1 2026:CGHC:22910-DB AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 985 of 2015 Judgment Reserved on 06.04.2026 Judgment Delivered on 14.05.2026 • Ku. Divya Chandrakar, D/o Tikaram Chandrakar, aged about 20 Years, R/o Village - Kanpa, Police Station - Tumgaon, Civil and Revenue District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh. ---Appellant versus • State of Chhattisgarh, Through Police Station - Mahasamund, Civil and Revenue District – Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Shaswat Mishra, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Dy. A.G. CRA No. 951 of 2015 VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 • Shyambati, W/o Tikaram, aged about 40 Years, R/o Village- Kanpa, Police Station- Tumgaon, Civil and Revenue District- Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh. ...Appellant versus • State of Chhattisgarh, Through Police Station- Mahasamund, Civil and Revenue District- Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Vaibhav A. Goverdhan, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Dy. A.G. Division Bench Hon'ble Shri. Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal J. & Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. C A V Judgment Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1.Since both the appeals arise out of the same judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.07.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Mahasamund, C.G. in Sessions Trial No.33/2014, they are being heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. 3 2. By the impugned judgment, appellant- Divya Chandrakar in CRA No.985 of 2015 has been convicted under Sections 302 & 201 of Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 of IPC Imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month Under Section 201 of IPC Rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month (Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently) 3. By the same judgment, co-accused/appellant- Shyambati in CRA No.951/2015 has been convicted under Section 201 of IPC and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 201 of IPC Rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month 4 4. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 17.02.2014 at about 3:00 PM, appellant- Divya Chandrakar was admitted in Aditya Hospital, Mahasamund on account of abdominal pain. It is alleged that she delivered a female child in the hospital and thereafter committed murder of the newborn by throttling and flushed the dead body in the toilet, with the assistance of her mother co-accused- Shyambati. The dead body was discovered when the toilet got choked and upon inspection by hospital staff, a newborn child was found in the flush tank. On the basis of written report submitted by PW-8 Dr. Jyoti Kalikoty, merg was registered and thereafter FIR bearing Crime No.124/2014 was lodged against the accused persons. 5. After due investigation, statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. The accused persons were charge-sheeted before the jurisdictional criminal Court and the case was committed to the trial Court, in which, accused persons abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they have not committed the offence. 6. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined as many as 09 witnesses and exhibited 26 documents and Article ‘A1’. In defence, the accused persons have examined none and not 5 exhibited any document. The statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., in which, they denied circumstances appearing against them in the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, pleaded innocence and false implication. 7. The learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted and sentenced the accused persons/appellants for the offences as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which, these appeals have been preferred by the appellants herein, questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is unsustainable in law, as the same is based solely on circumstantial evidence and the prosecution has failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the appellants. It is contended that there is no eye-witness to the alleged incident, no evidence of last seen, and no recovery of any incriminating material connecting the appellants with the commission of the offence; thus, the entire case rests on mere suspicion and conjectures. It 6 is further submitted that the most crucial link in the prosecution case, namely, the identity of the deceased newborn child, has not been established. No DNA examination has been conducted to prove that the deceased infant was born to appellant Divya and, in the absence of such scientific evidence, the foundational fact of maternity remains unproved, rendering the prosecution case doubtful. Learned counsel also submits that as per the medical evidence of PW-2 Dr. Hemant Chandravanshi, although the cause of death has been opined to be throttling, but he has admitted in cross-examination that strangulation may also occur naturally during delivery due to the umbilical cord and that differentiation between the two is difficult. Therefore, the possibility of natural or accidental death during childbirth cannot be ruled out. It is further contended that the statements of PW-7 Dr. H.B. Kalikoty and PW-8 Dr. Jyoti Kalikoty create serious doubt regarding the prosecution story, as despite alleging advanced pregnancy, appellant Divya was admitted only for complaint of stomach pain, which appears improbable. Moreover, PW-8 has stated that the child was born dead, which directly contradicts the prosecution case of homicidal death. It is also argued that the alleged incident took place in a hospital, which is a busy place, and in the absence of any proper record of entry or movement of persons, the possibility of involvement 7 of some other person cannot be ruled out. There is no independent or corroborative evidence to establish that the appellants disposed of the body of the newborn child. 