2026:HHC:32366 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Criminal Revision No.251 of 2026 Date of Decision: 4.8.2026 _____________________________________________________________________ Shakuntla ……...Petitioner Versus Punjab National Bank …....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the Petitioner: Mr. Surender Verma, Advocate. For the Respondent: Ms. Kiran Sharma, Advocate. ___________________________________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral) Instant criminal revision petition, lays challenge to judgment dated 8.1.2026, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sundernagar, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.55/2024, affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 13/21.8.2024, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Sundernagar, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in complaint No. 299-1/2022, whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced her to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of ten months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.4,70,000/- to the complainant. 2026:HHC:32366 2 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as well as material adduced on record by respective parties, are that the complainant instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Act in the competent Court of law, alleging therein that the accused, who had raised loan through her account, issued a cheque bearing No. 370831 in favour of the complainant for a sum of Rs. 4,70,000/- to repay the loan amount. However, same was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds in the account of the accused person vide return memo dated 14.10.2022. Immediately after receipt of aforesaid return memo, complainant served the accused with a legal notice dated 21.10.2022, calling upon her to make the payment good within the stipulated time, but since needful was not done, complainant had no option but to institute complaint under Section 138 of the Act in learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, which on the basis of pleadings and material adduced on record, found the accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and convicted and sentenced her as per description given hereinabove. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by trial Court, petitioner-accused preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sundernagar, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, which was also dismissed 2026:HHC:32366 3 vide judgment dated 18.01.2026. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for acquittal after setting aside judgments of conviction passed by courts below. 4. Vide order dated 05.05.2026, this Court suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below, subject to petitioner-accused furnishing bail bonds and depositing 50% of the compensation amount within a period of six weeks, but fact remains that the aforesaid order has never been complied with, as such, this Court has no option but to decide the case on its own merits. 5. Having carefully perused grounds taken in the appeal vis-à-vis reasoning assigned by the learned Sessions Judge, thereby upholding the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather this Court finds that both the courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously and there is no scope of interference. 6. In her statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., accused admitted the factum of having raised loan through her bank account as detailed hereinabove, but denied the rest of the claim of complainant. 2026:HHC:32366 4 However, pattern of cross-examination conducted upon complainant nowhere suggests that there is any specific denial to the issuance of cheque and signatures thereupon. If it is so, no illegality, otherwise, can be said to have been committed by the court below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which clearly provide that there shall be presumption available in favour of the holder of the cheque that same was issued in discharge of the lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but for that purpose, accused is/was under obligation to raise probable defence. Probable defence could be raised by the accused by referring to the documents as well as evidence adduced on record by the complainant or by leading some cogent and convincing evidence. However, in the case at hand, accused, despite sufficient opportunity, failed to raise probable defence. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 2026:HHC:32366 5 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein: “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If 2026:HHC:32366 6 however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.” 8. Complainant with a view to prove its case examined Sh. Vinod Kumar, Branch Manager as CW-1, who tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex.CW-1/A, reiterating therein contents of complaint. He also 2026:HHC:32366 7 tendered in evidence cheque Ex.CW-1/B, dishonour memo Ex.CW-1/C, legal notice Ex.CW-1/D, postal receipt Ex.CW-1/E, postal track consignment Ex.CW-1/F, and General Power of Attorney Ex.CW-1/G. Cross-examination conducted upon afore witness nowhere suggests that accused was able to extract something contrary to what this witness stated in examination-in-chief. This witness while admitting that loan account statement was not produced on record, specifically denied that cheque does not reflect the correct liability of the accused. While admitting that security cheques are also taken in loan cases, he also admitted that security cheque in the instant case was retained. He admitted that cheque Ex.CW-1/B had been filled in different inks, however, he denied that there is no liability of the accused person towards the bank. 9. Accused with a view to prove her defence examined herself as DW-1. She deposed that she had mortgaged land of her mother-in-law while taking loan in the instant case and no cheque was issued at the time of taking loan. She deposed that she had given installments for one year after taking loan. She admitted that she had taken loan of Rs. 4,70,000/- and thereafter had given 10 to 12 installments. She admitted her signature in cheque Ex.CW-1/B, however, feigned ignorance whether cheque in question was given by her for repayment of loan. She admitted that she owed money to the bank and volunteered that she needed two to three 2026:HHC:32366 8 months to return the same. She also admitted that she had signed all loan documents on her own free will. In nutshell, accused attempted to build up a case that cheque in question was obtained by bank as a security cheque, but such defence never came to be probablised by leading cogent and convincing evidence. 10. Otherwise also, by now it is well-settled that a person is liable for the commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act even if the Cheque is filled by some other person. Reliance in this regard is placed upon judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bir Singh Vs. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197, wherein it was observed as under: “37. A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted. 38. answered in the negative. 40. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt. 41. The fact that the appellant-complainant might have been an Income Tax practitioner conversant with knowledge of law does not make any difference to the law relating to the dishonour of a cheque. The fact that the loan may 2026:HHC:32366 9 not have been advanced by a cheque or demand draft or a receipt might not have been obtained would make no difference. In this context, it would, perhaps, not be out of context to note that the fact that the respondent- accused should have given or signed blank cheque to the appellant- complainant, as claimed by the respondent-accused, shows that initially there was mutual trust and faith between them. 42. In the absence of any finding that the cheque in question was not signed by the respondent-accused or not voluntarily made over to the payee and in the absence of any evidence with regard to the circumstances in which a blank signed cheque had been given to the appellant-complainant, it may reasonably be presumed that the cheque was filled in by the appellant-complainant being the payee in the presence of the respondent- accused being the drawer, at his request and/or with his acquiescence. The subsequent filling in of an unfilled signed cheque is not an alteration. There was no change in the amount of the cheque, its date or the name of the payee. The High Court ought not to have acquitted the respondent-accused of the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.” 11. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of 2026:HHC:32366 10 supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 12. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 13. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no 2026:HHC:32366 11 reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 14. 14. Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. 15. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender herself before the learned trial Court within six weeks to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction, if any, stands vacated. Learned court below is also directed to release the amount, if any, deposited before it by the accused, on filing appropriate application by the complainant within one week. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. August 4, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma), (manjit) Judge