2026:JHHC:21445-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(Cr.) (DB) No.812 of 2025 ----- Mahavir Gope @ Mahabir Gope aged about 35 years, son of Logan Gope, resident of village-Bakashpur, P.O.-Lapa, P.S.- Karra, District-Khuti. … … Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary having it office at Project Building, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagannathpur, District-Ranchi. 2. The Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prison & Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Project Bhawan, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagannathpur, District- Ranchi. 3. The District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Khunti, P.O & P.S. Khuti, District- Khunti. 4. The Superintendent of Police Khunti, P.O & P.S.- Khunti, District- Khunti. 5. The Sub Divisional Police Officer,Torpa, P.O. & P.S.- Torpa, District- Khunti. … … Respondents ------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD C.A.V. on 17.07.2026 Pronounced on 20/07/2026 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer 1. This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 21.10.2025 (Annexure-1) passed by the District Magistrate- cum-Deputy Commissioner, Khunti (respondent No. 3) whereby and whereunder the petitioner was put under preventive detention in terms of Section 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. Further prayer has been made for quashing of the order dated 05.12.2025 (Annexure-3), passed by the Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prison & Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 2 (Respondent No.2), whereby and whereunder the order of preventive detention passed under Section 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 has been confirmed by the respondent no.2 on behalf of the State. 2. During the pendency of the instant writ petition, fresh order was passed by the authority concerned on 09.01.2026 by which the detention of the writ petitioner has been extended for further three months from 21.01.2026 to 20.04.2026 and consequent thereto petitioner sought leave of this Court to amend the writ petition to challenge inter- alia the extended detention period and the same was allowed by this Court vide order 16.01.2026. 3. Again, during the pendency of the instant writ petition, order of extension of detention order was passed on 10.04.2026, by which the detention of the petitioner has been extended for further three months from 21.04.2026 to 20.07.2026, thereafter an interlocutory application being I.A. No.6243 of 2026 was filed seeking amendment in the writ petition, in the pleading and prayer portion thereof and the said interlocutory application was allowed vide order dated 08.06.2026. Accordingly, the amended writ petition has also been filed. Factual Matrix 4. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition, which are required to be enumerated, read as under: - 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 3 i. Proposal was made by the Superintendent of Police, Khunti, vide letter No. 1086/DCB, dated 06.10.2025 addressed to the District Magistrate cum- Deputy Commissioner, Khunti for taking action against the petitioner U/S 12(2) of Jharkhand Control of Crime Act, 2002 stating therein that since the petitioner is an anti-social element and he may cause disruption to peace and public order, as such, petitioner be detained in the interest of maintaining public peace. ii. District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Khunti (respondent No.3) passed an order vide Memo no. 1/V, dated 21.10.2025 on the basis of the aforesaid recommendation and directed the authorities to detain the petitioner Mahavir Gope under Section 12 (2) of the Jharkhand by Control of Crimes Act for a period of three months. iii. The order passed by District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Khunti (respondent No. 3) on 21.10.2025 against the petitioner under the provision of u/s 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crime Act, 2002 is approved by Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prison & Disaster Management Government of Jharkhand (respondent No.2) vide order dated 24.10.2025. iv. The Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prison & Disaster Management Government of 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 4 Jharkhand, (respondent No.2) No. 05/CCA/01/60/2025-417/CCA, order dated 05.12.2025 has confirmed the order of detention u/s 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crime Act, 2002 passed by District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Khunti (respondent No.3) vide order dated 21.10.2025 and accordingly, petitioner has been detained for a period of 3 months, i.e. from 21.10.2025 to 20.01.2026. v. In course of pendency of the writ petition detention of the petitioner was further extended vide letter No. 09/CCA, dated 09.01.2026 by the Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Prison & Disaster Management Government of Jharkhand, (respondent No. 2) for further three months from 21.01.2026 to 20.04.2026. vi. Petitioner was involved in four (4) criminal cases but of out of four he has been acquitted in two cases, and in rest of the cases he has been granted bail. vii. The status of the criminal cases against the petitioner is as follows: - (I) In Karra P.S. Case No. 28/2012, petitioner has been acquitted vide Judgment dated 30.08.2018 passed by the learned District & Additional Sessions Judge-I, Khunti. 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 5 (II) In Jariyagarh P.S. Case No. 09/2022, petitioner has been acquitted vide Judgment dated 17.09.2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Khunti. (III) In Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.01/2025, petitioner has been granted bail by the Hon'ble High court vide order dated 18.11.2025, Passed in B.A. No.9931/2025. (IV) In Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.02/2025, petitioner has been granted bail by the Hon'ble High Court vide order dated 01.07.2025 Passed in B.A. No. 5204/2025. viii. It is the case of the Petitioner that he was produced before the Advisory board on 17.11.2025 which is after a lapse of almost 27 days from the date of detention i.e. 21.10.2025 which again is violation of the provision of law U/S 19 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 which clearly mandates that the exercise be done within a period of 21 days (3 weeks). ix. During pendency of the writ petition, the detention of the petitioner has been further extended by three months i.e. from 21.04.2026 to 20.07.2026 vide Letter 05/CCA/01/60/2025-108/CCA dated 10.4.2026 issued under the signature of the Respondent No. 2. 