JUDGMENT : 1. The present appeal has been filed under Clause-10 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 16.02.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 4956 of 2015, whereby and whereunder, the learned Single Judge has been pleased to dismiss the writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant herein. Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition as has been incorporated in the impugned judgment needs to be referred herein which are as under: (I) The petitioner was appointed as Constable No. 2498 in the year 2011 and during his service he was posted at Pokharia, P.S.: Tundi, Dhanbad on 29.07.2013.The appellant on 29.7.2013 at 05:00 a.m. had made 11 round firing in the air from his A.K.47 rifle in his room and outside the room. On hearing the sound of firing other police personnel had reached there and had caught the appellant and taken him to Dhanbad Police centre. (II) On observation, it was found that the appellant was mentally ill and in this regard a report dated 29.7.2013 was submitted by Unit In-Charge to the Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad. (III) Then the appellant was suspended from his service vide office order No. 3391/13 dated 19.12.2013 and accordingly charge was framed against the appellant by office notification no.5010 dated 20.12.2013. (IV) Thereafter vide Memo No. 5148 dated 28.12.2013 formal charge memo has been issued to the appellant alleging that the appellant had unnecessarily fired 11 rounds A.K.47 Rifle which shows his negligence, indiscipline, violation of order etc. (V) The appellant was admitted in RINPAS, Ranchi and after treatment he was released from the hospital on 16.8.2013 with an advice to take rest of one month. The appellant has submitted his show-cause reply on 3.1.2014 and by District Order No.735/14 dated 11.3.2014 he was exonerated from suspension and was deployed in Arms Duty for one month. (VI) During enquiry, the witnesses were examined and either of the witnesses cannot be said to be eye witness of the firing caused by the appellant. After enquiry, the appellant had submitted his explanation showing his innocence and health hazard. (VII) The Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad has passed order of punishment removing the petitioner from the police force with immediate effect which was communicated to him vide memo no. 633 dated 5.2.2015.
After enquiry, the appellant had submitted his explanation showing his innocence and health hazard. (VII) The Superintendent of Police, Dhanbad has passed order of punishment removing the petitioner from the police force with immediate effect which was communicated to him vide memo no. 633 dated 5.2.2015. (VIII) Against the aforesaid order the appellant had filed Departmental Appeal which was decided vide order dated 25.1.2016 converting the punishment of removal into compulsory retirement. 3. Being aggrieved,by the order dated 5.2.2015 passed by the disciplinary authority and order dated 25.1.2016 passed by the appellate authority, the petitioner has preferred a writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 4956 of 2015 but the same was dismissed by the learned writ court vide judgment dated 07.3.2022. 4. It needs to refer herein that against the aforesaid order dated 07.3.2022, the petitioner has filed LPA No. 152 of 2022 confining his argument to the limited aspect regarding non-compliance of the principles of natural justice and has submitted that the writ court did not consider the said aspect as it was not pleaded in the writ application. 5. Consequently, the amendment petition was filed to incorporate the question of non-compliance of principle of natural justice. The said amendment petition was allowed vide order dated 17.5.2023 and the order passed by the writ court in WP(S) No. 4956 of 2015 dated 7.3.2022 was set-aside and the matter was remanded back for reconsideration after amendment before the learned writ Court. 6. Pursuant to the order dated 17.5.2023 passed in LPA No. 152 of 2022, an amended writ petition was heard which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 16.2.2024 against which theinstant appeal has been preferred 7. It is evident from the factual aspect that the writ petitioner was posted as constable has opened 11 round firing from his AK47 Rifle in air at about 05:00 a.m. on 29.7.2013 in his room and outside the room. The unit in-charge and other constables caught hold of him and took him to the Dhanbad Police Station and as per the writ petitioner it was recorded that the petitioner has lost his mental balance. The authorities have decided to initiate a departmental proceeding which was initiated and a memorandum of charge has been issued on 28.12.2013 with a direction to file show cause. 8.
