2026:JHHC:21509 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Criminal Appeal (S.J.) No. 07 of 2017 Shanicharwa Oraon S/O Sri Matla Oraon Resident of Vill Bedal, tand Toli P.S.+P.O. Bhandra, Dist.-Lohardaga …… Appellant Versus The State of Jharkhand ……Respondent ---------- For the Appellant : Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate For the State : Mrs. Vandana Bharti, A.P.P. ---------- PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI ----- J U D G M E N T C.A.V. on 17.12.2025 Pronounced on: 21.07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/accused and Mrs. Vandana Bharti, learned A.P.P appearing on behalf of the State. 2. The instant Criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 20.05.2016 and order of sentence dated 26.05.2015 passed by Sessions Judge, Lohardaga in S.T. No. 81 of 2014 whereby and whereunder, the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC and sentenced him to undergo RI for 7 years and a fine of Rs 10,000/- and in default of fine, further directed to undergo sentence for 02 months. 3. The case of the prosecution is based upon the statement made in the fardbeyan (Ext.-3) by the informant Poko Oraon, aged 40 years, w/o Late Karma Oraon, resident of Village–Chapatoli, P.S.–Sisai, District–Gumla, who happens to be the mother of the victim Reena Kumari (since deceased). On Tuesday dated 08.04.2014 at 9.00 A.M, the 2026:JHHC:21509 2 statement was made before the Police officer that the marriage of her daughter Reena Kumari was solemnized on 3rd March 2014 with Shanicharwa Oraon, R/o–Bedaal Tand Toli as per the customs and traditions. After the marriage, the informant’s daughter Reena Kumari was continuously given beatings and also given threats that she would be killed and thrown into the well on account of dowry demand, and it was always communicated by her daughter over the Phone. 4. Record reveals that on 07.04.2014 about 9 O’clock in the night, Reena Kumari talked to her younger sister Rinki over the Phone and narrated that Shanicharwa Oraon went for Procession after giving beatings to her and told her sister to come Chapa Toli on the next day as she would also come there. But, on the next morning, the informant’s younger daughter Rinki received a call from Shanicharwa Oraon who told her over the phone that her sister Reena Kumari has poured Kerosene Oil on herself, set herself on fire and was burned to death. It is further alleged that, before the incident, Shanicharwa Oraon used to demand bicycle and things from the informant’s daughter. 5. Upon the aforesaid allegation, an FIR being Bhadra P.S. Case no. - 13/2014 under section 306 of IPC got registered against the appellant/accused and after due investigation, charge-sheet has been submitted. Learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, where charge under section 306 of IPC was framed and it was read over to the accused and explained to him in Hindi. 6. To prove its case, prosecution examined nine witnesses in the present case; however, no witnesses were 2026:JHHC:21509 3 examined on behalf of defence. The statement of the accused/appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded wherein the accused /appellant denied all the incriminating circumstance/evidences put to him. 7. After analyzing the evidence available on record, learned Trial Court found the accused/appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 306 of IPC and sentenced him to undergo RI for 7 years and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of fine, further directed to undergo sentence for 02 months. Being aggrieved, appellant/accused has preferred the present appeal. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused has vehemently argued that in the absence of cogent and reliable evidence to establish abetment of suicide, conviction under section 306 of IPC could not be sustained as there is no iota of evidence which could even remotely suggests any positive action on the part of the appellant/accused which led to the commission of abetment. It is further submitted that learned trial court has committed an error in holding the appellant/accused guilty of having abetted the commission of suicide in the absence of evidence which could suggest the presence of mens rea and any incitement to the deceased that led to end her life. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused has further submitted that even if the case of the prosecution is accepted on its face value, still there has to be clear mens rea to commit the offence and mere harassment or demand of money without any positive action on the part of the appellant/accused which led to the suicide would not amount to an offence under section 306 of IPC. In the present case, the prosecution has miserably failed to bring 2026:JHHC:21509 4 on record any material to show that there was abetment from the side of the appellant/accused. 10. Learned counsel further pointed out contradictions in the testimony of P.W. 6 and P.W. 9 and tried to convince this Court that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts and, therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted in the present case. 11. To buttress the above arguments, learned counsel for the appellant/accused has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2024) 3 SCC 573 wherein it has been held that for conviction under section 306 of IPC there has to be clear mens rea to commit the offence and mere harassment is not sufficient to hold accused guilty of abetting the commission of suicide. 12. Per contra, learned A.P.P submitted that the trial court has rightly held the appellant/accused guilty under section 306 of IPC as the deceased committed suicide within 35 days of marriage raising of presumption under section 113–A of the Evidence Act as to abetment of suicide by the married women. It is further submitted that learned trial court after appreciating the evidences of P.Ws. 6 and 9 has rightly convicted the appellant/accused guilty of the alleged offence, which requires no interference. 13. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 14. Before adverting to the factum of the instant case, it is beneficial to reproduce the relevant provision contained in Section 306 of IPC pertaining to abetment of suicide and “abetment of a thing” has been described in Section 107 of IPC, which reads as under: 2026:JHHC:21509 5 “306. Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” “107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of a thing, who— First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.” Explanation 2.— Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act. 15. From a bare reading of the above said provisions, it is clear that to constitute an offence under Section 306 of IPC, the prosecution has to establish: (i) that a person committed suicide, and (ii) that such suicide was abetted by the accused. In other words, an offence under Section 306 would stand only if there is an “abetment” for the commission of the crime. 16. As per the Section 107 of IPC, a person can be said to have abetted in doing a thing, if he, firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation to Section 107 2026:JHHC:21509 6 of IPC states that any willful misrepresentation or willful concealment of material fact which he is bound to disclose, may also come within the contours of “abetment”. It is manifest that under all the three situations, direct involvement of the person or persons concerned in the commission of offence of suicide is essential to bring home the offence under Section 306 of IPC. 17. Now, it is apposite to discuss herein the legal proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Naresh Kumar (Supra) where the wife has committed suicide by consuming poison on account of demand of money and incessant harassment by her husband. The Apex Court while considering the facts of the case reiterated plethora of settled precedents and held that in order to convict a person under Section 306 of IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. Mere harassment or demand of dowry is not sufficient to hold an accused guilty of abetting the commission of suicide and it also requires an active act or direct act or act of instigation which led the deceased to commit suicide. The ingredient of mens rea cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous and thus, acquitted the appellant. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment reads as under – 14. What ultimately led the deceased to take such a drastic step of committing suicide is not clear. To put it in other words, the plain reading of the oral evidence of both these witnesses does not disclose any form of incessant cruelty or harassment on the part of the husband which would in ordinary circumstances drag the wife to commit suicide as if she was left with no other alternative. Mere demand of money from the wife or her parents for running a business without anything more would not constitute cruelty or harassment. 17. This Court in Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan [Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 144], considering the 2026:JHHC:21509 7 provisions of Section 306IPC along with the definition of abetment under Section 107IPC observed as under : (SCC pp. 149-50, paras 14-16) “14. Section 306IPC makes abetment of suicide a criminal offence and prescribes punishment for the same. … 15. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word “instigate” is to bring about or initiate, incite someone to do something. This Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh [Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088], has defined the word “instigate” as under : (SCC p. 629, para 20) ‘20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”.’ 16. The scope and ambit of Section 107IPC and its co-relation with Section 306IPC has been discussed repeatedly by this Court. In S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan [S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12 SCC 190 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 465], it was observed as under : (SCC p. 197, para 25) ‘25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by the Supreme Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.’ ” 18. This Court in M. Arjunan v. State [M. Arjunan v. State, (2019) 3 SCC 315 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 219], while explaining the necessary ingredients of Section 306IPC in detail, observed as under : (SCC p. 317, para 7) “7. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306IPC are : (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, the accused cannot be convicted under Section 306IPC.” 19. This Court in Ude Singh v. State of Haryana [Ude Singh v. State of Haryana, (2019) 17 SCC 301 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 306], held that in order to convict an accused under Section 306IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability. It was observed as under : (SCC pp. 321-22, para 16) 2026:JHHC:21509 8 “16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of cause of a suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case. 16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted commission of suicide by another, the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions abovereferred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four corners of Section 306IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased.” 20. This Court in Mariano Anto Bruno v. State [Mariano Anto Bruno v. State, (2023) 15 SCC 560 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1387] , after 2026:JHHC:21509 9 referring to the abovereferred decisions rendered in context of culpability under Section 306IPC observed as under : (SCC para 45) “45. … It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306IPC is not sustainable.” 