2026:HHC:35439 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 40 of 2015 Reserved on: 14.08.2026 Date of Decision: 21.08.2026 Rajinder Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr A.S. Rana, Advocate. For the respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 19.12.2014 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (I), Una, District Una, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 15.01.2013 and order of sentence dated 17.01.2013 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.3, Una, District Una, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:35439 manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the accused was driving a vehicle bearing registration No. PB-07G-7202 on 10.05.2007. He lost control of the vehicle, and the vehicle fell off the road into a gorge. The accused, Dilbag Singh (PW2) and Raghubir Singh (PW3), sustained injuries in the accident. They were taken to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police, and an entry (Ext.PW10/K) was recorded at the police station. HC Sukhdev (PW4) was sent to the spot for verification. He found that the vehicle bearing registration No. PB-07G-7202 had fallen into the gorge. He sent a Rukka (Ext.PW4/A) to the police station, where FIR (Ext.PW7/C) was registered. HC Ravinder Singh (PW7) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW7/A). He seized the vehicle vide memo (Ext.PW1/A). HC Sarup Lal (PW6) examined the vehicle and found that there was no defect in it which could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW6/A). HC Ashok Kumar 3 2026:HHC:35439 (PW9) took the photographs (Ext.PW9/C) of the vehicle. Surjeet Ram produced the documents of the vehicle which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW1/B). Dr V.K. Raizada (PW12) examined Raghubir and found that he had sustained multiple injuries. He advised X-ray, but no report was received by him. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW12/B). He also examined Dlbag Singh and accused Rajinder Singh and found that they had sustained simple injuries that could have been caused in the accident. He issued the MLCs (Ext.PW12/C and Ext.PW12/D). Raghubir Singh went to Bharaj Life Care Hospital and Trauma Centre, Hoshiarpur, where Dr Rachpal Singh (PW11) examined him and found that Raghubir Singh had sustained a fracture of both bones of the left leg. He issued the discharge slip (Ext.PW11A), bill (Ext.PW11B) and OPD slip (Ext.PW11C). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4 2026:HHC:35439 4. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses to prove its case. HC Ravinder Kumar (PW1) witnessed the recovery. Dilbag Singh (PW2) and Raghubir Singh (PW3) were travelling in the vehicle. HC Sukhdev Singh (PW4) went to the spot after coming to know of the accident. Surjit Rana (PW5) witnessed the recovery. HHC Sarup Lal (PW6) mechanically examined the vehicle. HC Ravinder Singh (PW7) investigated the matter. Balbir Singh (PW8) witnessed the recovery. HC Ashok Kumar (PW9) took the photographs. Constable Rajesh Kumar (PW10) proved the entries in the daily diary. Dr Rachpal Singh (PW11) treated Raghubir Singh. Dr V.K. Raizada (PW12) examined the injured and the accused. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that he was driving the vehicle bearing registration No. PB-07G-7202 on 10.05.2007. He admitted that the police had seized the van and the documents. He stated that he was not negligent and a false FIR was registered against him. The witnesses also deposed against him falsely. He claimed that he was innocent. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses proved that the accused was driving the van 5 2026:HHC:35439 in a rash or negligent manner. He had put the vehicle into neutral gear. The speed of the vehicle increased, and the accused could not control it, which led to the accident. Dilbag Singh and Raghubir Singh had sustained injuries in the accident. Therefore, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and sentenced him as under: Sections Sentence Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code To undergo simple imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of ₹300/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. Section 338 of the Indian Penal Code To undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge(I), Una, District 6 2026:HHC:35439 Una (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle by putting it in neutral gear. He was asked repeatedly not to do so, but he did not heed the advice. The speed of the vehicle increased, and the accused could not control it. Dilbag Singh and Raghubir Singh had sustained injuries in the accident. The sentence imposed by learned Trial Court was adequate. There was no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. Dilbag Singh (PW2) and Raghubir Singh (PW3) could not identify the accused as the driver of the vehicle. The mechanical report also did not show that the vehicle was in a neutral gear, which falsifies the prosecution version. The learned Trial Court had imposed a harsh sentence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and judgment and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 7 2026:HHC:35439 9. I have heard Mr A.S. Rana, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 10. Mr A.S. Rana, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the identity of the accused as driver of the vehicle was not established. The occupants of the vehicle could not identify him in the Court. The occupants of the vehicle were not experts, and their testimonies that the accused had put the vehicle in neutral gear were not believable. Driving the vehicle at a high speed does not constitute any negligence, and learned Courts below erred in holding the accused negligent. The statement of Dr Rachpal Singh (PW11) was not believable because he had initially stated that there was no fracture. The fracture of both bones of the left leg did not correspond to the injuries noticed by Dr V. K. Raizada (PW12). The learned Trial Court had imposed an excessive sentence. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the statements of the occupants of the vehicle clearly proved that the accused had put the 8 2026:HHC:35439 vehicle in a neutral gear, which is a violation of Rule 172 of Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1999. This was the proximate cause of the accident, and the learned Courts below have rightly held that the accused was negligent. