[2026:RJ-JP:4188] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous 3rd Bail Application No. 16907/2025 Pradeep Kumar @ Ankit S/o Jagpal Singh, R/o Krishana Nagar Gali No. 10, Police Station Gangnahar, Janpath Roorkee, Uttarakhand, At Present Gunner No. 15257477K, 881 Missile Regiment Unit, Jodhpur. (Presently Confined At Central Jail, Jaipur) ----Petitioner Versus State Of Rajasthan, Through PP ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. M.C. Jain, Adv. with Mr. Ankit Jain, Adv. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Amit Punia, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN Order 28/01/2026 1. This third bail application under Section 483 BNSS has been filed on behalf of the petitioner, who has been arrested in connection with FIR No.02/2022 registered at Special Police Station, District C.I.D Surakchha (Raj.) for offences punishable under Sections 3 & 9 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923. 2. The first and second bail applications filed on behalf of the petitioner were dismissed on merits by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide orders dated 15.02.2023 and 19.03.2024, respectively. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of filing Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 16159/2024. Vide order dated 27.01.2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court declined to grant bail and permitted the petitioner to [2026:RJ-JP:4188] (2 of 14) [CRLMB-16907/2025] withdraw the petition, while granting liberty to apply for bail before the appropriate Court after completion of recording of pre- charge evidence. Pursuant thereto, a bail application was filed by the petitioner before the learned trial Court, which came to be dismissed on 13.11.2025. Hence, this third bail application has been filed on behalf of the petitioner. 3. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has falsely been implicated in this case. It is submitted that the petitioner is in custody since 21.05.2022, and as such he has already suffered incarceration of about three years and eight months. Counsel submits that pre-charge evidence were concluded on 24.04.2025 i.e., after more than two years and eleven months of the arrest of the petitioner. Thereafter, charges were framed against the petitioner under Sections 3 & 9 of the Act, vide order dated 19.11.2025, after six months of conclusion of pre-charge evidence. Counsel submits that over two months have elapsed since the charges were framed, yet the prosecution has failed to examine its witnesses, thereby causing an unwarranted delay in the proceedings. In these circumstances, it is urged that the fundamental right of the petitioner to a speedy trial, as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, stands seriously infringed. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner is facing trial before the Magistrate Court, where, even in the event of conviction, the maximum sentence that may be imposed would not exceed seven years, notwithstanding that the offence alleged carries a maximum punishment of fourteen years. It is further argued that a perusal of the complaint filed by [2026:RJ-JP:4188] (3 of 14) [CRLMB-16907/2025] the prosecution would reveal that no incriminating material has been recovered from the mobile phone of the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner has not been supplied with the alleged material which is stated to have been transmitted by him through WhatsApp to a person in a neighbouring country. Learned counsel submits that even if the allegations contained in the complaint are accepted at its face value, the provisions of Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1923”) are not attracted, and at best, the case would fall within the ambit of Section 5 of the Act of 1923. It is contended that in the absence of any specific allegation that the petitioner acted with a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, which is a sine qua non for invocation of Section 3 of the Act of 1923, the said provision is not applicable. Counsel further submits that the delay in the trial is entirely attributable to the prosecution and, in such circumstances, continued incarceration of the petitioner would serve no useful purpose. The petitioner undertakes to abide by all the conditions that may be imposed by this Court. Lastly, it is submitted that in view of the prolonged incarceration of the petitioner and the absence of any likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future, the petitioner deserves to be enlarged on bail. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713. 4. Per contra, learned State counsel vehemently opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. It is submitted that the offence alleged is of a serious nature and carries a [2026:RJ-JP:4188] (4 of 14) [CRLMB-16907/2025] maximum punishment of fourteen years under Section 3 of the Act of 1923. It is further submitted that the question as to whether the provisions of Section 3 of the Act of 1923 are attracted in the present case is a matter to be adjudicated during trial and cannot be gone into at this stage. Learned State counsel submits that sufficient incriminating material is available on record to prima facie establish the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offence and, since the offence pertains to the safety and security of the State, the present bail application deserves to be dismissed. In support of his submission, learned State counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State versus Captain Jagjit Singh reported in AIR 1962 (SC) 253. 