2026:HHC:34094 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 381 of 2019 Date of decision:04.08.2026 State of Himachal Pradesh ...Appellant Versus Karmo @ Karam Singh & another ...Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellant : Mr. Manish Thakur, Deputy Advocate General. For the respondents : Mr. Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate with Mr. Atharv Sharma, Advocate. Romesh Verma, Judge(oral): The instant regular second appeal arises out of the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge- II, Kangra at Dharamshala (Camp at Dehra), dated 04.12.2018, whereby the appeal filed by the present appellant/defendant was dismissed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Jawali, District Kangra, dated 16.12.2017 was affirmed, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiffs for declaration was decreed. 2. The facts as emerge in the present case are that the plaintiffs/respondents, Karmo @ Karam Singh and Chanchalo Devi, filed a suit for declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs are the owners in possession of the land comprised in Khata No. 16 min, Khatauni No. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? -2- 2026:HHC:34094 53, Khasra No. 2, Plot 1, land measuring 08.25.52 HMs, situated in Mohal Mohli, Tehsil Fatehpur, District Kangra, as per the Jamabandi for the year 2008–09, and the revenue entries showing the defendant in possession of the suit land and the "kisam" of the suit land as "Jungal Mehfusa Gir Mehduda " are categorically illegal, null and void and are mere paper entries, which are not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs. 3. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant has no right, title, or interest over the suit land. During settlement operation conducted by the State Government in the year 1984–85, the officials of the Settlement Authority, without the express knowledge, consent and behind the back of the plaintiffs, recorded the possession of the Forest Department in the column of cultivation and changed the "kisam" of the land to " Jungal Mehfusa Gir Mehduda ". The suit land is in the physical, exclusive possession of the plaintiffs, and the revenue entries showing the defendant to be in possession of the suit land are wrong, null, and void and are required to be deleted from the revenue record. 4. As per the plaintiffs, the settlement officials, without making any inquiry regarding the suit land, incorporated the possession of the defendant in the revenue record on the basis of wrong revenue record and thereby created a cloud over the status of the plaintiffs on the suit land. -3- 2026:HHC:34094 5. It is the case of the plaintiffs that they are in settled possession of the suit land, but in case, during the pendency of the suit, the defendant succeeds in dispossessing the plaintiffs from the suit land, in that event, decree for possession may kindly be passed in their favour. Therefore, the suit was filed for declaration, permanent prohibitory injunction and, in the alternative, a suit for possession against the defendant. 6. The suit was resisted by the defendant by filing written statement wherein preliminary objections with respect to maintainability, suppression of facts, estoppel, locus standi, limitation, etc. were taken. On merits, it was contended that the suit land is a dense forest and the same is in the possession of the defendant. As per the defendant, the plaintiffs never remained in possession of the suit land. The settlement officials rightly incorporated the possession of the defendant in the revenue record as per the factual position on the spot, as the plaintiffs were never in possession at any point of time. It was stated that since the suit land is a dense forest and is in the continuous possession of the defendant, therefore, the question of dispossession of the plaintiffs from the suit land does not arise at all. It was pleaded that the case projected in the suit is concocted and an afterthought story, which is liable to be rejected. The defendant prayed for the dismissal of the suit. -4- 2026:HHC:34094 7. The plaintiffs filed a replication to the written statement, whereby all the averments as made in the plaint were reiterated. 8. The learned trial Court, vide its order dated 24.08.2011, framed the issues in the following manner: 1. Whether revenue entries showing the defendant in possession of the suit land and Kisam of the suit land as Jungal Mehfusa Gair Mehduda, are wrong, illegal, null and void and such entries are required to be deleted from the revenue record by incorporating the possession of plaintiffs and kisam as Banjar Kadim, as alleged? OPP. 2. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative then whether plaintiffs are entitled for a decree of declaration, as prayed for? OPP. 3. Whether plaintiffs are entitled for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction, as prayed for? OPP. 4. Whether, in alternative, the plaintiffs are entitled for a decree of possession, as prayed for? OPP. 5. Whether suit of the plaintiffs is not maintainable? OPD. 6. Whether plaintiffs have not approached the court with clean hands and has suppressed the material facts? OPD. 7. Whether plaintiffs are estopped by their own act and conduct from filing the present suit? OPD. 8. Whether plaintiffs have no locus standi to sue? OPD. 9. Whether suit of the plaintiffs is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD. 10. Whether suit of the plaintiffs is without cause of action? OPD. -5- 2026:HHC:34094 11. Whether defendant is entitled for special costs? OPD. 12. Whether suit of the plaintiffs is time barred? OPD. 13. Relief. 9. Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. directed the respective parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Finally, vide its judgment and decree dated 16.12.2017, learned trial Court decreed the suit filed by the plaintiffs and held the plaintiffs to be the owners in possession of the land comprised in Khata No. 16 min, Khatauni No. 53, Khasra No. 2, Plot No. 1, land measuring 08.25.52 HM, situated in Mauja Mohli, Tehsil Fatehpur, District Kangra, H.P. and ordered the revenue entries to be corrected accordingly. Further, the plaintiffs were also granted decree of permanent prohibitory injunction, restraining the defendant from proclaiming any right, title, or interest over the suit land or interfering in the possession of the plaintiffs in any manner. 10. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant filed an appeal by invoking the provisions of Section 96 of the CPC in the Court of the learned Additional District Judge-II Kangra at Dharamshala (Camp at Dehra) on 01.02.2018. 11. Learned first appellate Court, vide its impugned judgment and decree dated 04.12.2018, dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant/present appellant and affirmed the findings of the learned trial Court. -6- 2026:HHC:34094 12. Still feeling dissatisfied, the defendant has approached this Court by filing the present regular second appeal. 13. It is contended by Mr Manish Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant, that the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below are erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. It is submitted that the learned Courts below have not appreciated the point in controversy and have wrongly decreed the suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondents. It has further been contended that, after accepting the present regular second appeal, the suit filed by the respondents deserves to be rejected. 14. On the other hand, Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, duly assisted by Mr. Atharv Sharma, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents, has defended the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. He submitted that there are concurrent findings of fact returned by the learned Courts below. Therefore, this Court will not interfere with the well-reasoned judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below while exercising powers under Section 100 of the CPC. 15. This court had admitted the appeal on 31.12.2019 on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the Ld. Courts below have fallen in error by presuming that the plaintiffs have proved their title on the basis of latest Jamabandi i.e. 2008-09 Ex. P 4 and without going to the earlier revenue record, where, there -7- 2026:HHC:34094 is no entry, either of plaintiffs or their predecessor-in- interest in the column of ownership? 2. Whether without specific pleadings and evidence with regard to other co-sharers and mortgagees, the relief of declaration and possession can be granted? 3. Whether a declaratory suit can be filed and maintained without impleading all the stake-holders? 16. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material available on the case file. 17. Mr. Manish Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State has argued the case only on substantial question of law No.1 and fairly stated that he does not press the other questions of law. 18. The plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration against the defendant-State on the ground that they are the owners in possession of the land comprised in Khata No.16, Min Khatauni No. 53, Khasra No.2, Plot 1, land measuring 08.25.52 HM, situated in Mohal Mohli, Tehsil Fatehpur, District Kangra, H.P. 19. It is the case of the plaintiffs that during the settlement operation conducted in the year 1984–85, the officials of the settlement authority, without the express knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, recorded the possession of the Forest Department in the column of cultivation and changed the “kisam” of the land to "Jungal Mehfusa Gir Mehduda ". It is the further case of the plaintiffs that the suit land is in their physical possession and the entries showing the -8- 2026:HHC:34094 defendant to be in possession are illegal, wrong, null and void and not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs. 20. The said suit has been contested by the present appellant/defendant, primarily on the ground that the suit land is a dense forest and is in the possession of the defendant. It is the case of the defendant that the settlement officials rightly incorporated the possession of the defendant in the revenue record as per the factual position on the spot and that the plaintiffs never remained in possession of the suit land. 21. In order to substantiate their contentions, plaintiff No.1, Karam Chand, filed his affidavit, Ext.PW-1/A. In the affidavit, he reiterated all the averments as made in the plaint. He averred in the affidavit that in the year 1984–85, the officials of the settlement authorities, in the absence of the plaintiffs and without their express consent, had recorded the possession of the defendant and the said entry is illegal, wrong, null, and void. He stated that the said entry should be deleted from the revenue records. As per the affidavit, the plaintiffs have planted various types of trees over the suit land and the revenue record showing the possession of the defendant is totally incorrect and liable to be corrected. 