9.So far as co-accused- Shyambati is concerned, it is submitted that there is absolutely no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to show her involvement in the alleged offence or in causing disappearance of evidence, and her conviction under Section 201 IPC is wholly baseless. Counsel further challenges the evidentiary value of the alleged identification proceedings on the ground that the same were conducted in the presence of police and are hit by Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and are therefore inadmissible, in view of the law laid down in Chunthuram v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 10 SCC 733. Placing reliance on the settled principles governing cases based on circumstantial evidence as laid down by the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 166, and reiterated in Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 572, it is submitted that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are neither fully established nor do they form a complete chain excluding every hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. 8 10.Further reliance has been placed on recent decisions of this Court in Ajay Pawle @ Bankhandi @ Dhola v. State of Chhattisgarh (CRA No.6/2023, decided on 24.03.2026) and Kamlesh @ Tikam Manhare v. State of Chhattisgarh (CRA No.1777/2019, decided on 02.01.2025), to contend that in the absence of a complete chain of circumstances, conviction under Sections 302 and 201 IPC cannot be sustained. It is thus submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt and consequent acquittal. 11. Per contra, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment and submits that the medical evidence clearly establishes that the child was born alive and died due to throttling, and the surrounding circumstances sufficiently connect the appellants with the crime in question. He further submits that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence and recorded conviction, which does not call for interference. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 13. At the outset, it is to be noted that the present case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. There is no eye-witness to 9 the alleged act of delivery, murder, or disposal of the newborn child. The law relating to appreciation of circumstantial evidence is well settled. The five golden principles, constituting the panchsheel for proof in cases based on circumstantial evidence, have been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), wherein it has been observed in paragraph 153 as under: “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established : (1)the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra1 where the following observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047] Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the 1 (1973) 2 SCC 793 10 mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2)the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3)the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4)they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5)there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 14. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Sanjay vs State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 572 has held as under that:- "15. Undoubtedly, the case at hand is one based on circumstantial evidence. It is the settled law that in a case based on 11 circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must convince the Court that circumstances point towards the guilt of the accused alone and none else, as also lack of his innocence. This Court in Pritinder Singh alias Lovely v. State of Punjab, (2023) 7 SCC 727 succinctly summarized the position of law on circumstantial evidence: "17. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It has been held that the circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. It has been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should be proved". It has been held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the quilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is quilty. It has been held that the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved, and that there must be a chain of evidence so complete so as not to leave any reasonable 12 ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 18. It is a settled principle of law that, however strong a suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to consider the present case." 16. More recently, this came to be reiterated by this Court in Pradeep Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2024) 3 SCC 324, observing that in circumstantial evidence cases, all facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of the accused's guilt, excluding his innocence and also exclusion of third- party involvement. Moreover, in Pradeep Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2023) 5 SCC 350, this Court clarified that in cases where there is a heavy reliance on circumstantial evidence and on a perusal of evidence, two views are possible, the one which is favourable to the accused must be adopted. [See also: Kali Ram v. State of H.P., (1973) 2 SCC 808] 15. In the present case, the first and foremost circumstance which the prosecution was required to establish was that the 13 deceased newborn child was born to appellant- Divya Chandrakar. This foundational fact itself remains unproved. Admittedly, no DNA examination was conducted. PW-2 Dr. Hemant Chandravanshi has clearly admitted that without a DNA test, it cannot be ascertained as to who were the parents of the child. PW-9 Rajaram Sharma, the Investigating Officer, has also admitted this lapse. In a case of this nature, where the identity of the child is the linchpin of the prosecution case, failure to conduct a DNA test constitutes a serious lacuna going to the root of the matter. 