, thus, it is incorrect on the part of the appellant to take the ground that holding the proceeding to be ex-parte, suffers from an error. Analysis 51. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent and gone through the findings recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment as also the trial court records including the order- sheets based upon which the learned Family Judge has accepted that the notice has been validly served upon the defendant/appellant and decided the Suit ex-parte. 52. 52. Since herein ground of holding the proceeding to be ex-parte has been taken and, as such, this court is not going upon the testimony of the witnesses rather thought it proper to consider the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, in order to reach to the conclusion as to whether holding the proceeding to be an ex-parte against the defendant, the appellant herein, is just and proper. 53. It is evident from the order dated 05.06.2023 that while hearing the petitioner on the point of admission the notice was issued after admitting the suit with a direction upon the petitioner to file requisites for appearance of the defendant- appellant through Nazarat, Speed Post and WhatsApp or e-mail, if any. Office was directed to issue the same and also intimate the respondent about the case over mobile phone call, WhatsApp or SMS, if it be possible. 54. The matter was posted before the court on 11.07.2023. The petitioner has filed postal receipt and track report and simultaneously also filed petition for paper publication. The court has heard on the issue of substituted mode of service of notice through paper publication in the daily local newspaper. The court has allowed the same as would be evident from the order dated 11.07.2023. Thereafter, on 14.12.2023, the proceeding has been held to be ex-parte by accepting non-appearance of the respondent-appellant. 55. Thereafter the matter thereafter was proceeded ex-parte and the respondent-petitioner to the suit was allowed to examine witnesses and after hearing the argument the judgment/decree has been passed which is the subject matter of the present appeal. 56. It is also settled that the Court is required to issue notice for the purpose of securing appearance of the concerned parties. The procedure to secure appearance is provided under Order V of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 18 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 provides the applicability of the procedural law as available in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 57. The procedure to secure appearance is provided under Order V of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 18 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 provides the applicability of the procedural law as available in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 57. The requirement, as per the law, as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the purpose of securing the appearance of the parties, it is the duty of the court to take all effective measures to secure the appearance of the parties concerned, i.e. by issuance of notice through registered post or through ordinary process and if on the basis of the settled procedure as laid down for securing the appearance, even the parties are not appearing, then the order is to be passed that too on the basis of application which is to be made by the party to go for the substituted service of notice through paper publication. 58. This Court is conscious of the settled position of law that the ex-parte hearing is the requirement as per the statute but before reaching to such conclusion, it is bounded duty of the concerned court to take effective steps for service of notice upon the concerned party so that the appearance must be secured. However, even if effective service of notice is being taken but the concerned party has chosen not to appear then the recourse is to be taken by switching over from the mode of service of notice by way of paper publication. 59. Thereafter, the court is to post the matter for ex-parte hearing on the principle that if the party, even after service of the notice, has chosen not to appear then the other party why to suffer. But it is also equally settled that before switching over to the mode of substituted service of notice, the court has to wait for the service of notice and the same is to be based upon the valid report of the process server, so as to take a final call to allow the party concerned to go for the substituted service of notice. 60. Further, there is wide difference in between valid service and deemed service and before reaching to the conclusion of deemed service all the parameters laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure are strictly to be adhered to. 60. Further, there is wide difference in between valid service and deemed service and before reaching to the conclusion of deemed service all the parameters laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure are strictly to be adhered to. If there will be any bypass of the process and in absence thereof any adjudication is being made then it is nothing but miscarriage of justice. 61. It requires to refer herein that the primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties on the basis of substantial justice. A court's duty is to deliver substantial justice, meaning ensuring fair outcomes based on merits. Laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even an adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizens under personal and other laws. The procedure has always been viewed as the handmaid of justice and not meant to hamper the cause of justice or sanctify the miscarriage of justice. 62. