2026:JHHC:21487 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Criminal Appeal (S.J.) No. 1114 of 2004 Kamakhaya Narain Tiwari, son of late Gupteshwar Tiwari, resident of village Hur Madhya, Police Station Garhwa, District Garhwa …… Appellant Versus The State of Jharkhand ……Respondent ---------- For the Appellant : Mr. A.K. Kashyap, Sr. Advocate For the State : Mr. Tarun Kumar, A.P.P. ---------- PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI ----- J U D G M E N T C.A.V. on 15.10.2025 Pronounced on: 21.07.2026 1. Heard Mr. A.K. Kashyap, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Tarun Kumar, learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State. 2. The instant Criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 28.06.2004 and order of sentence dated 29.06.2004 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Garhwa in Sessions Trial No. 59 of 1987 whereby and whereunder, the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and sentenced him to undergo RI for six months and a fine of Rs 5000/- and in default of fine, further directed to undergo Simple Imprisonment for two months. 3. The case of the prosecution is based upon the written statement by the informant Parmeshwari Tiwari who, happens to be the father of the Shashi Kumari (since deceased), before the Daroga Ji on Tuesday dated 2026:JHHC:21487 2 10.08.1984 at 8.00 P.M in the presence of his brother Balmiki Tiwari and other villagers namely Ramlakhan, Harihar Tiwari, Surender Tiwari, Umesh Pandey, Mahesh Tiwari, Sumer Tiwari and Bhuneshwar Tiwari stating therein that after all hustle and trouble, on June,1979 the marriage of his daughter Shashi Kumari was solemnized with the second son of Gupteshwar Tiwari namely Kamakhaya Narain Tiwari of village - Hur and seeing off of the bride was done in a very simple manner. The father-in-law and the husband of the bride got displeased at the time of marriage from the informant for giving less dowry, on account of informant’s poverty. After 2 months of the marriage, Shashi Kumari (since deceased) who was residing at her in-laws house was called to her parental home and she told her parents that her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law always taunted her on account of less dowry given by informant/parents. Further, on December, 1979 on the occasion Vidai of the bride from the parental home, the son-in-law of the informant Kamakhaya Narain Tiwari again got displeased as special gifts were not presented due to the poor financial condition of the informant and further stated that their daughter would not return to her parental home to meet her parents unless a motorcycle was given/presented to him. From that date until her death, the informant-father, his son and his nephew repeatedly attempted to bring the Shashi Kumari (since deceased) to the parental home but her in- laws consistently refused to send her, demanding a motorcycle on multiple occasion. Since, the informant’s village is adjoining to the daughter in-law’s village, thus the informant from time to time, came to know from the villagers 2026:JHHC:21487 3 that Shashi Kumari was regularly tortured and subjected to cruelty by her in-laws due to non-fulfillment of demand. 4. Record reveals that on 21st June 1984, the informant met with son-in-law Kamakhaya Narain Tiwari in Garhwa bazaar and purchased a Releigh cycle for Rs 725/- with a hope that situation would get improved. But, on 9th July, 1984, the informant came to know from his cousin Prasen Tiwari that Shashi’s in-laws had caused her death by administering poison and thereafter, falsely claiming that she died of diarrhea. The informant after getting the news of demise of his daughter, rushed to Garhwa hospital at 2 O’clock in the night and after reaching there, he overheard that she had been subjected to assault by her in-laws on 8th July and poison has been administered, causing her death and thereafter admitted her to Garhwa hospital on account of being suffering from diarrhea where she died. The alleged motive to administer Poison to Shashi Kumari was the failure to provide a motorcycle in dowry despite repeated demands. 5. Upon the aforesaid allegation, an FIR being Garhwa P.S. Case no.- 0146/84 under section 302/34 of IPC and Section 3 the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has been registered against Gupteshwar Tiwari, Kalawati Devi, Ram Krishna Tiwari, Kamakhaya Narain Tiwari and Kamlesh Tiwari. After due investigation, charge-sheet was submitted. Charges were framed under section 302/34 of IPC against Gupteshwar Tiwari, Kalawati Devi, Ram Krishna Tiwari, Kamakhaya Narain Tiwari and Kamlesh Tiwari and charge under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was framed against Kamakhaya Narain Tiwari. Charges were read over and explained to them, where they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2026:JHHC:21487 4 6. To prove its case, the prosecution examined seven witnesses in the present case. However, no witnesses were examined on behalf of defence. The statements of accused persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded wherein the accused persons denied the allegation levelled against them. However, during the pendency of the trial Gupteshwar Tiwari and Kalawati Devi had died. 7. The trial Court after considering all the evidences on record, acquitted Ram Krishna Tiwari, Kamlesh Tiwari and Kamakhaya Narain Tiwari from the charges under section 302/34 of IPC and held Kamakhaya Narain Tiwari guilty under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and sentenced him to undergo RI for six months and a fine of Rs 5000/- and in default of fine, further directed to undergo Simple Imprisonment for two months. Being aggrieved, the appellant/convict Kamakhaya Narain Tiwari has preferred the present appeal. 