The authorities have decided to initiate a departmental proceeding which was initiated and a memorandum of charge has been issued on 28.12.2013 with a direction to file show cause. 8. It is admitted fact that the writ petitioner has not disputed the charge of 11 rounds of firing by AK 47 Rifle rather he has tried to explain the circumstances under which he has fired 11 rounds. The Enquiry Officer has found the charge proved and forwarded the enquiry report before the disciplinary authority who has inflicted punishment of removal from service. The said finding of the disciplinary authority was upheld by the appellate authority, however, by taking lenient view,the appellate authority hasmodified the aforesaid punishment of removal into compulsory retirement taking into consideration the medical condition of the appellant/writ petitioner. 9. The writ petitioner being aggrieved with both the aforesaid orders has filed writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 4956 of 2015 which was dismissed vide order dated 16.2.2024 which is the subject matter of this appeal. Arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant/writ petitioner: 10. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the disciplinary authority has not appreciated the fact of violation of principle of natural justice as the writ petitioner has not been provided adequate opportunity of hearing which ought to have been given to him. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant has further relied upon the provision of Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 and by taking aid of section 47 thereof has submitted that the mandate as provided under the aforesaid section has not been followed and, as such, on that ground also the order of punishment is not proper. Arguments advanced on behalf of the Respondents: 12. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-State while defending the impugned order has submitted that there is no error in the impugned order rather the learned Single Judge has considered the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer in entirety and on consideration of the charge proved mainly on the basis of admission of the imputation as per the memorandum of charge. 13. It has been submitted that although the disciplinary authority has inflicted the punishment of removal from service but the appellate authority by taking lenient view has reduced the same to that of compulsory retirement. 14.
13. It has been submitted that although the disciplinary authority has inflicted the punishment of removal from service but the appellate authority by taking lenient view has reduced the same to that of compulsory retirement. 14. It has been contended that the offence of the writ petitioner is not condemnable and if on the basis of the consideration of the aforesaid misconduct the writ petitioner has not found to be retained in service. Hence, there is no error in the impugned judgment and thus the same needs no interference. Analysis: 15. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and gone through the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. 16. The following issues require consideration in the present case: (i) Whether in a case of misconduct the provision of Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation)Act, 1995 having its applicability. (ii) Whether the compulsory retirement suffers from error that too if the person concerned, the appellant herein, is a member of a disciplined force and, as such, allowing to retain in service will it not jeopardy the interest of disciplinary force ? 17. Both the issues are being taken up separately but before considering the issues this court needs to point out certain admitted facts. 18. Admittedly, the writ petitioner was posted as constable has made 11 round firing from his AK47 Rifle in air at about 05:00 a.m. on 29.7.2013 in his room and outside the room. The unit in-charge and other constables caught hold of him and took him to the Dhanbad Police Station and as per the writ petitioner it was recorded that the petitioner has lost his mental balance. The authorities have decided to initiate a departmental proceeding which was initiated and a memorandum of charge has been issued on 28.12.2013. 19. It is admitted fact that the writ petitioner has been charged of 11 rounds of firing by AK 47 rifle rather he has tried to explain that the incidents took place due to mental imbalance.
The authorities have decided to initiate a departmental proceeding which was initiated and a memorandum of charge has been issued on 28.12.2013. 19. It is admitted fact that the writ petitioner has been charged of 11 rounds of firing by AK 47 rifle rather he has tried to explain that the incidents took place due to mental imbalance. The Enquiry Officer has not found himself satisfied with the explanation furnished and the charge has been found to be proved which finally has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and in consequence upon the same as also after providing opportunity to file reply to the second show cause the order of punishment dated 5.2.2015 was passed of removing the writ petitioner from service since the employer has come to the conclusive finding that retaining the service of the writ petitioner will jeopardy the interest of the disciplined force. 20. The writ petitioner has preferred an appeal before the appellate authority who by taking lenient view, particularly, on consideration of the explanation so furnished, has reversed the punishment to that of compulsory retirement vide order dated 25.01.2016. 21. The writ petitioner has challenged the order of compulsory retirement,particularly, by taking aid of Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. The argument has been advanced by taking aid of section 47 of the Act, 1995, therefore, the provision of section 47 of the Act needs to be referred along with objects and intents of the Act, 1995. The Act, 1995 was enacted with the following objects which is being referred herein under: “47.Non-discrimination in Government employments.-(1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service. Provided that, if an employee , after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.
