Judgment wp576.26.odt 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.576 OF 2026 Bhojraj Tukaram Jangle, aged about 40 years, occupation – labourer, r/o Khandoba Ward, Hinganghat, taluka Hinganghat, district Wardha, at present Central Prison, Amravati. ….. Petitioner. :: V E R S U S :: 1. State of Maharashtra, through its Secretary, Home Department (Special) Mantralaya, Mumbai. 2. District Magistrate/Collector, Wardha, taluka and district Wardha. ….. Respondents. ========================================= Shri Y.K.Dhande, Counsel for the Petitioner. Shri V.A.Thakare, Additional Public Prosecutor for Respondents/State. ========================================= CORAM : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE & RAJ D.WAKODE, JJ. CLOSED ON : 06/10/2026 PRONOUNCED ON : 09/10/2026 JUDGMENT : (Per : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE) 1. Heard learned Counsel Shri Y.K.Dhande for the petitioner and learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri V.A.Thakare for respondents/State. Rule. .....1/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 2 2. By this petition, the petitioner challenges order of detention dated 20.11.2025 passed by respondent No.2 - District Magistrate/Collector, Wardha detaining him for a period of one year and subsequent orders of approval dated 1.12.2025 and confirmation by Advisory Board dated 26.12.2025. 3. Respondent No.2 - District Magistrate/Collector, Wardha has passed the detention order detaining the petitioner under Section 3 of The Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers, Persons Engaged in Black Marketing of Essential Commodities, Illegal Gambling, Illegal Lottery and Human Trafficker Act, 1981 (for short, the MPD Act). 4. As per contentions of the petitioner, on 12.11.2025, the Police Station Officer of Hinganghat Police Station has forwarded a proposal to respondent No.2 - District Magistrate/Collector, Wardha to detain the petitioner under the MPD Act terming him as dangerous person. In the said proposal, it was contended that the petitioner is a dangerous person acting in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of ‘public peace and order’. Several offences are registered against him under various provisions. Out of that, 2 offences are under investigation and 13 offences are pending before the court for trial. He has created terror in the area for smoothly running dangerous activities. The detenu is a source of .....2/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 3 encouragement for other like minded criminals to illicit business posing serious threats to ‘peace and order’. The petitioner is a habitual offender involved in attempting to commit robbery together with other co-accused using deadly weapons while roaming in public places causing injuries to innocent persons. He is assembling unlawful gang and thereby became a threat to the society. 5. Considering the proposal, on 20.11.2025, respondent No.2 has passed the detention order thereby detaining the petitioner under provisions of the MPD Act. Respondent No.1 by exercising powers under Section 12(1) of the MPD Act has confirmed the said detention order passed by respondent No.2 and thereby directed further detention of the petitioner. Hence, this petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that merely because several offences are registered against the petitioner, that by itself is not sufficient to initiate the action of detention against him. It is duty of the Detaining Authority to ascertain truthfulness of confidential statements before passing the order. Mere recording of statements of witnesses itself is not sufficient. He submitted that respondent No.2 further has not ascertained any prevailing circumstances at the time of passing of the detention order. Though there is an endorsement on confidential statements stating ‘verified’, the same is not sufficient to record satisfaction about truthfulness of .....3/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 4 the said statements. Moreover, the said statements nowhere disclose that activities of the petitioner caused disturbance to ‘the public order.’ The order to make an order detaining certain persons is governed by provisions of the MPD Act. The order of detention has to be based upon subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority with a view to prevent detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of ‘public order’. The statements of confidential witnesses have not been verified by the Detaining Authority personally and perusal of the same would reflect that the same are related to individual incidents and it does not have any nexus with maintenance of ‘public order’ and, therefore, without recording any satisfaction, the said orders came to be passed. He further submitted that Section 2 of the MPD Act speaks about “dangerous person” means, which states that a person, who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code and Chapter IV of the BNS or any offences under Chapter-V of the Arms Act. .....4/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 5 The petitioner has not committed any such offences and, therefore, for all these grounds, the detention order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 7. Learned Additional Public Pleader for the State strongly opposed the said contentions and submitted that in all 15 offences are registered against the petitioner, which show that he was continuously involved in illegal activities. While considering the proposal of detention, the Detaining Authority is satisfied that the petitioner is a dangerous person within the meaning of Section 2(b- 1) of the MPD Act. The Detaining Authority is further satisfied itself that the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of ‘public order’ and it was necessary to detain him under the MPD Act with a view to prevent him from acting in the similar manner in future. The Detaining Authority further considered that 13 offences are registered against the petitioner, which are before the court for trial and 2 offences are under the investigation. In order to curb criminal activities of the petitioner, preventive actions under Section 110(e)(g) of the CrPC as well as action of externment were already taken against the petitioner. Despite said actions taken against him, activities of the petitioner could not be curbed and, therefore, the detention order was passed and, therefore, no interference is called for. .....5/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 6 He submitted that the Advisory Board has also considered the entire record and, thereafter, the order came to be confirmed. 