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 6 Submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner: 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned decision: i. The impugned detention order dated 21.10.2025 issued under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 by the respondent is illegal and in complete violation of the provisions of the Act and is a clear case of abuse of the process of law. ii. The non-supply of information by the respondent authorities regarding the representation preferred by the petitioner is violative of provision of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,2002. iii. Mere pendency of criminal cases cannot be a ground for detention order under Section 12(3) of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act. iv. Detaining authority did not record satisfaction in the order of detention renders the impugned order bad in law. v. Detaining authority erred in issuing the detention order dated 21.10.2025 merely because the Petitioner has been made accused in four (4) criminal cases. vi. Respondent authorities cannot detain the petitioner in the garb of maintaining 'public order' and can take away the petitioner's Fundamental 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 7 Rights entirely on false apprehensions without any iota of evidence of any kind whatsoever or even without establishing prima facie any imminent threat to public order. vii. Respondent authorities have acted arbitrarily, in complete malafide and highhandedness in an attempt to deprive the petitioner of his right to freedom of life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. viii. The name of the petitioner was recommended on the ground that petitioner was involved in four criminal cases and therefore he is habitual in crime and petitioner is member of PLFI group and his main profession to collect levy in the name of organization to spread fear and terror in the society. But the same cannot be a ground for detention under Section 12 (2) of Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act as that can be dealt with the ordinary Criminal law and on this ground alone, detention order is illegal. ix. When general provisions of law could suffice the purpose then there is no need of invoking extra ordinary statute, in other words the State could have filed and approached the courts of law for cancellation of bail, however without doing so the State chose to impose the provisions of section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 8 curtailing the liberties of the petitioner and awarding him with the extraordinary punishment of preventive detention. x. Petitioner was not informed about his right of representation and the same is a mandate as provided by the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. xi. The petitioner was informed of his right of representation by the relative of the petitioner after due consultation with the lawyer and as such his right of representation as well as his right of being informed that he had a right of representation were curtailed by the Jail Authorities. xii. Petitioner when tried to send a representation to the Detaining Authority the same was refused by the Jail Authorities and it was communicated to him that the same would not be forwarded. This clearly depicts the malicious and biased attitude of the Jail Authorities. xiii. The detenu i.e. the petitioner in the instant case was not supplied with the copies of the Letters or Memos forwarded by the Superintendent of police, Khunti. The petitioner was only handed over the copy of the Order passed by the District Magistrate and the copy of the order confirming the Preventive Detention issued from the office of the Additional Secretary, 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 9 Department of Home, Prisons and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand. 6. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the order of detention, therefore, suffers from error and hence not sustainable in the eye of law. Submission made by the learned counsel for the State 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has submitted that- i. Petitioner is a notorious member of banned extremist organization PLFI, having lots of criminal antecedents of serious nature. He is having his syndicate/gang/Arms extremists in Jharkhand as well as in other neighbour state with help of which he facilitated organized crimes of different nature such as collecting levy from businessmen, traders etc. and extorting money from people of the locality by way of spreading fear and terror among the society. The activities of the petitioner are detrimental to maintaining Public Law and Order. Therefore, the petitioner is kept under preventive detention under the said exigent circumstances. ii. Vide memo no 902/अनु०. Dated 26.09.2025 SDPO Torpa, Khunti forwarded the details of petitioner for preventive detention of petitioner in light of his criminal antecedent as well as terror and havoc created by the petitioner in the locality in the name 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 10 of banned extremists organization PLFI, along with entire details of case of petitioner. iii. vide letter number 1086/DCB, dated 06.10.2025, the Sub Divisional Police Officer, Torpa, recommended and forwarded the proposal of preventive detention of petitioner to Deputy Commissioner, Khunti for taking needful action in view of the report and proposal submitted by SDPO Torpa/respondent number-05. Accordingly, the impugned detention order to keep the petitioner under detention was passed by the Deputy Commissioner Khunti vide office memo no. 01, dated 21.10.2025. iv. Detention order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Khunti has been confirmed by the department of Home, Prison and Disaster Management vide letter no. 374/CCA dated 24.10.2025 within the stipulated time. v. The department of Home, Prison and Disaster Management, Jharkhand, placed the matter of the petitioner before the Advisory Board within the stipulated time held on 17.11.2025 for consideration of Advisory Board. vi. Petitioner has five criminal antecedents of serious nature, out of which in three cases he is in judicial custody. 