2026:HHC:32442 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 305 of 2018 Reserved on: 24.07.2026 Decided on: 04.08.2026. Paras Ram (deceased) through LRs & others ...Appellants. Versus Gian Chand (deceased) through LRs ...Respondents. Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellants : Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar, Senior Advocate with Mr. Tek Chand, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr. Arun Kumar Sharma, Advocate vice Mr. Amandeep Sharma, Advocate. Romesh Verma, Judge : The present regular second appeal arises out of the judgment and decree as passed by the learned District Judge, Hamirpur, dated 12th April 2018, whereby the appeal filed by the plaintiffs/appellants was ordered to be dismissed and the judgment and decree as passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Nadaun, District Hamirpur dated 30th August 2014 was affirmed, whereby suit filed by the plaintiffs was ordered to be dismissed. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? -2- 2026:HHC:32442 2. The facts as emerge in the present case are that the plaintiff-appellants filed suit for possession by way of demolition and removal of construction on Abadi (house) raised forcibly over the land comprised in Khata No. 70 min, Khatauni No. 73 min, Khasra No. 602 measuring 0.00.68 hectares, situated at village Kuthiana, Mauza Nauhangi, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur (H.P.). 3. As per the case as set up by the plaintiff, the land comprised in Khata No. 70 min, Khatauni No. 73 min, Khasra No. 602 measuring 0.00.68 hectares and Khasra No. 601 measuring 0.12.84 situated in Village Kuthiana, Mauza Nauhangi, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P. is owned and possessed by the plaintiff, as shown in the Jamabandi for the year 2003–04. The defendants are total strangers qua the suit land and they have got no right, title, or interest over the same. 4. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendants in the year 1998 forcibly raised the construction of a house (Abadi) over the land bearing Khasra No. 602, Khata No. 70min, Khatauni No.73 min, measuring 0.00.68 hectares situated at Village Kuthiana, Mauza Nauhangi, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P. 5. The plaintiff averred in the plaint that at the time of raising the construction, the defendants were requested not to raise any construction, however, the plaintiff was told that the defendants have applied for the correction of the revenue record of their adjoining land, -3- 2026:HHC:32442 and in case they failed to correct the revenue record in their favour, in that event, they shall vacate the land bearing Khasra No. 602 by way of removing said construction of their own. Keeping in view the assurance as given by the defendants as well as the alleged correction application, the plaintiff kept waiting till 27th December 2005. 6. It is the case of the plaintiff that the suit land was demarcated with the help and aid of Field Kanungo. It has been stated that when after such a long time about the pendency of the correction application alleged to have been filed by the defendants, nothing concrete happened, the plaintiff asked the defendants to vacate the suit land after removing the construction of the house raised forcibly. He did not hear anything about the correction application, and the defendants clearly refused to vacate the suit land bearing Khasra No. 602 measuring 0.00.68 hectares. Rather, they openly proclaimed that plaintiff may go anywhere, but they would not vacate the land at any cost. 7. Therefore, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking decree for possession by way of demolition and removal of construction of Abadi (house) raised forcibly over the land comprised in Khata No. 70 min, Khatauni No. 73 min, Khasra No. 602 measuring 0.00.68 hectares as per Jamabandi for the year 2003–04 situated at Village Kuthiana, Mauza Nauhangi, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P. Further, it was prayed that a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction -4- 2026:HHC:32442 restraining the defendants from cutting and removing the trees in any manner over the middle boundary of Khasra Nos. 601, 602 measuring 0.13.52 hectares be passed in his favour and against the defendants. 8. The suit was contested by the defendants and written statement was filed on behalf of defendants No. 2 to 5, wherein preliminary objections with respect to the maintainability, cause of action, special cost, etc., were raised by them. 9. As per the case as set up by the defendants, the land comprised in Khasra No. 602 is part and parcel of old Khasra Nos. 298 and 299. The settlement staff had wrongly and illegally shown and allotted Khasra No. 602 to the plaintiff and wrongly shown under the previous ownership of plaintiff, for which the correction papers have been sent to the Court of Settlement Officer Kangra at Dharamshala. It was stated that the defendants have got no concern with other Khasra numbers of the suit land. All the averments as made in the plaint were refuted and specifically denied, and the defendants prayed for the dismissal of the suit as was filed by the plaintiff. 