16.In the matter of Chotkau v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 6 SCC 742, Hon'ble Apex Court, in para-80 has observed as under:- “80. After saying that Section 53A is not mandatory, this Court found in paragraph 54 of the said decision that the failure of the prosecution to produce DNA evidence, warranted an adverse inference to be drawn. Paragraph 54 reads as follows: (Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 12 SCC 460 SCC p.485) "54. For the prosecution to decline to produce DNA evidence would be a little unfortunate particularly when the 14 facility of DNA profiling is available in the country. The prosecution would be well advised to take advantage of this, particularly in view of the provisions of Section 53A and Section 164A CrPC. We are not going to the extent of suggesting that if there is no DNA profiling, the prosecution case cannot be proved but we are certainly of the view that where DNA profiling has not been done or it is held back from the trial court, an adverse consequence would follow for the prosecution." 17.In the case of Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130, Hon'ble Apex Court in para-44 has held as under: “44. Now, after the incorporation of Section 53 (A) in the Criminal Procedure Code, w.e.f. 23.06.2006, brought to our notice by learned counsel for the Respondent-State, it has become necessary for the prosecution to go in for DNA test in such type of cases, facilitating the prosecution to prove its case against the accused. Prior to 2006, even without the aforesaid specific provision in the Cr.P.C. the prosecution could have still resorted to this procedure of 15 getting the DNA test or analysis and matching of semen of the Appellant with that found on the undergarments of the prosecutrix to make it a fool proof case, but they did not do so, thus they must face the consequences.” 18. In the light of the aforesaid principles, it is evident that in the present case, the most crucial piece of evidence, namely DNA examination, has not been conducted by the prosecution to establish a link between the appellant- Divya and the deceased child. No plausible explanation has been offered for such omission. Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational fact of maternity and the alleged involvement of appellant- Divya in the crime in question, thereby creating a serious dent in the prosecution case. 19. This apart, the prosecution has also relied upon the evidence of PW-6 Dr. Karuna Awade and PW-8 Dr. Jyoti Kalikoti to show that appellant Divya had recently delivered a child. Even if this evidence is accepted, it only establishes that the appellant might have undergone delivery; however, it does not conclusively prove that the child found in the toilet was born to her. In the absence of scientific evidence such as DNA profiling, the possibility that the child could belong to some other person 16 cannot be ruled out, particularly when the place of occurrence is a hospital where several patients and attendants are present. 20. The second circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the recovery of the dead body from the toilet of the ward where appellant Divya was admitted. However, mere recovery from a place accessible to several persons does not, by itself, establish the involvement of the appellant. Both PW-7 Dr. H.B. Kalikoty and PW-8 Dr. Jyoti Kalikoty have admitted that the hospital is a busy place and no record is maintained regarding the entry or movement of persons. This creates a reasonable possibility of access by third persons and, consequently, weakens the prosecution case. 21. The third circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the medical evidence regarding the cause of death. Though PW-2 Dr. Hemant Chandravanshi has opined that the death of the child was due to throttling and was homicidal in nature, but he has also admitted in cross-examination that strangulation may occur naturally during delivery due to the umbilical cord and that it may be difficult to distinguish between homicidal and accidental strangulation in certain cases. This admission introduces a significant element of doubt regarding the exact 17 cause of death. In such circumstances, the medical evidence cannot be said to be conclusive. 22. Another important aspect is that the prosecution story appears improbable. It is difficult to believe that an unmarried girl could deliver a child in the toilet of a busy hospital and commit such an act without being noticed by anyone. The evidence of PW-7 Dr. H.B. Kalikoty and PW-8 Dr. Jyoti Kalikoty also creates doubt, as they did not notice that appellant Divya was carrying an advanced pregnancy of about eight months, which would ordinarily be visible. This affects the reliability of their testimony. 23. The prosecution has also relied upon the identification proceedings (Ex.P-8); however, the same are of no evidentiary value as they were conducted in the presence of police. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chunthuram v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2020) 10 SCC 733 has clearly held that identification in the presence of police is hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. and, therefore, cannot be relied upon. The relevant paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said judgment are reproduced hereunder:— “10. To establish the presence of Chunthuram at the place of incident, the courts relied on the test identification parade and the testimony of Filim Sai 18 (PW 3). The test identification evidence is not substantive piece of evidence but can only be used, in corroboration of statements in court. The ratio in Musheer Khan v. State of M.P. Musheer Khan v. State of M.P., (2010) 2 SCC 748: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1100] will have a bearing on this issue where A.K. Ganguly, J. writing for the Division Bench succinctly summarised the legal position as follows: (SCC p. 756, para 24) "24. It may be pointed out that identification test is not substantive evidence. Such tests are meant for the purpose of helping the investigating agency with an assurance that their progress with the investigation into the offence is proceeding on right lines." 11. The infirmities in the conduct of the test identification parade would next bear scrutiny. The major flaw in the exercise here was the presence of the police during the exercise. When the identifications are held in police presence, the resultant communications tantamount to statements made by the identifiers to a police officer in course of investigation and they fall within the ban of Section 162 of the Code. (See Ramkishan Bombay (Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay. (1955) 1 SCR 903: AIR 1955 SC 104: 1955 Cri LJ 196.) Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 903 : AIR 1955 SC 104 : 1955 Cri LJ 196]).” 19 24. Thus, in the present case, the identification proceedings (Ex.P-8), having been conducted in the presence of police, lose their evidentiary value and cannot be relied upon to connect the appellants with the alleged offence. 25.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar vs. State of Karnataka 2026 INSC 417 (decided on 27.04.2026) has reiterated the settled principles governing cases based on circumstantial evidence. It has been held that where a case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to establish each circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, and the chain of circumstances so proved must be complete and must unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, and they must exclude every possible hypothesis except that of guilt. It has further been emphasized that there must be no gap in the chain of evidence, and mere suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot take the place of legal proof. 26.In the matter of Vaibhav v. State of Maharashtra 2025 INSC 800, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has elaborately considered the principles governing cases resting on circumstantial evidence and reiterated that such cases require a higher degree of 20 scrutiny. It has been held that each incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable and cogent evidence, and the chain of circumstances so proved must be complete and incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused. The Court emphasized that the circumstances must be of a conclusive nature and tendency, and should exclude every possible hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. It was further observed that where any link in the chain is missing, or where the proved circumstances are compatible with any other reasonable hypothesis, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The Court also cautioned that suspicion, however strong or grave, cannot be permitted to take the place of legal proof, and conviction cannot be based on conjectures or surmises. 27.This Hon’ble High Court, in Kamlesh @ Tikam Manhare vs. State of Chhattisgarh (CRA No. 1777 of 2019, decided on 02.01.2025), has reiterated the settled principle of “panchsheel” governing appreciation of circumstantial evidence, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (Supra). 21 28.Also, this Hon’ble Court in the matter of Prasen Kumar Bhargav vs. State of Chhattisgarh in CRA No.1323 of 2022 dated 20.11.2025 has held as under:- “33. For these reasons, taking the TIP and in- court identification together, we find that the identification is not free from reasonable doubt. This Court finds it necessary to examine the legal principles governing the evidentiary value of such identification. Reliance is placed on the celebrated judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Asharfi and Ram Dhani v. State, reported in 1960 SCC OnLine All 86, wherein the Court emphatically held that the primary purpose of a TIP is only to test the memory and veracity of a witness who had no prior acquaintance with the accused, and such identification is merely corroborative in nature. The Court further observed that where the circumstances surrounding the parade disclose that the witness may have seen the accused earlier, or where the fairness of the parade is compromised, the evidentiary value of the TIP stands materially weakened. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow: "10. LEGAL EFFECT OF IDENTIFICATION MEMO. We have already seen that a test identification furnishes evidence to 22 corroborate the evidence which the witness tenders before the Court and that the identification memo is nothing more than a record of the statement which the witness has expressly or impliedly made before the person who conducted the identification, Determination of the legal effect of the memo should therefore present little difficulty. The persons who can conceivably hold identification proceedings are (a) the police, (b) ordinary citizens and (c) Magistrates. The laws applicable to these categories of persons are different, hence we proceed to deal with their cases separately. 