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 11 vii. The Department of Home, Prison and Disaster Management confirmed the detention order of the petitioner vide letter no. 417 CCA/ Ranchi dated 05.12.2025 after the report and opinion submitted by the Advisory Board. viii. Proposal for extension of detention was sent to the department of Home, Prison and Disaster Management vide letter no. 10 dated 06.01.2026 and accordingly the detention of the petitioner has been extended vide letter no. 09 dated 09.01.2026 by the Department of Home, Prison and Disaster Management. ix. On culmination of the period of detention as earlier extended up to 20.04.2026, the matter was duly examined by the Department of Home, Prison and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand and considering the continued criminal antecedents and conduct of the petitioner being prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the detention of the petitioner has been further extended for a period of three months i.e. from 21.04.2026 to 20.07.2026 vide Letter No. 05/CCA/01/60/2025-108/CCA dated 10.04.2026 issued by the Respondent No.2 and the same is legal, just and proper and does not call for any interference by the Hon’ble Court. 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 12 8. Learned counsel appearing for the State, based upon the aforesaid grounds, have submitted that it is, therefore, not a case where the order of detention is said to suffer from an error. Analysis 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the order of detention as also the pleadings made on behalf of the petitioner and the State as available in the writ petition and the counter affidavits. 10. The issues which require consideration herein are as follows– i. Whether representation of the petitioner was not forwarded by the jail authorities to the Government, and hence, the jail authorities acted mala fidely. ii. Whether grant of bail to the petitioner in pending cases and acquittal in some of the cases, is ground for his release from the prevention detention passed under 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002? iii. Whether the criminal activities of petitioner come under the purview of definition of ‘’Anti-social Elements’’ as defined under section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002? iv. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, can it be said that the authorities have got the subjective satisfaction while passing the order of detention? Re: Issue No. (i) 11. The issue no.(i) i.e. whether representation of the petitioner was not forwarded by the jail authorities to the 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 13 Government, and hence, the jail authorities acted malafidely? 12. In this regard learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that petitioner was not informed about his right of representation, and when petitioner was informed of his right of representation by the relative of the petitioner after due consultation with the lawyer, then, petitioner tried to send representation to the Detaining Authority, but, the same was refused by the Jail Authorities and it was communicated to him that the same would not be forwarded, which, clearly depicts the malicious and biased attitude of the Jail Authorities. 13. Since a controversy has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the representation submitted by the petitioner was not duly forwarded by the jail authorities to the authority concerned therefore, it becomes incumbent upon this Court to examine and appreciate the aforesaid contention of the petitioner on the basis of the material available on record; and in light of the settled statutory provisions governing such matters. 14. At this juncture, Sections 17 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes, 2002 needs to be referred herein. Section 17 of the Act, 2002 inter alia provides that ground of orders of detention to be disclosed and opportunity of making a representation against the order of the State Government 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 14 shall be given to the person affected by the order. Section 17 of the Act, 2002 reads as under- 17. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to person affected by the order. - (1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than ten days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 15. Further, Article 22(5) of the Constitution mandates that the authority making the order shall as soon as may be communicate the grounds on which the order has been made to the person detained and the detaining authority shall afford to the person detained the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. 16. Following the mandate of Article 22(5), provision has been made under section 17 of Jharkhand Control of Crimes,2002, wherein it has been provided that the detaining authority shall communicate the grounds to the detenue on which the detention order has been passed and shall afford to the detenue an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of the State Government. 17. In the present case, this Court finds that in the counter Affidavit dated 20.01.2026, it is specifically 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 15 mentioned that copy of detention order along with the grounds of dentition was served upon the petitioner, as such there is compliance of the Article 22(5) of the constitution. 18. Further, ongoing to the impugned detention order which is annexed as Annexure-1 to this writ petition, this court finds that annexure-1 contains two part and first part is impugned detention order dated 21.10.2025 passed under section 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes,2002, by the detaining authority i.e. Respondent No.3 and the second part is grounds of detention and in the said document, detaining authority had noted that copies of the said documents shall be given to the detenue. 19. Hence, one of the constitutional requirements as provided under Article 22(5) of Constitution of India and Section 17 of the Act,2002, as to communicate the grounds to the detenue on which the detention order has been passed has been fulfilled by the State/Respondent, by providing the petitioner, the ground of detention and detention order dated 21.10.2025(Annexure-1) passed by the respondent no.3 District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, District- Khunti. 