10. The plaintiff filed replication to the written statement and reiterated all the averments as made in the plaint. 11. The learned trial Court framed the issues in the matter on 19th March 2009 in the following manner. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the possession of the suit land as prayed for ? OPP. -5- 2026:HHC:32442 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed for ? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit ? OPD. 4. Whether the suit is not legally maintainable ? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit by his own acts and conduct ? OPD. 6. Relief. 12. The learned trial Court directed the respective parties to adduce evidence in support of their contention, and vide its judgment and decree dated 30th August 2014, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Nadaun, District Hamirpur dismissed the suit as was filed by the plaintiff. 13. Feeling aggrieved, plaintiff filed an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in the Court of learned District Judge, Hamirpur on 9th October 2014. The learned First Appellate Court, vide its impugned judgment and decree dated 12th April 2018, affirmed the findings of the learned trial Court and dismissed the appeal as filed by the plaintiff. 14. Still feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff has approached this Court by filing the instant Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. 15. It is contended by Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Tek Chand, Advocate for the appellants that the impugned judgments and decrees as passed by learned Courts -6- 2026:HHC:32442 below are erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He submitted that the learned Courts below have not appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record and have wrongly dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. 16. On the other hand, Mr. Arun Kumar Sharma, learned vice counsel for the respondents have defended the impugned judgments and decrees. He submits that while exercising the power under Section 100 of the CPC, this Court will not interfere in the well- reasoned judgments by interfering in the concurrent findings of the fact as returned by the learned Courts below. 17. This Court vide its order dated 17th July 2018, admitted the present appeal on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the correction in the revenue entries during the pendency of the proceedings before the civil court can override the presumption of truth attached to the record of rights? 2. Whether both the courts below have grossly misread and misconstrued the evidence on record which has resulted in the passing of the illegal and perverse judgment? 3. Whether the learned first appellate court has erred in dismissing the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC? -7- 2026:HHC:32442 18. During the course of the arguments, learned Senior Counsel, on instructions, has submitted that he does not press substantial question of law No. 3 and he shall be addressing his arguments only on substantial questions of law No. 1 and 2. 19. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the case file. 20. The plaintiff-appellants had approached the learned trial Court for the grant of decree for possession by way of demolition and removal of construction of Abadi raised forcibly over the land comprised in Khata No. 70 min, Khatauni No. 73 min, Khasra No. 602 measuring 0.00.68 hectares as per Jamabandi for the year 2003-04. Further, decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from cutting or removing the trees in any manner standing over the middle boundary of Khasra No. 601, 602 measuring 0.13.52 hectares was sought from the learned trial Court. It is a case of the defendants that the settlement staff wrongly and illegally allotted Khasra No. 602 to the plaintiff and wrongly shown under the previous ownership of plaintiff qua which correction papers were sent to the Court of Settlement Officer Kangra at Dharamshala by the settlement field staff after spot inquiry on correction application of the defendants against the wrong done to them. It is the stand of the defendants that the Abadi and the cattle shed were constructed by the grandfather of the defendants without any objection from any corner, and the plaintiff -8- 2026:HHC:32442 is also estopped to file the present suit by his own act, deed, conduct and acquiescence. All the averments as made in the plaint have been refuted by defendant No. 2 to 5 by filing written statement. 21. In order to substantiate its case, PW-1 Paras Ram entered the witness box and stated that the disputed land is Khasra No. 602 and the area of the same is 68 centiare. He stated that adjoining to Khasra No. 602, there is Khasra No. 601 and the dimension of the same is 1284 centiare and that he is the owner of the land. The defendants have got no right, title, or interest over the same and in the year 1998, the defendants started excavating the suit land and they started raising construction of the house over Khasra No. 602. Though, he requested the defendants not to do so, but they did not refrain from their illegal designs. He stated that on his asking, they said that the correction application is pending between the parties. He got demarcated the suit land on 27th December 2005 and the said demarcation was conducted by the Field Kanungo. He stated that his land be got evicted from the defendants. 