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent finding of facts while deciding the revision. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485 that a revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court. It was observed: - “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as hereunder: “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local 9 2026:HHC:35439 jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should be exercised within the four corners of this section whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However, while exercising power under this section, the Court does not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision, considers the material only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the ground that an alternative view is possible on 10 2026:HHC:35439 the facts of the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate from the evidence on record. 7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri) 2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving re- examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts. 7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents and merits of the case which could have been avoided, especially when the subject matter had come under its revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of the case, something which is generally impermissible unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court 11 2026:HHC:35439 to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless: i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or untenable in law. ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after considering immaterial or irrelevant material or no material at all. iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the High Court had reversed concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside the impugned order, observed as under: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the 12 2026:HHC:35439 Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.” 7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High Court has failed to highlight any reason or material satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. 14. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Dilbag Singh (PW2) stated that he had hired a vehicle for ₹450/-. He could not identify the accused because of lapse of time. He was permitted to be cross-examined, and he admitted that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Raghubir Singh (PW3) stated that he had hired a taxi for ₹450/-. The accused present in the Court was driving the vehicle. He could 13 2026:HHC:35439 identify the accused because he was travelling with him. The accused admitted in reply to question No. 2 that he was driving the vehicle bearing registration number PB-07G-7202 which was going downhill towards Pandoga on 10.05.2007 at about 09.30 p.m. The statement made by the accused corroborates the testimonies of Dilbag Singh (PW2) and Raghubir Singh (PW3) that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705: 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC. It was observed at page 742: “51. That brings us to the question of whether such a statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is administered to the accused, the statements made by the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why sub- section (3) says that the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment if he gives false answers. Then comes sub-section (4), which reads: “313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.” Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is clear 14 2026:HHC:35439 on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari (1967) 3 SCR 708: AIR 1968 SC 110: 1968 Cri LJ 95. This Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M.B. 1951 SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC 468, held that an answer given by an accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 678: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730, this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the exact language in which the three-Judge bench answered the question, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at pages 684-685: “Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from the accused his version or explanation, if any, of the incident which forms the subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By sub- section (3), the answers given by the accused may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examination under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charged against him the court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he does not confess and in explaining circumstance appearing in the evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no 15 2026:HHC:35439 offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety.” (emphasis supplied) Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section (1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it now stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the presence of the accused is dispensed with, his examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with. Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub-section (4), asd the present sub- section (3) corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub-section (3). Therefore, the aforesaid observations apply with equal force.” 16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can be used to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but such statement cannot form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244: 27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State of 16 2026:HHC:35439 Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422: (SCC pp. 357-58, para 23) “23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently improbable but is contradicted by the other evidence. According to this statement, the injury that the appellant received was caused by the appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim. This was contradicted by the statement of the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The injury found on his body when he was examined by the doctor on 13-10-1961 negates both these versions. Neither of these versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which led to his washing his clothes and having a bath in River Patro, the amount of bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains being so considerable as to attract the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one, as his clothes all got stained with blood, as also his books, his exercise book, his belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife which was discovered on his person was found to have been stained with blood according to the report of the Chemical Examiner. According to the post-mortem report, this knife could have been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like these, there being enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piercing the same with the other evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime.” (emphasis supplied) 17. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 213, that the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so 17 2026:HHC:35439 far as it supports the prosecution’s case, can be used against him for recording a conviction. It was observed at page 275: - “52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to put material evidence to the accused under Section 313 CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing against him as well as to put forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution, can be used against him for rendering a conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.” 18. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to lend corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was held at page 761: - 24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement, if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be brushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held that since no oath is administered to the accused, the statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of course, shall not render himself liable to punishment merely on the basis of answers given while he was being examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, 18 2026:HHC:35439 sub-section (4) says that the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court, in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953 Cri LJ 1933, held that the answers given by the accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR 678, this Court held that when the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the court may rely upon the confession and proceed to convict him. 25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244, para 27) “27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction.” In this connection, reference may also be made to the judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185 and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766. The abovementioned decisions would indicate that the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt or confession as such cannot be made the sole basis for finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is not making the statement on oath, but all the same the confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of evidence since the same lends credence to the evidence led by the prosecution. 26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by the accused while examining him under Section 313, fully corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 19 2026:HHC:35439 and hence the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved, and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.” 19. HC Sukh Dev (PW4) stated that the driver identified himself as Joginder Singh and he had sustained injuries. He was referred to the hospital. The accused disclosed his name as Rajinder Singh in the hospital. Dr V.K. Raizada (PW12) examined the accused and found that the accused had sustained simple injuries in the accident. These injuries corroborate the prosecution version that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. 20. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was driving the van and the submission that the accused was not proved to be the driver of the vehicle is not acceptable. 21. Dilbag Singh (PW2) stated that the vehicle was going downhill and the driver had put the vehicle in a neutral condition. He stated in his cross-examination that he did not know how to drive the vehicle. However, he volunteered to say that he used to drive the tractor. Similarly, Raghubir Singh (PW3) stated that the accused put the vehicle in neutral when it started going down the 20 2026:HHC:35439 hill. He asked the accused not to put the vehicle in neutral gear, but the accused did not heed his request. He stated in his cross- examination that he used to drive the tractor and had knowledge about driving the vehicle. Therefore, both the witnesses used to drive the tractor and they could depose whether the vehicle was being driven in neutral gear or not. Thus, the findings recorded by learned Courts below that the accused had put the vehicle in neutral gear are duly supported by the evidence on record. 22. Rule 172 of HP Motor Vehicles Rules, 1991 provides that no person shall drive a motor vehicle with a clutch pedal depressed or with any free wheel or other device in operation which frees the engine from the driving wheels and prevents the engine from acting as a brake when the vehicle is going down. Thus, the rule casts an obligation upon the driver not to disengage the gear. In the present case, the witnesses consistently stated that the accused had put the vehicle into neutral gear, meaning that the gears were disengaged and there was a violation of Rule 172 of HP Motor Vehicles Rule, 1991 leading to the accident. 