20. Now, the controversy raised by the petitioner in the writ petition that his representation was not forwarded to the detaining authorities, by the Jail Authorities and hence, petitioner has alleged that jail authorities acted maliciously and with biasness. 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 16 21. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, this Court has gone through the entire pleading of the writ petition as well as exhibit annexed therein, wherefrom it is apparent that in support of aforesaid statement the petitioner has not placed any cogent evidence and he has just stated that his right of representation has been curtailed by the Jail authorities. 22. It is settled position of law that allegation without evidence has no leg to stand and in the absence of cogent evidence the same can only be treated as bald and empty allegation. Further the initial onus to substantiate the allegation of not forwarding the petitioner’s representation by the jail authorities lies on the petitioner himself and the petitioner has not been able to produce any evidence to substantiate his allegation. 23. At this juncture it would be pertinent to see the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex court on the question of burden of proving a case based on allegation of mala fide. 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chandra Prakash Singh v. Purvanchal Gramin Bank, (2008) 12 SCC 292, has held that it is a proposition of law that the burden of proving mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Mere allegation is not enough. Party making such allegations is under the legal obligation to place specific materials before the court to substantiate the said allegations. There has to be very strong and convincing 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 17 evidence to establish the allegations of mala fides specifically and definitely alleged in the petition as the same cannot merely be presumed. The presumption under law is in favour of the bona fides of the order unless contradicted by acceptable material, for ready reference the paragraph-34 of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein below- “34. Thus, as a proposition of law, the burden of proving mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Mere allegation is not enough. Party making such allegations is under the legal obligation to place specific materials before the court to substantiate the said allegations. There has to be very strong and convincing evidence to establish the allegations of mala fides specifically and definitely alleged in the petition as the same cannot merely be presumed. The presumption under law is in favour of the bona fides of the order unless contradicted by acceptable material.” 25. Further, in case of E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3, while dealing the issue of mala fide, Hon’ble Apex Court laid down that the Court would be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Paragraph-92 of the said judgment is being quoted herein below- “92. Secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. Here the petitioner, who was himself once the Chief Secretary, has flung a series of charges of oblique conduct against the Chief Minister. That is in itself a 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 18 rather extraordinary and unusual occurrence and if these charges are true, they are bound to shake the confidence of the people in the political custodians of power in the State, and therefore, the anxiety of the Court should be all the greater to insist on a high degree of proof. In this context it may be noted that top administrators are often required to do acts which affect others adversely but which are necessary in the execution of their duties. These acts may lend themselves to misconstruction and suspicion as to the bona fides of their author when the full facts and surrounding circumstances are not known. The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charge of unworthy conduct against ministers and other high authorities, not because of any special status which they are supposed to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life or administrative set up—these considerations are wholly irrelevant in judicial approach—but because otherwise, functioning effectively would become difficult in a democracy. It is from this standpoint that we must assess the merits of the allegations of mala fides made by the petitioner against the second respondent.” (emphasis supplied) 26. On the basis of the discussion made hereinabove this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner has failed to prove mala fides against the jail authorities and has not produced any clinching evidence and merely imputing allegation against the jail authorities that jail authorities had not forwarded his representation, is not fit to be accepted. 27. Accordingly, Issue No.(i) is answered against the petitioner. 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 19 Re: Issue No.(ii) 28. The issue no.2 is whether grant of bail to the petitioner in pending cases and acquittal in some of the cases, is ground for his release from the prevention detention passed under 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002? 29. In this regard petitioner has raised ground that petitioner is already on bail or has been acquitted by the Court of law, and the said cases were relied by the detaining authority while passing the impugned order of detention dated 21.10.2025 and hence, detention order cannot be sustained. 30. This court from perusal of record finds that in the proposal submitted by Superintendent of Police, Khunti, vide Letter No. 1086/DCB dated 06.10.2025, , to the District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Khunti, there is inter alia reference of four cases registered against the petitioner- Karra P.S. Case No. 28/2012 dated 03.07.2012, Jariyagarh P.S. Case No. 09/2022 dated 03.04.2022, Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.01/2025 dated 01.01.2025 and Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.02/2025 dated 02.01.2025. 31. In Karra P.S. Case No. 28/2012 and Jariyagarh P.S. Case No. 09/2022, petitioner has been acquitted of by the learned Trial Court by order dated 30.08.2018 and 17.09.2025 respectively. 