2026:HHC:36435 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No.  : 470 of 2026 Decided on    : 25.08.2026 Man Singh …Petitioner Versus Manmohan Singh & Ors. …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioner : Mr.   P.S.   Goverdhan,   Senior Advocate,   with   Mr.   Rakesh Thakur, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr.   Suneet   Goel,   Senior Advocate,   with   Mr.   Vishwas Kaushal,   Advocate,   for respondents No. 1, 2(b), 2(c), 3 and 4. Virender Singh, Judge (Oral) The petitioners have filed the present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order dated 07.08.2023, passed by the Court of learned Senior   Civil   Judge,   Nalagarh,   District   Solan,   H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’), in CMA No. 511/2023, filed in Civil Suit titled as “Manmohan Singh & Ors. Versus Man Singh & Ors.”. 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:36435 2. By   way   of   the   order   dated   07.08.2023,   the learned   trial   Court   has   allowed   the   application   filed   by respondent   No.   1   Manmohan   Singh   and   permitted respondent No. 1 Manmohan Singh to prove the Will dated 20.09.2003, by way of leading secondary evidence. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the present  lis,  are,   hereinafter   referred   to,   in   the   same manner, as were, referred to, by the learned trial Court. 4. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present petition,   before   this   Court,   as   borne   out   from   the documents annexed with the petition, may be summed up, as under:­ 4.1 Plaintiff   Manmohan   Singh   and   others,   have filed the suit for declaration, with consequential relief of permanent   prohibitory   injunction,   on   the   ground   that earlier Sh. Jaswant Singh, predecessor­in­interest of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1, was owner in possession of the subject matter of the lis, as detailed in the head­note of the   plaint,   who   expired   on   14.10.2004   and   during   his lifetime, he has executed a registered Will No. 286, dated 20.09.2003, with respect to his entire land/share in favour of Surmukh Singh, Manmohan Singh and Amarjeet Singh 3 2026:HHC:36435 sons of Jaswant Singh, and Smt. Gurnam Kaur, wife of Sh. Jaspal Singh son of Jaswant Singh, residents of Village Manpura,   Tehsil   Baddi,   District   Solan,   H.P.,   in   equal shares and he has not given anything to defendant No. 1 Man   Singh,   who   is   also   son   of   Jaswant   Singh,   by specifically mentioning in the Will that he is disobedient and disrespectful. 4.2 It   is   the   further   case   of   the   plaintiffs   that Assistant   Collector   Nalagarh,   has   ignored   the   aforesaid registered Will No. 286, dated 20.09.2003, and has entered and sanctioned the mutation No. 1714, dated 24.08.2005, in   favour   of   plaintiffs   and   defendant,   on   the   basis   of natural succession, and that too, behind the back of the plaintiffs. 4.3 It is their further case that they had produced the  original  registered Will, before  the then  Patwari,  on 17.01.2005, for entering the mutation, as per registered Will,   but,   the   said   Will   was   not   produced   by   the   then Patwari before the Assistant Collector, Nalagarh. When, Assistant   Collector,   inquired   for   the   original   Will,   the plaintiffs told that they had already handed over the same to concerned Patwari, for entering the mutation and even 4 2026:HHC:36435 certified   copy   of   the   registered   Will   was   also   produced before the Assistant Collector, Nalagarh, but the same was ignored. 5. On the basis of above facts, they have sought the decree of declaration. 6. The suit has been contested by defendant No. 1, by filing the written statement, in which, he has taken the plea that Sh. Jaswant Singh, during his lifetime, destroyed the original Will, in the presence of family members, as he was misbehaved and maltreated by plaintiffs No. 1 and 2, in   the   year   2004. Thereafter,   Sh. Jaswant   Singh   also sworn­in an affidavit, in the Court premises at Nalagarh. 6.1 In nutshell, the execution of the Will has been controverted by defendant No. 1, as, according to him, due to subsequent act of the plaintiffs, Sh. Jaswant Singh had destroyed/revoked the Will. 7. When, the lis was pending for PWs, plaintiff No. 1   Manmohan   Singh,   has   moved   an   application   seeking indulgence of the learned trial Court to permit him to lead secondary   evidence,   to   prove   the   original   Will   No.   286, dated 20.09.2003. The said prayer has been made on the ground that the original Will was misplaced by the Patwari. 5 2026:HHC:36435 As   such,   the   same   could   not   be   produced   before   the Assistant   Collector,   Nalagarh,   for   sanctioning   the mutation. On the basis of above facts, they have sought the indulgence of the learned trial Court to permit them to lead secondary evidence. The application is duly supported by the affidavit. 8. Application has been contested, on the ground, that   application   is   not   maintainable,   the   plaintiffs   have availed   two   opportunities   to   lead   evidence,   however,   he could   not   produce   evidence. All   the   allegations,   with regard to the Will, its production before the Patwari and misplacement have also been disputed. As such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 9. The learned trial Court, after considering the rival contentions, has allowed the application, subject to cost of Rs. 500/­. 10. The  said  order  has  been  assailed  before  this Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 11. The ‘scope of interference’ under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,  has elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “K. Valarmathi & Ors. 6 2026:HHC:36435 Versus Kumaresan, 2025 INSC 606”. Relevant para 9 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “Essence   of   the   power   under   Article   227   being supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the original jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to supervise. Nor can it be invoked to supplant a statutory legal remedy under   the   Civil   Procedure   Code,   1908. For   example, existence of appellate remedy under Section 96 of the Code   operates   as   a   near   total   bar   to   exercise   of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.” 