8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant/convict has vehemently argued that in the present case the prosecution has miserably failed to bring on record any iota of evidence to show that there was any demand of dowry directly/indirectly at the time of marriage or prior to marriage, by the appellant/convict in the light the definition of dowry under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (prior to 1986 amendment). 9. Learned senior counsel for the appellant/convict further pointed out that the marriage was solemnized in June, 1979 and the murder of the victim was alleged to have been committed on 9th July, 1984, thus the addition of clause “or any time after marriage” in the definition of dowry under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 by way of 2026:JHHC:21487 5 the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act No. 43 of 1986) effectuated from 19.11.1986, being not retrospective and would not be applicable in the present case, as the alleged offence committed prior to the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986, as such, offence for demanding dowry under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has not been made out and the appellant/convict is liable to be acquitted. 10. Per Contra, learned A.P.P for the state has submitted that the Amendment Act, 1986 is retrospective in operation and is applicable to the facts of the present case. He further submitted that from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, it is evident that demand of dowry as alleged has been made by the appellant/convict and the trial court has correctly appreciated the evidences on record based upon the circumstances and facts of the present case and no interference is required in the judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 12. It is appropriate to mention herein that the appellant/convict namely Kamakhaya Narain Tiwari has been acquitted under section 302/34 of IPC and convicted under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.Therefore, this court while deciding the present appeal is primarily concerned with the evidentiary material qua the demand of dowry. 13. Before coming to the facts of the case, it is apposite for this court to determine whether the addition of subsequent clause “or any time after marriage” in the definition of dowry under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition 2026:JHHC:21487 6 Act, 1961 by way of the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act No. 43 of 1986) effectuated from 19.11.1986, is ex post facto law, or in other words is it retrospective in operation? 14. For answering the above issue, it is required to refer herein the Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,1961 (prior 1986 amendment) and for the ready reference Section 2 of the Act is quoted hereunder – 2. Definition of “dowry”.—In this Act, “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly— (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. Explanation I.—[* * *] Explanation II.—The expression “valuable security” has the same meaning as in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). It transpires from plain reading of the above provision that "Dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before the marriage as consideration for the marriage, excluding dower/Mahr under Muslim personal law. The clause “or any time after marriage” in the definition of dowry was added/inserted by way of the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act No. 43 of 1986) effectuated from 19.11.1986 under Section 2 of the Act, 1961. 15. Coming to the ex post facto law, Article 20(1) of the Constitution of Indian provides that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the Act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a punishment greater than that 2026:JHHC:21487 7 which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. 16. Art. 20(1) of the Constitution of India sets two limitations upon the law-making power of every sovereign legislative authority, i.e. retrospective criminal legislation (i.e. ex post facto law) and forbids making ex post facto criminal law. In other words, making an act crime for the first time and then making that law retrospective and the infliction of a greater punishment which could have been inflicted under the law when it was in force at the time of commission of the act/offence. What is prohibited is not only the enactment of such legislation/statute with retrospective operation but also against conviction under such law. 17. Art. 20(1) of the Constitution of India is to prohibit conviction and sentence under ex post facto laws. This provision creates no inhibition in respect of procedure to be followed in connection with the trial. No person as an accused to be tried in accordance with particular procedure by introducing Amendment, even subsequent to the date of occurrence or when the offence was committed. In other words, the provisions of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution of India do not limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedures. Normally, a law has to be prospective and not retrospective except in special circumstances. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Ratan Lal v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1965 SC 444 has observed that the any law would have retrospective operation, if, the particular statute makes provision to that effect. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the judgment is quoted hereunder - “6. Every law that takes away or impairs a vested right is retrospective. However ex post facto law is necessarily 2026:JHHC:21487 8 retrospective. Under Art. 20(1) of the Constitution, no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of that act. But an ex post facto law which only mollifies the rigour of a criminal law does not fall within the said prohibition under Art. 20 of the Constitution. If a particular law makes provision to that effect, though retrospective in operation, it will be valid. The question whether such a law is retrospective and, if so, to what extent depends upon the interpretation of a particular statute, having regard to the well settled rules of construction.” 19. Considering the above legal proposition and discussion made in the preceding paragraphs, this court is of considered view that the alleged demand of dowry has taken place in the year 1984, prior to the amendment in definition of dowry under Section 2 of the Act, 1961 by way of Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act No. 43 of 1986). Therefore, amendment made in Section 2 of the Act, 1961 by way of Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act No. 43 of 1986), not being retrospective, is not applicable to the facts of the present case and thus, the word “dowry” under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has to be looked into in the light of definition of dowry as enumerated under Section 2 of the Act, 1961 (prior to the Amendment Act, 1986). Thus, the factum of demand of dowry has to be considered in the light of “at the time or before the marriage”, which is punitive in nature under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 20. Now, coming to the case in hand, it would be appropriate for this court to discuss the evidence of witnesses essentially related to the aspect of dowry demand in the light of Section 2 of the Act, 1961 i.e. dowry demanded “at or before” the time of marriage. 21. P.W.-1 Nityanand Dubey is the Formal witness who proved Formal FIR (Ext.-1). P.W.-3 Parmeshwari Tiwari is the 2026:JHHC:21487 9 informant, who happens to be the father of the deceased victim. During his cross examination at Para-5, he has stated that he did not take the receipt of the Cycle from the shopkeeper which he purchased for his son-in-law as he left the shop after making the payment. His younger brother was with him. In Para 6 of his cross-examination, he has stated that there was consistently demand of motor cycle by son-in- law after the marriage. 22. P.W.-4 Sumer Tiwari was declared hostile and P.W.- 5 Balmiki Tiwari who happens to be the brother of the Informant has spoken nothing about the demand of dowry. 23. P.W.-6 Birendra Tiwari who happens to be the brother of deceased victim and the son of the informant. In his evidence, he stated that when he went to meet his sister Shashi Kumari at her in-laws house after her marriage, she told him that her in-laws were consistently kept saying that if motorcycle was not given from her parental side, she would be killed. 24. P.W.-7 Sakuntala Devi is the mother of deceased and Wife of the informant. She has stated in her evidence that after the solemnization of marriage, there was demand of motor cycle from her daughter in-laws’ side and it was told that if motorcycle be not given then her daughter would be killed. At Para 3 of her cross-examination, she has stated that Kamakhaya Narain told that if motorcycle would not be given, her daughter is not allowed to visit her parental home, as nothing had been given at the time of marriage. 25. In the light of evidence of the prosecution witnesses as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it transpires that P.W.-3 Parmeshwari Tiwari (Informant) has spoken about the demand made after the marriage. P.W.-6 Birendra Tiwari and 2026:JHHC:21487 10 P.W.-7 Sakuntala Devi in their respective evidences also stated about the demand of motorcycle after the marriage. However, nothing has been uttered by both the witnesses about the demand of dowry “at or before” the time of marriage. 26. Considering the discussion alluded herein above, this court is of considered view that nothing has been brought on record by the prosecution which even slightly indicates this court to believe the factum of dowry demand at or before the time of marriage from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, as nothing has been uttered by the witnesses in this regard. Therefore, the prosecution failed to establish the charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, against the appellant/convict. 27. Consequently, the appellant/convict is exonerated from the charge and is hereby acquitted. The impugned judgment of conviction dated 28.06.2004 and order of sentence dated 29.06.2004 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Garhwa in Sessions Trial No. 59 of 1987, is hereby set aside. 28. Resultantly, the instant appeal being Criminal Appeal (S.J.) No. 1114 of 2004 is hereby allowed. 29. Since, the appellant/convict is on bail, he is discharged from the liability of bail bonds. 30. Let trial court record be sent back to the court concerned. (Arun Kumar Rai, J.) Jharkhand High Court, at Ranchi Dated : 21 .07.2026 R.K/Rajnish /- A.F.R.