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 20 32. Further, in Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.01/2025 and Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.02/2025, petitioner has been enlarged on bail by the Hon’ble High Court by order dated 18.11.2025 and 01.07.2025 respectively. 33. Hence, out of the four cases registered against the petitioner, petitioner has been acquitted in two cases and has been enlarged on bail in two cases. 34. In the present case, from the ground of detention, it is apparent that in the pending case Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.01/2025, it is registered under section 308(4)/3(5) of B.N.S. and 17 of CLA Act. Further, pending Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.02/2025, is registered under 308/111/161(2)/3(5) of BNS and 25(1-B) a/25(6)/26/35 of Arms Act and 17 of CLA Act. 35. Hence, so far as release of the petitioner on bail, in the two pending cases i.e. Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.01/2025 and in Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.02/2025, which are registered under the various sections of B.N.S. Act, Arms Act and CLA Act, is concerned, this Court finds that it is the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority that in spite of his continuous activities causing threat to maintenance of public order and in such circumstances, based on the relevant materials and satisfying itself, that it would not be possible to control his habituality in continuing the criminal activities by resorting the normal procedures, the Detaining Authority had passed an impugned order 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 21 detaining him under the Jharkhand Crime Control Act, 2002. 36. Further, the ground of bail cannot be said to affect the decision of detention taken by the competent authority, rather the accusation so made in the First Information Report is to be seen for the purpose to have the subjective satisfaction of the nature of accusation made in the said FIR. 37. Since the detention order is to be passed by the competent authority anticipating the criminality of the concerned and it would be evident from the accusation made in the ground of detention dated 21.10.2025, (Annexure-1) passed by the Respondent no. 3 District Magistrate-cum- Deputy Commissioner, Khunti, wherein inter alia aforesaid two pending criminal cases against the petitioner is mentioned. 38. The consideration of coming from judicial custody by virtue of order passed by the court to release on bail has been taken into consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court in D.M Nagaraja Versus Government of Karnataka and others reported in (2011) 10 SCC 215 wherein detenue had challenged his detention order. The Hon'ble Apex Court in this case had noted in paragraph-17 that the even after release on bail detenue again started indulging in the same type of offences, particularly, threatening the public life, damaging public property, etc. and hence, detenue appeal was dismissed. Further in paragraph-20 of the aforesaid 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 22 judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court had noted the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order against the detenue, for the ready reference Paragraph-17 and 20 of D.M. Nagaraja(supra) case is quoted herein below - "17. All the abovementioned details which have been correctly stated in the detention order clearly show that the appellant is not amenable to ordinary course of law. It also shows that even after his release on bail from the prison on various occasions, he again started indulging in the same type of offences, particularly, threatening the public life, damaging public property, etc. All these aspects have been meticulously considered by the detaining authority and after finding that in order to maintain public order, since his activities are prejudicial to the public, causing harm and danger, the detaining authority detained him as "goonda" under Karnataka Act 12 of 1985 for a period of 12 months and the same was rightly approved by the Advisory Board and the State Government. Inasmuch as the detaining authority has taken note of all the relevant materials and strictly followed all the safeguards as provided in the Act ensuring the liberty of the detenue, we are in entire agreement with the decision of the detaining authority as well as the impugned order of the High Court affirming the same." xxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 20. In the case on hand, we have already extracted criminality, criminal activities starting from the age of 30 and details relating to eleven cases mentioned in the grounds of detention. It is not in dispute that in one case he has been convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of nine years. He had been acquitted in two cases and four cases are pending against him wherein he was granted bail by the courts. It is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that in spite of his continuous activities causing threat to maintenance of public order, he was getting bail one after another and indulging in the same activities. In such circumstances, based on the relevant 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 23 materials and satisfying itself, namely, that it would not be possible to control his habituality in continuing the criminal activities by resorting to normal procedure, the detaining authority passed an order detaining him under Act 12 of 1985." 39. Thus, from the impugned detention order dated 21.10.2025 (Annexure-1), it is evident that the petitioner is habitually involved in offences relating to extortion, organised crime, Arms Act, CLA Act etc. and further on the basis of subjective satisfaction the detaining authority has arrived to conclusion that the well-organized manner in which such pre-judicial activities have been carried on and nexus between dates of incidents and passing of the detention order and the said observation is according to the ratio led down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of D.M Nagaraja Versus Government of Karnataka and others(supra) therefore, the said observation of the detaining authority cannot be said to be suffer from an error. 40. Accordingly, Issue No.(ii), has been answered herein. Issue No.(iii) and Issue No.