12. In  a recent decision in “Nandi Infrastructure Corridor   Enterprises   Ltd.   &   Anr. Versus   B.   Gurappa Naidu & Ors., 2026 INSC 434”, the scope of interference has again been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Relevant paragraph 35 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:­ “35. In   short,   the   principles   laid   down   in   the   above matters is as follows: a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not   to   be   exercised   unless   there   has   been   an   (a) unwarranted   assumption   of   jurisdiction,   not   vested   in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable   refusal   to   exercise   jurisdiction   vested   in Courts or tribunals. b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh   the   evidence   or   facts   upon   which   the determination   under   challenge   is   based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.” 7 2026:HHC:36435 13. Being guided by the above decisions, this Court is of the view that from the very inception of the lis, it is the case   of   the   plaintiffs   that   the   original   Will   allegedly executed   by   Sh. Jaswant   Singh,   was   produced   before Patwari for sanctioning the mutation, but, Patwari has not produced   the   said   Will   before   the   Assistant   Collector, Nalagarh. Although, the said stand has been controverted by the defendants, in the written statement, by putting forward   the   plea   that   on   account   of   the   subsequent conduct of the plaintiffs, their predecessor­in­interest had destroyed the  Will No. 286, dated 20.09.2003. On the similar grounds, the indulgence of the learned trial Court has been sought to permit the plaintiffs to prove the Will No. 286, dated 20.09.2003, by way of secondary evidence. 14. Once, the learned trial Court, on the basis of the stand taken by the parties before it, has exercised the jurisdiction   to   allow   the   application,   by   permitting   the plaintiffs to adduce the evidence, then, in the absence of any material to justify that those findings fall within the definition   of   ‘perverse   findings’,   interference   is   not justifiable, by this Court. 8 2026:HHC:36435 15. The term “perverse” has duly been elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Arulvelu and Another Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another’, reported in  (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:­ “22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The  trial  court  very   minutely   examined  the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The   trial   court's   analysis   of   evidence   also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on no   evidence   or   evidence   which   is   thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse. 23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well   settled   that,   in   an   appeal   against   acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others,   this   Court   observed   that   the   expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the 9 2026:HHC:36435 evidence   itself. In Triveni   Rubber   &   Plastics   v. Collector   of   Central   Excise,   Cochin,   the   Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence   or   that   they   are   so   perverse   that   no reasonable   person   would   have   arrived   at   those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against   the   evidence. In   Godfrey   v.   Godfrey,   the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman   Dictionary   of   Contemporary English – International Edition Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English ­ 1998 Edition Perverse:   Law   (of   a   verdict)   against   the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse:   Purposely   deviating   from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked   or   wayward;   stubborn;   cross   or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the   weight   of   evidence   but   is   altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: 10 2026:HHC:36435 "8. … We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal  unless the same is found  to be perverse. In   the   present   case,   the   High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained   between   the   decisions   which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision   is   arrived   at   on   no   evidence   or evidence   which   is   thoroughly   unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is   some   evidence   on   record   which   is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever   compendious   it   may   be,   the conclusions   would   not   be   treated   as perverse   and   the   findings   would   not   be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer­cum­ Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath &   Sons   &   Others   1992,   this   Court   observed   as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points   on   which   the   challenge   to   the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion,   the   High   Court   was   in   error   in 11 2026:HHC:36435 constituting   itself   into   a   court   of   appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re­appreciate the primary or perceptive   facts   which   were   otherwise within   the   domain   of   the   fact­finding authority  under  the  statute. The  question whether the transactions were or were not sales  exigible to sales tax constituted  an exercise   in   recording   secondary   or inferential   facts   based   on   primary   facts found   by   the   statutory   authorities. But what   was   assailed   in   review   was,   in substance,   the   correctness   ­   as distinguished from the legal permissibility ­ of   the   primary   or   perceptive   facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding   relevant   material   or   by   taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to   suffer   from   the   vice   of   irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." The   term   “perverse”   has   duly   been elaborated   by   the   Hon’ble   Supreme Court   in   ‘Arulvelu   and   Another Versus   State   represented   by   the Public   Prosecutor   and   Another’, reported   in  (2009)   10   Supreme Court Cases 206. Relevant paragraphs   22   to   30   of   the   said judgment are reproduced, as under:­ “22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court.  