1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 601 of 2026 1 - Gurucharan Singh Hora S/o Shri Ajit Singh Hora Aged About 65 Years R/o C- 39, Sector- 4, Devendra Nagar, Raipur, Tehsil And District- Raipur (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Dr. Apporv Patel S/o Shri Ashok Patel Aged About 51 Years R/o Shiv Ganga Trimurti Society Gurmohar Flat, Gulbai Tekra, Ahmedabad (Gujarat) 3 - Amin Anyut Vishnu Bhai S/o V.C. Amin Aged About 55 Years R/o 394, Konto Kasent Canada Represented Through Power Of Attorney Holder Dr. Apporv Patel S/o Shri Ashok Patel Aged About 51 Years R/o Shiv Ganga Trimurti Society Gurmohar Flat Gulbai Tekra, Ahmedabad (Gujarat) 4 - Smt. Shweta Rajnikant W/o Shri Rajnikant Patel Aged About 32 Years R/o Suruchi Apartment Ahmedabad (Gujarat) Currently R/o 6624 West Palm Florida 33411 (U. S. A.) Represented Through Power Of Attorney Holder Dr. Apporv Patel S/o Shri Ashok Patel Aged About 51 Years R/o Shiv Ganga Trimurti Society Gurmohar Flat Gulbai Tekra, Ahmedabad (Gujarat) 5 - Purvi Rajesh Patel D/o Ashok D. Patel Aged About 48 Years R/o 110, Natchez Court Kery, North Kerelina (U.S.A.) Represented Through Power Of Attorney Holder Dr. Apporv Patel S/o Shri Ashok Patel Aged About 51 Years R/o Shiv Ganga Trimurti Society Gurmohar Flat Gulbai Tekra, Ahmedabad (Gujarat) Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2026.05.30 12:15:49 +0530 2 6 - Shailesh Shankar Bhai Aman S/o Shri Shankar Lal Amin Aged About 62 Years R/o Mani Nagar, Ahmedabad (Gujarat) 7 - Janak Shankar Bhai Amin S/o Shri Shankar Lal Amin Aged About 58 Years R/o 5 Dilip Nagar, Mani Nagar, Ahmedabad (Gujarat) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Sr. Advocate along with Ms. Shivangi Agrawal, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vikhyat Arora, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Order on Board 15/05/2026 1. The petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the impugned order dated 18.03.2026, passed by the learned 4th District Judge, Raipur, in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 14/2025, whereby the misc. appeal filed by the petitioner against the order dated 01.01.2025 passed by the learned 3rd Additional Judge to the Court of First Civil Judge Senior Division, Raipur in Civil Suit No. 2-A/2023, has been dismissed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is the defendant No.1 before the learned trial Court. The respondents Nos. 2 to 7 filed a civil suit before the learned trial Court for declaration of title and permanent injunction over the suit property of the diverted land Khasra No. 589/4 and 595/4 area 0.182 hectare, agricultural land of Khasra No. 585/2 and 595/1 area 0.1154 hectare situated at village Telibandha PH No. 64, Tahsil and District Raipur and 3 also the diverted land of Khasra No. 579/4 and 595/4 area 0.182 hectare over which a house, servant quarters are constructed which are also situated at village Telibandha Tahsil and District Raipur. It is the pleading of the plaintiff in the civil suit that late Rajendra M. Patel and Smt. Daksha Patel have executed their separate will deeds on 06.03.2021 with respect to their properties, including the suit property, by which the plaintiffs No. 1 to 4 were given 20-20% share, and the plaintiffs No. 5 and 6 were given 10- 10% share of their property. Accordingly, the plaintiffs came into possession of their respective shares of the properties as per the will dated 06.03.2021 after the death of Rajendra M. Patel on 22.03.2021 and Smt. Daksha Patel on 04.05.2021. When the plaintiffs moved their application for mutation before the Tahsildar, Raipur, the defendant No. 2/petitioner raised an objection that he had an agreement to purchase the suit land from Rajendra M. Patel and Smt. Daksha Patel, and he is in possession of the same. The plaintiffs have pleaded that Rajendra M. Patel and Smt. Daksha Patel has never executed any agreement in favour of the defendant no.1/petitioner or any other person and has not received any advance amount. Since the plaintiffs are residents of out of the State of Chhattisgarh, to take advantage, the defendant no.1 raised the objection in the mutation proceeding and tried to encroach on the suit properties, which were reported to the police, but no action has been taken by them. It is also the pleading that the mutation application of the plaintiffs has been rejected by the 4 Tahsildar Raipur on the ground that the documents with respect to the ancestral property of the plaintiff have not been annexed with the application, and the appeal against the order dated 31.05.2022 is pending before the SDO (Revenue), Raipur. Therefore, the plaintiffs have filed the civil suit. In the said civil suit, an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2, read with Section 151 of CPC for the grant of temporary injunction has also been filed. 3. After hearing the parties on the application of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC, the learned trial Court passed the order on 01.01.2025, allowing the application and directed the parties to maintain the status quo with respect to the suit property till the final adjudication of the suit. The said order dated 01.01.2025 was challenged by the defendant No.1/petitioner in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 14/2025 before the learned 4th District Judge, Raipur, which has been dismissed by order dated 18.03.2026. Hence, the present writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the learned trial Court, as well as the appellate Court, has committed gross illegality in allowing the application for the grant of temporary injunction. They should have considered that the issue involves disputed question of fact, which is to be decided after recording evidence of the parties. The plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit property and have not annexed any document that prima facie shows their possession of the suit property. The learned 5 appellate Court has also considered in Para 11 of its order that the possession of either party could not be ascertained at this stage, and when the possession of