21. This Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab [Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 200 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 417], observed that whenever a person instigates or intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission, the doing of a thing, a person can be said to have abetted in doing that thing. To prove the offence of abetment, as specified under Section 107IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible, to determine the culpability. 22. This Court in Kashibai v. State of Karnataka [Kashibai v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 15 SCC 751 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 575], observed that to bring the case within the purview of “abetment” under Section 107IPC, there has to be an evidence with regard to the instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid on the part of the accused and for the purpose proving the charge under Section 306IPC, also there has to be an evidence with regard to the positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid to drive a person to commit suicide. 23. 23. Had there been any clinching evidence of incessant harassment on account of which the wife was left with no other option but to put an end to her life, it could have been said that the accused intended the consequences of his act, namely, suicide. A person intends a consequence when he : (1) foresees that it will happen if the given series of acts or omissions continue, and (2) desires it to happen. The most serious level of culpability, justifying the most serious levels of punishment, is achieved when both these components are actually present in the accused's mind (a “subjective” test). 24. For intention in English law, Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967 provides the frame in which the mens rea is assessed. It states: “A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence, (a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reasons only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but (b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.” 2026:JHHC:21509 10 Under Section 8(b), therefore, the jury is allowed a wide latitude in applying a hybrid test to impute intent or foresight on the basis of all the evidence. 25. It is now well settled that in order to convict a person under Section 306IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. Mere harassment is not sufficient to hold an accused guilty of abetting the commission of suicide. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide. The ingredient of mens rea cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous. 18. Further, it is apposite to discuss herein Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, which reads as under: “113-A.- Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.— When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 19. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act requires, firstly that her husband or relatives subjected her to cruelty, and secondly that the married woman committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage. 20. The mere fact that the deceased committed suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage, the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act would not automatically apply. The legislative mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act may be raised, having regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such 2026:JHHC:21509 11 relative of her husband. The term “the court may presume having regard to all other circumstances of the case that such suicide had been abetted by her husband” would indicate that the presumption is discretionary, unlike the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which is mandatory. Therefore, before the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act is raised; the prosecution must show evidence of cruelty or incessant harassment in that regard. 21. The court should be extremely careful in assessing evidence under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act for finding out if cruelty was meted out. If it transpires that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court would not be satisfied for holding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide was guilty. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana, reported in (2014) 12 SCC 595, has considered the provisions of Sections 306 of IPC in the light of the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. The relevant para of the judgment reads under - “30. We are of the view that the mere fact that if a married woman commits suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage, the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act would not automatically apply. The legislative mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband has subjected her to cruelty, the presumption as defined under Section 498-AIPC, may attract, having regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide has been 2026:JHHC:21509 12 abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. The term “the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband” would indicate that the presumption is discretionary. So far as the present case is concerned, we have already indicated that the prosecution has not succeeded in showing that there was a dowry demand, nor would the reasoning adopted by the courts below would be sufficient enough to draw a presumption so as to fall under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. 