8. Considering contentions raised by the petitioner, it has to be seen, whether requirement before passing an order of detention under Section 3 of the MPD Act is fulfilled. 9. In view of provisions of Section 3(1), the State Government is authorized to issue an order of detention against an individual, provided it is satisfied that such detention is imperative to prevent individual from engaging in conduct prejudicial to maintenance of ‘public order.’ 10. Sub-section (2) provides that the State Government may empower District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police to exercise powers conferred by sub-section (1). The State Government is, however, required to record a satisfaction that the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area are such, that would require conferment of powers of the State Government upon the jurisdictional District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police in order to prevent any person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 11. Proviso to sub-section (2) stipulates that, the period specified in the order made by the State Government under this .....6/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 7 sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed six months, but the State Government may amend such order to extend such period from time to time not exceeding three months at any time. In other words, the State Government, by such order, may confer its powers under sub-section (1) of Section 3 upon District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police for a period, not exceeding six months with a rider of permissible extension from time to time, but not exceeding three months at one time. 12. Thus, the State Government will have to record a satisfaction that in a particular area, within the local limits of jurisdiction of District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police, the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail are such that would require a preventive detention of a person, if contingency so arises. The order of detention must, therefore, explicitly disclose the existence of such circumstances or the reasonable likelihood thereof, wherein the possibility of an individual or individuals acting in a manner detrimental to the maintenance of public order is manifest. In such situations, where the contingency materializes, the officers empowered under sub-section (2) of Section 3 shall be vested with the necessary authority and powers conferred by the State Government to prevent the individual(s) from engaging in conduct as described in sub-section (1). .....7/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 8 13. Similarly, sub-section (3) of Section 3 provides that when an order is passed under sub-section (2), the officer concerned shall forthwith report the said fact to the State Government, together with the grounds on which the order has been made, as also, such other particulars that would have bearing on the matter. Sub-section (3) further provides that no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government. 14. Thus, Section 3 indicates that prime responsibility of passing order of preventive detention lies with the State Government. 15. In the light of the above legal provisions, the order impugned passed by the Detaining Authority requires to be examined. 16. Perusal of the order impugned, admittedly, shows that no prevailing circumstances are mentioned in the said order showing that provisions applied against the petitioner are inadequate to curb his activities. Perusal of the record reveals that in all 15 offences are registered against the petitioner since 2021 to 2025, which are reproduced as under: .....8/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 9 .....9/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 10 .....10/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 11 .....11/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 12 .....12/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 13 Out of 15 offences, 13 offences are pending for trial and 2 offences are under investigation. .....13/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 14 17. The proposal for the detention further reveals that preventive actions are also initiated against the petitioner by initiating action under Section 110(a)(e)(g) of the CrPC and proceedings of externment. The details of preventive actions are as follows: .....14/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 15 Thereafter, respondent No.2 considered Crime No.1437/2025 registered under Sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act at Hinganghat Police Station; Crime No.882/2025 registered under Section 310(4) and 310(5) of the BNSS at Hinganghat Police Station; Crime No.881/2025 registered Sections 309(6) and 3(5) of the BNSS and under Section 142 of the Maharashtra Police Act; and Crime No.1371/2024 registered under Sections 4 and 25 of the Arms. 18. The Detaining Authority has also recorded statements of secret witnesses. It appears that all these offences are registered on the basis of complaints by individuals due to assault to them by the petitioner. Perusal of statements the secret witnesses reveals that witnesses have stated that the petitioner was possessing knife and sword and showing the said knife and sword, abused them and he is also involved in abusing various persons by threatening them. The statement of A-Witness shows that when he along with his friends was playing on football ground, the petitioner and his friends came there and disclosed them that they want to play here and they should leave the place. On that count, there was a quarrel between them and the witness as well as other players, who were playing with him, were threatened by the petitioner. Similarly, the statement of B-Witness shows that when he was proceeding to market, the petitioner restrained him and .....15/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 16 demanded money from him and as he declined to pay the money, he was abused and snatched amount Rs.1500/-. 