CRL.M.C. 7378/2026 Page 1 of 11 $~61 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Date of Decision : 30.09.2026 # CNR No.DLHC010473142026 + CRL.M.C. 7378/2026, Crl.M.A.30837/2026, Crl.M.A.30838/2026 LUV BHARDWAJ .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Manohar Malik, Ms. Astha Gumber, Advs. versus CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION .....Respondent Through: Mr. Ripudaman Bhardwaj (SPP) along with Ms. Kritika Malok, Adv. for CBI CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA SACHIN DATTA, J. (ORAL) 1. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) seeking setting aside of the condition imposed upon the petitioner vide Para-7 (l) of the order dated 09.09.2026 passed by the Ld. Special Judge, CBI-19, (PC Act), RADC, New Delhi in CC No. 283/19. The said order reads as under: - Digitally Signed By:CHINU LUTHRA Signing Date:06.10.2026 14:11:56 Signature Not Verified CRL.M.C. 7378/2026 Page 2 of 11 Digitally Signed By:CHINU LUTHRA Signing Date:06.10.2026 14:11:56 Signature Not Verified CRL.M.C. 7378/2026 Page 3 of 11 Digitally Signed By:CHINU LUTHRA Signing Date:06.10.2026 14:11:56 Signature Not Verified CRL.M.C. 7378/2026 Page 4 of 11 Digitally Signed By:CHINU LUTHRA Signing Date:06.10.2026 14:11:56 Signature Not Verified CRL.M.C. 7378/2026 Page 5 of 11 2. Vide the aforesaid order, the petitioner was permitted to travel to Istanbul, Turkey from 10.09.2026 to 15.09.2026 and thereafter to Paris, France from 15.09.2026 to 24.09.2026 subject to certain conditions. 3. The challenge by way of the present petition is confined to the restriction concerning the petitioner not moving a subsequent similar application within the next six months, except in exceptional and compelling Digitally Signed By:CHINU LUTHRA Signing Date:06.10.2026 14:11:56 Signature Not Verified CRL.M.C. 7378/2026 Page 6 of 11 circumstances. The permission which has been granted for the proposed journey is not in dispute. The petitioner has already undertaken the travel in terms of the permission granted vide the aforesaid order dated 09.09.2026. 4. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the aforesaid condition inserted vide Para-7(l) of the order dated 09.09.2026 infringes upon the petitioner’s fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is further pointed out that in the past when the petitioner has undertaken the travel, he has scrupulously complied with the directions issued by the learned Trial Court, and there is no warrant to impose the limitation of the kind as set out in Paragrpah- 7(l) of the aforesaid order. 5. Mr. Ripudaman Bhardwaj, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the restriction was justified and in the interest of ensuring the presence of the petitioner for the purpose of trial and therefore, cannot be faulted. Analysis 6. The right to travel abroad undoubtedly forms part of the personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. However, the recognition of such right does not imply that an accused facing criminal proceedings has an unqualified right to travel abroad at any time and for a duration of his choice. Where criminal proceedings are pending against someone charged with serious charges, the right to travel has necessarily to be balanced against the requirement of securing the presence of the accused and ensuring that the proceedings are not impeded or delayed. 7. In Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1071, the Supreme Court, while considering the right of an accused to travel Digitally Signed By:CHINU LUTHRA Signing Date:06.10.2026 14:11:56 Signature Not Verified CRL.M.C. 7378/2026 Page 7 of 11 abroad, has specifically emphasised that the right to travel, though a facet of personal liberty under Article 21, cannot be considered in isolation. The Court has held that a balance has to be maintained between individual liberty, the right to speedy trial and the larger societal interest in the effective administration of criminal justice. The Court has further recognised that the conduct of the accused is a relevant consideration while determining whether permission to travel abroad ought to be granted. The Court therein has observed as under: “10. An argument has been advanced on behalf of the respondent no. 2 that imposing a condition requiring deposit of his passport or mandating prior permission of the Court before travelling abroad would amount to an infringement of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Suffice it to observe that the right to a speedy trial is equally an integral facet of Article 21. While Article 21 undoubtedly guarantees the fundamental right to personal liberty, which includes the right to travel abroad, such right cannot be viewed in isolation. A balance must be struck between the individual liberty of the respondent no. 2 on the one hand and the right of the appellant to a speedy trial together with the larger societal interest in ensuring the effective administration of criminal justice, on the other. Reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI14 where this Court observed: 16. We are of the opinion that while it is true that Article 21 is of great importance because it enshrines the fundamental right to individual liberty, but at the same time a balance has to be struck between the right to individual liberty and the interest of society. No right can be absolute, and reasonable restrictions can be placed on them. While it is true that one of the considerations in deciding whether to grant bail to an accused or not is whether he has been in jail for a long time, the court has also to take into consideration other facts and circumstances, such as the interest of the society.” 8. The aforesaid principle is of particular relevance in the present case. The petitioner is not aggrieved by denial of any travel permission sought by him. On the contrary, the trial Court has permitted the petitioner to travel to Digitally Signed By:CHINU LUTHRA Signing Date:06.10.2026 14:11:56 Signature Not Verified CRL.M.C. 7378/2026 Page 8 of 11 Istanbul and Paris for the period sought by him. The challenge is confined to the further condition that a similar application shall not be moved for a period of six months, save in ‘exceptional’ and ‘compelling’ circumstances. 9. Pertinently, the impugned condition does not impose an absolute embargo upon the petitioner’s right to travel abroad. It regulates the manner in which a further request for such travel is to be considered during the stipulated period. The condition itself preserves the jurisdiction of the trial Court to consider a subsequent request where circumstances are shown to be exceptional and compelling. Thus, the petitioner has not been placed beyond the reach of judicial consideration; only successive applications for foreign travel as a matter of routine during the specified period has been restricted. 