the plaintiffs could not be prima facie established, no injunction can be granted in their favour. He would further submit that the consideration of the learned trial Court as well as the appellate Court with respect to the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss are erroneous as the plaintiff’s title itself is in cloud, they are not in possession of the suit property, and therefore, all three aforesaid requirements for grant of a temporary injunction are not in their favour. Until and unless the plaintiffs are able to prove the execution of a will in their favour, they are not the title holders of the suit property, and no injunction can be granted in their favour. It is further submitted by him that the grant of temporary injunction is a discretionary relief which can be granted only when the Court is prima facie found that it is necessary to protect the subject property from any injury/damages till final adjudication of the suit, and that the hardship of withholding the injunction would be greater than that arising from granting it. In support of his submission, he would rely upon the judgment of “Wander Limited v. Antox India (P) Ltd.” 1990 (Supp) SCC 727, and “Hikmatunisha and others vs. Sukhamen & Others” 2017 SCC Online CG 01. 6 5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material annexed with the petition, and gone through the pleadings and the documents. 6. In the present case, the claim of the plaintiff is based on a will dated 06.03.2021, allegedly executed by Rajendra M. Patel and Smt. Daksha Patel with respect to the suit properties in the respective shares. They claimed that they are in possession of the suit property on the basis of the said will after the death of Rajendra M. Patel and Smt. Daksha Patel. On the other hand, the defendant no.1 has claimed that there was an agreement to purchase the suit property in his favour from Rajendra M. Patel and Smt. Daksha Patel for the total consideration of rupees three crore, and the entire amount of sale consideration was paid to them and came into possession, the sale deed was to be executed after coming back from Ahmadabad after treatment. However, during treatment, Rajendra M. Patel died on 22.03.2021, and thereafter an agreement was executed on 08.04.2021 by Smt. Daksha Patel. She also died on 04.05.2021 during the Covid-19 pandemic, and the sale deed of the suit property could not be executed in his favour. He denied the execution of the will deed in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendant no. 1 has not disclosed as to on what date he entered into an agreement to purchase the property with Rajendra M. Patel and Smt. Daksha Patel, on which date and by which mode he paid the 7 sale consideration of rupees three crore to Rajendra M. Patel and Smt. Daksha Patel. 7. Both parties have challenged the claim of the other party. The plaintiffs have challenged the execution of the agreement and possession of the defendant No. 1 over the suit property, whereas the defendant No. 1 challenged the execution of the will deed in favour of the plaintiffs by Rajendra M. Patel and Smt. Daksha Patel. Both the rival claims of the respective parties are disputed questions of fact which requires the detailed evidence. However, the learned trial Court, on the basis of the documents submitted by the plaintiffs, prima facie found that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property. The defendant No.1 has not acquired any title over the suit property through the alleged agreement, and considering the nature of the dispute between the parties, instead of restraining the defendant No. 1 from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs, the order of maintaining status quo by the parties over the suit property till the final adjudication of the suit has been passed by the learned trial Court. The order of status quo is to maintain the nature of the property as it is on the date of the passing of the order, and it does not create or extinguish any right of the parties over the suit property. 8. After considering the pleadings of the parties and the nature of the dispute, the learned trial Court passed an order directing the parties to maintain the status quo over the suit property. The 8 learned appellate Court has also, after due appreciation of the dispute involved in the suit, the nature of the claim by respective parties and the material available on record, dismissed the appeal by defendant No. 1. There is a concurrent finding of both the learned Courts below with respect to the status quo order over the suit property. 9. With respect to exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another” 2003 (3) SCC 524, held that:- “7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an a error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or the tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or reweigh, the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision.” 10. Further, the scope, ambit and nature of exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India have been clarified in the case of “Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another vs. Rajendra 9 Shankar Patil” 2010 (8) SCC 329, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi 13 (see AIR pp. 222-34, para 5 of the Report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathankhan 14, The Constitution Bench Almedabad Mfg. & Calico Pte. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnandis. 43°. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai v principles of interference by the High Court under Article 227. Of course in Ram Chander Rai16, a two- Judge Bench of this Court discussed the Surya Dev Rai16 this Court held that a writ of certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil court, subordinate to the High Court (SCC p. 688. Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath 17 and a para 19 of the Report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no pending. But insofar as the formulation of the principles on the scope of divergence of views. 44. In para 38 sub-para (4) at SCC p. 695 of the Report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai16 and they are set out: 10 "38.