2026:HHC:35920 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 199 of 2013 Reserved on: 17.08.2026 Date of Decision: 24.08.2026 State of H.P. .... Appellant Versus Narender Kumar alias Ninu ....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr Rajesh Kumar, Advocate, Legal Aid Counsel. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 01.09.2012, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Kangra at Dharamshala, 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 2026:HHC:35920 H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 11.06.2008, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. (learned trial Court) were set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant, Gagan Singh (PW-4), is running a shop near Sihal Bridge. He, Balkar Singh (PW-5), Rajinder Kumar (PW-8) and Balwinder Singh were talking to each other outside their shops. Mukesh Kumar was crossing the road on 26.01.2001 at about 03.15 p.m., when a bus bearing registration No. HP-38- 5595 came from Dhameta at a high speed and crushed Mukesh Kumar under its tyres. Mukesh Kumar succumbed to the injuries on the spot. The driver identified himself as Narinder Singh, the present accused. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused. The matter was 3 2026:HHC:35920 reported to the police. Statement (Ext.PW-4/A) was reduced to writing and was sent to the police station where FIR (Ext.PW-3/A) was registered. ASI Bahadur Singh (PW-6) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW- 6/A). Shashi Pal (PW-2) took the photographs (Ext.PW-2/A1 to Ext.PW-2/A8), whose negatives are Ext.PW-2/A9 to Ext.PW-2/A16. ASI Bahadur Singh (PW-6) conducted the inquest and prepared the reports (Ext.PW-6/B and Ext.PW- 6/C). Dr Suman Saxena (PW-9) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased and found that the cause of death was a crush injury of the head, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. She issued the report. (Ext.PW-9/A). ASI Bahadur Singh (PW-6) seized the vehicle along with the documents vide Memo (Ext. PW-1/A). Ravinder Kumar (PW-8) mechanically examined the bus and found that there was no defect in it, which could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW-8/A). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned trial Court. 4 2026:HHC:35920 3. Learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 9 witnesses to prove its case. Gian Singh (PW-1) and S I Dayanand (PW-3) witnessed the recovery. Shashi Pal (PW-2) took the photographs. Gagan Singh (PW-4), Balkar Singh (PW-5) and Rajinder Singh (PW-6) witnessed the accident. ASI Bahadur Singh (PW-7) investigated the matter. Ravinder Kumar (PW-8) mechanically examined the bus. Dr Suman Saxena (PW-9) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that the police had seized the bus. However, he denied the rest of the prosecution case. He claimed that he was innocent. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned trial Court held that the statements of the witnesses, photographs and the site plan proved that Mukesh Kumar was crushed under the tyres of the bus. There was a 5 2026:HHC:35920 bus stop at a distance of about 15 metres from the place of accident. The accused was supposed to drive the bus at a slow speed; however, he drove the bus at a high speed, which led to the accident. The bus had skid marks to the extent of 67 feet. Hence, the learned trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Section 279 and 304-A of the IPC and sentenced him as under: - Sections Sentences 279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹1000/-, and in default of payment of the fine amount, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. 304-A The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and in default of payment of fine amount, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court held that the bus was in 6 2026:HHC:35920 the middle of the road. The deceased was crushed under the rear tyres of the bus, which suggested that the deceased had suddenly tried to cross the road. The accused had applied the brakes to avoid the accident. Had the accused been negligent, the child would have been crushed under the front tyres and not the rear tyres of the bus. No person deposed that anyone was waiting at the bus stop, and the reasoning of the learned trial Court that the accused should have driven the bus at a slow speed was not acceptable. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court were set aside. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that Gagan Singh, Balkar Singh and Rajinder Singh had stated that the bus was being driven at a high speed. The photographs show that the victim was dragged under the rear tyre of the bus. There was a bus stand at a distance of 15 meters from the place of accident, and the learned trial court had rightly held that the accused was supposed to drive the bus slowly. However, the bus had skidded for 67 feet after the application of the brakes, which showed that the speed of the 7 2026:HHC:35920 bus was quite high. Learned Appellate Court erred in holding that the child had suddenly crossed the road, which led to the accident. Such plea was not taken by any person. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr Rajesh Kumar, learned Legal Aid Counsel, for the respondent /accused. 10. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle, which is apparent from the fact that 67 feet skid marks were visible on the spot. The accused was unable to bring the bus to a halt immediately after applying the brake. The accused never took the plea that the child had suddenly crossed the road and learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused on this ground. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 8 2026:HHC:35920 11. Mr Rajesh Kumar, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the child was crossing the road from his house towards the shops located on the other side of the road. Thus, the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the negligence of the accused cannot be inferred if some person crosses the road suddenly. This is also evident from the fact that the child had hit the rear tyre and not the front tyre of the bus. The learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: 9 2026:HHC:35920 Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab 10 2026:HHC:35920 v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double 11 2026:HHC:35920 presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12 2026:HHC:35920 15. It was specifically mentioned in the statement (Ext.PW4/A) that the child was crossing the road and was coming from his house towards the shop. Gagan Singh (PW- 4) stated that a child was coming from the other side towards the shop, who was crushed under the rear tyre. Rajinder Singh (PW-7) stated that a child aged 3-4 years was crossing the road. A bus came from Dhameta at a high speed and hit the child, who was crushed under the rear tyres of the bus. Therefore, it was duly established that the child was crossing the road when he was hit by the bus. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahadeo Hari Lokre v. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 4 SCC 758, that if a person suddenly crosses the road, the driver may not be able to avoid the accident, and he cannot be held liable for negligence. It was observed at page 759: - “4... But the case assumes a different complexion if we agree with the sole eyewitness in the case, Dayanand PW 1, that at the time of the impact, Ravikant was actually crossing the road from West to East. That would mean that if Ravikant suddenly crossed the road from West to East without taking note of the approaching bus, there was every possibility of his dashing against the bus without the driver becoming aware of his crossing till it was too late. If a person suddenly crosses the road, the bus driver, even if he is driving slowly, may not be in a position to avoid the accident. Therefore, it will not be possible to hold that the bus driver was negligent.” 13 2026:HHC:35920 16. This Court also took a similar view in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1989 SCC OnLine HP 18: 1990 ACJ 598 and observed at page 600: - “14. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has been stated that the truck was moving at high speed, but it has not been said what that speed actually was. To say that a vehicle was moving at a high speed is neither proper nor legal evidence of high speed, nor does it in any way indicate rashness on the part of the driver. The prosecution should have been exact on this aspect, as the speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved in a case under section 304-A of the Penal Code, 1860. Further, there are no skid marks, which eliminates the evidence of the high speed of the vehicle. In addition to this, it has been stated by the witnesses that the vehicle stopped at a distance of 50 feet from the place of the accident. This appears to be exaggerated. However, it is not a long distance looking at the two points, viz., the first impact of the accident and the last tyres of the vehicle and the total length of the body of the truck in question. If seen from these angles, the distance stated by the witnesses cannot be considered to be very long and thus an indication of high speed. The version of the petitioner that he blew the horn near the place of the curve, which frightened the child, cannot be considered to be without substance. This can otherwise be reasonably inferred that the petitioner would have blown the horn on seeing the child on the road as it is in evidence that the child had come on the pucca portion of the road while there is no evidence as to whether the witnesses, more particularly, Ghanshyam, PW 7, Chander Kanta, PW 8, mother, and a few other witnesses were there at that particular time. Rather, the depositions of these witnesses indicate that they were coming from some village lane that joined the main road in question. Children of this age, usually crafty by temperament, move faster than their parents and are in advance of them while walking. This appears to have happened in 14 2026:HHC:35920 the present case. A minute examination of the circumstances of this case and the evidence brought on the record discloses that the deceased had reached the pucca portion of the road much before the arrival of his parents and the witnesses. That is why, in their deposition, they have said that the child had been run over by the truck. On the other hand, the petitioner has stated that the child got frightened by the blowing of the horn by him and started crossing the road, which could not be seen by him, and the result was the accident and the death of the child. In case some pedestrians suddenly cross a road, the driver of the vehicle cannot save the pedestrian, however slowly he may be driving the