JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, J. Notices upon respondent nos. 6 to 8 have already been effected in light of the order dated 05.03.2024 and, thereafter the matter was adjourned on several times and in spite of that respondent nos. 6 to 8 have chosen not to appear. 2. In view of that, this writ petition is being heard in absence of respondent nos. 6 to 8. 3. Heard Mr. Kundan Kumar Ambastha, learned counsel for the petitioners, Ms. Shalini Shahdeo, learned counsel for the State and Mr. Rajeev Ranjan Tiwary, learned counsel for respondent nos.5(i) to 5(vi). 4. This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 14.02.2008/18.03.2008 passed by the Additional Collector, Land Ceiling, Hazaribagh in Land Ceiling Appeal No.14 of 2007, contained in Annexure-6 of the writ petition, by which, the Additional Collector has allowed the appeal filed by original respondent no.5 and set- aside the order dated 09.10.2007 passed by the D.C.L.R., Hazaribagh in Preemption Case No.4 of 2007-08, by which, the petition filed by the original petitioner under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Areas and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act claiming preemption over the land was allowed. The prayer is also made for quashing the order dated 09.06.2008 contained in Annexure-7 of the writ petition passed by the Member Board of Revenue, Jharkhand in Revision Case No.25 of 2008, whereby, the revision filed by the original petitioner has been dismissed. 5. Mr. Kundan Kumar Ambastha, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the original petitioner, namely, Matuk Ram Rajak filed an application before the L.R.D.C., Hazaribagh under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Areas and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act claiming preemption over the lands measuring 0.3½ decimals corresponding to plot no.1088 of Khata No.159 situated at Village-Masaratu Tola, P.S. Katkamsandi, District- Hazaribagh claiming himself to be an adjoining raiyat with respect to the vended land. He further submits that the original petitioner was holding land adjoining to the lands in question i.e. plot no.1088 as he purchased the lands of the aforesaid plot vide registered sale deed dated 25.02.2004 and he also purchased the lands of plot nos.1085 and 1087 respectively by registered sale deeds dated 16.05.1969 and 28.03.1980. He further submits that the original petitioner was holding land adjoining to the lands in question i.e. plot no.1088 as he purchased the lands of the aforesaid plot vide registered sale deed dated 25.02.2004 and he also purchased the lands of plot nos.1085 and 1087 respectively by registered sale deeds dated 16.05.1969 and 28.03.1980. He then submits that the respondent nos.6 to 8 have transferred 0.3½ decimal of land out of plot no.1088 of Khata No.159 situated at Village- Masaratu Tola, P.S. Katkamsandi, District- Hazaribagh in favour of original respondent no.5, namely, Sangita Devi by registered sale deed dated 26.06.2007, contained in Annexure-2 of the writ petition. He next submits that when it has come to the knowledge of the original petitioner about the transfer of land in favour of original respondent no.5, the original petitioner filed Preemption Case No.4 of 2007-08 claiming preemption over the aforementioned lands being an adjoining raiyat holding lands over the plot nos.1088 as well as plot nos.1087 and 1085 which is the adjoining land of the aforesaid lands. He next submits that original respondent no.5 appeared in the said preemption case and filed her show-cause stating therein that the land in question is not an agricultural land and in view of that, the original petitioner is not entitled to claim preemption. He submits that after hearing both the sides and considering the materials on record, the D.C.L.R., Sadar, Hazaribagh has allowed the said preemption case vide order dated 09.10.2007 and directed original respondent no.5 to transfer the aforesaid lands in favour of the original petitioner. He also submits that being aggrieved with the said order, original respondent no.5 has preferred Land Ceiling Appeal No.14 of 2007 before the Additional Collector, Hazaribagh, who after hearing both the sides at length passed the order dated 03.01.2008 directed the Circle Officer, Katkamsandi to submit report after making spot verification in presence of both the parties and it was further observed that final order would be passed on receipt of the enquiry report. He further submits that the Circle Officer has submitted report, contained in Annexure-5 of the writ petition stating therein that the said land is in the residential area. He submits that thereafter the learned appellate authority has been pleased to set-aside the order dated 09.10.2007 passed by the D.C.L.R., Hazaribagh vide order dated 14.02.2008/18.03.2008. He further submits that the Circle Officer has submitted report, contained in Annexure-5 of the writ petition stating therein that the said land is in the residential area. He submits that thereafter the learned appellate authority has been pleased to set-aside the order dated 09.10.2007 passed by the D.C.L.R., Hazaribagh vide order dated 14.02.2008/18.03.2008. He then submits that aggrieved with that order, the original petitioner preferred Revision Case No.25 of 2008 before the Member Board of Revenue, Jharkhand and the revisional court has been pleased to dismiss the said revision case on misconception. He elaborates his argument by way of submitting that the said land is of agriculture in nature and in view of the report of the Circle Officer only turning down the finding of the D.C.L.R. Hazaribagh by the appellate authority as well as revisional authority is not tenable. By way of drawing attention of the Court to the said report, he submits that in last two lines there is interpolation by way of inserting line that land is in residential area. By way of referring the sale deed of original respondent no.5, he submits that in the schedule of the land, original petitioner’s land is shown to be in the north side of the said land. On these grounds, he submits that the impugned orders may kindly be set-aside. 