1 2026:CGHC:21377-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1718 of 2022 Badal Chandrakar S/o Radheshyam Chandrakar Aged About 28 Years R/o Near Old Market, Kurud, P.S. And Tehsil - Kurud, District: Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Kurud, District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh 2 - Superintendent Of Police Dhamtari, District: Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh 3 - XYZ (Details Of The Victime Is Enclose Under Envelop) ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title Taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Mr. Prafull N Bharat, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Mayank Chandrakar, Advocate. For Respondents No. 1 & 2 : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer For Respondent No. 3/ Complainant Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 07/05/2026 1 Heard Mr. Prafull N Bharat, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Mayank Chandrakar, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer for the State/respondent No.1 2 as well as Mr. Awadh Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant. 2 By this petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the petitioner seeks quashing of the entire proceedings of Session Trial No. 49/2021 pending in the Court of learned Additional Session Judge (FTC) Dhamtari, District Dhamtari including the FIR No. 0132/2021 dated 30.03.2021 registered at Police Station Kurud, District Dhamtari which resulted into filing of charge sheet of the challan No. 174/2021 dated 18.07.2021 submitted before learned Additional Session Judge (FTC) Dhamtari, District Dhamtari in Session Trial No. 49/2021 and the charge memo dated 27.06.2022. 3 Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the complainant/victim/ respondent No. 2, aged about 26 years, lodged a written complaint before the Police Station Kurud on 30.03.2021 alleging that the petitioner gave false assurance of marriage and committed sexual intercourse with her since she was aged about 16 years. It was further alleged that the petitioner had recorded obscene video of the sexual act and had been threatening her to make the said video viral. Whenever she used to ask the petitioner to marry her, she has been denied. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, an FIR bearing Crime No. 0132/2021 was registered by the police for the offences under Sections 294, 506, 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was also filed on 18.07.2021 before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kurud. Thereafter, the case was registered as Sessions Trial No. 49/2021 by the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) Dhamtari, and thereafter, charges were framed against the petitioner on 27.06.2022 for the offences under Sections 376-2, 377, 313, 294, 506-II, 509B, of the 3 IPC and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, which are under challenge in this petition. 4 Mr. Prafull N Bharat, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Mayank Chandrakar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the physical relationship between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 was established with mutual consent and the allegations levelled against the petitioner are totally false as even according to the respondent No. 3/complainant, their relationship existed for more than 12 long years and all of a sudden, the FIR was lodged. Had it been a case of forceful sexual intercourse, the complainant/respondent No. 3 would not have sat quietly and would have reported the matter either to her family members or to the Police but since the said relationship was out of love and affection, the victim did not made any complaint for such long period. There is no material on record except the self statement of the victim/complainant and further there is no material on record to establish that the complainant ever conceived through the petitioner and that the petitioner got the pregnancy terminated. No material has been seized with regard to framing of charge against the petitioner under Section 67 of the IT Act. The victim was very well aware that she belongs to a caste different from the petitioner and when their marriage could not materialise, the petitioner has falsely been roped in this case. Hence, the FIR, the charge sheet and the consequential criminal proceedings deserves to be quashed by this Hon’ble Court. 5 On the other hand, Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned counsel for the State/respondents No. 1 and 2 submits that when the complainant made a written complaint at the Police Station, prima facie a cognizable offence was found to be made out and as such, the Police was duty bound to register the FIR and investigate the matter. In the investigation, evidence 4 and materials are available to further proceed against the petitioner and as such, charge sheet was filed on the basis of which the learned trial Court has framed charges against the petitioner and now the case is before the learned trial Court where the petitioner may advance his arguments and as such, this petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed at this stage. 6 Mr. Awadh Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3/complainant submits that there are enough evidence and material available on record to proceed against the petitioner. The learned trial Court has rightly framed charges against the petitioner which are grave in nature. The complainant/respondent No. 3 was lured by the petitioner when she was a minor and thereafter, she was continuously subjected to sexual exploitation by the petitioner for long 12 years and later, the petitioner retracted from his promise of marriage and as such, the complainant was compelled to lodge the FIR against the petitioner. 7 We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the pleadings and materials available on record with utmost circumspection. 8 In nutshell, the case of the prosecution is that the complainant was subjected to sexual exploitation on the pretext of marriage for about 12 long years. The incident is said to have taken place in between 30.03.2009 to 16.10.2020 and the written complaint was made on 30.03.2021 on the basis of which the FIR was registered. The complainant/respondent No. 3 is also a graduate and well educated and as such, she was aware of the consequences of her own act. From perusal of the FIR itself, it is evident that both the parties are known to each other and the physical relationship established between them was consensual and not forceful. It is not a case where the complainant is a minor girl or illiterate lady though she claims to have been subjected to 5 sexual exploitation since she was aged 16 years. She was fully aware of the consequences of her acts and after having long relationship, she cannot term the same to be an offence where she has been sexually exploited. Even the police has not seized any documents/medical prescription with relation to alleged termination of pregnancy of the complainant or any video clip, photograph etc. which may suggest that she was subjected to threat or coercion. 9 It would be beneficial to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Rajnish Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197, whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as under: “33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the complainant and the appellant were residing in different towns. The complainant is an educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or were being established under a false assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right from the inception of the relationship. 34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship between the complainant and the appellant was consensual without the existence of any element of deceit or misconception. 6 35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022, makes it abundantly clear that she was in a consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when she had proposed that they should marry and live together, the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been registered immediately after this incident. However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant that the appellant was getting married to another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped. xxx 39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused.” 10 Recently, the Apex Court, in Samadhan s/o Sitaram Manmothe v. State of Maharashtra & Another {Cr.A. No. 5001 of 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6906 of 2025)} while dealing with similar issue, observed as under: “37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No.2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the marriage of respondent No.2 was subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties was consensual, and therefore, 7 the absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when the same can be otherwise clearly discerned. 38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made: “29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90 IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] , in which it was held as follows: (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees 8 to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. xxx 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” 39. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335,this Court formulated the parameters in terms of which the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the BNSS) could be exercised. While it is not necessary to revisit all these parameters, a few that are relevant to the present case may be set out. The Court held that 9 quashing may be appropriate: “102. xxx (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where theallegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police ofÏcers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. xxx” 40. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are unable to concur with the findings recorded by the High Court, inasmuch as the present case pertains to a consensual relationship, and the acts of respondent No.2 clearly manifest consent to such a relationship devoid of any coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation as contemplated in Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In our opinion, the High Court’s refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS is unsustainable. The acts complained of in the present case occurred within the contours of a relationship that was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be nothing short of an abuse of the court machinery.” 11 In view of the above ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, we can safely hold that the present case pertains to a consensual relationship, and the acts of respondent No.3 clearly manifest consent to such a relationship devoid of any coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation. The acts complained of in the present case occurred within the contours of a relationship that was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be nothing short of an abuse of 10 process of law. 12 Accordingly, the entire proceedings of Session Trial No. 49/2021 pending in the Court of learned Additional Session Judge (FTC) Dhamtari, District Dhamtari including the FIR No. 0132/2021 dated 30.03.2021 registered at Police Station Kurud, District Dhamtari which resulted into filing of charge sheet of the challan No. 174/2021 dated 18.07.2021 submitted before learned Additional Session Judge (FTC) Dhamtari, District Dhamtari in Session Trial No. 49/2021 and the charge memo dated 27.06.2022, are quashed. 13 Resultantly, this petition stands allowed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Amit AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Digitally signed by AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Date: 2026.05.08 19:25:22 +0530