2026:HHC:36668 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 321 of 2015 Reserved on: 19.08.2026 Date of Decision: 27.08.2028 State of Himachal Pradesh ....Appellant Versus Bhuri Singh & Anr. ....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the appellant/State : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr Naresh Kaul, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 24.12.2014, passed by Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Court No. 2, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before Learned trial Court) were acquitted of the commission 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 2026:HHC:36668 of offences punishable under Sections 324 and 325 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 324 and 325 read with Section 34 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant, Ved Parkash (PW-1), went to his field on 09.05.2007. He found that a branch of a Dreak tree had fallen during the previous night, and accused Bhuri Singh was cutting it. The informant objected, and the accused retorted by saying that the tree belonged to him. The informant tried to prevent the accused from cutting the tree. However, the accused inflicted a blow with the sickle on the informant’s left hand. Accused Sheela Devi also came to the spot. She inflicted blows on the informant's back and the right arm. The accused Bhuri Singh inflicted a blow on the informant's face, and his tooth was broken. The matter was reported to the police, and an entry (Ext. PW-10/A) was recorded in the Police Station. An application was filed for the 3 2026:HHC:36668 informant’s medical examination. Dr Dilwar Singh (PW-3) examined the informant/victim and found that he had sustained multiple injuries. He referred the informant to an orthopaedic and dental surgeon for expert opinion. Dr Raman Vaid (PW-4) found that the informant’s tooth was dislocated; hence, the injury was grievous in nature. Dr Dilwar Singh (PW-3) issued the final opinion (Ext. PW-3/E) stating that the injuries were grievous, which could have been caused by means of a sickle (Ext.P-1). An entry (Ext.PW-10/B) was recorded in the police station, and an FIR (Ext. PW-8/A) was registered. ASI Sher Singh (PW-9) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the spot map (Ext.PW-9/A). The accused produced a sickle (Ext.P-1), which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW-1/C). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned trial Court. 3. The learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of offences punishable under 4 2026:HHC:36668 Sections 324 and 325 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined ten witnesses to prove its case. Ved Parkash (PW-1) is the informant. Shilpa (PW-2), Milkhi Ram (PW-5) and Subhash Chand (PW-6) are the eyewitnesses. Dr Dilwar Singh (PW-3) medically examined the informant. Dr Raman Vaid (PW-4) is the dental surgeon, who examined the informant and found that the nature of the injury was grievous. Nathu Ram (PW-7) prepared the Challan. ASI Ashok Kumar (PW-8) signed the F.I.R. ASI Sher Singh (PW-9) investigated the matter. HHC Rashpal Singh (PW-10) proved the entries. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the prosecution case. They asserted that they had never given any blow to the informant, the police had falsely implicated them, and the witnesses deposed falsely in connivance with the informant and the police. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 6. Learned trial Court held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were not reliable. Dr Raman Vaid (PW- 5 2026:HHC:36668 4) stated that the informant was suffering from periodontitis and the tooth had come out because of the disease. No corresponding injury was found on the face. There were discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses. Dr Dilwar stated that the possibility of sustaining the injuries while doing the agricultural work could not be ruled out. The relationship between the parties was strained, and the prosecution case required careful consideration. The circumstances on record made the prosecution case doubtful. Hence, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned trial Court erred in appreciating the material placed before it. The informant narrated the incident on oath in the Court. His testimony was corroborated by Shilpa (PW-2), Milkhi Ram (PW-5) and Subhash Chand (PW- 6). There was no reason to show that the witnesses had deposed falsely. Their testimonies were corroborated by the medical evidence. The learned Trial Court held that the informant and Shilpa were related to each other, but mere relationship is not sufficient to discard the prosecution case. 6 2026:HHC:36668 Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for the respondent. 9. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other on material particulars. The medical evidence also corroborated their testimonies. The learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the statements of the witnesses without any cogent reasons. Therefore, h e prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that Dr Raman Vaid (PW-4) proved that the tooth had come out because of the disease. This falsified the informant's version that the accused had caused injuries to him. The names of the prosecution witnesses were not mentioned in the earliest complaint made 7 2026:HHC:36668 to the police, and their presence on the spot is highly doubtful. The learned trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed: Scope of interference with an acquittal: 26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater. 27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the 8 2026:HHC:36668 golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words: “25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. 9 2026:HHC:36668 Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.” 