6. Ms. Shalini Shahdeo, learned counsel for the State submits that both the learned courts have rightly passed the orders. She further submits that pursuant to the order of the Coordinate Bench, further affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State, wherein, it has been pointed out that on proper application only, the nature of land can be changed by the State Government. 7. Mr. Rajeev Ranjan Tiwary, learned counsel for respondent nos.5(i) to 5(vi) opposed the prayer made in the present writ petition and submits that the Additional Collector, Hazaribagh has rightly called report from the Circle Officer, Katkamsandi, Hazaribagh, who has submitted his report, wherein, it has come that the said land is in residential area and, thereafter, the Additional Collector, Hazaribagh has passed the impugned order and in view of that, the Additional Collector, Hazaribagh has rightly passed the order, which was also rightly affirmed by the revisional court and, as such, there is no illegality in the impugned orders. He relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramji Sharma @ Ramji Babu (Dead) By LRS v. State of Bihar and others , reported in (1996) 10 SCC 671 . He refers paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said judgment, which read as under: “4. The question which is to be answered is as to whether the expression land as defined in the Act will include not only the land which are being used or capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture purposes but also land within the urban areas meant for building purposes. It is well known that in and around the towns and urban areas at one point of time most of the lands were used for agriculture or horticulture purposes. With growth of population and development activities slowly-slowly such agricultural land are converted to use which are non- agricultural. Many colonies have been developed by the side of the old cities which at one point of time were agricultural fields and crops used to be grown. But with passes of time and cry for more plots of land for construction of buildings they lost their original character and purpose. It appears that the framers of the Act were quite conscious of this aspect of the matter. that is why while defining 'land' they laid much emphasis in respect of the nature of use such land was being put by saying that it meant land which is used or capable of being put by saying that it meant land which used or capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture or the homestead of the land- holder. It need not be pointed out that the sole object of the Act is to put ceiling on the land held by land-holders for agriculture or horticulture purposes and to declare the areas beyond the ceiling as surplus which shall vest in the State Government. In this background neither it can be assumed not it can be held that the frames of the Act had in mind even the lands which are in the heart of the cities meant for construction of buildings. In this background neither it can be assumed not it can be held that the frames of the Act had in mind even the lands which are in the heart of the cities meant for construction of buildings. It is a matter of common knowledge that even in areas which are completely urban in nature or even in colony some plots are lying vacant as no constructions have been made over the same for one reason or the other including financial constraint. Till constructions are made they are being used for growing some crops or fruits. But can be said that such plots which are meant for building purposes shall be deemed to be land within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act? According to us, the answer is in negative. Whenever and application under Sub-Section 16 is filed, which is in respect of a land within the urban area, the authorities or the High Court concerned should first examine which is the primary object for which such land was being used or is capable of being used. If it found that the land was being retained by the transferor or was being transferred to another person for a purpose and object which is not connected which agriculture then and application under sub-section (3) of Section 16 should not be entertained. On the other hand, if the authorities or the High Court are satisfied that the land which has been transferred is fully covered by the definition of land as given under Section 2(f) then provisions of the Act have to be applicant was entitled for retransfer in his favour from the transferee on the same terms and conditions. A full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of AIR 1975 PATNA 119, presided over by N.L. Untwalia C.J. (as he then was) examined the scope of expression 'land' as defined in Section 2 (f) of Act. It was observed: "The consensus of opinion - and, as I shall presently show, there is no conflict in any of the decisions - is that a parti piece of land belonging to a raiyat, an agriculturist, which is his homestead on which there is no dwelling house or any of the things as mentioned in the Explanation, is not a land covered by the Act. It has been further pointed out that land fit for building purposes not connected with agriculture situated ordinarily and agriculture situated ordinarily and generally town or bazaar areas, to which are applicable the provisions of the Transfer of Property act. is not the homestead of a land-holder to make it a land within the meaning of Section 2(f). (emphasis supplied) We are in agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid judgment of the Full Bench. 