[2026:RJ-JP:4142] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19810/2025 Modern Emergency Services JV Pvt. Limited, Having Its Registered Office At 407, 4Th Floor, Jaipur Center, B2 By Pass Junction, Tonk Road Jaipur Through Authorized Representative Shri Shrikant Taneja, S/o Sudhir Kumar Taneja, Aged About 34 Years, R/o 312 Surya City, Bharatpur, Rajasthan ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Additional Chief Secretary, Department Of Medical Health And Family Welfare Government Secretariat, Jaipur. 2. Mission Director, National Health Mission, Rajasthan, Swasthya Bhawan, C-Scheme, Jaipur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Madav Mitra, Sr. Adv. assisted by Mr. Sanjay Sharma, Mr. Vibhuti Bhushan Sharma, Ms. Jaya Mitra & Mr. Sharukh Khan Mr. Vibhuti Bhushan Sharma Mr. Harshit Tiwari For Respondent(s) : Mr. Archit Bohra, AGC with Mr. Rahul Verma & Mr. Prakhar Jain HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA Order 29/01/2026 1. The present writ petition has been filed with the following prayers - "It is therefore, humbly prayed before Your Lordships that your Lordships after going through the entire record of the case may very graciously allow the instant Writ Petition and further: (i) By appropriate writ, order or direction, Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 10.12.2025 (Annexure-1) passed by Respondent No. 2 herein; and (ii) By appropriate writ, order or direction, Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to direct the Respondents to give extension of the contract/agreement dated 11.12.2020 in favour of the petitioner for a further period of six months; and (iii) By appropriate writ, order or direction, Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to strike down Condition No. 6.4(35) contained in the Request for Proposal dated 26.11.2025 (Annexure-18); and (iv) By an appropriate writ, order or direction, Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to direct the Respondents to reimburse the cost of newly procured 350 vehicles/ambulances [2026:RJ-JP:4142] (2 of 9) [CW-19810/2025] strictly in accordance with the letter dated 11.07.2023 (Annexure-16) and/or (v) Any other order or direction as Your Lordships deem just, appropriate and equitable in the facts and circumstances of the case may also kindly be passed in favor of the petitioner." 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the petitioner is a Joint-Venture Company comprising of M/s Gunesh India Private Limited, M/s Sammaan Foundation and M/s Golden Path Lab Private Limited. All the aforementioned three companies are duly incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and decided to form a Joint Venture by executing a Joint Venture Agreement on 01.09.2020. The respondent issued a Request for Proposal ('RFP') on 07.07.2020 for the operation and management of 104 Janani Express in the State of Rajasthan as per the terms and conditions contained therein and the petitioner participated and succeeded in obtaining a Letter of Intent ('LOI') on 17.11.2020. 3. Pursuant to the LOI dated 17.11.2020, the petitioner signed a service agreement dated 11.12.2020. The duration of the service agreement was initially from 10.12.2020 to 10.12.2023, which was extended vide order dated 24.08.2023 for a further period of two years up to 10.12.2025, which came to an end on 10.12.2025. 4. From the averments of the writ petition, it is borne out that in the present writ petition, the petitioner is assailing: the legality and validity of the order dated 10.12.2025 passed by respondent No.2, wherein respondent No.2 rejected the petitioner's request to extend the period of the service agreement dated 11.12.2020 for a further period of six months; reimburse the cost of newly procured 350 vehicles/ambulances; as well as Clause 6.4(35) of [2026:RJ-JP:4142] (3 of 9) [CW-19810/2025] the subsequent RFP No. F-23 (178)/NHM/IAP/104JE/2025-26/627 dated 26.11.2025. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the action of the respondents is wholly arbitrary, perverse, and deserves to be set aside, being contrary to the terms and conditions of the service agreement dated 11.12.2020. He further submits that the petitioner has been duly performing their obligations under the service agreement dated 11.12.2020, and the same was due to expire on 10.12.2023 initially and the cost of the newly purchased/deployed vehicles could not be paid back to the petitioner by the respondents by 10.12.2023, the respondent No.2 acknowledged the same vide letter dated 11.07.2023 and formulated a mechanism to pay back the cost of the newly procured vehicles. Thereafter, the service agreement was extended upto 10.12.2025, and when the extension period was about to end, the petitioner vide letter dated 25.11.2025 requested the respondents for extension of the service agreement dated 11.12.2020 for a further period of six months since the respondent No.2 had neither taken over the vehicles and assets in accordance with the 'Exit Clause' stipulated under Clause 10.4(d) of the RFP dated 07.07.2020 nor paid the cost of the vehicles to the petitioner in accordance with the letter dated 11.07.2023, and in an arbitrary manner the respondents declined the prayers qua extension of the service agreement and reimbursement of the cost of newly procured vehicles/ambulances, even before deciding the petitioner's representation vide letter dated 25.11.2025, and issued a fresh RFP on 26.11.2025. He further submits that the fresh RFP dated 26.11.2025 incorporated a new clause i.e. Clause [2026:RJ-JP:4142] (4 of 9) [CW-19810/2025] 6.4(35), as per which the outstanding bank loan for the vehicles/ambulances deployed on turnkey basis by the old service provider, will be payable by the new service provider, which is contrary to both, the letter dated 11.07.2023 and the RFP dated 07.07.2020; he therefore prays that the impugned order may kindly be set aside and the present writ petition may kindly be allowed. