1 2026:CGHC:7778 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 492 of 2016 1 - Smt. Derhinbai Wd/o Ramsingh, Aged About 70 Years R/o Mainpur, Teh. Chaaraamaa, District Uttar Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh, 2 - Romnath S/o Ramsingh, Aged About 50 Years R/o Mainpur, Teh. Chaaraamaa, District Uttar Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh, 3 - Dewaar S/o Ramsingh, Aged About 40 Years R/o Mainpur, Teh. Chaaraamaa, District Uttar Bastar Kanker, C.G ......Plaintiffs ... Appellants versus 1 - Smt. Rajon Bai Wd/o Kunwarsingh, Aged About 70 Years R/o Mainpur, Teh. Chaaraamaa, District Uttar Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh, 2 - Chamaraa S/o Kunwarsingh, Aged About 45 Years R/o Mainpur, Teh. Chaaraamaa, District Uttar Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh 3 - Ashaaram S/o Kunwarsingh, Aged About 42 Years R/o Mainpur, Teh. Chaaraamaa, District Uttar Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh .........Defendants 4 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Collector, Kanker District Uttar Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh 5 - Bhagobai D/o Kunwarsingh W/o Mitku Gond, R/o Village Kanhaarpuri, Teh. Kanker, District Uttar Bastar Kanker, Chhattisgarh ........Defendant, ... Respondents (Cause title taken from CIS) AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2026.02.13 16:32:15 +0530 2 For Appellants : Mr. Raja Sharma and Ms. Aditi Parakh, Advocates. For Respondent/State : Shri Malay Jain, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board 12.02.2026 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellants/plaintiffs challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 02.07.2016 passed by the learned Additional District Judge(FTC) Uttar Bastar Kanker in Civil Appeal No.08A/2016 (Smt. Rajonbai w/o Late Kunwar Singh & Ors Vs Derhinbai w/o of Late Ramsingh & Ors) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 0.03.2016 passed by the learned First Civil Judge, Class- I, Uttar Bastar, Kanker, C.G. in Civil Suit 44A/2013 (Smt. Derhinbai w/o of Late Ramsingh & Ors Vs. Smt. Rajonbai w/o Late Kunwar Singh & Ors) whereby the learned appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiffs filed a suit against the defendants for a declaration of ownership and possession regarding land situated in Gram Mainpur, Tehsil Charama, District North Bastar Kanker, with khasra Nos. 399/4.753, 399/3.757, 399/1.759, 399/1.779, and 399/4.773, totaling 5-5 plots with areas of 0.09, 0.18, 1.37, 0.37, and 0.14 hectares respectively, the total area being 2.150 3 hectares, pleading inter alia that prior to year 1952, Kunwar Singh and Ram Singh, sons of Beersay Gond, did not own or possess any landed property in Village Mainpur, Tehsil Charama. They sustained themselves and their family by doing manual labor. Since Defendant No. 1 Kunwar Singh was the elder brother, he was the head of the family. During his minority, Plaintiff Ram Singh went to Village Malladobri, Tehsil Kanker, to the house of Lelhu Gond as a “ghar jamai” (resident son-in-law / lamseena) for his daughter Nohari Bai. After 3–4 years, he returned to Village Mainpur with 12 khandis of paddy (at the rate of 4 khandis per year), valued at Rs. 120 at the prevailing market rate. The plaintiff Ram Singh sold the said paddy and two calves, and in the year 1952 purchased agricultural land from the then Malguzar (landlord) Gopal Rajput of Village Mainpur for Rs. 130.00. The land was registered in the name of Defendant No. 1 Kunwar Singh through a registered sale deed dated 07.01.1952 and the details of the land are Khasra No. 394, area 2.40 acres & Khasra No. 399, area 7.66 acres. The plaintiff had purchased the said land from his independent earnings. Defendant No. 1 Kunwar Singh had not contributed any amount toward the purchase of the said property. The plaintiff himself cultivated the land and, through hard work, made it suitable for agriculture. In the year 1955, an amicable partition took place between the two brothers in the presence of village elders. In this partition, the land measuring 10.07 acres (which had been purchased in the name of the elder 4 brother) was divided into two equal shares. Under the partition, the plaintiff received the agricultural land as Khasra Nos. 394/2 rakba 0.06 hectare, 394/3 rakba 0.30 hectare, 399/2 rakba 2.18 hectare, 399/4 rakba 1.98 hectare, Total – 5.06 acres. Defendant No. 1 Kunwar Singh received the land in the partition as Khasra No. 399/4-753 rakba 0.09 hectare, 399/3-757 rakba 0.18 hectare, 399/1-759 rakba 1.37 hectare, 394/1-779 rakba 0.37 hectare, 394/4-773 rakba 0.14 hectare, total – 2.150 hectares, subsequently came to be known as the suit land. 3. About 20 years after the said partition, Defendant Kunwar Singh, allegedly under someone’s influence, filed Civil Suit No. 03-A/83 before the Court of Civil Judge Class-II, Kanker, seeking declaration of title and possession against the plaintiff. Taking advantage of the fact that the sale deed was in his name, he claimed that the land measuring 5.06 acres had been purchased from his personal income. After due trial, the said suit was dismissed with costs on 26.02.1991, as Defendant Kunwar Singh failed to prove that the suit land had been purchased from his personal income. Against the said judgment and decree, Defendant Kunwar Singh filed Civil Appeal No. 6-A/91 before the Court of the Additional District Judge, Kanker. The appeal was dismissed on 25.11.2000. Since no further appeal or revision was filed before any competent court against the said order and judgment, the decision has become binding upon Defendant Kunwar Singh. The cause of action arose on 25.11.2000 from the 5 judgment passed in Civil Appeal No. 6-A/91 by the Hon’ble Additional District Judge, Kanker. The plaintiffs, after making necessary averments regarding jurisdiction, court fees, and limitation, have filed the suit against the defendants seeking declaration of ownership (title) and recovery of possession. 4. The defendants in the written statement denied the plaint averments and stated that the suit land was purchased by the deceased Defendant Kunwar Singh in his own independent capacity from Gopal Rajput on 07.01.1952. His name was duly recorded in the revenue records in respect of the said land. Therefore, the plaintiffs have no right, title, or interest in the said land. The plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief from the defendants. 