19. It is well settled law that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and, therefore, it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that liberty of a person is not jeopardized unless his case falls squarely within. The provisions shall not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorizing such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinizing the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court. 20. In Haridas Shankar Gaikwad vs. Commissioner of Police & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 4349, this court, by considering the entire law developed on this issue, observed that, “the criminal prosecution launched and the preventive detention ordered are on the very same allegations of organised smuggling activities, through a network set up, revealed on successive raids carried on at various locations, on specific information received, leading to recovery of huge cache of contraband. When bail was .....16/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 17 granted by the jurisdictional Court, that too on conditions, the detaining authority ought to have examined whether they were sufficient to curb the evil of further indulgence in identical activities; which is the very basis of the preventive detention ordered.” It is further observed by this court that, “the Detaining Authority has not considered the efficacy of the conditions imposed by the jurisdictional Court while enlarging the petitioner on bail and enter any satisfaction, however subjective it is, as to the conditions not being sufficient to restrain the detenu from indulging in such activities. In the light of law laid down by the Hon’ ble Apex Court, it is to be borne in mind that when a person is enlarged on bail by Competent Criminal Court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinizing the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.” 21. In another decision, in the case of Joyi Kitty Joseph vs. Union of India and ors, reported in (2025)4 SCC 476, the Hon’ ble Apex Court, by referring catena of decisions, observed that, “the formation of the opinion about detention rests with the Government or the officer authorized. Their satisfaction is all that the law speaks of and the courts are not constituted an Appellate .....17/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 18 Authority. Thus the sufficiency of the grounds cannot be agitated before the court. However, the detention of a person without a trial, merely on the subjective satisfaction of an authority however high, is a serious matter. It must require the closest scrutiny of the material on which the decision is formed, leaving no room for errors or at least avoidable errors. The very reason that the courts do not consider the reasonableness of the opinion formed or the sufficiency of the material on which it is based, indicates the need for the greatest circumspection on the part of those who wield this power over others”. 22. Thus, the law as to the preventive detention is settled, which states that, “preventive detention laws or an exceptional measure reserved for tackling emergent situations ought not to have been invoked in this case as a tool for enforcement of “law and order”, especially when the existing legal framework to maintain law and order is sufficient to address the offences under consideration.” 23. Perusal of the detention order reveals that the Authority mainly relied upon two statements of secret witnesses, i.e. witnesses-A & B. Admittedly, the said statements show that there was dispute between them which was in individual capacity. Besides the said statements, the Detaining Authority has not verified genuineness of the said statements. .....18/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 19 24. Thus, there is a substance in contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent No.2 relied upon statements without verifying truthfulness of the same. On the basis of the said two statements of two secret witnesses, respondent No.2 recorded that he is subjectively satisfied that the petitioner is a dangerous person as defined under Section 2(b-1) of the MPD Act. 25. The issue with the detention order, which we need to address is, whether the alleged act of commission for which the detenu is kept under detention is prejudicial to ‘ public order’; and secondly, whether all relevant circumstances were considered and whether there were existence of extraneous factors. 26. Before addressing these questions, it is necessary to understand how the Hon’ble Apex Court has distinguished between disturbances relatable to ‘law and order’ and disturbances caused to ‘public order.’ Mere breach of law in all cases does not lead to ‘public disorder.’ The difference between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ was expressed by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr.Ram Manohar Lohia vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1966 AIR 740 wherein it is observed thus: “Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but .....19/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 20 cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. ….. It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and order" also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting public order". One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State.” 