5. I have considered the contentions. 6. In light of the rival submissions of both the parties, I have perused the material available on record. Perusal of the record would reveal that petitioner is in custody since 21.05.2022 and after recording the pre-charge evidence, charges were framed on 19.11.2025. Perusal of the record would further reveal that in this case, complaint was filed on 21.05.2022, but since the prosecution sanction was not submitted along with it, no proceedings took place for the next five months except waiting for the sanction. After prosecution sanction, cognizance was taken and the prosecution witnesses were summoned for pre-charge evidence and their pre-charge evidence were completed only on 24.04.2025. The trial Court took more than two years and eleven months in completion of pre-charge evidence of the prosecution [2026:RJ-JP:4188] (5 of 14) [CRLMB-16907/2025] witnesses. Thereafter, the trial Court framed the charges on 19.11.2025, after a delay of more than six months from the conclusion of the pre-charge evidence. 7. Now, this Court would like to discuss delay in trial of accused in custody and its effects. The personal liberty is a priceless treasure for a human being. It is basically a natural right. No one would like to lose his liberty. People from centuries have fought for liberty, for absence of liberty causes sense of emptiness. The sanctity of liberty is the fulcrum of any civilized society. The expression 'Personal Liberty' in Article 21 of the Constitution is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of a person and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given additional protection under Article 19 of the Constitution. 'Personal Liberty' under Article 21 of the Constitution primarily means freedom from physical restraint of person by incarceration or otherwise. The concept of "right to life and personal liberty" guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution includes the "right to live with dignity" and it does not mean mere animal like existence of life. After the Hon’ble Supreme Court's decision rendered in the case of Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, Article 21 of the Constitution now protects the right of life and personal liberty of citizen not only from the executive action but from the legislative action also. A person can be deprived of his life and personal liberty if two conditions are complied with, first, there must be a law and secondly, there must be a procedure prescribed by that law provided that the procedure [2026:RJ-JP:4188] (6 of 14) [CRLMB-16907/2025] is just, fair and reasonable. Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in catena of the judgments that prolonged incarceration without trial is violative of rights of an accused and the Court should step in to protect him and no provision can take away the power of constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of fundamental rights. Prolonged incarceration is a valid ground for granting bail in the Indian judiciary system, particularly when coupled with the anticipated length of the trial. The right to liberty under Article 21 is a critical consideration, and Courts should incline to grant bail to prevent undue hardship particularly when prosecution is not showing promptness in producing witnesses. However, the nature of the offence, potential risks associated with releasing the accused, and the overall context of the case must be carefully evaluated. 8. In a case, Masroor v. State of U.P. reported in 2009 (14) SCC 286, Hon’ble Supreme Court beautified that there should be a balancing approach between personal liberty of the accused and interest of public and a case of prosecution. Again, Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a case Neeru Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2014(16) SCC 508 ardently discussed the aspect of balancing two interests by observing that "The sanctity of liberty is the fulcrum of any civilized society. It is a cardinal value on which the civilisation rests. It cannot be allowed to be paralysed and immobilized. Deprivation of liberty of a person has enormous impact on his mind as well as body. A democratic body polity which is wedded to rule of law, anxiously guards liberty. But, a pregnant and significant one, the liberty of [2026:RJ-JP:4188] (7 of 14) [CRLMB-16907/2025] an individual is not absolute. The society by its collective wisdom through process of law can withdraw the liberty that it has sanctioned to an individual when an individual becomes a danger to the collective and to the societal order. Accent on individual liberty cannot be pyramided to that extent which would bring chaos and anarchy to a society. A society expects responsibility and accountability from the member, and it desires that the citizens should obey the law, respecting it as a cherished social norm. No individual can make an attempt to create a concavity in the stem of social stream. It is impermissible. Therefore, when an individual behaves in a disharmonious manner ushering in disorderly things which the society disapproves, the legal consequences are bound to follow. At that stage, the Court has a duty. It cannot abandon its sacrosanct obligation and pass an order at its own whim or caprice. It has to be guided by the established parameters of law." 9. In the case of Jahir Hak vs State of Rajasthan : AIR 2022 (SC) 3047, indulgence of bail was extended to the accused therein by the Hon'ble Apex Court by considering the following observations made in the case