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State, while supporting the action of the respondents, raises preliminary objection about the maintainability of the writ petition in the light of Clause 10.6 of the RFP dated 07.07.2020, which provides an alternate and efficacious remedy to the petitioners, since prayers No.(i), (ii) and (iv) can very well be determined by the mechanism provided under Clause No.10.6 of the RFP. 7. He further submits that, as far as the prayer No.(iii) is concerned, since the erstwhile clause 6.4(35) contained in the subsequent RFP stood amended vide corrigendum dated 23.12.2025, and the amended provision has never been challenged by the petitioner, therefore prayer No.(iii) also cannot be accepted. 8. Heard and considered the submissions made at bar and perused the material available on record. 9. It is an undisputed fact that in terms of the RFP dated 07.07.2020, the petitioners were issued an LOI dated 17.11.2020 and a service agreement was executed on 11.12.2020 between the parties consciously, wherein the parties mutually accepted their covenants in accordance with the terms and conditions encapsulated in the RFP dated 07.07.2020. It is also not disputed [2026:RJ-JP:4142] (5 of 9) [CW-19810/2025] that the service agreement dated 11.12.2020 had initially expired on 10.12.2023, and was extended vide order dated 24.08.2023 for a further period of two years up to 10.12.2025. 10. From a bare perusal of the prayer clause of the writ petition and the RFP dated 07.07.2020, it is evident that the petitioner vide prayer No.(i), (ii) & (iv) qua quashment of the order dated 10.12.2025, extension of the service agreement and reimbursement of the cost of newly procured vehicles/ambulances, respectively, is seeking redressal of a dispute, squarely falling within the ambit of the word 'dispute' between the parties arising in connection with or arising out of the agreement. It is apt to reproduce Clause 10.6 of the RFP dated 07.07.2020 as under: "10.6 Settlement of Disputes 10.6.1 Settlement of Disputes: If any dispute with regard to the interpretation, difference or objection whatsoever arises in connection with or arises out of the agreement, or the meaning of any part thereof, or on the rights, duties or liabilities of any party, the same shall be referred for decision to the committee constituted as below:- 1. Principal Secretary Medical and Health, GoR. 2. Representative of Secretary Finance, GoR. 3. Representative of Secretary Law, GoR. 4. Representative of Secretary IT, GoR. If either of the party is not satisfied with the decision of above committee it may refer the matter for arbitration as per clause 10.6 10.6.2 Arbitration: If dispute or difference of any kind arises between the NHM and the Service Provider in connection with or relating to the agreement, the parties shall make every effort to resolve the same amicably by mutual consultations. If the parties fail to resolve their dispute or difference by such mutual consultations and even after the decision of Dispute Settlement Committee decision then either party may give notice, within thirty days of decision of Dispute Settlement Committee, to the other party of its intention to commence arbitration, as hereinafter provided. The applicable arbitration procedure will be as per the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 of India. In that event, the dispute or difference shall be referred to the sole arbitration of an officer as the arbitrator to be appointed by the NHM. If the arbitrator to whom the matter is initially referred is transferred or vacates his office or is unable to act for any reason, [2026:RJ-JP:4142] (6 of 9) [CW-19810/2025] he/she shall be replaced by another person appointed by NHM to act as Arbitrator. Work under the agreement shall, notwithstanding the existence of any such dispute or difference, continue during arbitration proceedings and no payment due or payable shall be withheld on account of such proceedings unless such payments are the direct subject matter of the arbitration. Reference to arbitration shall be a condition precedent to any other action a law. Venue of Arbitration: The venue of arbitration shall be Jaipur, Rajasthan." 11. Thus, a bare look to Clause 10.6 above reveals that in case of a dispute between the parties arising in connection with or arising out of the agreement, the same will have to be referred to a committee constituted under Clause 10.6.1, and if either party is not satisfied by the decision of such committee, the said dispute/ decision of the committee can further be referred to arbitration in terms of Clause 10.6.2. Therefore, when the parties to a commercial contract have mutually agreed to a particular mechanism of redressal, this Court ordinarily should not exercise the powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India to obviate such arrangement made between the parties. 