23. Dilbag Singh (PW2) and Raghubir Singh (PW3) consistently stated that the vehicle had fallen into the gorge. HC Sukhdev Singh (PW4) corroborated this version. Balbir Singh 21 2026:HHC:35439 (PW8) also stated that the vehicle bearing registration No. PB- 07G-7202 had fallen into the gorge. HC Ashok Kumar (PW9) took the photographs (Ext.PW9/A to Ext. PW9/C) in which the vehicle is shown to have fallen into the gorge. A site plan (Ext.PW7/A) also shows that the vehicle has fallen 15 feet downhill into a gorge. Therefore, the material on record shows that the vehicle had left the road and fallen into a gorge. The site plan (Ext.PW7/A) shows that the road is straight and does not have any curve. It was laid down in Keshav Murti vs. State, 2002 Criminal Law 103 (Karnataka) that where the accident had taken place on a wide road, and the vehicle had left the road, the maxim of res ipsa loquitur would apply and the burden would shift upon the accused to explain as to how the accident had taken place. It was observed: “Here is a car proceeding from Bangalore to Shimoga. At the place concerned, there are no other vehicles on the road. There is no obstruction. The road is of a width of 19 ft. of cement and tar road, with 6 ft. kacha road on either side. Still, the vehicle hits a roadside tree. Added to that, there is a report of the IMV Inspector at Ex. P. 5 to the effect that the accident is not due to any mechanical defect in the vehicle. In such a situation, an accident of this nature would prima facie show that the same could not be accounted for by anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle, i.e., the petitioner. A presumption in that regard thus arises. In such a case, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, it is for the petitioner-driver to explain how the accident occurred without negligence on his part. What the 22 2026:HHC:35439 petitioner has done in the course of his examination under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code is simply denying everything. He does not say anything, and even to the general question that is asked at the end as to whether he has got anything to say, he did not choose to say anything, nor did he care to explain the manner in which the accident occurred, i.e., in order to rebut the above said presumption as regards the accident occurring due to his negligence, and in order to show that accident occurred for a particular reason not attributable to his negligence. This was, therefore, an appropriate case wherein, on the basis of a presumption that the Supreme Court was speaking about, that conviction could be based.” 24. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thakur Singh Vs. State of Punjab 2003(9) SCC 208 that where the accident speaks for itself, it is sufficient for the prosecution to establish the accident and the burden will shift upon the accused to explain the same. Thus, where the accused admits that he was driving the vehicle which fell into a canal, the burden was upon him to establish that the accident had taken place due to some circumstances other than his negligence. It was observed: “It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge and then it fell into the canal. In such a situation, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play, and the burden shifts onto the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part.” 23 2026:HHC:35439 25. This principle was discussed in detail by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 9 SCC 284 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 660 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1107: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 607 and it was held that where the accident by its nature is more consistent its being caused by negligence than by any other cause mere happening of the accident is per se sufficient to invoke the principle of res ipsa loquitor and in absence of any explanation by the driver of the vehicle, he is liable to be convicted for rash and negligent driving. It was observed at page 295: - “(A) Rash and negligent driving 12. Rash and negligent driving has to be examined in the light of the facts and circumstances of a given case. It is a fact incapable of being construed or seen in isolation. It must be examined in light of the attendant circumstances. A person who drives a vehicle on the road is liable to be held responsible for the act as well as for the result. It may not always be possible to determine with reference to the speed of a vehicle whether a person was driving rashly or negligently. Both these acts presuppose abnormal conduct. Even when one is driving a vehicle at a slow speed but recklessly and negligently, it would amount to “rash and negligent driving” within the meaning of the language of Section 279 IPC. That is why the legislature, in its wisdom, has used the words “manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life”. The preliminary conditions, thus, are that (a) it is the manner in which the vehicle is driven; (b) it be driven either rashly or negligently; and (c) such rash or negligent driving should be such as to endanger human life. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the penalty contemplated under Section 279 IPC is attracted. 24 2026:HHC:35439 13. “Negligence” means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations would not do. Negligence is not an absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically exact formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. Whether there exists negligence per se or the course of conduct amounts to negligence will normally depend upon the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances which have to be taken into consideration by the court. In a given case, even not doing what one ought to do can constitute negligence. 14. The court has to adopt another parameter, i.e. “reasonable care” in determining the question of negligence or contributory negligence. The doctrine of reasonable care imposes an obligation or a duty upon a person (for example, a driver) to care for the pedestrian on the road, and this duty attains a higher degree when the pedestrians happen to be children of tender years. It is axiomatic to say that while driving a vehicle on a public way, there is an implicit duty cast on the drivers to see that their driving does not endanger the life of the right users of the road, maybe either vehicular users or pedestrians. They are expected to take sufficient care to avoid danger to others. 