31. In this connection, we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Hans Raj v. State of Haryana [Hans Raj v. State of Haryana, (2004) 12 SCC 257 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 217] , wherein this Court has examined the scope of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act and Sections 306, 107, 498-A, etc. and held that, unlike Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, a statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law merely on the proof of circumstances enumerated in Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. This Court held that, under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, the prosecution has to first establish that the woman concerned committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband has subject her to cruelty. Even though those facts are established, the court is not bound to presume that suicide has been abetted by her husband. Section 113-A, therefore, gives discretion to the court to raise such a presumption having regard to all other circumstances of the case, which means that where the allegation is of cruelty, it can consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of the word “cruelty” in Section 498-AIPC.” 23. Now, coming to the case in hand, it would be appropriate for this court to discuss the evidence of witnesses. The prosecution witness, P.W. – 1 Bindeshwar Sahu, P.W. – 3 Kalawati Devi, P.W.- 4 Sanjay Kumar Sahu and P.W.- 5 Urmila devi, being co-villagers of Shanicharwa Oraon, have not supported the case of prosecution and therefore have been declared hostile. 24. P.W.-2 Dipesh Oraon who happens to be the neighbor has identified his signature on the fardbeyan marked as Ext.- 1. His testimony is hearsay in nature. He has stated that he knew Pokko Oraon and her daughter Reena Kumari and has spoken that the marriage of Reena 2026:JHHC:21509 13 was solemnized with Shanicharwa Oraon in Bedaal Tanda and a month after her marriage, Reena was burnt to death. He did not hear anything about the relationship between Reena and her husband. He further stated that Pokko Oraon in her statement was saying that her son-in-law set ablaze her daughter and killed her. In his cross-examination, he stated that apart from Pokko Oraon he did not hear about the incident of fire and never heard of any complain about Shanicharwa and Reena’s relationship. He further stated that he never heard about any complain and the story of Pokko Oraon about killing by setting ablaze is false. 25. P.W. – 7 Dr. Akhileshwar prasad conducted the post mortem examination of the victim/deceased Reena Kumari and proved the report which is marked as Ext.-2. He stated that almost 90 to 95% of the body was burned with peeling out of burnt skin. In his opinion cause of death was due to asphyxia and hypo volumic shock leading to cardio respiratory failure. In cross examination, he has stated that such type of burn might be caused only when patient is in standing position and there were no external injuries, hence there was no sign of struggle over injured body. Even, otherwise death on account of burn injury has not been disputed by the appellant/accused. 26. P.W.-8 Shivshankar Prasad Singh is the I.O in the present case. He has proved the fardbeyan marked as Ext.-3, Signature and endorsement for lodging F.I.R as Ext.-3/1 and formal F.I.R as Ext.-4. He has stated that fardbeyan of the mother (P.W.-6) of the victim was recorded near the dead body of the victim and sent the body for the postmortem. The witnesses Bindeshwar Sahu, Kalawati devi and Urmila Devi in their respective statements supported the incident. During 2026:JHHC:21509 14 cross examination at para 10, he has stated that on 08.04.2014 visited the place of incident and again went there on the same day. He only made inquiries and not recorded the statement when he visited the place of incident for the first time. The victim’s sister Rinki was not there when he went for the first time. He further stated that he neither took out call records details of Rinki nor seized her mobile. 27. Now evidence of P.W-6 (mother of the victim) and P.W.-9 (younger sister of the victim) is specially required to be discussed and analyzed as the prosecution is relying heavily on their testimony to establish the culpability of the appellant/accused under Section 306 of IPC. 28. P.W.-6 Pokko Oraon who happens to be the informant and the mother of the deceased Reena Kumari. She has stated that one and half year ago, her daughter namely Reena got married to Shanicharwa Oraon of the Bedaal Tand Toli and after the marriage her daughter was residing at marital home. She further stated that after the marriage her daughter was given beatings regularly. Her daughter was taunted for dowry and for not giving Cycle and the shoes. On 7th she got information about the beatings over the phone and it was said by the victim/deceased that she should be brought back to her parental home. It was said by this witness that the victim would be taken back on Janmashtami day. It is further stated that when she went there, she found her daughter dead. Her daughter died due to burning. The accused keep threating her daughter to drown her into the well and to set her ablaze. 29. P.W.-6 in her cross examination at para-4 has stated that earlier she had made no complain on behalf of her daughter against the Shanicharwa Oraon. At para-5, she 2026:JHHC:21509 15 further stated that she did not call for panchayat meeting regarding the daughter’s beatings. At para-8, it is further stated that cycle and shoes had been given at the time of marriage, whose receipt/document was made. The accused Shanicharwa Oraon had not informed her about the incident over the phone. The Police has recorded her statement at Tand Toli and never enquired further. Her son-in-law Shanicharwa Oraon went for flag procession and she had not talked to neighbors of accused’s locality. 30. P.W.-9 Rinki Kumari is the sister of the deceased. In her evidence, she has stated that her elder sister Reena got married to Shanicharwa Oraon on 03.03.2014 and went to her matrimonial home after the marriage. Shanicharwa Oraon used to demand dowry from her sister and threatened to kill her if demands were not fulfilled. She further stated that her elder sister Reena called her on mobile phone in the night and narrated the incident of dowry demand and about beatings and also said that Shanicharwa threatened to strangulate her. She further stated that a day before her death, Reena told over phone that Shanicharwa was beating her ever since he brought her home after the marriage and she told her to take back to the parental home. On the day of incident, her mother was about to leave for her sister’s matrimonial home, when she received call from Shanicharwa Oraon wherein he said that your sister Reena has died by pouring kerosene oil and she set herself ablaze, which she narrated to her mother. She further stated that when she alongwith her mother and pooja came to her sister’s matrimonial home then she found her sister dead and in completely burnt condition. 