12. That time and again, the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated that in contractual matters where an alternate mechanism of redressal is provided for and accepted by the parties to the contract, Courts ought not to entertain such dispute under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. The above position of law is fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd.1, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: "21. There is yet another substantial reason for not entertaining the writ petition. The contract in question contains a clause providing inter alia for settlement of disputes by reference to arbitration [Clause 67 of the Contract]. The Arbitrators can decide 1 (1996) 6 SCC 22 [2026:RJ-JP:4142] (7 of 9) [CW-19810/2025] both questions of fact as well as questions of law. When the contract itself provides for a mode of settlement of disputes arising from the contract, there is no reason why the parties should not follow and adopt that remedy and invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. T he existence of an effective alternative remedy - in this case, provided in the contract itself - is a good ground for the court to decline to exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. The said Article wa s not meant to supplant the existing remedies at law but only to supplement them in certain well-recognised situations. As pointed out above, the prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus was wholly misconceived in this case since the respondent was not seeking to enforce any statutory right of theirs nor was it seeking to enforce any statutory obligation cast upon the appellants. Indeed, the very resort to Article 226 - whether for issuance of mandamus or any other writ, order or direction-was misconceived for the reasons mentioned supra." (Emphasis Supplied) 14. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation & Ors. Vs. Gayatri Construction Company and Anr.2 opined that where the agreement provides for an in-house remedy for settlement of disputes, the High Courts ought not to entertain such disputes under the supervisory writ jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. In view of the above settled position of law, prayer No.(i), (ii) & (iv) of the present writ petition cannot be entertained as the petitioner can always seek appropriate remedy available under Clause 10.6 of the RFP dated 07.07.2020. 16. Lastly, as regards to prayer No.(iii), the same assails erstwhile Condition No.6.4(35) of the subsequent RFP dated 26.11.2025 (Annexure-18). From the record of the case it transpires that the reply to the writ petition was filed on 05.01.2026 and along with the said reply, the respondent has annexed a copy of the corrigendum dated 23.12.2025 in relation to Clause 6.4(35) of the subsequent RFP dated 26.11.2025, and substantial change has been made in the original clause, as now a specific loan amount of Rs.11,57,25,000/- has been explicitly 2 (2008) 8 SCC 172 [2026:RJ-JP:4142] (8 of 9) [CW-19810/2025] quantified as payable by the incoming service provider or as quantified at the time of the said agreement in order to wipe out misplaced apprehension of the petitioner/protect and secure the financial interest of the petitioner. It is also pertinent to mention here that the petitioner has neither challenged the amended provision contemplated under Condition No.6.4(35), nor filed a rejoinder/counter-affidavit in the present matter to refute the same. Therefore, as of today, prayer No.(iii) has become redundant in view of the corrigendum dated 23.12.2025. 17. Even otherwise, the petitioner is always at liberty to assail the amended provision of Clause 6.4(35) in case they consider it prejudicial to their financial interest or otherwise, before the appropriate forum, in accordance with law. 18. Before parting with this writ petition, it is pertinent to mention that both the parties have urged several contentions of fact, relied upon several other clauses of the contract apart from those mentioned supra, and cited various provisions of the Rajasthan Transparency in Public Procurement Act, 2012. I have not set them out herein because I am of the considered opinion that they are outside the ken of a writ petition. It shall be open to the parties to urge and rely upon them at the proper stage and before the appropriate forum as any finding on the said aspect by this Court would affect the case of the parties before the appropriate forum. 19. In view of the aforesaid deliberation, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, arguments advanced by respective counsels for the parties and judgments of the Hon'ble [2026:RJ-JP:4142] (9 of 9) [CW-19810/2025] Apex Court, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present writ petition. 20. Accordingly, the present writ petition fails, and is hereby dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to avail the remedies available under Clause 10.6.1 and 10.6.2 of the RFP dated 07.07.2020 qua relief sought for vide prayer No.(i), (ii) and (iv), and seek remedy before the appropriate forum qua prayer No.(iii) in accordance with the law. 21. All pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. (MANEESH SHARMA),J DEEPA RANI /19