11. In theory there is no objection to a test identification being held by the police. But in such an event the express or implied statement made by the identifier before them would be a statement which would immediately be hit by Sec. 162, Cr. P.C. whereunder it can be used only for the purpose of contradicting him under Sec. 115 of the Evidence Act and cannot at all be used for corroborating ham. Consequently a test identification held by the police nullifies the object of using the identification for corroborating the testimony given by the identifier before the Court. It is for this reason that such proceedings should never 23 be held by the police. record of the statement of the witness the identification memo can of 14. Our reasons for this view may be indicated briefly. As a course be utilised under Sec. 159 of the Evidence Act for refreshing the memory of the person who prepared it. But Sec. 157 is of greater consequence, for it provides specifically for corroborating of the testimony of the witness. It reads: "In order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such witness relating to the same fact, at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact, may be proved." 35. In the matter of Gireesan Nair Vs. State of Kerala, reported in (2023) 1 SCC 180, it has been held by the Supreme Court that TIPS, even if held, cannot be considered in all the cases as trustworthy evidence on which the conviction of an accused can be sustained, instead it is used to corroborate the evidence given by witnesses before a court of law at the time of trial. 38. Applying the above settled principles to the present case, this Court notes several infirmities in the TIP said to have been 24 conducted in respect of the appellant. The victim (PW-2) had allegedly been exposed to the accused prior to the TIP, as is apparent from the evidence of the investigating witnesses, thereby defeating the very purpose of conducting an identification parade. The prosecution has also failed to establish that sufficient precautions were adopted to ensure that the appellant was mixed with persons of similar appearance. Further, no independent witness has supported the fairness of the process, and the memorandum of the parade does not disclose adherence to mandatory safeguards.” 29. Applying the aforesaid principles to the evidence available on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances. The most crucial link, namely, the identity of the child, is missing. The other circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are also not conclusive and do not exclude every hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. The possibility of natural death or involvement of some other person cannot be ruled out. Thus, the findings recorded by the trial Court are not sustainable in law. The conviction of appellant- Divya appears to be based on conjectures and surmises rather than on legally admissible and 25 reliable evidence. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence imposed upon appellant- Divya are set aside and she is acquitted of the charges levelled against her. 30.So far as co-accused-Shyamvati is concerned, there is absolutely no cogent, reliable or independent evidence on record to establish that she had, in any manner, assisted in causing the disappearance of evidence. The prosecution has failed to prove any overt act on her part connecting her with the alleged offence. There is neither any direct evidence nor any circumstance to show her involvement in the disposal of the dead body of the newborn child. Her conviction under Section 201 IPC appears to be based merely on assumptions and conjectures, without there being any legally admissible evidence to substantiate the same. It is well settled that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. In the absence of any material linking co-accused-Shyamvati with the alleged act, her conviction cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 31. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appellants are entitled to acquittal. 26 32. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 985 of 2015 and Criminal Appeal No. 951 of 2015 are allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court are hereby set aside. The appellants, Ku. Divya Chandrakar and Shyamvati, are acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. 33.Appellants–Divya Chandrakar, and Shyambati, who are on bail, shall have their existing bail bonds discharged. However, in terms of Section 437-A Cr.P.C., both of them are directed to furnish a personal bond of ₹25,000/- each with one surety in the like amount before the trial Court concerned, which shall remain in force for a period of six months, along with an undertaking to appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court upon receipt of notice in the event of filing of a Special Leave Petition or grant of leave against this judgment. 34.Registry is directed to transmit the lower Court record along with a copy of this judgment to the concerned trial Court forthwith for information and necessary compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Vishakha 27 HEAD-NOTE Conviction based on circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained unless the complete chain of circumstances is conclusively established. Failure to prove the identity of the child and absence of conclusive evidence excluding every hypothesis of innocence renders the prosecution case doubtful. Conviction based on conjectures and surmises is unsustainable in law, entitling the accused to acquittal.