Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Rajasthan · body

2026 DAILYLAW 20753 (RAJ)

UNION OF INDIA v. M/S VIJAY ELECTRICAL

CMA/207/2025 · 2026-01-20

Sangeeta Sharma, Sanjeev Prakash Sharma

Transfer Petitionbody2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

[2026:RJ-JP:2328-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 207/2025 1. Union of India, Through Secretary, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, Department of Telecommunication Limited, New Delhi. 2. Chief General Manager (TP), Department of Telecommunication, New Delhi. 3. General Manager, Telecommunication Nigam Limited, New Delhi. 4. Deputy General Manager, Office-Telecom Project Amenity Block, PG MTD Compound, Opposite GPO, MI Road, Jaipur. ----Appellants/non-Claimants Versus M/s Vijay Electrical, (A Registered Partnership Firm Under The Indian Partnership Act 1932) Through Its Partner Shri Pankaj Kumar Son Of Shri Bagatlal Siyal, R/o Vallabh Nagar, Dist. Udaipur, Hall-26, Siyal Sadan, Adarsh Nagar, Gayariawas Road, Near Abhinav School, Udaipur-313001. ----Respondent/Claimant For Appellant(s) : Mr. Tej Prakash Sharma For Respondent(s) : Mr. O.P. Mishra HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SANGEETA SHARMA Order 20/01/2026 1. This appeal has been filed under Section 13 of Commercial Courts Act, 2015 against the arbitral award passed by the Commercial Court, Ajmer dated 23.04.2024 whereby the objections raised under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred as the Act) by the appellant(s) Union of India were rejected. [2026:RJ-JP:2328-DB] (2 of 7) [CMA-207/2025] 2. Learned counsel submits that the award passed by the arbitrator in arbitral proceedings No.56/2013 was orally pronounced on 14.11.2017, but the final award was passed on 15.06.2020 and thus for the period of three years during which the award was not delivered, the appellant(s) cannot be held liable to pay the interest. 3. Learned counsel further submits that the claimant had raised his claim beyond the limitation period. The contract rescinded on 25.01.2010, whereas the application for appointing the arbitrator was moved under Section 11 of the Act in the year 2013 and the same was beyond the period of limitation. 4. Learned counsel, however, submits that the award passed was, therefore, patently illegal. Learned counsel, further, submits that neither the interest on the earnest money was payable nor the interest could be imposed on the performance security deposited and the arbitrator had committed patent illegality in awarding interest. 5. The learned counsel further submits that the amount spent in Boarding and Lodging Inter City Traveling and Conveyance of Rs.20,000/- was also unjustified. 6. We find that the learned arbitrator had pronounced the award on 14.11.2017 on the question of limitation. The learned Commercial Court has examined the case and it is noticed that after the rescinding of the contract on 25.01.2010 the non- claimants were served with the notice on 14.05.2012 and another notice by registered post was sent on 17.05.2012 which remains unanswered, thus the claim was raised within the period of limitation, thereafter, the application was moved for appointing of [2026:RJ-JP:2328-DB] (3 of 7) [CMA-207/2025] the Arbitrator, in terms of Section 11 of the Act. Section 11 of the Act comes into force where the parties do not consent to appoint an Arbitrator. Thus the date on which an application for appointment of Arbitrator is moved would not be the date to be counted for the purpose of counting limitation. Thus the claim cannot be said to be time barred. 7. We further notice that on the date when the award was pronounced by the learned Arbitrator i.e. 14.11.2017, the parties did not deposit the fees of the learned Arbitrator. Section 39(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 reads as under:- “Lien on arbitral award and deposits as to costs.—(1) Subject to the provisions of sub- section (2) and to any provision to the contrary in the arbitration agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall have a lien on the arbitral award for any unpaid costs of the arbitration.” 8. In view of above, the learned Arbitrator had power of lien on the award and the award was not required to be signed till the fees was deposited by the parties. Apparently the fees has been deposited only in the year June, 2020 and immediately thereafter the award was signed on 15.06.2020 and was made available to the parties on 23.10.2020. 9. In view of above facts, it cannot be said that there was any patent illegality committed by the concerned learned Arbitrator. Even otherwise, the scope of Section 34 as well as Section 37 of the Act, is limited. It would be apposite to quote provisions of Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act for ready reference:- “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application [2026:RJ-JP:2328-DB] (4 of 7) [CMA-207/2025] for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if— (a) the party making the application [establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that]— (i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the Court finds that— (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. [Explanation 1.—For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,— [2026:RJ-JP:2328-DB] (5 of 7) [CMA-207/2025] (i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or (ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or (iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. Explanation 2.—For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.] [(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award: Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.] (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. [2026:RJ-JP:2328-DB] (6 of 7) [CMA-207/2025] [(5) An application under this section shall be filed by a party only after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing compliance with the said requirement. (6) An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other party.] 37. Appealable orders.—(1) [Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal] shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely:— [(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8; (b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9; (c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34.] (2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal— (a) accepting the plea referred in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or takeaway any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.” 10. We also notice that the learned Commercial Court has also taken note of the fact that apart from the aforesaid arguments, there is no other objections raised in terms of the various objections which can be raised under Section 34 of the Act by the non-claimants/appellants. [2026:RJ-JP:2328-DB] (7 of 7) [CMA-207/2025] 11. In view thereof, the rejections of the objections under Section 34 of the Act by the learned Commercial Court can neither be said to be unjustified nor can be said that this Court is required to entertain the present appeal in terms of Section 37 of the Act. 12. We also notice that the award passed in the year 2020 is for a petty sum of Rs.1,24,393/- which has not been released even till date, by the Department. We, therefore, impose a cost of another Rs.20,000/- on the appellant(s) to be deposited with Child Welfare Secretariat. 13. Accordingly, the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. 14. All pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (SANGEETA SHARMA),J (SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),ACTING CJ KAVISH /3