(2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.” 22. It is evident from the objects and the intents of the Act, 1995that the preamble to this Act delineates its objectives of promoting and ensuring equality and full participation in the mainstream society of persons with disabilities. The Act aims to protect and promote the economic and social rights of persons with diverse deprivations The Act.1995 in section 2, covers seven disabilities. The criteria for the classification of each disability are embodied in a biomedical model according to which: i. Blindness; ii. Low vision: iii. Hearing impairment. iv. Locomotor disability or cerebral palsy: v. Mental retardation: vi. Mental illness: and vii. Leprosy-cured person. 23. Section 47 of the Act, 1995 deals with non-discrimination in government employment. It is evident from the bare perusal of the aforesaid proviso that Chapter VIII speaks about the subject “non- discrimination” i.e. non-discrimination in transport as provided under section 44, non-discrimination on the road as provided under section 45, non-discrimination in the built environment as provided under section 46 and non-discrimination in Government employments as provided under section 47 thereof. 24. It is evident from the provision of section 47(1) that no establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service; provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits; provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. 25. Further as per the mandate of Section 47(2) no promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability.
25. Further as per the mandate of Section 47(2) no promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability. Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section. 26. It needs to refer herein that the writ petitioner for the first time has taken aid of the provision of the Act, 1995 but no such plea has been taken before the enquiry officer or before the disciplinary authority and as such this court thinks it fit and proper to discuss and consider the same and for the aforesaid purpose issue no.1 has been framed. 27. Section 47 deals with the word that no establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service. Act 1995 also provides that for the purpose of determination of disability a certificate is required to be there issued from the competentauthority for the purpose to have the social security. 28. We are conscious that the Act, 1995 or the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force or any rules, order or any instructions issued there under, enacted or issued for the benefit of persons with disabilities as per the provision provided under section 72 thereof but the core questions herein the applicability of the Act, 1995 in the present case. 29. It is admitted case of the writ petitioner that he has been subjected to departmental proceeding on the issue of misconduct committed by him. The question therefore is that is it a case of dispensing with from service or reducing in rank an employee who acquires disability during his service. Since there is no disability certificate having brought on record which is the mandatory document to be considered for the purpose of having aid of section 47(1). 30. Further since the Act, 1995 has been enacted with the core objective to have equal opportunity to a disabled person and for the aforesaid purpose non-discrimination has been kept at Chapter-VIII thereof.
Since there is no disability certificate having brought on record which is the mandatory document to be considered for the purpose of having aid of section 47(1). 30. Further since the Act, 1995 has been enacted with the core objective to have equal opportunity to a disabled person and for the aforesaid purpose non-discrimination has been kept at Chapter-VIII thereof. We are dealing with the issue of misconduct and therefore we are of the firm view that if charge has been framed on the ground of misconduct, then it will not lead to any issue of discrimination so as to apply any of the provision as under Chapter-VIII. 31. The issue of Act, 1995 has been taken into consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court wherein section 47 and 72 both have been taken into consideration in the case of Kunal Singh v. Union of India reported in 2003 (4) SCC 524 . The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment is reproduced herein under: “6. Short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 47 of the Act. 7. From the facts, which are not in dispute, it is clear that the disability suffered by the appellant is covered by Section 2(i)(v) read with Section 2(o) of the Act. It is also not in dispute that this disability was acquired by the appellant during his service. Under Section 2 “disability” and “person with disability” are separately defined and they are distinct. We may also notice some provisions in Chapter VI of the Act relating to employment. Section 32 deals with identification of posts which can be reserved for persons with disabilities. Section 33 speaks of reservation of such percentage of vacancies not less than 3% for persons or class of persons with disability of which 1% each shall be reserved for persons suffering from: (i) blindness or low vision; (ii) hearing impairment; and (iii) locomotor disability or cerebral palsy. Section 38 requires the appropriate Governments and local authorities to formulate schemes for ensuring employment of persons with disabilities. Section 47 is included in Chapter VIII of the Act. Chapter VI deals with employment relating to persons with disabilities including identification of posts and reservation of vacancies for such persons. Under this Chapter, reservation of vacancies for persons with disabilities is made for initial appointments.