10. The record also discloses that the petitioner has been granted permission to travel abroad on several earlier occasions. The petition itself records successive journeys undertaken by the petitioner, including travel to Istanbul from 12.07.2026 to 20.07.2026, followed shortly thereafter by the travel which was the subject matter of the application decided on 09.09.2026. 11. The fact that the petitioner has duly complied with the conditions attached to his earlier permissions is undoubtedly a relevant consideration in his favour. However, such compliance cannot, by itself, confer an indefeasible entitlement to seek permission for foreign travel at successive intervals, especially when there are grave allegations of economic offences against the petitioner. Each request remains subject to the requirement of balancing the petitioner’s personal liberty against the orderly progress of the criminal proceedings. Digitally Signed By:CHINU LUTHRA Signing Date:06.10.2026 14:11:56 Signature Not Verified CRL.M.C. 7378/2026 Page 9 of 11 12. It is also significant that, while considering the application for travel, the respondent/ CBI had specifically opposed the same, inter alia, on the ground that the proposed travel was not shown to be compelling and that the grant of permission on previous occasions could not, by itself, constitute a ground for granting fresh permission. The trial Court, while accepting the petitioner's request to travel, nevertheless considered it appropriate to put in place safeguards governing the present journey. Those safeguards include the requirement of return on the specified date, availability through video conferencing, an obligation not to delay the trial and, in paragraph 7(l), the restriction on moving a similar application for six months except in exceptional and compelling circumstances. 13. In this backdrop, the impugned condition cannot be viewed in isolation from the permission which was granted. The trial Court has not denied the petitioner's liberty to travel; it has permitted the present travel while seeking to ensure that requests for repeated foreign travel do not become routine and incessant during the pendency of the trial. The stipulation is inherently limited and expressly carves out ‘exceptional’ and ‘compelling’ circumstances. The condition, therefore, leaves open the possibility of judicial consideration of a subsequent request where circumstances genuinely warrant such consideration. 14. The reliance placed by the petitioner upon Satish Chandra Verma v. Union of India, (2019) SCC OnLine SC 2048, does not advance the case beyond the proposition that the right to travel abroad constitutes an important facet of personal liberty, and is a fundamental right of the petitioner. Likewise, the principles concerning flight risk and evasion of the Digitally Signed By:CHINU LUTHRA Signing Date:06.10.2026 14:11:56 Signature Not Verified CRL.M.C. 7378/2026 Page 10 of 11 process of law, as noticed in Sumer Singh Salkan v. Assistant Director, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 2699, cannot be read to mean that those are the only circumstances in which the Court may regulate foreign travel. 15. The concern in the present case is not merely whether the petitioner is likely to abscond; it also concerns the orderly progress of ongoing criminal proceedings and the need to regulate repeated requests for absence from the jurisdiction of the Court. 16. Equally, the petitioner's submission that there has been no breach of any previous travel condition cannot, by itself, render the impugned condition impermissible. Past compliance is certainly a relevant circumstance while considering a request for travel, but it does not eliminate the Court's power to impose appropriate prospective safeguards. The Supreme Court in Seesa Santosh (supra) has recognised precisely such a balancing exercise between individual liberty and the effective administration of criminal justice. 17. The apprehension of the petitioner that the expression “exceptional and compelling circumstances” may be construed in an unduly restrictive manner is, at this stage, conjectural. The condition does not predetermine the outcome of any future application. If circumstances arise which, on their own facts, warrant travel during the stipulated period, it would remain open to the petitioner to place those circumstances before the trial Court, which would be required to consider the request in accordance with law. 18. The question before this Court is consequently not whether every proposed foreign journey of the petitioner during the next six months would necessarily be unjustified. The question is whether the trial Court, while Digitally Signed By:CHINU LUTHRA Signing Date:06.10.2026 14:11:56 Signature Not Verified CRL.M.C. 7378/2026 Page 11 of 11 permitting the present journey, could place a limited regulatory condition upon successive/repeated requests for foreign travel, having regard to the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the frequency of the earlier travel permissions, and the requirement of securing the petitioner's availability. In the facts of the present case, the answer is in the affirmative. 19. The impugned condition is thus neither an absolute prohibition upon foreign travel nor an extinguishment of the petitioner's right to approach the Court. It is in the nature of a limited regulation, operating for a specified period and subject to an express exception. No ground is, therefore, made out for interference with paragraph 7(l) of the order dated 09.09.2026. 20. In the above conspectus, this Court is not persuaded to grant the relief sought in the present petition. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed. 21. It is, however, clarified that the petitioner shall remain at liberty to approach the trial Court during the aforesaid period in the event of any circumstance arising which, according to him, warrants foreign travel within the stipulated period. Any such application shall disclose the circumstances necessitating the proposed travel and shall be considered by the trial Court in accordance with law and on its own merits 22. The petition is disposed of in the above terms. Pending applications also stand disposed of. SACHIN DATTA, J SEPTEMBER 30, 2026/uk, ka By:CHINU LUTHRA Signing Date:06.10.2026 14:11:56