22. In cross-examination, he stated that it is incorrect that the entry was incorporated in the revenue record because there was a forest on the spot. Self-stated that he is in possession of the suit land. -9- 2026:HHC:34094 He admitted that the said land was not cultivated by the plaintiffs. He further admitted that neither any orchard nor any wooden house has been constructed by the plaintiffs over the same. He denied that by means of the present suit, he intends to occupy forest land. He admitted that trees have grown of their own over the suit land and he denied that he intended to occupy forest land in order to prejudice the rights of the defendant. 23. The plaintiffs examined Desh Raj, who filed his affidavit, Ext. PW-2/A. He has also reiterated the averments as made by PW-1, Karam Chand @ Karmo. 24. In cross-examination, he denied that the suit land is forest land. He denied that the entry was incorporated in the revenue record because the suit land is forest land. He denied that by means of the present suit, the plaintiffs intend to occupy forest land. 25. PW-3 is the statement of Ganesh Singh, who filed his affidavit, Ext. PW-3/A. In his affidavit, he stated that the defendant has no right, title, or interest over the suit land and that the same is owned and possessed by the plaintiffs. As per PW-3, during the settlement operation in 1984–85, the officials of the settlement authority, in the absence of the plaintiffs and without their express consent, incorporated the name of the defendant in the column of possession without any authority or order from the competent Court. He stated that -10- 2026:HHC:34094 the revenue entries, as being reflected, are illegal, wrong, and liable to be deleted. 26. In cross-examination, he denied that there is forest over the suit land. He further denied that the entry was incorporated in the revenue record because there is a forest. 27. PW-4 is the statement of Vijay Singh, who filed his affidavit, Ext.PW-4/A. He has also stated on the same lines as has been done by PW-1 to PW-3. 28. In order to rebut the case of the plaintiffs, the defendant examined, Som Dutt, DW-1 as its witness. He stated in his testimony that in 2013, he was working as a Range Officer in the Range Office, Tehsil Fatehpur, District Kangra. He stated that over the suit land, there is a forest, U.P. 144 Mohali, in which there are various timber trees, which are protected trees. He placed on record photographs of the suit land, which have been exhibited as Ext. DW-1/A to Ext. DW- 1/E. He stated that the plaintiffs filed the suit in order to grab forest land. 29. In cross-examination, DW-1 admitted that as per the revenue record, the suit land is owned by the plaintiffs. He admitted that various trees are standing over the suit land and those trees are owned by the plaintiffs. He admitted that the suit land is owned by the plaintiffs, Karam Chand and others. He stated that he does not know if any tree was planted over the suit land by officials of the Forest -11- 2026:HHC:34094 Department. He admitted that the Government has no concern with the private land. Self-stated that they are only concerned with forest land. 30. The plaintiffs placed on record a copy of the Jamabandi for 2008–09 qua Khasra Nos. 82 & 2, in which the land is shown to be owned by the plaintiffs along with other co-sharers and the same is shown in the possession of the Forest Department. The said Jamabandi was exhibited as Ext. P-4. 31. Ext. P-5 is a copy of the Jamabandi for the year 2003-04, wherein again the plaintiffs are shown as owners along with other co- sharers and the land is shown to be in possession of the Forest Department. 32. In Ext. P-6 the copy of ‘missal haqiat’, the suit land has been carved out post settlement operation and in the column of possession, the Forest Department has been shown to be in possession and classification of the same has been shown to be “Jungal Mehfuja Mehduda”. The perusal of the ‘missal haqiat’ shows that the entry of the Forest Department in the column of possession came for the first time without any order of competent court of law or authority as prior to the said entry the perusal of the jamabandi for the year 1976-77 shows that in the possessory column, the tenants have been shown to be in possession over the suit land bearing Khasra No.482/344 (old) and Khasra No.2 (new) and the classification of the -12- 2026:HHC:34094 land has been shown to be “banjar Kadim”. In the remarks column, it has been reflected that the trees standing on the suit land are owned by the State Government. 33. The appellant has failed to establish and prove that how post settlement operation, an abrupt entry came to be incorporated vide Ext.P-6 in the absence of any material placed on record by the State. Neither any order of competent authority has been placed on record nor the learned Deputy Advocate General has been able to satisfy this Court that on the basis of some legal order, the said entries were incorporated in the “missal haqiat” for the year 1984-85. Since, the State/appellant has failed to demonstrate from the record the basis of such change, therefore, the learned trial Court rightly decreed the suit holding the plaintiffs to be owners in possession of the suit land and the revenue entries were ordered to be corrected accordingly. 34. In the Jamabandi for the year 1963–64, Khasra number has been depicted as 482/344 and the classification of the land has been again shown as banjar kadim. 