Section 47 is included in Chapter VIII of the Act. Chapter VI deals with employment relating to persons with disabilities including identification of posts and reservation of vacancies for such persons. Under this Chapter, reservation of vacancies for persons with disabilities is made for initial appointments. Section 47 in Chapter VIII deals with an employee of an establishment who acquires a disability during his service. 8. The need for a comprehensive legislation for safeguarding the rights of persons with disabilities and enabling them to enjoy equal opportunities and to help them to fully participate in national life was felt for a long time. To realize the objective that people with disabilities should have equal opportunities and keeping their hopes and aspirations in view a meeting called the “Meet to Launch the Asian and Pacific Decades of Disabled Persons” was held in Beijing in the first week of December 1992 by the Asian and Pacific countries to ensure “full participation and equality of people with disabilities in the Asian and Pacific regions”. This meeting was held by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific. A proclamation was adopted in the said meeting. India was a signatory to the said proclamation and agreed to give effect to the same. Pursuant thereto this Act was enacted, which came into force on 1-1- 1996. The Act provides some sort of succour to the disabled persons. 9. Chapter VI of the Act deals with employment relating to persons with disabilities, who are yet to secure employment. Section 47, which falls in Chapter VIII, deals with an employee, who is already in service and acquires a disability during his service. It must be borne in mind that Section 2 of the Act has given distinct and different definitions of “disability” and “person with disability”. It is well settled that in the same enactment if two distinct definitions are given defining a word/expression, they must be understood accordingly in terms of the definition. It must be remembered that a person does not acquire or suffer disability by choice. An employee, who acquires disability during his service, is sought to be protected under Section 47 of the Act specifically. Such employee, acquiring disability, if not protected, would not only suffer himself, but possibly all those who depend on him would also suffer. The very frame and contents of Section 47 clearly indicate its mandatory nature.
An employee, who acquires disability during his service, is sought to be protected under Section 47 of the Act specifically. Such employee, acquiring disability, if not protected, would not only suffer himself, but possibly all those who depend on him would also suffer. The very frame and contents of Section 47 clearly indicate its mandatory nature. The very opening part of the section reads “no establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service”. The section further provides that if an employee after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits; if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post he will be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. Added to this no promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability as is evident from sub- section (2) of Section 47. Section 47 contains a clear directive that the employer shall not dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during the service. In construing a provision of a social beneficial enactment that too dealing with disabled persons intended to give them equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation, the view that advances the object of the Act and serves its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the Act. Language of Section 47 is plain and certain casting statutory obligation on the employer to protect an employee acquiring disability during service. 10. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent on the basis of the definition given in Section 2(t) of the Act that benefit of Section 47 is not available to the appellant as he has suffered permanent invalidity cannot be accepted. Because, the appellant was an employee, who has acquired “disability” within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Act and not a person with disability. 11. We have to notice one more aspect in relation to the appellant getting invalidity pension as per Rule 38 of the CCS Pension Rules.