(iv) 41. Since both these issues, whether the petitioner falls within the purview of the definition of “Anti-social Elements”; and whether the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was duly recorded while passing the detention order, are interlinked and inseparably connected, this Court deems it appropriate to take them up together for consideration, both on the basis of the material available on 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 24 record and in light of the settled principles of law governing preventive detention. 42. But before considering these issues, the statutory provisions as contained under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes, 2002 needs to be referred. 43. The relevant provisions which require consideration are Sections 2(d) and section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes, 2002, which are necessary to be referred herein. 44. “Anti-social Element” has been defined in section 2(d) of the Act,2002, which reads hereunder as: - 2(d) "Anti-social element" means a person who- (i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code;or (ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; or (iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or any other grounds whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different religions, racial or language groups or castes or communities; or (iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls; or (v)who has been convicted of an offence under sections 25,26, 27, 28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959 45. From perusal of Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Crime Control Act, 2002, it is evident that "anti-social element" is a person who habitually commits or abets offenses listed in Chapters XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code, or certain 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 25 other specific crimes. It needs to refer herein that this definition requires a pattern of behaviour, not isolated incidents, and aims to identify individuals whose acts cause alarm or terror among the public, warranting preventive detention to maintain public order. 46. It needs to refer herein that the Act of 2002 was meant to make special provisions for the control and suppression of anti-social elements with a view to maintenance of public order. It also needs to refer herein that the “Law and Order” problems typically affect only individuals or small groups, whereas “public order” disruptions affect the community’s normal functioning on a broader scale often generating fear or anxiety among the general public. 47. It is pertinent to mention herein that the primary element with respect to Section 2(d)(i) of the Act of 2002 seems to be the word "habitual". It would thus mean that a person who is frequently engaged in committing or attempting or abating commission of an offence in terms of Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code would be an antisocial element. In this context, we may refer to the case of Vijay Narayan Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in (1984) 3 SCC 14 wherein the word "habitually" has been sought to be enumerated in the following manner: "31. It is seen from Section 12 of the Act that it makes provision for the detention of an anti-social element. If a person is not an 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 26 antisocial element, he cannot be detained under the Act. The detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an order is made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social element as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Sub-clauses (ii), (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d) of the Act which are not quite relevant for the purposes of this case may be omitted from consideration for the present. The two other sub-clauses which need to be examined closely are sub clauses (i) and (iv) of Section 2(d). Under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting the human body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property, of the Penal Code, 1860 is considered to be an anti-social element. Under subclause (iv) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who has been habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls, is an anti-social element. In both these sub clauses, the word "habitually" is used. The expression "habitually" means "repeatedly" or "persistently". It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. It connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in each of the said sub clauses or an aggregate of similar acts or omissions. This appears to be clear from the use of the word "habitually" separately in subclause (i), sub-clause (ii) and sub- clause (iv) of Section 2(d) and not in sub clauses (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d). If the State Legislature had intended that a commission of two or more acts or omissions referred to in any of the sub- clauses (i) to (v) of Section 2(d) was sufficient to make a person an "anti-social element", the definition would have run as "Anti-social element" means "a person who habitually is. ..". As Section 2(d) of the Act now stands, whereas under sub- clause (iii) or sub-clause (v) of Section 2(d) a single act or omission referred to in them may be enough to treat the person concerned as an 'antisocial element', in the case of sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii) or subclause (iv), there should be a repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in sub-clause 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 27 (i), subclause (ii) or in sub-clause (iv) by the person concerned to treat him as an "anti-social element". Commission of an act or omission referred to in one of the sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) and of another act or omission referred to in any other of the said sub-clauses would not be sufficient to treat a person as an "anti-social element". A single act or omission falling under subclause (i) and a single act or omission falling under subclause (iv) of Section 2(d) cannot, therefore, be characterized as a habitual act or omission referred to in either of them. Because the idea of "habit" involves an element of persistence and a tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of the same class or kind, if the acts or omissions in question are not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when they are committed with a long interval of time between them they cannot be treated as habitual ones." 48. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that if a person is not an antisocial element, he cannot be detained under the Act of 2002. The detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an order is made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social element as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting the human body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property, of the Penal Code, 1860 is considered to be an anti-social element. Further the expression "habitually" means "repeatedly" or "persistently". It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 28 isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. 49. Further, Section 12 of the Act,2002 empowers the State Government to detain a person, which reads as under- 12. Power to make order detaining certain persons. - The State Government may- (1) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that such anti-social element be detained. (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may by an order in writing direct, that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in sub- section (1) exercise the powers conferred upon by the said sub- section: Provided that the period specified in an order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. (3) When any order is made by District Magistrate, he shall forthwith report, the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government: Provided that where under Section 17 the grounds of detention are communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 29 modification that, for the words "twelve days", the words "fifteen days" shall be substituted. 50. Hence, power to make orders detaining certain persons are provided in Section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. Section 12(1) provides that if State Government is satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that such anti-social element be detained. 51. So, section 12(1) empowers the State Government to detain anti-social element if there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person. The anti-social element has been defined in Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and section 2(d)(i) of the Act provides that “Anti-social element” means a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of gang habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code. 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 30 52. In the backdrop of the aforesaid statutory provisions, the factual aspect of the present case is to be considered in order to consider these issue as formulated herein above. 53. Re-adverting to the factual aspect of the present case, the petitioner has challenged the order of preventive detention dated 21.10.2025 (Annexure-1) passed under section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crime Act,2002 by the respondent no.3 District Magistrate-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Khunti, and also the order of confirmation of detention dated 05.12.2025 and subsequent orders of extension of detention of the petitioner latest one 10.04.2026 by which detention of petitioner has been extended from 21.04.2026 to 20.07.2026 extending the period of detention. 54. On going through the detention order dated 21.10.2025 (Annexure-1), this Court finds this detention order was passed by the respondent no.3 District Magistrate- cum-Deputy Commissioner, Khunti, on the recommendations made by the Superintendent of Police, Khunti, vide Letter No. 1086/DCB dated 06.10.2025. 55. This Court finds from the ground of communication that two cases are pending against the petitioner i.e. Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.01/2025 registered under section 308(4)/3(5) of B.N.S. and 17 of CLA Act and Jaryagarh P.S. Case No.02/2025 registered under Sections 308/111/161(2)/3(5) of BNS and 25(1-B) a/25(6)/26/35 of 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 31 Arms Act and 17 of CLA Act under the various sections of B.N.S. Act, Arms Act and CLA Act. 56. Hence, from the FIRs and charge sheet mentioned in the ground of detention dated 21.10.2025 (Annexure-1), it indicates that crime committed by the petitioner ranges to extortion, organised crime, Arms Act, CLA Act etc. 57. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that petitioner habitually commits offences punishable under section Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code/BNS and hence comes under the purview of anti-social element as defined in section 2(d)(i) of the Act 2002. 58. Further the question of subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned while passing the order of detention is questioned herein and has submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is absence of material linking habitual criminality of the petitioner, therefore in absence of subjective satisfaction, the order of preventive detention is bad in law. 59. Before, proceeding further, it would be pertinent to mention the case of Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587, wherein Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down certain principles to be observed by the Constitutional Court while examining the legality of orders of preventive detention. Paragraph-28 of this judgment is quoted herein below- “28. In the circumstances of a given case, a constitutional court 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 32 when called upon to test the legality of orders of preventive detention would be entitled to examine whether: “28.1. The order is based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the absence of such satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the exercise of the power is predicated, would be the sine qua non for the exercise of the power not being satisfied; 28.2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction, the detaining authority has applied its mind to all relevant circumstances and the same is not based on material extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute; 28.3. Power has been exercised for achieving the purpose for which it has been conferred, or exercised for an improper purpose, not authorised by the statute, and is therefore ultra vires; 28.4. The detaining authority has acted independently or under the dictation of another body; 28.5. The detaining authority, by reason of self-created rules of policy or in any other manner not authorised by the governing statute, has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each individual