5. So far the facts of the present case are concerned, the High Court has rejected the contention that the land is question can be held to be land within the meaning of Section 2(f) merely because in the Kathian Entry it had been recorded as Bhit Land. The High Court in the impugned order has observed: "It goes without saying that all the urban lands at some at some point of time or the agricultural operations were carried on. Therefore, mere description of the land as a Bhit land by the survey authorities would not be a conclusive proof that the land was agricultural in nature. The fast development and urbanisation of the town Hazipur which has very recently been made a district, cannot be lost sight of. Therefore, I, would accept the second contention of Mr. Krishna Prakash Sinha and hold that the pre-emptor has not succeed in establishing his case that the disputed land was a land within the meaning of the provisions of the Act to which the provisions of Section 16 (3) would apply." In view of the findings recorded by the High court that the land which have been transferred were in the town of Hajipur and in the urban area, the application filed under sub-section (3) of Section 16 has been rightly dismissed. Accordingly, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to cost.” 8. Relying on the above judgment, Mr. Accordingly, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to cost.” 8. Relying on the above judgment, Mr. Rajeev Ranjan Tiwary, learned counsel submits that the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that even the lands which are completely urban in nature or even in a colony some plots are lying vacant as no constructions have been made over the same for one reason or the other including financial constraint and till the constructions are made they are being used for growing some crops or fruits. He next submits that so far as interpolation aspect is concerned, the original petitioner has kept mum before the appellate authority as well as revisional authority on that point and in view of that, there is no finding of the said authorities as no contention was made by the original petitioner before the said authorities with regard to interpolation. 9. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record including the impugned orders as well as the order of the first court i.e. the D.C.L.R., Sadar, Hazaribagh in Preemption Case No.4 of 2007-08. The said preemption case was allowed on the ground that the said land is agricultural in nature and it has not been notified as urban land. Thereafter, the original respondent no.5 has preferred an appeal being Land Ceiling Appeal No.14 of 2007 before the Additional Collector, Hazaribagh, which has been allowed on the report submitted by the Circle Officer, Katkamsandi, Hazaribagh, contained in Annexure-5 of the writ petition and after discussing the plot number and adjoining lands, he has reported that the said land is in residential area and thereafter the appellate authority has passed the order dated 14.02.2008/ 18.03.2008, which has been affirmed by the revisional authority i.e. the Member Board of Revenue, Jharkhand vide order dated 09.06.2008 in Revision Case No.25 of 2008. 10. So far as the argument with regard to interpolation in the record is concerned, that point has not been taken/argued before the appellate authority as well as revisional authority by the original petitioner and in view of that, there is no finding on that point. 10. So far as the argument with regard to interpolation in the record is concerned, that point has not been taken/argued before the appellate authority as well as revisional authority by the original petitioner and in view of that, there is no finding on that point. In the report, it is clearly pointed out by none other than the Circle Officer, Katkamsandi, Hazaribagh that the land in question is in residential area and in view of that, the appellate authority has allowed the appeal and that has been affirmed by the revisional authority. 11. The main object behind the right of preemption, either based on custom or statutory law, is to prevent intrusion of a stranger into the family- holding or property. A co-sharer under the law of preemption has right to substitute himself in place of a stranger in respect of a portion of the property purchased by him, meaning thereby, that where a co-sharer transfers his share in holding, the other co-sharer has right to veto such transfer and thereby prevent the stranger from acquiring the holding in an area where the law of preemption prevails. The original petitioner has failed to establish the said proposition before the appellate authority as to how he is co-sharer and having right of preemption. 12. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, this Court finds that no case of interference is made out and, as such, this writ petition is dismissed.