35. The appellant has failed to establish and prove how the suit land, which was shown in the possession of tenants in earlier revenue records such as the Jamabandi for the years 1963–64 and missal haqiat for 1976–77 where it was classified as banjarqadim, came to be shown in the possession of the Forest Department. -13- 2026:HHC:34094 36. The learned Deputy Advocate General tried to justify the change in the revenue record by submitting that the suit land, being forest land, has been rightly shown as "Jungal Mehfusa " in the record of rights. 37. This Court is in agreement with the findings returned by the learned Courts below, where they have categorically held that the revenue entries have been changed abruptly without any basis or authority. In the absence of an order passed by competent authority, the changes effected in favour of the Forest Department are illegal, wrong, null, and void. 38. Undisputedly, when there is variance between earlier and the later entries, presumption of truth is attached to the later entries till such presumption is rebutted. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Durga Singh of Solan vs. Tholu and others 1962 PLJ (SC) 88 has held that the provisions of Land Revenue Act give presumptive value to the entries in the revenue record and when there is a conflict, it is the later entry which must prevail. It was further held that from the language of the Section itself it follows that where a new entry is substituted from old entry it is the new entry which will take place of the old one and will be entitled to presumption of correctness until and unless it is established to be wrong and substituted by another entry. 39. Similarly, while dealing with the similar provisions contained in Section 44 of Punjab Land Revenue Act, the Hon'ble -14- 2026:HHC:34094 Supreme Court in Dugra (deceased) and others vs. Milkhi Ram and others 1969 PLJ 105 observed as follows: “Where the earlier revenue entries were changed in the later revenue entries and the change was effected without any mutation and there was no order of the revenue authorities showing how the change was made, although presumption (under Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act) would be in favour of later entries, but that presumption was a rebuttable one and it would stand rebutted by the fact that alteration in the later entries was made unauthorisedly or mistakenly, there being no material to justify the change of entries.” (Emphasis supplied) 40. This Court in Chaudhary Sada Ram and others vs. Chaudhary Amarnath ILR 1984 H.P. 509, citing the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court, held that an abrupt change in the revenue record without any order of the competent Court of law carries no sanctity or authenticity. 41. The said proposition of law has been reiterated by this Court in Suresh Chand and others vs. Gurdas Ram and others, 2003(3) Shm. L.C. 304, which reads as follows: “13. Undisputedly, when there is variance between earlier and the later entries, the presumption of truth is attached to the later entries till such presumption is rebutted. 14. The provisions contained in Section 45, H.P. Land Revenue Act are similar to the provisions of Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act the Hon'ble Supreme Court -15- 2026:HHC:34094 in Raja Durga Singh of Solan v. Tholu and others, 1962 PLJ 88 (SC), has held that these provisions give a presumptive value to the entries in the revenue record and where there is a conflict, it is the later entry which must prevail. It was further held that from the language of the Section itself, it follows that where a new entry is substituted for an old entry, it is that new entry which will take the place of the old one and will be entitled to presumption of correctness until and unless it is established to be wrong or substituted by another entry. 15. Again, while dealing with the similar provisions contained in Section 44, Punjab Land Revenue Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Durga (deceased) and others v. Milkhi Ram and others, 1969 PLJ 105 (SC), observed: - "Where the earlier revenue entries were changed in the later revenue entries and the change was effected without any mutation and there was no order of the revenue authorities showing how the change was made, although presumption (under Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act) would 2014:HHC:11899 be in favour of the later entries, but that presumption was a rebuttable one and it would stand rebutted by the fact that alteration in the later entries was made unauthorisedly or mistakenly, there being no material to justify the change of entries." (Emphasis supplied) 42. The same proposition of law has been reiterated in RSA No.102 of 1999, dated 13.06.2011, titled Jagdev Singh v. Smt. Bhagwanti and Others, wherein it was observed as under: “19. Each case has to be examined on its own facts. Entries of tenancy which are in existence for a long time can themselves show that such entries are proof of the tenancy themselves. In the present case there was a clear-cut pleading by the plaintiffs of tenancy. They also proved on -16- 2026:HHC:34094 record the documents Ext.P-1 to Ext.P-3, which showed the existence of the tenancy. In Ext.P-4, which is of the year 1966-67, Sohan Singh is shown to be the person in possession. The question which arises is whether this entry which was made in the year 1966-67 should be relied upon or not because admittedly thereafter the possession was shown of the defendants only. 20. xxx xxx xxx 21. Another important factor in this case is that