2026:JHHC:21509 16 31. During the cross examination at Para-6, this witness has stated that she had been to her sister matrimonial home at the time of her marriage, and thereafter she came to her sister’s matrimonial home on the day of incident. She had never gone there in between. At para-7, she stated that she did not disclose the phone number to the police from which she used to talk to her elder sister. At para-8, she said that in her statement before the police she stated that Reena told her over phone in the night that she would be killed by beating, strangulation and by pouring kerosene oil on her. She denied the suggestion that Shanicharwa did not give beatings to her sister and did not demand dowry. 32. This court after assessing the evidence on record as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, finds that the victim died within a span of 35 days of marriage at her matrimonial home by setting ablaze herself. P.W.-6 has spoken about the factum of demand of cycle and shoes in the form of dowry by the appellant/accused, however, during her cross examination she said that cycle and shoes were given at the time of marriage. Moreover, she has stated that her daughter was given beatings and threaten to drown into the well and to set her ablaze, but it was also stated during her cross that no complain or panchayati meeting was called earlier regarding her daughter’s torture/beatings. It has also been stated that Shanicharwa Oraon went for flag procession on the day of incident. Nothing has been uttered by this witness which could disclose mens rea of the appellant/accused or the instigation or active role of the appellant/accused in aiding the commission of suicide. 2026:JHHC:21509 17 33. Now, coming to the oral evidence of P.W.-9, this court finds that this witness has stated that ever since the marriage, the appellant/accused demanded dowry and threatened to kill her sister (victim), if demands were not meted out. She further stated that a day before her death, Reena told over phone that Shanicharwa had given beatings and narrated the incident of dowry demand and also stated that Shanicharwa threatened to strangulate her. However, during cross examination, she stated that she did not disclose her phone number to the police from which she used to talk to her elder sister. She further stated that Reena told her over phone in the night that she would be killed by beating, strangulation and by pouring kerosene oil on her. 34. Taunting and giving beatings to the victim by the appellant/accused on account of demand of dowry for cycle and shoes has become doubtful after conjoint reading of examination-in-chief and cross examination of P.W.-6 as this witness in her cross examination has stated that the cycle and shoes which were given at the time of marriage, its receipts/documents were prepared. Whereas, her examination-in-chief reveals that the victim was taunted for not giving of cycle and shoes. However, P.W.-9 has also spoken about the demand of dowry but what was the demand, it has not been disclosed by the P.W.-9. Therefore, in the above said background, the demand of dowry by the appellant/accused becomes doubtful. 35. Now, giving of beatings to the deceased by the hands of the appellant/accused is concerned, both P.W.-6 and P.W.-9 had spoken in their respective testimony that the deceased was given beatings by the appellant/accused on account of demand of dowry but, as stated earlier, this Court 2026:JHHC:21509 18 does not believe the version of P.W.-6 and P.W.-9 qua the demand of dowry. Apart from that, nothing has been stated either by P.W.-6 or by P.W.-9 from which this Court may infer that there was instigation or any active role of the appellant/accused which prompted the victim to commit suicide. Nonetheless, there is no cogent evidence regarding the factum of dowry demand and giving threats to kill or beatings by the appellant/accused. It is also required to be noted that from the evidence, it is evident that the parental home and matrimonial home of the victim were not very far apart and if there had been a demand of dowry by the appellant/accused and on that score, victim had been subjected to ill treatment at his hand, then why did none of the family members visit to the place of the appellant/accused to make him understand not to demand dowry and give beatings to the victim. This is also one of the reasons for this Court not to believe the version of witnesses. 36. Considering the legal proposition and discussion made in the preceding paragraphs, this Court is of considered view that in the above-stated factual background no presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act could be drawn. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish the active role and mens reas (if any) of the appellant/accused by leading any cogent evidence which constitute offence under section 306 of IPC. 37. Consequently, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellant/accused beyond the reasonable doubt, as such, the impugned the judgment of conviction dated 20.05.2016 and order of sentence dated 26.05.2015 passed by Sessions Judge, Lohardaga in S.T. No. 81 of 2014, is hereby set aside. 2026:JHHC:21509 19 38. Resultantly, the instant appeal being Criminal Appeal (S.J.) No. 07 of 2017 is hereby allowed. 39. Since, the appellant/accused is on bail, he is discharged from the liability of his bail bond. 40. Let trial court record be sent back to the court concerned. (Arun Kumar Rai, J.) Jharkhand High Court, at Ranchi Dated : 21.07.2026 R.K/Rajnish /- A.F.R.