Because, the appellant was an employee, who has acquired “disability” within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Act and not a person with disability. 11. We have to notice one more aspect in relation to the appellant getting invalidity pension as per Rule 38 of the CCS Pension Rules. The Act is a special legislation dealing with persons with disabilities to provide equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation to them. It being a special enactment, doctrine of generalias pecialibus non derogant would apply. Hence Rule 38 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules cannot override Section 47 of the Act. Further, Section 72 of the Act also supports the case of the appellant, which reads: “72. Act to be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law.—The provisions of this Act, or the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force or any rules, order or any instructions issued thereunder, enacted or issued for the benefit of persons with disabilities.” 32. It is thus evident that the petitioner who has tried to take aid of the Act, 1995 but it is not the case of the writ petitioner that he has in any way subjected to discrimination so that the writ petitioner may come under the fold of Chapter-VIII particularly section 47 thereof, since, it is neither the case of dismissing him from service nor reducing in rank due to disability sustained by him during service rather the case is of misconduct of firing 11 rounds from A.K. 47 Rifle which has been admitted by the writ petitioner, however, he has tried to give explanation that he was suffering from mental imbalance/insomnia. 33. This Court based upon the aforesaid discussions is of the view that in the facts of the present case it is not a case where the provision of Act, 1995 is applicable. 34. Accordingly, the issue no.1 has been answered. Issue No.2 35. The petitioner since has admitted that he has opened 11 rounds of fire from his AK 47 Rifle.
34. Accordingly, the issue no.1 has been answered. Issue No.2 35. The petitioner since has admitted that he has opened 11 rounds of fire from his AK 47 Rifle. The writ petitioner had to accept that 11 rounds of firing is from the bullets which have been issued in his name and as such there was no occasion for the writ petitioner to deny the same, however, he has tried to furnish the explanation that he was suffering from mental imbalance/insomnia. 36. The question therefore is that when the writ petitioner being a constable in a disciplined force if has acted in such an illegal manner can he be retained in service that was the consideration which has been given by the employer and for that he was put under suspension in contemplation of departmental proceeding which was initiated by framing of charge. The charge has been proved and thereafter second show cause notice has been issued.Therefore, the disciplinary authority at the first instance instead of taking decision of dismissal from service has passed the order of punishment of removal but the same has also been reversed by the appellate authority to that of the compulsory retirement. Therefore, this court is of the view that the disciplinary authority/appellate authority was no so harsh in removing the writ petitioner from service otherwise they would have passed the order of dismissal from service. The reason is that the employer also intends not to keep the writ petitioner in service considering the interest of the disciplined force. 37. This Court after having discussed the aforesaid facts and adverting to the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge has found that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the fact of the case in entirety. 38. Further, the law is well-settled that in the matter of administrative decision which has been taken by the disciplinary authority this Court under Article 226 has very limited scope as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran reported in AIR 2015 SC 545 wherein at paragraph 13 thereof, the following guidelines has been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision which reads hereunder as: “13.
Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 39. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. v. Abrar Ali reported in AIR (2017) SC 200 , wherein the following guidelines have been laid down, showing interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, the same extract of para 8 thereof, is referred hereinbelow: “8.
v. Abrar Ali reported in AIR (2017) SC 200 , wherein the following guidelines have been laid down, showing interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, the same extract of para 8 thereof, is referred hereinbelow: “8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re- appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1931 , Para 6), this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. 40.
The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. 40. Adverting to the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order, this Court has found that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in the matter of showing interference on the point of judicial review in the administrative order passed by the disciplinary authority has been discussed. 41. The learned Single Judge has further taken into consideration the nature of the charge which has been proved by the inquiring officer and on acceptance of the finding recorded by the inquiring officer based upon which initially the order for review was passed but subsequently the order for removal has been reversed to that of the compulsorily retirement, the same has also been taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge properly in view of the fact that misconduct has been admitted by the delinquent employee, i.e., the writ petitioner and justification which has been given has not found to be satisfactory which according to our considered view cannot be said to suffer from an error. 42. Accordingly, issue no.2 has been answered. 43. In the result, the present appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. 44. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand disposed of.