27. Thus, to determine an act to qualify as a disturbance to ‘public order’, the specific activity must have an impact on the broader community or the general public, invoking feelings of fear, .....20/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 21 panic, or insecurity. Not every case of a general disturbance to public tranquility affects the ‘public order.’ 28. In another decision, in the case of Kuso Sah vs. State of Bihar, reported in (1974)1 SCC 195, the Hon’ ble Apex Court held that, “the two concepts have well defined contours, it being well Established that stray and unorganized crimes of theft and assault are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. Infractions of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder. …..” It has further been held that, “the power to detain a person without the safeguard of a court trial is too drastic to permit a lenient construction and therefore courts must be astute to ensure that the detaining authority does not transgress the limitations subject to which alone the power can be exercised.” 29. In view of the above observations and turning to Section 3(1) of the MPD Act, admittedly, the Government has to arrive at a subjective satisfaction that the petitioner has to be detained in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of ‘public order.’ 30. As observed earlier, the term ‘public order’ is defined in explanation to Section 2(a) of the MPD Act as encompassing .....21/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 22 situations that cause “harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave wide-spread danger to life or public health. 31. The detention order in the present matter fails to differentiate between offences which create a “law and order” situation and which prejudicially affect or tend to prejudicially affect “public order”. The offences referred to detention order alleged to have been committed by the detenu between the two individuals. It was the dispute between two individuals and during exchange of words, the assault was allegedly made by the petitioner. In some offences, allegations against the petitioner are that he was found along with weapons preparing for committing robbery; and in some of offences, allegations levelled against the petitioner are that by threatening individuals, he snatched amount from them. 32. On an overall consideration of circumstances, it does appear to us that existing legal framework for maintaining ‘law and order’ is sufficient to address like offences which were under consideration, which the Commissioner anticipates could be repeated by the detenu if not detained. The preventive detention laws, an exceptional measure reserved for tackling emergent situations, ought not to have been invoked as a tool for enforcement of “law and order”. .....22/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 23 33. As observed earlier, power to make an order of detention primarily rests with the State Government. By way of sub-section (2), power of the State Government is conferred upon District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police to deal with the emergent situation that may arise to detain a person with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Such an exercise of powers of the State Government, by its officers, is, therefore, subject to approval by the State Government, that too, within twelve days of making order by the officers. 34. If the impugned order passed by respondent No. 2 is examined, in the light of the above settled legal position, definitely, it nowhere shows that there was any disturbance to ‘public order’ due to activities of the petitioner and provisions applied against the petitioner were inadequate to curb his activities and, therefore, the ‘law and order situation’ arose and, therefore, the detention was required. Thus, merely on the basis of multiple offences, activities of the detenu cannot be termed as an act amounting to disturb the ‘public order’ unless habitually has disturbed any ‘ public order.’ 35. In the present case, 15 offences were mentioned in the detention order and 3 offences are considered by the Detaining Authority. In-camera statements of witnesses are also not sufficient .....23/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 24 to speak regarding crimes against the petitioner and it also falls short to determine that activities of the petitioner are prejudicial to members of the society. The allegations show that out of dispute between two individuals, the FIR came to be lodged against the petitioner. Thus, it nowhere reveals that due to the said act of the petitioner, members of the society were prejudiced. 36. Thus, we find force in submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner that allegations made in the offence, which are the basis of passing the detention order impugned, does not amount to an act, which is prejudicial to the ‘public order.’ However, at the most, it would be said to be an act of disturbing the ‘law and order.’ 37. We, thus, find that the detention order impugned is unsustainable in law. We are, therefore, inclined to allow this writ petition. Hence, we proceed to pass following order: ORDER (1) The Criminal Writ Petition is allowed. (2) The order of detention dated 20.11.2025 passed by respondent No.2 - District Magistrate/Collector, Wardha detaining him for a period of one year and subsequent orders of approval dated 1.12.2025 and confirmation by Advisory Board dated 26.12.2025 are hereby quashed and set aside. .....24/- Judgment wp576.26.odt 25 (3) The petitioner shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other offence. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. (RAJ D.WAKODE, J.) (URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.) !! BrWankhede !! .....25/-