case; 28.6. The satisfaction of the detaining authority rests on materials which are of rationally probative value, and the detaining authority has given due regard to the matters as per the statutory mandate; 28.7. The satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind existence of a live and proximate link between the past conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him or is based on material which is stale; 28.8. The ground(s) for reaching the requisite satisfaction is/are such which an individual, with some degree of rationality and prudence, would consider as connected with the fact and relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry in respect whereof the satisfaction is to be reached; 28.9. The grounds on which the order of preventive detention rests are not vague but are precise, pertinent and relevant which, with sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the satisfaction for the detention, giving him the opportunity to make a suitable representation; and 28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law, have been 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 33 strictly adhered to.” 60. Hence, Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana (supra), on the issue of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority has laid down that the order based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the absence of such satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the exercise of the power is predicated, would be the sine qua non for the exercise of the power not being satisfied. Hon’ble Apex Court further laid down that the Court may examine that the satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind existence of a live and proximate link between the past conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain or is based on material which is stale. 61. In the present case, ongoing to the impugned detention order, passed by the detaining authority Respondent No. 3 dated 21.10.2025(Anneure-1), it is evident that the sequence of criminal cases registered against the detenue. 62. This Court has gone through the impugned order dated 21.10.2025 wherefrom it is evident that authority concerned has taken note of the fact that petitioner has been an active member of PLFI extremist group whose main profession has been extortion of money in the name of the organization by spreading terror and fear in the society. 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 34 Mahavir Gope (petitioner herein) has been habitually engaged in criminal activities which ranges from criminal conspiracy, extortion and the cases under arms act which are prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order. The catena of criminal cases against the said Mahavir Gope as contained in the letter No. 902/Anuo dated 26.09.2025 of Sub-Divisional Police Officer Torpa and substantiated by Jariyagarh PS case No. 02/2025 on 02.01.2025 under section 308/111/61(2)/3(5) of BNS and under section 25(1- B)a/25(6) /26/35 of Arms Act and 17 CLA act and Jariyagarh PS case No. 01/25 dated 01.01.2025 under section 308(4)/3(5) of BNS and 17 CLA Act, shows that the continued criminal activities as evidenced by the multiple criminal cases pending against petitioner demonstrate a proclivity to disturb the public peace and order. 63. It is further evident from the sub paragraph of the said order of detention that the detaining authority has expressly noted his satisfaction based upon the material available on record and has mentioned that he is satisfied subjectively and objectively with the material and report placed before him that the activities of petitioner are not merely a matter of 'Law and Order' but constitute a grave threat to "Public Order" thereby making it necessary to detain him (Mahavir Gope) in order to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of Public Order. 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 35 64. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that authority concerned has expressed its subjective satisfaction based upon the material available against the petitioner. Further it is apparent that the detaining authority respondent no.3 while passing the detention order 21.10.2025 (Annexure-1), was satisfied that petitioner if released from jail will act in manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 65. In the present case, the factual aspect as has been dealt with hereinabove while deciding the issue, this Court is of view that the detaining authority has taken into consideration the fact in entirety which shows the subjective satisfaction based upon the document as found to be available with the recommending authority which has been accepted by the detaining authority. Further, the, satisfaction has been arrived by the detaining authority bearing in mind existence of live and proximate link between the past conduct of a petitioner and material which is not stale and is in consonance of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana and others(supra). 66. This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid factual aspect is of the view that respondent authorities after being satisfied from the material available on record has considered that the petitioner comes under purview of ‘’Anti- social Elements’’ as defined under section 2(d)(i) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and detention of 2026:JHHC:21445-DB 36 petitioner is required to maintain public order and while arriving the said satisfaction, the authority concerned has followed all the constitutional mandate therefore, order of detention requires no inference by this Court. 67. Accordingly, Issue No.(iii) and Issue No.(iv) are hereby answered. 68. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the orders of detention need no interference. 69. Accordingly, the detention order dated 21.10.2025 (Annexure-1) passed by the Respondent No.3 and order dated 05.12.2025 (Annexure-3), passed by the Respondent No.2 confirming the detention order and the subsequent orders 09.01.2026 (Annexure-3/1) and 10.04.2026 extending the period of detention, passed by the respondent no. 2 requires no interference. 70. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands dismissed. 71. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands dispose of. I agree. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.) Date : 20/07/2026 Birendra /A.F.R. Uploaded On: - 21/07/2026