22. In the cross-examination, he stated that on the spot, there are two rooms, cow shed, and a verandah. It is admitted that the defendants had filed the correction application with respect to Khasra Nos. 602 and 603. He stated that he has filed the suit pertaining to Khasra No. 602. He admitted that over Khasra Nos. 602 and 603, a house is situated over the same. He admitted that Abadi situated over -9- 2026:HHC:32442 the land belongs to the defendants, however, he is the owner of the land. He admitted that when the Abadi was constructed, then the same was done in his area. 23. PW-2 is the statement of Pritam Chand. He stated that the demarcation report, Exhibit PW-2/A, was prepared by him. He stated that he went on the spot and demarcated the suit land on the basis of the application, Exhibit PW-2/B, and statements of the parties, Exhibit PW-2/C and Exhibit PW-2/D were recorded. He admitted that over area of Khasra No. 602, there is Abadi of the defendants. 24. PW-3 is the statement of Joginder Pal, and in the cross- examination, he has also admitted that over Khasra No. 602, there is Gair Mumkin Abadi reflected in the revenue record. 25. In order to rebut the case of the plaintiff, the defendants examined DW-1 Subhash Chand, defendant No. 5. He stated that they are owners in possession of Khasra No. 602 and the old number of this Khasra number was 298. He stated that they are coming as owners-in-possession over Khasra No. 298, from the time of their forefathers. Over the suit land, they are having 10 rooms with a slate porsh Kacha Makaan. The same was constructed at the time of their forefathers. He stated that after the correction, the suit land has been allotted to them. He denied that over the suit land, the plaintiff is in possession from the time of his ancestors. He stated that the construction was raised about 80–90 years ago. He admitted that suit -10- 2026:HHC:32442 land was demarcated in the year 2005. He admitted that the plaintiff had filed an appeal against the correction order. He denied that they forcibly intend to occupy the suit land. He admitted that the settlement was carried out in their presence. 26. That plaintiff has placed on record Exhibit P-1, the copy of Misal Haqiyat 2003–04, whereby the suit land bearing Khasra No. 602 has been shown to be Gair Mumkin Abadi, and Khasra No. 601 as Barani Abbal. The plaintiff has also placed on record Exhibit P-2, i.e. copy of the Jamabandi for the year 1998–1999, which reflects the spot position as has been reflected in Exhibit P-1. The copy of the demarcation report is Exhibit PW-2/A, and the copies of statements are Exhibit PW-2/C and Exhibit PW-2/D. 27. The defendants have placed on record copy of Jamabandi for the year 1998–1999 Ex.D-1 of Mauza Kuthiana which shows Giana as owner in possession of the suit land over Khasra No. 298 Min (old number), and Khasra No. 603, (new number), Khasra Nos. 298, 299 Min (old number), and Khasra No. 604 (new number). In the said Jamabandi, Khasra No. 603 has been depicted as Gair Mumkin Abadi, and Khasra No. 604 has been shown as Barani Abbal. To the similar extent is the copy of Jamabandi Exhibit D-2, whereby Khasra Nos. 298 and 299 have been shown to be owned and possessed by Giana, son of Badri. Exhibit D-3 is the copy of Jamabandi, whereby Khasra Nos. 603 and 604 have been shown to be owned and possessed by Giana. -11- 2026:HHC:32442 The copy of the application for correction has been placed on record, which is titled as Giana vs. Paras Ram. Copy of the correction order has been placed on record as Exhibit D-4 dated 19th May, 2011. 28. The perusal of the oral evidence as has been led by the respective parties shows that it has been stated by the defendants that they are having old abadi over the suit land bearing Khasra No. 602 and the same is coming since their forefathers. DW-1 in his deposition has categorically stated that they have raised a construction of a slate- posh house comprising of ten rooms over the land bearing Khasra No. 602. The old number of the same is Khasra No. 298. The plaintiff and his witnesses have admitted the fact whereby it has been admitted that in Khasra Nos. 602 and 603, there are houses. There is an admission on the part of the plaintiff that over the suit land, there is an old abadi of the defendants, however, the land belongs to him. To the similar extent, PW-2 has admitted that over the suit land, there is an abadi of the defendants. PW-3 has also admitted in his cross-examination that over Khasra No. 602, gair mumkin abadi is incorporated in the revenue records. 29. The oral evidence when read in conjunction with the correction order Exhibit D-4, which has been placed on record, falsify the case of the plaintiff. Though, it is the consistent case of the plaintiff that on the strength of the revenue record, that is Exhibit P-1, he is the owner in possession of Khasra Nos. 601 and 602, and since the -12- 2026:HHC:32442 defendants have raised construction over the suit land, therefore, decree for possession and injunction be passed in his favour. 