vehicle. In such a situation he cannot be held negligent; rather it appears that the parents of the child were negligent in not taking proper care of the child and allowed him to come alone to the road while they were somewhere behind and they could have rushed to pull back the child before the approaching vehicle came in contact with him as it is in their depositions that the truck driver was at a distance coming at a high speed and in case the child wanted to cross the road, it could do so within the time it reached at the place of the accident. How the accident actually took place has not been clearly and comprehensively stated by any of the witnesses. They appear to have been prejudiced by the act of driver’s act. Their versions are, therefore, coloured by the ultimate act of the petitioner and the fact that the child had been finished.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. A similar view was taken in State of H.P. vs. Manpreet Singh, Latest HLJ 2008(1) 538, wherein it was observed as under: “7…The respondent, in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has explained that on seeing the deceased, he had blown the horn, and the deceased stopped on the road. As soon as he reached near him, he immediately tried to cross the road and got hit. His version has been duly 15 2026:HHC:35920 corroborated by Hardeep Singh (DW1), who was a pillion rider with him. Ajay Kumar (PW1) has admitted that this version is that the respondent had blown the horn, and Daya Ram, on hearing it, had stopped for a while. In these circumstances, if a person suddenly crosses the road, without taking note of the approaching vehicle, and its Driver may not be in a position to save the accident, it will not be possible to hold the Driver guilty of the offence. In the instant case, the deceased, knowing fully well that at least the approaching vehicle had stopped on hearing the horn while crossing the road, but when the motorcycle reached near him, he darted before it, and the accident took place. Thus, in my opinion, the prosecution could not prove the offence charged against the respondent beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent was driving rashly or negligently. Therefore, in these circumstances, the learned trial Court had rightly acquitted the respondent of the charges framed against him...” (Emphasis supplied) 18. A similar principle would apply to the present case, and the accused cannot be held liable on the facts so found by the learned courts below. 19. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the accused that the mere use of the term ‘high speed’ is not sufficient to convict the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: 16 2026:HHC:35920 “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 20. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, and it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption 17 2026:HHC:35920 of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 21. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal, 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 22. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 23. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable because witnesses stated that he was driving the vehicle at high speed without any further evidence that the accused was in breach of his duty to take care. 24. It was submitted that the bus had skidded for 67 feet, which showed the high speed of the bus. The site plan 18 2026:HHC:35920 (Ext. PW-6/A) mentions that there were skid marks of 67 feet towards the left side and 60 feet towards the right side. The skid marks towards one side were more than the other because the bus had turned towards the right side after the application of the brakes. Taking the ideal conditions, skid marks of 67 feet translates to the approximate speed of the bus as 55.81 km per hour at the start of the skid and the skid marks of 60 feet translates to 52.81 km per hour at the start of the skid2, which speed cannot be said to be excessive considering that the speed limit on the highway was fixed as 55 km per hour at the relevant time, and the skid marks do not prove the high speed of the bus. 25. The statements of the witnesses that the accused was negligent are also not sufficient. A witness can only depose about the facts that had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in 2 Using the formula V = √ (2gxFxDxn), where V is the speed of vehicle (ft/sec), g is the acceleration due to gravity (32.174 ft/sec2), F is the adjusted friction, F = (μ ± G); μ is the coefficient of friction between the tires and the roadway, G is the roadway grade (for 3% use 0.03), D is the distance of skid mark (ft), and n is the braking efficiency as a decimal (for 100% use 1.0). 19 2026:HHC:35920 Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 26. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn based on evidence led before the Court.” 27. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statements that the accident had occurred because of the negligence of the accused. 28. No person has deposed about any other negligence of the accused. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court, even if another view is possible. 20 2026:HHC:35920 29. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 30. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 31. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 24th August, 2026. (Ravinder)