5. After appreciating the evidence available on record and after framing the issues, the learned trial Court by the judgment and decree, allowed the suit of the plaintiffs observing that the suit land was purchased by the plaintiffs’ father, Ramsingh, in the name of the defendants’ father, Kunwarsingh, from his own independent funds. Therefore, on this basis, the suit land obtained in the partition cannot be considered as the exclusive property of Kunwar Singh, because Kunwar Singh did not contribute any amount towards the purchase of the said land. From the perusal of the revenue records submitted by the plaintiffs, Exhibits P-2 to P-6, it is evident that the name of Kunwar Singh is recorded in the revenue records of the suit land. However, for the reasons stated 6 above, the mere entry of name in the revenue records does not make him the owner of the 5.01 acres of land obtained in partition, nor does it confer upon him the rights of a landowner. The possession of the suit land by the defendants is proved by the evidence. Therefore, on the basis of the above reasons, it is established that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the suit land from the defendants. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the defendants preferred Civil Appeal before the learned First Appellate Court. By the impugned judgment and decree, the appellate Court, reversed the findings of the Trial Court and allowed the appeal filed by the defendants by holding that in 1955, land bearing Khasra No.02(10.07acres) was mutually partitioned between Kunwar Singh and Ram Singh, and a formal khata division was completed in 1967. Both parties remained in peaceful possession and cultivation of their respective shares until at least 1983. In Civil Suit No. 44A/2013, the plaintiffs challenged this long- standing partition, claiming ownership over Khasra No. 05 (2.150 hectares), which had been allotted to Kunwar Singh. The stand taken by plaintiffs that their cause of action arose from the appellate Court judgment dated 25.11.2000 in Civil Appeal No. 6A/1991. However, this claim appears unjustified because the plaintiffs did not raise any objection or file a counterclaim regarding ownership in earlier proceedings, particularly in the 1983 suit or after its disposal in 1991. Since they did not take any action at the right time, their 7 challenge in 2013 is unjustified and legally weak. It was also observed that as per Article 64 of the Limitation Act, the period for filing a suit to claim possession (recovery of ownership) is within 12 years from the date the cause of action arises. In the present case, even after considering the evidence, it is clear that the suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondents was not presented within this prescribed limitation period. If the 12-year period is calculated from the year 1983, it would have expired in 1995. Even if, for argument’s sake, the 12-year period is calculated from the date of the decision in Civil Suit No. 3A/1983, i.e., 26.02.1991, the limitation would still expire in 2003. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court are bad in law, perverse and erroneous, and are liable to be set aside. It is contended that the learned appellate court was not justified in reversing the well-reasoned findings and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court without proper appreciation of the evidence on record. Learned counsel further submits that the appellate court erred in relying on records of a previous suit and other materials de hors the mandate of the law of evidence, without independently evaluating the evidence led in the present case. Learned counsel further submitted that the finding of the appellate Court that the suit is barred by limitation was arrived at without coming to any concrete conclusion as to the date on which the cause of action arose, and is therefore perverse and 8 legally unsustainable. The impugned judgment suffers from serious infirmities inasmuch as the learned lower appellate court has misread and misappreciated the documentary and oral evidence available on record. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record. 9. On perusal of the record, this Court finds no merit in the present second appeal. The findings recorded by the First Appellate Court are based on proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and do not give rise to any substantial question of law. The First Appellate Court has rightly held that the land bearing Khasra No. 02 (10.07 acres) was partitioned between Kunwar Singh and Ram Singh in 1955, with formal khata division in 1967, and that both parties peacefully possessed and cultivated their respective shares until at least 1983. The plaintiffs in Civil Suit No. 44A/2013 challenged this long-standing partition, claiming ownership of Khasra No. 05 (2.150 hectares) allotted to Kunwar Singh. Their claim is unjustified, as they neither raised objections nor filed a counterclaim in earlier proceedings, including the 1983 suit or after its disposal in 1991. Further, the suit is barred by limitation under Article 64 of the Limitation Act. Even counting 12 years from 1983, limitation expired in 1995, and if counted from the 26.02.1991 decision in Civil Suit No. 3A/1983, limitation expired in 2003. 9 10. The conclusions reached by the First Appellate Court are neither perverse nor contrary to law and are based on proper appreciation of evidence. No substantial question of law arises for consideration in this second appeal. 11. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. The findings of fact recorded by the first appellate Court cannot be interfered with unless such findings is shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal does not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. It is well established that when there is a finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 13. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC in. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under 10 Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The ipugned judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 14. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Amardeep