(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." 45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below: (Surya Dev Rai case 16, SCC pp. 695-96) "38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) * * (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in 11 appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene b would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character." 12 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. 13 (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendencecan interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority". (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and a courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (1) High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the b and courts basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 14 (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly C exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India21 and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. 15 (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this F article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. 16 (0) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 11. In the case of “Wander Ltd. and Another vs. Antox India P. Ltd.” (1990) Supp. SCC 727, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: “9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated "...is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be ade-quately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the 'balance of convenience' lies." 17 The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case. The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted. 10. In the present case, the learned Single Judge held that, at all events, as between Antox and Wander Ltd. even to the extent considera- c tions relevant for a passing-off action go, the latter was undisputably the earlier user of the trademark in that Wander Ltd. was manufacturing and marketing the Calcium Gluconate Vitamin tablets under the trademark "Cal-De-Ce" at its own factory in Bombay from August 1983 up to June 1986. If this is correct, Antox's user cannot be held to be prior user. It is pertinent to note, and perhaps emphasise, that the appellate bench did not disturb this finding at all. Learned Single Judge was persuaded to the view that, in any event, so far as the prima facie position as to the test of earlier user is concerned Antox could not be held entitled to inter-locutory order in its favour on the basis of the earlier user claimed by it. The interlocutory relief was accordingly refused against both Wander and Alfred Berg. 18 11. Aggrieved by this order of the trial Judge declining the inter-locutory injunction Antox preferred O.S.A. Nos. 111-12 of 1989 before the Division Bench. The Division Bench, however, reassessed the material considered by the Single Judge and came to a different conclu-sion. The Division Bench held: "... The plaintiffs had licences to manufacture for sale with the trade names and had indeed sold the manufactured stock in bulk to the defendants. Its user of the trade marks pursuant to the licence obtained, was not the user of registered user under Sections 48 and 49 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, nor was its manufacture carried out in pursuance of any loan licence taken out by the defendant under Rule 69-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules." "The plaintiffs manufacture with the trade names, under licences in the trade names and the consequent user of the trade names estab-lish a prima facie case for passing off action and the balance of con-venience, requiring the status quo to be maintained, the plaintiffs having had the benefit of the injunction from September 23, 1988 till March 2, 1989 when it was vacated and from May 2, 1989 whenthis be entitled to have the interim injunction as prayed for by them." (emphasis supplied) 12. Appellants-defendants have come up in appeal here. 19 13. On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the appellate bench fell into error on two important propositions. The first is a mie birection in regard to the very scope and nature of the appeals before it and the limitations on the powers of the appellate court to substitute its second pertains to the infirmities in the ratiocination as to the quality of user of the trademark on founded. We shall deal with these two separately. 14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been - shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of dis-cretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reas-sess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different 20 view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph': (SCR 721) "... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton² '...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion etion is is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case." The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.” 12. With the narrow confines of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it is difficult for this Court to interfere with the findings of the courts below, which are concurrent and consider the entire evidence available before the courts. Even if the appreciation of the pleadings and documents is incorrect, or even if this Court were to feel that the conclusions at which the court below has arrived would not flow from the pleadings and documents on which they have placed reliance, that cannot constitute a basis for this Court to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 13. From the aforesaid consideration and in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shayma Shetty and Wander Limited, this Court is of the considered 21 opinion that there is no illegality or jurisdictional error committed by the learned trial Court as well as the appellate Court while granting the order or maintaining status quo in the suit. 14. Accordingly, the present writ petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Alok