of Union of India vs K.A. Najeeb (2021) (3) SCC 713:- “12. Even in the case of special legislations like the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 or the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“the NDPS Act”) which too have somewhat rigorous conditions for grant of bail, this Court in Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (1999) 9 SCC 252 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1156], Babba v. State of [2026:RJ-JP:4188] (8 of 14) [CRLMB-16907/2025] Maharashtra [Babba v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 11 SCC 569 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 118] and Umarmia v. State of Gujarat [Umarmia v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 2 SCC 731 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 114] enlarged the accused on bail when they had been in jail for an extended period of time with little possibility of early completion of trial. The constitutionality of harsh conditions for bail in such special enactments, has thus been primarily justified on the touchstone of speedy trials to ensure the protection of innocent civilians. 19. Yet another reason which persuades us to enlarge the respondent on bail is that Section 43- D(5) of the UAPA is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Unlike the NDPS Act where the competent court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail; there is no such precondition under UAPA. Instead, Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the competent court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-settled considerations like gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by abscission, etc.” 10. In the case of Mehmood Mohammed Sayeed vs State of Maharashtra reported in 2001 (7) SRJ 336, the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the fact that the trial may take long time, disposed of the appeal of the appellant and released him on bail with certain conditions. The same is reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of ready-reference:- "1. Leave granted. Though learned Counsel for the State of Maharashtra opposed appellant to be released [2026:RJ-JP:4188] (9 of 14) [CRLMB-16907/2025] on ball we have taken note of the fact that appellant is remaining in custody from 18-1- 2000 onwards. The offences alleged against him include Sections 463, 467, 461, 419 read with Section 120 of the Indian Penal Code. Investigation is completed and the charge-sheet has been laid. What remains is only the trial. We do not know how long the trial will take, particularly, seeing the condition of the trial Courts in Maharashtra. 2. When learned Counsel for the State noticed that we are disposed to release the appellant on ball he alternatively pleaded that stringent conditions may be imposed on him because of the allegations that he has some links with the international terrorists gang. We, therefore, impose the following conditions on him: 1. He shall report to the Worli Police Station, Mumbai on every Monday between 4.00 p.m. and 6.00 p.m. until further orders: and 2. If, he is to leave the limits of Mumbai City Corporation he shall take permission from the trial Court. 3. If he is prepared to abide the above conditions he shall be released on bail on his executing a bond of Rs. 2 lacs with two solvent sureties to the satisfaction of the trial Court. This appeal is disposed of accordingly." 11. While it is true that Article 21 of the Constitution of India is of great importance because it enshrines the fundamental right to individual liberty but at the same time a balance has to be struck between the right to individual liberty and the interest of the Society. No right can be absolute and reasonable restrictions can be placed on them. While it is true that one of the considerations in deciding whether to grant bail to an accused or not is whether [2026:RJ-JP:4188] (10 of 14) [CRLMB-16907/2025] he has been in jail for a long time. The Court is also required to take into account other relevant factors, including the broader interest of society. In the present case, the record reveals that the trial Court took more than two years and eleven months to complete the pre-charge evidence. The charges were framed against the petitioner on 19.11.2025, i.e., after a delay of more than six months from the conclusion of the pre-charge evidence. Further, more than two months have elapsed since the framing of charges; however, the prosecution has failed to produce its witnesses, resulting in an unwarranted delay in the proceedings. The petitioner has been in custody since 21.05.2022, and given the current pace of proceedings, there appears to be no likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future. A person accused of a criminal offence cannot be kept in confinement for an indefinite period as an under trial prisoner. The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental facet of personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. In such circumstances, the prosecution cannot take shelter under the plea that the charges are serious in nature, as the gravity of the offence alone cannot justify prolonged incarceration without progress in trial. 