the first entry showing the defendants or their predecessors-in- interest to be in possession was incorporated in the year 1966-67. The suit was filed in the year 1985 and thus the entries in favour of the defendants were continuing for almost two decades and these entries showed the defendants to be in possession of the suit land. The tenancy, if any, of the plaintiffs was not in favour of the plaintiffs alone but in favour of a large number of persons. The predecessors-ininterest of the plaintiffs were not in exclusive possession of the entire land measuring 243-11 kanals. It appears that a large number of covillagers were shown to be in possession and a formal entry showing them to be tenants was made. There could have, in fact, been no tenancy over the land which admittedly is uncultivable. In Ext.P-1 to Ext.P-3 a large number of persons are shown to be owners and similarly a large number of persons are shown to be in possession. However, in Ext.P-4 only Sohan Singh is shown to be in possession of the suit land. No doubt, there is no material on record to show how this change in the entry was recorded but keeping in view the nature of the suit land and the fact that Sohan Singh was one of the co-owners, it cannot be said that this entry is wrong. As far as Ext.P-5 is concerned sons of Sohan Singh and the family members themselves are shown to be sole owners. This entry is of the year 1982-83. Therefore, entry in favour of Sohan Singh was incorporated for the first time -17- 2026:HHC:34094 prior to year 1966-67. There is some legitimacy attached to these entries of more than two decades. Furthermore entries in the revenue record are just pieces of evidence. The plaintiffs have failed to show that how and in what capacity they were tenants. Even assuming that their predecessors were tenants, the plaintiffs themselves have failed to lead any evidence to show that they are actually in possession of the suit land. The learned lower Appellate Court totally misdirected itself and misread the oral and documentary evidence which clearly showed that the plaintiffs had virtually admitted that the defendants were in possession of the suit land. There can be no tenancy without possession and, therefore, the learned trial Court was justified in holding that the plaintiffs have failed to show that they are owners in possession of the suit land.” 43. To the similar extent this Court in Shiam Singh and others v. Chaman Lal and others, 2011 (2) Shim. LC 1, held as under: “17. So far as substantial question of law No. 5 is concerned, all the three brothers were recorded as joint tenants in the Jamabandi for the year 1947-48, copy Ext. P- 10. In the subsequent Jamabandis for the years 1951-52, copy Ext.P-1 and 1955-56, copy Ext. P6 also, all of them were recorded as joint tenants and the physical possession was recorded with Nand Lal, not in his individual capacity, but as a co-sharer (co-tenant). This possession of Nand Lal was for himself and on behalf of his other two brothers, as their agent, as explained hereinabove, while dealing with substantial question of law No. 4. This entry was changed in the Misal Hakiat, copy Ext. P-5. Per oral evidence, this Misal Hakiat was prepared on the basis of settlement carried out in the year 1968 or 1969. In this document, names of Prem Singh and Kushal Singh, the other two brothers, i.e. the -18- 2026:HHC:34094 predecessors of the plaintiffs, were omitted. There is absolutely no evidence, leave alone any documentary evidence, in the form of record prepared in the settlement process, supporting the change in the entries. When a state of things is shown to have been in existence for a sufficient long time, the presumption is that such a state of things continues, unless contrary is proved.” 44. Therefore, in view of the exposition of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court, I am of the considered view that the revenue entries changed in favour of the defendant without authority and in the absence of an order by a competent Court of law carry no sanctity. Therefore, the learned Courts below rightly held the entries to be illegal, null and void, and not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs. 45. Another contention as raised by the learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant is that the suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondents is hopelessly time-barred, as the entries in favour of the Forest Department were incorporated about 40 years ago, whereas the suit was filed in 2010. 46. To this submission of the learned Deputy Advocate General, it is apt to mention that the cause of action in favour of the plaintiffs arose on the date when the rights of the plaintiffs were infringed and not from the date when revenue entries were changed in the record of rights. The limitation would begin to run not from the date of the entry affecting the right of the person concerned, but from the -19- 2026:HHC:34094 date when he feels aggrieved by the entry and it is the satisfaction of such person as to when does he feel aggrieved. 47. This exposition of law was laid down by this Court in Taj Ali vs. Charg Deen and others, 2015(3) Shm. LC 1486, which reads as follows: “15. While deciding the issue of limitation, the lower appellate Court heavily relied upon para-9 of the plaint which reads as under:- “9. That the cause of action has arisen to the plaintiff on 22-10-90 when the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade dismissed the application of the plaintiff for correction and directed the parties to file civil suit to get the entry corrected and also on such dates when the wrong entry in favour of Taaj Din as son of Shri Sher Ali has been incorporated.” 