28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence. 29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed: “75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.” 30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses. 31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though 10 2026:HHC:36668 the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal. 33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so. 13. The entry (Ext. PW-10/A) does not mention that any person had witnessed the incident. Therefore, the statements of Shilpa (PW-2), Milkhi Ram (PW-5) and Subhash Chand (PW-6) are required to be seen with due care and caution. 14. The informant stated that accused Bhuri Singh was cutting a Dreak tree at about 07.30 a.m., and when he objected, accused Bhuri Singh inflicted an injury by means of a sickle. Subhash Chand (PW-6), on the other hand, stated 11 2026:HHC:36668 that the wife of Bhuri Singh was cutting a Dreak tree, which led to the incident. Therefore, the statements of these two witnesses are contradictory regarding the genesis of the incident. 15. The informant Ved Parkash (PW-1) stated that the accused had pushed him and inflicted blows with fists. Sheela Devi inflicted blows by means of a stick, and thereafter Bhuri Singh inflicted a blow by means of Darat. He tried to avoid the blow, and he sustained injury on his arm. This is contrary to the earliest version wherein it was stated that the injury was caused to the thumb. Dr Dilwar Singh (PW-3) found injury No. 1 over the left hand and the base of the little finger, 3 cm long, 3 mm deep and 2 mm wide, with regular margins, which could have been caused by means of a sickle. He noticed an injury on the left forearm, but that was not stated to have been caused by means of a sickle. Therefore, the medical evidence does not corroborate the informant's version on oath. 16. The informant stated that his tooth was dislocated because of the fist blows given by the accused. Dr Raman Vaid (PW-4) examined the informant and found that the informant was suffering from periodontitis. There was no 12 2026:HHC:36668 corresponding injury, swelling or bleeding to the adjacent tissues. He admitted in his cross-examination that the informant had lost a tooth because of periodontitis. The tooth in question had caries, and the possibility of coming out of the tooth because of the caries could not be ruled out. There was no corresponding injury in the face and oral cavity. The statement of this witness shows that the tooth could have been dislocated by periodontitis and caries, and the absence of the corresponding injuries makes the informant's version doubtful that the tooth was dislocated because of the fist below inflicted by the accused. 17. Shilpa (PW-2) stated that the informant went to the spot and objected to the cutting of the tree by the accused. The accused gave two or three fist blows. Accused Sheela Devi also reached the spot and inflicted a blow by means of a stick. The accused inflicted a blow with a sickle when the informant tried to pick up the branch, and the informant sustained injuries on his hand. She stated in her cross-examination that she was studying in school. Her school was functioning on the date of the incident, but she had stayed at home. She admitted that there was a dispute between the informant and the 13 2026:HHC:36668 accused related to the land. She admitted that both the parties claimed the tree to be owned by them. 18. She has not assigned any reason as to why she should have stayed at home on the date of the incident. She is related to the informant, and her name was not mentioned in the entry in the daily diary recorded at the first instance. Therefore, the learned trial Court was justified in looking for corroboration to her testimony. 19. Milkhi Ram (PW-5) stated that accused Bhuri Singh started cutting the branch of the tree. The informant came to the spot and objected to the cutting of the branch. Both the parties had a scuffle and grappled with each other. Sheela Devi also came to the spot with two other women. They surrounded the informant. Bhuri Singh inflicted a fist blow on the informant’s face. He could not witness the incident because the woman had obstructed his view. The statement of this witness is contrary to the prosecution version, and the informant did not state that the accused and the informant had a scuffle with each other or that accused Sheela Devi came to the spot with two other women who had surrounded him. The name of this witness was also not mentioned in the entry 14 2026:HHC:36668 in the daily diary, and the learned trial Court was justified in discarding his version. 19. Subhash Chand (PW-6) has changed the genesis of the incident by saying that accused Sheela Devi was cutting the branch of the tree, which is nobody's case. 20. The learned Trial Court had rightly observed that the relationship between the parties was strained and the testimonies of the witnesses were required to be seen with due care and caution. The statements of the witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects, and the medical evidence also did not corroborate the testimonies of the witnesses. Hence, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court, and no interference is required with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 21. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 22. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents are directed to 15 2026:HHC:36668 furnish personal bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court, which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondents on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court 23. The present appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any 24. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 27th August, 2026. (Ravinder)