30. The learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of this Court in 2014 HLJ 8626 by arguing that presumption of truth is attached to the revenue record and in the absence of any rebuttal, the suit as filed by the plaintiff should have been decreed. 31. It is contended by learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that perusal of Exhibit P1 shows that plaintiffs are the owner of the suit land therefore on the strength of the same the suit filed by them for grant of decree for possession ought to have been decreed. No doubt, in Exhibit P-1, Missal Haqiyat for 2003-04, the Khasra Nos. 601 and 602 are being shown to be owned and possessed by the plaintiff. However, from the perusal of the application as filed by the defendants before the revenue authorities and the order of correction Exhibit D-4, it is clear that the area of Khasra No. 602 is 0.00.66 instead of 0.00.68 hectares. Exhibit D-4 shows that the suit land comprising of Khasra No. 602 is 0.00.66 hectares and its old Khasra No. was 298 instead of 343, and the same has been ordered to be deleted from the name of Paras Ram from his Khata No. 70/73, and it has been ordered that the same be entered in the Khata of predecessor-in-interest of the respondents in Khata No. 77/85. As per the said order, Khasra No. 601 was ordered to be reflected as measuring 0.19.75 hectares and it was ordered that the same be -13- 2026:HHC:32442 allotted to the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants in his Khata No. 70/73. The correction order as passed by the Collector Settlement falsifies the case of the plaintiff, and it has been fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the parties that revision petition was filed by the present appellants before the Divisional Commissioner, however, the same has been ordered to be dismissed. It has further been admitted by the learned counsel for the parties that the said order has attained finality. 32. Therefore, in view of the consistent oral evidence as led by the defendants, and in view of the cross-examination of the plaintiff and his witnesses, whereby they have categorically admitted that there is an old abadi of the defendants consisting of slate-posh 10-rooms house, and on the strength of the correction order, the case as projected by the plaintiff is totally false and incorrect, and no relief can be granted to him under such circumstances. 33. The presumption of truth has been rebutted by the defendants by placing on record the correction order and on the basis of the oral evidence, the defendants have been able to make out the case in their favour. 34. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that the plaintiff has not been able to plead and prove its case and both the Courts have rightly come to the conclusion that the entry qua Khasra No. 602 has been corrected in the name of the defendants and the -14- 2026:HHC:32442 same was given to them as per the correction order of the Settlement Officer. The said order has been incorporated in the revenue record Exhibit D-5, which pertains to the year 2008-09. Mutation No. 68 has been attested on the basis of the correction order, therefore, the defendants have rebutted the presumption of truth attached to the revenue record on which the plaintiff is heavily relying. 35. This Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Courts below have rightly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record and have thrashed the material as placed on record in its right perspective. 36. The Honorable Apex Court in its various judgments has held that the scope of interference while exercising the power under Section 100 of the CPC is very limited. 37. The Honorable Apex Court in case titled as Navneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty, (1996) 6 SCC 166, decided on 06.09.1996 has held as follows: “11. This Court, time without number, pointed out that interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower courts. 21. In our considered view the lower appellate court has fairly appreciated the evidence in the above background and has reached the conclusion that the suit was not barred by limitation. Even assuming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material.” -15- 2026:HHC:32442 38. To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Gurnam Singh (dead) by legal representatives vs. Lehna Singh (dead) by legal representatives, (2019) 7 SCC 641 has held as under: 13.1. The suspicious circumstances which were considered by the learned Trial Court are narrated/stated hereinabove. On re- appreciation of evidence on record and after dealing with each alleged suspicious circumstances, which were dealt with by the learned Trial Court, the First Appellate Court by giving cogent reasons held the Will genuine and consequently did not agree with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court. However, in Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court, by impugned judgment and order has interfered with the Judgment and Decree passed by the First Appellate Court. While interfering with the judgment and order passed by the first Appellate Court, it appears that while upsetting