16. Significantly the appellate Court ignored para-8 of the plaint which reads as under:- “8. The plaintiff came to know of this wrong entry in 1986 and then filed an application under section 37 of H.P. Land Revenue Act before the Assistant Collector, 2nd Grade, Kot-Khai on 26-6-1986 and the said application was dismissed and decided by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade Kot-Khai on 22-10-90 on the ground that party aggrieved by the wrong entry should seek redress in the civil court under section 46 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, hence this suit.” 17. It cannot be disputed that the entry of mutation dated 9.11.1949 was assailed for the first time only in the year 1986. But then plaintiff has explained of having learnt about the same, immediately prior to initiation of action under the provisions of the H.P. Land Revenue Act. While rejecting such application, liberty was reserved, enabling the plaintiff to institute appropriate proceedings before a Civil Court. It -20- 2026:HHC:34094 was for this reason that in the year 1991 suit came to be filed. 18. This Court in Shiam Singh & others vs. Chaman Lal & others, 2011 (2) Shim. LC 1, has held that for a suit for declaration, limitation would begin to run not from the date of the entry affecting the right of the person concerned, but from the date when he feels aggrieved by the entry and it is the satisfaction of such person as to when does he feel aggrieved. Defendant cannot be heard to say that the plaintiff would have felt aggrieved by the entry at some earlier point of time or when it was actually made. The Court further held that:- “15. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the plaintiffs-respondents were out of possession of the suit land and, hence, their suit was not covered by the provision of Section 46 of H.P. Land Revenue Act. Submission is misconceived. Section 46 does not speak of physical possession of the subject matter or the land with respect to the entry of which a person is aggrieved, but the right of the plaintiff. The person should be in possession of the right and not the land, with respect to the entry of which he is aggrieved. … …” … … “16. It is well settled proposition of law that possession of a co-sharer is the possession of all. A cosharer in exclusive possession holds the property for himself and also on behalf of the co-sharers not in physical possession. Such a co-sharer is an agent of other co- sharers, who are out of possession, in regard to their shares in the joint property. In view of this legal position, plaintiffs are to be presumed to be co-sharers with the defendants. This is especially so when the defendants- appellants have not taken the plea of ouster of the plaintiffs-respondents. Question is answered accordingly.” -21- 2026:HHC:34094 19. In Daya Singh & another vs. Gurdev Singh (Dead) by LRs & others, (2010) 2 SCC 194, Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India had the occasion to deal with a case where challenge to the entries reflected in the revenue record was laid after a period of 18 years. Upholding such action initiated by the aggrieved party, the Court framed a question to itself as to whether mere existence of an adverse entry in the revenue records would give rise to cause of action, as contemplated under Article 58 or would accrue when such right stood infringed or threatened to be infringed. Answering the same, relying upon Bolo vs. Koklan, (1929-30) 57 IA 325: AIR 1930 PC 270 and C. Mohammad Yunus vs. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808 the Court held that cause of action, would accrue only when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or there is at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right. The Court further held that mere existence of an adverse entry in the revenue records would not give rise to cause of action. 20. The view stands reiterated in Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla vs. Hargovind Jasraj & another, (2013) 3 SCC 182. 21. Now in the instant case also, plaintiff categorically pleaded and proved through his testimony of having acquired knowledge of incorrect entries, immediately prior to initiating action in the year 1986. In this view of the matter, the lower appellate Court erred in holding the plaintiff’s suit to be barred by limitation. As such, findings are reversed. Suit filed by the plaintiff cannot be said to be barred by limitation. Substantial question of law is answered accordingly.” 48. Therefore, the submission of the learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant that the suit was filed beyond the period of limitation does not hold good, as the plaintiffs specifically stated that -22- 2026:HHC:34094 the cause of action arose to them in July 2009 when they came to know regarding the wrong entries and after the expiry of the notice period, the same is still recurring against the defendant. 49. This Court is of the considered opinion that learned Courts below rightly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence on record and after perusing the same, the suit as filed by the plaintiffs/respondents was decreed for declaration holding the revenue entries in favour of the Forest Department to be wrong, illegal, null and void. 50. In the present case, there are concurrent findings of fact rendered by the learned Courts below and the scope of interference in the concurrent findings of fact, as per the various judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, is very narrow and limited. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held in its various decisions that the High Court cannot re- appreciate the evidence to substitute its own view for a plausible finding of fact arrived at by the learned first appellate Court. 51. Reference in this regard is made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty AIR 1996 SC 3521, wherein it has been held as under: “10. This Court, time without number, pointed out that interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to re-appreciating the evidence just to replace the findings for the lower courts. -23- 2026:HHC:34094 20. In our considered view the lower Appellate Court has fairly appreciated the evidence in the above background and has reached the conclusion that the suit was not barred by Limitation. Even assuming that another view is possible on a re-appreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the First Appellate Court was based on no material.” 52. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait and others (1997) 5 SCC 438 has held as under: “10. We would only add that (a) it is the duty cast upon the High Court to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the case even at the initial stage; and (b) that in (exceptional) cases, at a later point of time, when the Court exercises its jurisdiction under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 C.P.C in formulating the substantial question of law, the opposite party should be put on notice thereon and should be given a fair or proper opportunity to meet the point. Proceeding to hear the appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal is illegal and is an abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on Court; and even after the formulation of the substantial question of law, if a fair or proper opportunity is not afforded to the opposite side, it will amount to denial of natural justice. The above parameters within which the High Court has to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC should always be borne in mind. We are sorry to state that the above aspects are seldom borne in mind in many cases and second appeals are entertained and/or disposed of, without conforming to the above discipline. -24- 2026:HHC:34094 11. The guidelines to determine as to what is a "substantial question of law" within the meaning of Section 100 CPC, have been laid down by this Court in a Constitution Bench decision in Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd There is also a later decision of this Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India3. It is unnecessary to deal at length with that aspect any further.” 53. In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, AIR 1999 SC 2213, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “5. It is not within the domain of the High court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate Court. It is true that the lower appellate Court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court, in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate Court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” -25- 2026:HHC:34094 54. In Naresh and others vs. Hemant and others, (2022) 18 SCC 802, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “10. The High Court invoked the presumption without proper consideration and appreciation of the facts considered and dealt with by two courts holding by reasoned conclusions why the presumption stood rebutted on the facts. The High Court also committed an error of record by holding that there was no evidence that Trimbakrao Ingole alone had constructed the house, a finding patently contrary to the admission of PW-1 in his evidence. The fact that mutation also was done in the name of Trimbakrao Ingole alone which remain unchallenged at any time was also not noticed. The conclusion of the High Court that improper appreciation of evidence amounted to perversity is completely unsustainable. No finding has been arrived at that any evidence had been admitted contrary to the law or that a finding was based on no evidence only in which circumstance the High Court could have interfered in the second appeal. 2. The High Court therefore manifestly erred by interfering with the concurrent findings on facts by two courts below in exercise of powers under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code, a jurisdiction confined to substantial questions of law only. Merely because the High Court may have been of the opinion that the inferences and conclusions on the evidence were erroneous, and that another conclusion to its satisfaction could be drawn, cannot be justification for the High Court to have interfered. 