The  trial  court  very   minutely   examined  the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record.   The   trial   court's   analysis   of   evidence   also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on no   evidence   or   evidence   which   is   thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse. 12 2026:HHC:36435 23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well   settled   that,   in   an   appeal   against   acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others,   this   Court   observed   that   the   expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence   itself. In Triveni   Rubber   &   Plastics   v. Collector   of   Central   Excise,   Cochin,   the   Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence   or   that   they   are   so   perverse   that   no reasonable   person   would   have   arrived   at   those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against   the   evidence. In   Godfrey   v.   Godfrey,   the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 13 2026:HHC:36435 2. Longman   Dictionary   of   Contemporary English – International Edition Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English ­ 1998 Edition Perverse:   Law   (of   a   verdict)   against   the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse:   Purposely   deviating   from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked   or   wayward;   stubborn;   cross   or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the   weight   of   evidence   but   is   altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: "8. … We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal  unless the same is found  to be perverse. In   the   present   case,   the   High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it 14 2026:HHC:36435 would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained   between   the   decisions   which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision   is   arrived   at   on   no   evidence   or evidence   which   is   thoroughly   unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is   some   evidence   on   record   which   is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever   compendious   it   may   be,   the conclusions   would   not   be   treated   as perverse   and   the   findings   would   not   be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer­cum­ Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath &   Sons   &   Others   1992,   this   Court   observed   as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points   on   which   the   challenge   to   the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion,   the   High   Court   was   in   error   in constituting   itself   into   a   court   of   appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re­appreciate the primary or perceptive   facts   which   were   otherwise within   the   domain   of   the   fact­finding authority  under  the  statute. The  question whether the transactions were or were not sales  exigible to sales tax constituted  an exercise   in   recording   secondary   or inferential   facts   based   on   primary   facts found   by   the   statutory   authorities. But what was assailed.” 16. Similar   view   has   again   been   taken   by   the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘S.R. Tewari Versus Union of India and Another’, reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court 15 2026:HHC:36435 Cases 602. Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment is reproduced, as under:­ “30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking   into   consideration   irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it  is  “against the  weight of  evidence”,   or  if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the   basis   of   no   evidence   or   thoroughly   unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered   with. (Vide: Rajinder   Kumar   Kindra   v. Delhi Administration, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh thr. Secretary and Babu v. State of Kerala).” 17. Judging   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the present   case,   especially,   the   consisting   stand   of   the plaintiffs, this Court is of the view that the defendants are not able to make out a case before this Court, from which, it can be said that the findings, so recorded, by the learned trial Court, are suffering from any perversity. As such, this Court is of the view that the order passed by the learned trial   Court,   does   not   require   any   interference. Consequently, the petition is dismissed. 18. Any   of   the   observations,   made   hereinabove, shall not be taken, as an expression of opinion, on the 16 2026:HHC:36435 merits of the case, as these observations are confined, only to the disposal of the present petition. 19. The   parties   to   the   lis   are   directed   to   appear before the learned trial Court on 07.09.2026 at 10:00 am. 20. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s) disposed of. (Virender Singh) 25th August, 2026 Judge (Pramod Kumar)