12. As far as the judgment cited by the learned State counsel in Captain Jagjit Singh (supra) is concerned, the said decision is clearly distinguishable on facts. In that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the High Court had failed to consider the relevant factors such as the nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, circumstances peculiar to the accused, the reasonable possibility of the accused not being [2026:RJ-JP:4188] (11 of 14) [CRLMB-16907/2025] available for trial, and the fact that the accused therein was facing trial before the Sessions Court for an offence punishable with a maximum sentence of fourteen years. In contrast, in the present case, the petitioner is facing trial before the Magistrate Court, and he has already undergone incarceration for more than three years and eight months, and even in the event of conviction, he cannot be sentenced to more than seven years of imprisonment. 13. Recently in the case of Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu VS State of Chhattisgarh, Reported in (2025) 5 SCC 140, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “12. We may, however, hasten to add that, that cannot be an absolute proposition and some of the reasons which may be relevant for rejection for regular bail under Section 437(1)&(2) of the Code, may also be relevant for rejection of application under sub-section (6) of the said Section, in a given situation. We do not subscribe to the theory that factors which are relevant for rejection of regular bail, at the initial stage are not at all relevant for rejection of application under sub- section (6) of the said Section. Fact situations are so large in numbers, that it may not be possible to contemplate, enumerate, illustrate or incorporate here the factors which would be relevant and which would not be relevant for the purpose of rejection of application under sub-section (6) of Section 437 of the Code. But, it can certainly be said that grounds relevant for considering application under sub-section (6) of Section 437 of the Code and the grounds relevant for considering application for regular bail would be different to some extent. 13. In our view, following factors would be relevant: 1. Whether the reasons for being unable to [2026:RJ-JP:4188] (12 of 14) [CRLMB-16907/2025] conclude trial within sixty days from the first date fixed of taking evidence, are attributable to the accused? 2. Whether there are any chances of the accused tampering with evidence or causing prejudice to the case of the prosecution in any other manner? 3. Whether there are any chances of abscondence of the accused on being bailed out? 4. Whether accused was not in custody during the whole of the said period? If the answer to any one of the above referred fact situations or similar fact situations is in affirmative then that would work as a fetter on the right that accrues to the accused under first part of sub-section (6) of Section 437 of the Code. 14. xxx 15. xxx 16. xxx 17. This Court is of a considered view that applications under Section 437 (6) have to be given a liberal approach and it would be a sound and judicious exercise of discretion in favour of the accused by the Court concerned more particularly where there is no chance of tampering of evidence e.g. where the case depends on documentary evidence which is already collected; where there is no fault on part of the accused in causing of delay; where there are no chances of any abscondence by the accused; where there is little scope for conclusion of trial in near future; where the period for which accused has been in jail is substantial in comparison to the sentence prescribed for the offence for which he is tried. Normal parameters for deciding bail application would also be relevant while deciding application under Section 437(6) of the Code, but not with that rigour as they might have been at the time of application for regular bail.” [2026:RJ-JP:4188] (13 of 14) [CRLMB-16907/2025] 14. In backdrop of the aforesaid factual and legal aspect, this third bail application is accordingly allowed and it is directed that accused-petitioner Pradeep Kumar @ Ankit S/o Jagpal Singh shall be released on bail provided he furnishes a personal bond in the sum of Rs.3,00,000/- together with two sureties in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- each to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court with the stipulation that he shall appear before that Court and any Court to which the matter is transferred, on all subsequent dates of hearing and as and when called upon to do so. 15. It is made clear that the accused-petitioner shall not involve in any other offence(s) during currency of the bail and he shall mark his presence in first and third week of every month in the concerned police station, till conclusion of the trial. He shall also surrender his passport (if any) to the trial Court. It is further directed that the petitioner shall share his mobile number (in use) to the trial Court and investigating agency and shall keep his mobile phone in active mode and may not switch it off for a longer period intentionally. 16. Concerned SHO shall enter attendance of the petitioner in the Roznamcha. In case the petitioner fails to mark his presence in the concerned police station, the concerned SHO is directed to immediately report the matter to the concerned Court in this regard. 17. If any breach of these conditions is reported or come to the notice of the Court, the same shall alone be a reason for the trial Court to cancel the bail granted to him by this Court. [2026:RJ-JP:4188] (14 of 14) [CRLMB-16907/2025] 18. Office is directed to send a copy of this order to the concerned SHO for necessary compliance. 19. The observations made hereinabove are only for decision of the bail application and would not have any impact on the trial of the case in any manner. (ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J Manoj Solanki /68