12.In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojappa, (1964) 2 SCR 673, this court with regard to the scope for interference in a second appeal with facts under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code observed as follows: “12. ….The admissibility of evidence is no doubt a point of law, but once it is shown that the evidence on which courts -26- 2026:HHC:34094 of fact have acted was admissible and relevant, it is not open to a party feeling aggrieved by the findings recorded by the courts of fact to contend before the High Court in second appeal that the said evidence is not sufficient to justify the findings of fact in question. It has been always recognised that the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact is a matter for decision of the court of facts and cannot be agitated in a second appeal. Sometimes, this position is expressed by saying that like all questions of fact, sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a case is also left to the jury for its verdict. This position has always been accepted without dissent and it can be stated without any doubt that it enunciates what can be properly characterised as an elementary proposition. Therefore, whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by s. 100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid.” -27- 2026:HHC:34094 13.Though precedents abound on this settled principle of law, we do not consider it necessary to burden our discussion unnecessarily except to rely further on Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, (2007) 1 SCC 546, holding as follows: “71. The fact that, in a series of cases, this Court was compelled to interfere was because the true legislative intendment and scope of Section 100 CPC have neither been appreciated nor applied. A class of judges while administering law honestly believe that, if they are satisfied that, in any second appeal brought before them evidence has been grossly misappreciated either by the lower appellate court or by both the courts below, it is their duty to interfere, because they seem to feel that a decree following upon a gross misappreciation of evidence involves injustice and it is the duty of the High Court to redress such injustice. We would like to reiterate that the justice has to be administered in accordance with law. xxxx 73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as early as in 1890 stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, and they added a note of warning that no court in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section 100. xxxx 81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure findings of fact even after the amendment of Section 100 CPC in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the -28- 2026:HHC:34094 amendment of Section 100 CPC. The judgment of the High Court is clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention. 82. In view of the clear legislative mandate crystallised by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the High Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs.” 14.The order of the High Court interfering with concurrent findings of facts by two courts is, therefore, held to be unsustainable in exercise of the powers under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. The order of the High Court is consequently set aside. The orders dated 06.03.1998 and 13.06.2002 of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are restored. The suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed. The present appeal is allowed.” 55. In Brij Narayan Shukla (dead) through legal representatives vs. Sudesh Kumar Alias Suresh Kumar (dead) through Legal Representatives and others, (2024) 2 SCC 590, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “10.2 The High Court was hearing the Second Appeal under section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and it having reappreciated the findings to disturb findings of fact, committed an error.” 56. In Civil Appeal No.5131 of 2025, titled as R. Nagaraj (dead) through LRs and another vs. Rajmani and others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: -29- 2026:HHC:34094 “7. By the impugned judgment and order and without answering anything on the substantial questions of law framed/formulated, absolutely in a casual manner, the High Court has allowed the Second Appeal and has set aside the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below and thereafter has remanded the matter to the learned trial Court permitting the original plaintiff to amend the plaint and pray for fixation of the boundary. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, we are constrained to observe that the manner in which the High Court has dealt with the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC is not appreciable at all. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has exercised the powers as if the High Court was deciding the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court has not appreciated at all that the High Court was deciding the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC and that too against the concurrent findings of fact by both the courts below, which were, as such, on appreciation of evidence on record. Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable.11. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that the High Court was dealing with the Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC and the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below which were on appreciation of evidence on record. Neither at the stage of deciding the suit nor even before the first Appellate Court even such a prayer was made to amend the plaint, which is now permitted by the High Court, despite the fact that earlier in the suit during the course of trial, the plaint was amended. Under the circumstances also, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable.” -30- 2026:HHC:34094 57. No other point was urged by the learned counsel for the parties. 58. The substantial question of law framed is answered accordingly. 59. In view of the observations made hereinabove, there is no merit in the present appeal, and the same is ordered to be dismissed. 60. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (Romesh Verma) Judge August 04, 2026 (vt)