2026:HHC:35918 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 338 of 2014 Reserved on: 17.08.2026 Date of Decision: 24.08.2026 Suresh Kumar ....Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the petitioner : Ms Sheetal Vyas, Advocate. For the Respondent/ State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 19.07.2014, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Una, Camp at Amb, District Una, H.P. 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes 2 2026:HHC:35918 (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 15.01.2010, and order of sentence dated 21.01.2010, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No.1, Amb, District Una, H.P. (learned trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that the informant, Anant Ram (since deceased), was standing outside his shop located at Panjoa Bazar on 22.01.2006 at about 1:00 p.m. A motorcycle being driven by Banti, son of Tilak Raj, came at a high speed and hit the informant on the right side of the road. The informant fell and sustained injuries to his head, arms and legs. The motorcyclist went away from the spot. Naresh Kumar (PW-1) and Ashwani Kumar (PW-12) carried the injured to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police, 3 2026:HHC:35918 and the police recorded an entry (Ext.PW-9/A). ASI Karanjeet Singh (PW-14) went to the hospital for verification. He filed an application (Ext.PW-14/C) for obtaining the opinion of the Medical Officer regarding the fitness of the informant to make a statement and obtaining the MLC. Dr R.K. Garg (PW-4) certified that the informant was fit to make the statement and issued the MLC (Ext.PW-4/A), stating that the informant had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused in a roadside accident. ASI Karanjeet Singh (PW-14) visited the spot and prepared the site plan, recorded the informant’s statement (Ext. PW-14/A) and sent it to the Police Station where an FIR (Ext.PW-10/A) was registered. ASI Karanjeet Singh (PW-14) visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-14/B). The informant Anant Ram succumbed to his injuries. ASI Karanjeet Singh conducted the inquest on the dead body and prepared the report (Ext.PW-1/B). He filed an application (Ext.PW-14/D) for conducting the post-mortem examination of Anant Ram. Dr Pancham (PW-5) conducted the post-mortem examination and found that the death was caused by the ante-mortem injuries sustained by Anant Ram, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He 4 2026:HHC:35918 issued the report (Ext.PW-5/A). ASI Karanjeet Singh (PW-14) seized the motorcycle along with the documents vide memo (Ext.PW-1/A). ASI Davinder Singh (PW-11) examined the motorcycle and found that there was no mechanical defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued a report (Ext. PW-11/A). Sunil Kumar (PW-6) took the photographs of the spot (Ext.PW-6/A and Ext.PW-6/B), whose negatives are Ext.PW-6/C and Ext.PW-6/D. HC Sashi Kant (PW-7) took the photographs of the dead body (Ext.PW-7/A and Ext.PW-7/B), whose negatives are Ext.PW-7/C and Ext.PW-7/D. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned trial Court. 3. The learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279 and 304-A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses to prove its case. Naresh Kumar (PW-1) is an eyewitness. Rukam Deen 5 2026:HHC:35918 (PW-2), Pritam Chand (PW-3), Ashwani Kumar (PW-12) and Tarsem Lal (PW-13) did not support the prosecution case. Dr R.K. Garg (PW-4) conducted the medical examination of the informant. Dr Pancham (PW-5) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased. Sunil Kumar (PW-6) and HC Shashi Kant (PW-7) took the photographs. SI Om Parkash (PW-8) prepared the Challan. HC Pawan Kumar (PW-9) proved the entry in the daily diary. HC Surjeet Singh (PW-10) signed the F.I.R. ASI Davinder Singh (PW-11) mechanically examined the motorcycle. ASI Karanjeet Singh (PW-14) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that the informant Anant Ram was running a shop at Panjoa market. He denied the rest of the prosecution case. He claimed that a false case was made against him and the witnesses are related to the informant Anant Ram. He claimed that he was innocent. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6 2026:HHC:35918 6. The learned trial Court held that the testimony of Naresh Kumar proved that the accused was driving the motorcycle on the wrong side. The motorcycle hit the informant, who fell and sustained injuries. The statement made by the informant mentioned the name of the accused as driver of the motorcycle, which would be admissible as a dying declaration. It was suggested to the witnesses that the accident had occurred with a scooter; however, there was no proof of this fact. Hence, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under:- Section Sentence 279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of ₹1000/- and, in default of payment of fine amount, to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 304-A The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹5000/- and, in default of payment of the fine amount, to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court. The accused filed an appeal, which 7 2026:HHC:35918 was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Una Camp at Amb, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court that the accused was driving the motorcycle on the wrong side of the road. There was nothing in his cross-examination to show that he had any motive to depose falsely against the accused. His testimony was corroborated by the informant’s statement recorded by the police, which would be admissible as a dying declaration. The learned trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence and no interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the deceased was an 88-year-old man, who was roaming on the road. The deceased was supposed to take reasonable care. The prosecution had failed to prove the negligence of the accused. The statements of witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. Learned Trial Court erred in not extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the 8 2026:HHC:35918 present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate for the respondent/State. 10. Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. There is no evidence that the accused was driving the motorcycle at the time of the accident. The plea taken by the accused that the accident had occurred with a scooter was highly improbable, and learned Courts below erred in rejecting this plea. There is no evidence of the medical fitness of the informant, and learned Courts below erred in relying upon his statement as a dying declaration. Therefore, she prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned courts below be set aside. She relied upon the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Laxman vs State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 and Nallapati Sivaish vs. Sub Divisional Officer, Guntur, A.P. AIR 2008 SC 19 in support of her submission. 9 2026:HHC:35918 11. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Courts below have consistently held that the accused was driving the motorcycle at the time of the accident towards the wrong side of the road. This is a pure finding of fact, and this Court should not interfere with the pure finding of fact while deciding the revision petition. Driving the motorcycle towards the wrong side of the road violated the Rules of the Road Regulations, and this was the proximate cause of the accident. Learned Courts below had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not reappreciate the evidence in the revision petition. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the 10 2026:HHC:35918 findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub- section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any 11 2026:HHC:35918 interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in- depth roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and 12 2026:HHC:35918 the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the 13 2026:HHC:35918 aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well- established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is 14 2026:HHC:35918 passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 14. ASI Karanjeet Singh (PW-14) stated that he had filed an application (Ext.PW-14/C) for obtaining the opinion of the Medical Officer regarding the informant's fitness to make the statement. This application contains an endorsement by the Medical Officer: ‘fit for the statement’. The Investigating Officer was not cross-examined regarding the taking of the opinion regarding complainant’s fitness, and 15 2026:HHC:35918 the certificate issued by the Medical Officer has to be accepted as correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxman (supra) that where the doctor had certified that the declarant was conscious, his certificate could not be rejected on the ground that fitness of the declarant’s mind was not proved. In the present case, the doctor had specifically stated that the informant was fit to make the statement, and this judgment does not assist the petitioner. 15. In Nallapati Sivaiah (supra), there were two dying declarations, and it was held that the examination of the doctor was essential. In the present case, the doctor was examined as PW-4, and the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. 16. Statement (Ext.PW-14/A) mentioned that the motorcycle was being driven by Banti son of Tilak Raj Soni, resident of Panjoa. The accused mentioned his name, Suresh Kumar @ Banti son of Tilak Raj, in the notice of accusation as well as in the statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. Thus, the informant’s statement clearly identified the driver of the motorcycle as Banti. 16 2026:HHC:35918 17. Naresh Kumar (PW-1) stated that the informant was standing outside his shop on 22.01.2006 at about 12.30 p.m. A motorcycle being driven by Suresh Kumar alias Banti, present in the Court, without a registration number, came and hit the informant. The motorcycle was being driven on the wrong side of the road. He could not mention the speed of the motorcycle. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied in his cross-examination that the accused was a resident of his village. He admitted that the accused was a resident of Village Ladoli, whereas he is a resident of Village Panjoa Kalan. The accident had occurred in his presence and in the presence of Ashwani Kumar. The accident had occurred on the metalled portion of the road, and the informant fell on the heap of stones. The motorcycle had not fallen after the accident. He denied that the motorcycle had not hit the informant. 18. The statement of this witness that the accident had occurred on the wrong side of the road is duly corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW-14/B) wherein the accident is shown to have occurred on the right side of the road for a vehicle coming from Neharia. 17 2026:HHC:35918 19. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 20. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were bloodstain 18 2026:HHC:35918 marks and a V-shaped slipper of the deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map, Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road. 21. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj, 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured and by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not take a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 22. In Shakila Khader v. Nausheer Cama, (1975) 4 SCC 122: 1975 SCC (Cri) 379: 1975 SCC OnLine SC 103, the car went to the right side of the road, hit the parapet and turned turtle. It 19 2026:HHC:35918 was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the driver was negligent. It was observed at page 126: “6. The facts in the case speak eloquently about what should have happened. The main criterion for deciding whether the driving that led to the accident was rash and negligent is not only the speed but also the width of the road, the density of the traffic, and the attempt, as in this case, to overtake the other vehicles, resulting in going to the wrong side of the road and being responsible for the accident. Even if the accident took place in the twinkling of an eye, it is not difficult for the eyewitness to notice a car overtaking other vehicles and going to the wrong side of the road and hitting a vehicle travelling on that side of the road. The criterion adopted by the learned Judge for assessing the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 and rejecting them is thoroughly unjustifiable. There may be cases where it is difficult to be clear or specific in giving details as to the cause of the accident, but this is not one such case. The reference by the learned Judge about the slight damage to the electric post and the conclusion drawn therefrom that the car could not have been going at a high speed is not correct, as we shall show later. His further observation that the fact that the car travelled another 45 feet and hit against the parapet wall and turned turtle showed that the car must have been travelling at an