the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, the High Court has again appreciated the entire evidence on record, which in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC is not permissible. While passing the impugned judgment and order, it appears that High Court has not at all appreciated the fact that the High Court was deciding the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC and not first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC. As per the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain second appeal under Section 100 CPC after the 1976 Amendment, is confined only when the second appeal involves a substantial question of law. The existence of ‘a substantial question of law’ is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (Supra), in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower Court were erroneous being: (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; OR (ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court; OR (iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. -16- 2026:HHC:32442 It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. It is further observed that the Trial Court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in second appeal. 15. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has erred in reappreciating the evidence on record in the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. The High Court has materially erred in interfering with the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court, which were on re appreciation of evidence, which was permissible by the First Appellate Court in exercise of powers under Section 96 of the CPC. Cogent reasons, on appreciation of the evidence, were given by the First Appellate Court. First Appellate Court dealt with, in detail, the socalled suspicious circumstance which weighed with the learned Trial Court and thereafter it came to the conclusion that the Will, which as such was a registered Will, was genuine and do not suffer from any suspicious circumstances. The findings recorded by the First Appellate Court are reproduced hereinabove. Therefore, while passing the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 CPC. 15.1 As observed hereinabove and as held by this Court in a catena of decisions and even as per Section 100 CPC, the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the second appeal under Section 100 CPC is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law. On going through the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court, we are of the opinion that the question of law framed by the High Court while deciding the second appeal, cannot be said to be substantial questions of law at all. The substantial questions of law framed by the High Court are as under : “(i) Whether the Appellate Court can reverse the findings recorded by the learned trial court without adverting to the specific finding of the trial Court? (ii) Whether the judgment passed by the learned lower Appellate Court is perverse and outcome of misreading of evidence?” The aforesaid cannot be said to be substantial questions of law at all. In the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. At this stage, decision of this Court in the -17- 2026:HHC:32442 case of Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633, is required to be referred to. In the aforesaid decision, this Court has observed and held as under: “Whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by S.100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by Courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in Courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of S.100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid.” 17. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court dated 27.11.2007 passed in Civil Regular Second Appeal No.2191 of 1985 and restore the Judgment and Order passed by the learned District Judge, Sangrur dated 06.06.1985 passed in Civil Appeal No.27 of 29.02.1983 and consequently dismiss the suit preferred by the respondent herein–original plaintiff. No costs. 39. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as C. Doddanarayana Reddy (dead) by legal representatives and others vs. C. Jayarama Reddy, (2020) 4 SCC 659 has reiterated the principles as enunciated under Section 100 of the CPC: 25. The question as to whether a substantial question of law arises, has been a subject matter of interpretation by this Court. In the judgment reported as Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E- Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan8, it was held that -18- 2026:HHC:32442 findings of the fact could not have been interfered within the second appeal. This Court held as under: “12. This Court had repeatedly held that the power of the High Court to interfere in second appeal under Section 100 CPC is limited solely to decide a substantial question of law, if at all the same arises in the case. It has deprecated the practice of the High Court routinely interfering in pure findings of fact reached by the courts below without coming to the conclusion that the said finding of fact is either perverse or not based on material on record. 