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sugandhi v. P. Rajkumar, (2020) 10 SCC 706 has specifically observed that the procedure is the handmaid of justice. Procedural and technical hurdles shall not be allowed to come in the way of the court while doing substantial justice. If the procedural violation does not seriously cause prejudice to the adversary party, courts must lean towards doing substantial justice rather than relying upon procedural and technical violation, relevant paragraph of the aforesaid order is being quoted as under: "9. It is often said that procedure is the handmaid of justice. Procedural and technical hurdles shall not be allowed to come in the way of the court while doing substantial justice. If the procedural violation does not seriously cause prejudice to the adversary party, courts must lean towards doing substantial justice rather than relying upon procedural and technical violation. We should not forget the fact that litigation is nothing but a journey towards truth which is the foundation of justice and the court is required to take appropriate steps to thrash out the underlying truth in every dispute. Therefore, the court should take a lenient view when an application is made for production of the documents under sub-rule (3)." 63. Therefore, the court should take a lenient view when an application is made for production of the documents under sub-rule (3)." 63. In the case of Jasraj Inder Singh v. Hemraj Multanchand, (1977) 2 SCC 155 the Hon'ble Apex court has observed that "Justice is truth, is beauty and the strategy of healing injustice is discovery of the whole truth and harmonising human relations. Law's finest hour is not in meditating on abstractions but in being the delivery agent of full fairness. This divagation is justified by the need to remind ourselves that the grammar of justice according to law is not little litigative solution". 64. Justice is nothing but a manifestation of the truth. It is truth which transcends every other action and when procedural law stands in the way of the truth, the Court must find a way to circumvent it. Similarly, when substantive law, as it appears, does not facilitate the emergence of the truth, it is the paramount duty of the Court to interpret the law in light of its teleos. Such an exercise is warranted in a higher degree, particularly while considering a social welfare legislation, reference in this regard be made to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash @ Israel @ Raju @ Raju das Vs. Union of India & Anr. 2025 INSC 43 65. Further it needs to refer herein that the case which is related to the matrimonial dispute concerning annulment of marriage or divorce proceeding is a serious matter and it connects entire life of husband and wife against whom a decree for declaration of nullity or divorce has been sought. In the said matter, the court should not follow mechanical approach rather the court should take all statutory provision into account which is expected for appearance of the party. 66. Adverting to the factual aspect of the case. Herein the question is that once the learned Family Judge has accepted the postal receipt and track report then there must be some finding to that effect as to whether the notice said to be validly served or not and if the notice has not been served validly then the further steps ought to have been taken by the learned Family Judge to send the notice to be served through the jurisdictional police station for the purpose of securing appearance of the appellant herein. But, no such steps have been taken, rather, on the same date leave for paper publication was granted to come out with the paper publication and based upon the filing of the paper publication, the proceeding has been held to be ex-parte. 67. We are conscious of the fact that this Court is dealing with the issue of matrimonial dispute where the valuable right to defend is available to the opposite party to the Suit and if the procedure which has been adopted by the learned Family Judge, putting the case for ex-parte proceeding and thereafter passing the judgment/decree, will be approved then it is nothing but miscarriage of justice so far as the appellant-wife is concerned who is the defendant to the Suit. 68. This Court, based upon the aforesaid fact, as has been referred hereinabove, is of the view that the appellant being the wife and a contesting party upon whom the allegation has been levelled by filing an application under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, ought to have been given all effective opportunities to contest the case by taking effective measures for the purpose of securing her appearance. 69. This Court, in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction, is of the view that the learned Family Judge while posting the matter for ex-parte hearing has not taken the proper recourse for appearance of the opposite party available in the statute and has erred in passing the impugned judgment and decree. As such, the impugned judgment and decree needs interference on the ground of providing an opportunity to the defendant /wife to defend herself (the appellant herein). 70. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 18.04.2024 and decree signed on 02.05.2024 passed by the learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court-II, Dhanbad in Original Suit No. 545 of 2023 are hereby quashed and set-aside. 71. Consequently, the Original Suit No. 545 of 2023 is restored from the stage of appearance so that the appellant- wife will be at liberty to file written statement to adduce the evidence including examination-in-chief and cross-examination. 72. Learned counsel for both the parties have submitted that the parties will appear before the learned Family Judge on 24.04.2026. 73. The learned Family Judge is to decide the suit in accordance law preferably within a period of four months. 74. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the appeal stands allowed and disposed of. 75. 72. Learned counsel for both the parties have submitted that the parties will appear before the learned Family Judge on 24.04.2026. 73. The learned Family Judge is to decide the suit in accordance law preferably within a period of four months. 74. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the appeal stands allowed and disposed of. 75. Pending IA(s), if any, stands disposed of.