extremely high speed but there is a little blue paint on the pole and a faint gray stain on the parapet wall is self-contradictory unless we are to infer that the learned Judge implied that the one or the other is not true. He does not so hold. There can be no doubt about the car having hit the electric post and the parapet wall. That and the fact of its overturning would establish the rash and negligent driving. A car driven normally and travelling behind a bus does not go to the opposite side of the road, hit an electric post and parapet wall, and turn turtle. The car apparently stopped only because it 20 2026:HHC:35918 turned turtle. It did not hit the electric post or the parapet wall full tilt; if it did, it would have stopped at one of those points. We should remember that the collision with the scooter and pushing it back would have considerably reduced the speed of the car. Even so, it travelled farther. The slight damage to the electric post and the parapet wall is because the car hit them sideways. Nobody has suggested that they were brought into existence for this case. The car would probably not have stopped but for turning turtle, and it should have been travelling quite fast before it could overturn, as the learned Judge himself realises. There is only one conclusion possible on the facts of this case, and that is that the accused came over to the wrong side of the road and was responsible for the accident, and that is clearly a rash and negligent act in the condition of the road and the condition of the traffic.” 23. The accused breached the Rules of the Road Regulations, which was the proximate cause of the accident. Hence, the prosecution's version that the accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused has to be accepted as correct. 24. Ashwani Kumar (PW-12) stated that he did not know as to what had happened and whose negligence led to the accident. No accident had occurred in his presence. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that the accused was driving the motorcycle and hit the informant on the wrong side of the road. He denied that he and Naresh had 21 2026:HHC:35918 carried the injured to the hospital. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. 25. ASI Karanjeet Singh (PW-14) specifically stated that he had recorded the statement of Ashwani Kumar (PW- 12) (Ext.PW-14/A) as per his version. This was not challenged in the cross-examination and is to be accepted as correct. It was mentioned by Ashwani Kumar in the previous statement that the accident had occurred in his presence and the motorcycle had hit the informant on the right side of the road. Therefore, this witness is shown to have made two statements: one before the Court that the accident had not occurred in his presence and the other before the Police that the accident had occurred in his presence and the informant was standing on the right side of the road for a vehicle coming from Nehriya. Both these statements cannot stand together, and his credit has been impeached under Section 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous statement, his statement cannot be relied upon. However, when he is confronted with some portions of 22 2026:HHC:35918 the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed: “52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.” 26. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman versus State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed: “12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross- examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support for the view we have taken from the various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400, the Apex Court observed: 23 2026:HHC:35918 "It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit this witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony. 27. Thus, the testimony of this witness cannot be used to discard the prosecution version. 28. Dr R. K. Garg (PW-4) examined the informant and found that he had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused in an accident. He was not cross-examined at all, which means that his testimony has not been disputed by the accused. 29. Dr Pancham (PW-5) conducted the post-mortem examination of the informant and stated that the cause of death was ante-mortem injuries sustained by the informant that could have been caused in a roadside accident. He was also not cross-examined, and his testimony was also accepted by the accused. Thus, it is duly proved that the informant had died in the motor vehicle accident caused by the negligence of the accused. 24 2026:HHC:35918 30. It was submitted that the MLC (Ext.PW-4/A) shows that the wound was dressed and this would make the prosecution case doubtful. The submission cannot be accepted. No question was asked from any person whether any first aid was provided to the deceased at the spot or not. The informant was running a shop of Vaid, and the dressing of his wounds will not make the prosecution case suspect. 31. It was submitted that the learned trial Court erred in not extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused and such a benefit should have been extended to him. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving, and a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to him. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents 25 2026:HHC:35918 than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus: "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences for the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death 26 2026:HHC:35918 ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 32. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 33. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all 27 2026:HHC:35918 they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 34. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused, and a deterrent view was to be taken. 35. The learned trial Court sentenced the accused to rigorous imprisonment for one month and pay a fine of ₹1,000/-for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC and rigorous imprisonment for three months and pay a fine of ₹5,000/- for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of IPC which is not excessive considering that a precious life was lost in the accident. Hence, no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court. 36. No other point was urged. 28 2026:HHC:35918 37. In view of the above, the present revision fails and is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 38. The record of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 24th August, 2026. (Ravinder)