13. In Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu (1996 3 SCC 392), this Court held: "It is now well settled that concurrent findings of fact of trial court and first appellate court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its 8 (1999) 6 SCC 343 jurisdiction under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. The Single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did." 14. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty (1996 6 SCC 166), this Court held : "Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by com- pelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to re- place the findings of the lower courts. … Even as- suming that another view is possible on a reappreci- ation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material." 15. And again in Secy., Taliparamba Education Soci- ety v. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N. (1997 4 SCC 484), this Court held: (SCC p. 486, para 5) "The High Court was grossly in error in trenching upon the appreciation of evidence under Section 100 CPC and recording reverse finding of fact which is impermissible." 26. In a judgment reported as Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitkibai Sopan Gujar & Ors.9, this Court held that from a given set of circumstances if two inferences are possible then the one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court. In the said case, the First Appellate Court set -19- 2026:HHC:32442 aside the judgment of the trial court. It was held that the High Court can interfere if the conclusion drawn by the lower court was erroneous being contrary to mandatory provisions of law applicable or if it is a settled position on the basis of a pronouncement made by the 9 (1999) 3 SCC 722 court or based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. This Court held as under: “5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court had given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the tower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable of its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex Court, or was based upon in inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 27. In another judgment reported as Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari10, this Court held as under: “14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be substantial, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and -20- 2026:HHC:32442 circumstance of each case whether a question 10 (2001) 3SCC 179 of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.” 28. Recently in another judgment reported as State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal11, it was held that a concurrent finding of the fact is binding, unless it is pointed out that it was recorded de hors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or based on misreading of the material on records and documents. The Court held as under: “When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or it was based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. (see observation made by learned Judge Vivian Bose,J. as His Lordship then was a Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar & Ors. vs. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar & Ors., AIR 1943 Nagpur 117 Para 43).” 29. The learned High Court has not satisfied the tests laid down in the aforesaid judgements. Both the courts, the trial court and the learned First Appellate Court, have examined the School Leaving Certificate and returned a finding that the date of birth does not stand proved from such certificate. May be the High Court could have taken a different view acting as a trial court but once, two 11 (2019) 8 SCC 637 courts have returned a finding which is not based upon any misreading of material documents, nor is recorded against any provision of law, and neither can it be said that any judge acting judicially and reasonably could not have reached such a finding, then, the High Court cannot be said to have erred. Resultantly, no substantial question of law arose for consideration before the High Court. 30. Thus, we find that the High Court erred in law in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the trial court as affirmed by the First Appellate Court. The findings of fact cannot be interfered with in a second appeal unless, the -21- 2026:HHC:32442 findings are perverse. The High Court could not have interfered with the findings of the fact.” 40. In view of the exposition of law as laid down by the Honorable Apex Court, whereby it has been held that High Court will not interfere in the concurrent findings of fact as returned by the Courts below until the same is outcome of perversity or illegality. However, in the present case the Courts below have appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence in a legal manner and in the considered opinion of this Court, there is no perversity in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below. 41. Therefore, in view of the observations as made hereinabove, there is no merit in the present appeal and the same is ordered to be dismissed.Ordered accordingly. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. (Romesh Verma) Judge August 04, 2026. (Nisha)