15. The other principle that is pressed in aid by the courts in such cases is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine serves two purposes — one that an accident may by its nature be more consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the opposite party is responsible than by any other causes and that in such a case, the mere fact of the accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. Secondly, it is to avoid hardship in cases where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot prove how the accident occurred. The courts have also applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur in cases where no direct evidence was brought on record. The Act itself contains a provision which concerns the consequences of driving dangerously alike the 25 2026:HHC:35439 provision in the IPC that the vehicle is driven in a manner dangerous to public life. Where a person does such an offence, he is punished as per the provisions of Section 184 of the Act. The courts have also taken the concepts of “culpable rashness” and “culpable negligence” into consideration in cases of road accidents. “Culpable rashness” is acting with the consciousness that mischievous and illegal consequences may follow but with the hope that they will not and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening. The imputability arises from acting despite consciousness (luxuria). “Culpable negligence” is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of the civic duty of circumspection. In such a case the mere fact of accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. This maxim suggests that in the circumstances of a given case, the res speaks and is eloquent because the facts stand unexplained, with the result that the natural and reasonable inference from the facts, not a conjectural inference, shows that the act is attributable to some person's negligent conduct. [Ref. Justice Rajesh Tandon's An Exhaustive Commentary on Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (1st Edn., 2010).] 16. We have noticed these principles in order to examine the questions raised in the present case in their correct perspective. We may notice that certain doctrines falling in the realm of accidental civil or tortious jurisprudence are quite applicable to the cases falling under criminal jurisprudence like the present one. 17. Now, we may refer to some judgments of this Court which would provide guidance for determinatively answering such questions. In Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra [(2012) 2 SCC 648: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 848] where the driver of a vehicle was driving the vehicle at a high speed at late hours of the night in a drunken state and killed seven labourers sleeping on the 26 2026:HHC:35439 pavement, injuring other eight, this Court dismissing the appeal, laid down the tests to determine criminal culpability on the basis of “knowledge”, as follows: (SCC pp. 663-64, para 41) “41. Rash or negligent driving on a public road with the knowledge of the dangerous character and the likely effect of the act and resulting in death may fall in the category of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. A person, doing an act of rash or negligent driving, if aware of a risk that a particular consequence is likely to result and that result occurs, may be held guilty not only of the act but also of the result. As a matter of law—in view of the provisions of IPC—the cases which fall within the last clause of Section 299 but not within clause ‘Fourthly’ of Section 300 may cover the cases of rash or negligent acts done with the knowledge of the likelihood of its dangerous consequences and may entail punishment under Section 304 Part II IPC. Section 304-A IPC takes out of its ambit the cases of death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act amounting to culpable homicide of either description.” (emphasis supplied) 18. Again, in Naresh Giri v. State of M.P. [(2008) 1 SCC 791: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 324], where a train had hit a bus being driven by the appellant at the railway crossing and the bus was badly damaged and two persons died, this Court, while altering the charges from Section 302 IPC to Section 304-A IPC, observed: (SCC pp. 794-97, paras 7-9 & 13) “7. Section 304-A IPC applies to cases where there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act done in all probability will cause death. The provision is directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC. Section 304-A applies only to such acts which are rash and negligent and are directly the cause of death of another person. Negligence and rashness are essential elements under Section 304-A. 8. Section 304-A carves out a specific offence where death is caused by doing a rash or negligent act, and that act does not amount to culpable homicide under Section 299 27 2026:HHC:35439 or murder under Section 300. If a person wilfully drives a motor vehicle into the midst of a crowd and thereby causes death to some person, it will not be a case of mere rash and negligent driving, and the act will amount to culpable homicide. Doing an act with the intent to kill a person or knowledge that doing an act was likely to cause a person's death is culpable homicide. When intent or knowledge is the direct motivating force of the act, Section 304-A has to make room for the graver and more serious charge of culpable homicide. The provision of this section is not limited to rash or negligent driving. Any rash or negligent act whereby the death of any person is caused becomes punishable. Two elements, either of which or both of which may be proved to establish the guilt of an accused, are rashness/negligence; a person may cause death by a rash or negligent act which may have nothing to do with driving at all. Negligence and rashness to be punishable in terms of Section 304-A must be attributable to a state of mind wherein the criminality arises not because of an error in judgment but of deliberation in the mind, risking the crime as well as the life of the person who may lose his life as a result of the crime. Section 304-A discloses that criminality may be that, apart from any mens rea, there may be no motive or intention; still a person may venture or practise such rashness or negligence which may cause the death of others. The death so caused is not the determining factor. 9. What constitutes negligence has been analysed in Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.), Vol. 34, Para 1 (p. 3), as follows: ‘1. General principles of the law of negligence. — Negligence is a specific tort and in any given circumstance is the failure to exercise that care which the circumstances demand. What amounts to negligence depends on the facts of each particular case. It may consist in omitting to do something which ought to be done or doing something which ought to be done either in a different manner or not at all. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in 28 2026:HHC:35439 the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which can be reasonably foreseen to be likely to cause physical injury to persons or property. The degree of care required in the particular case depends on the surrounding circumstances and may vary according to the amount of risk to be encountered and to the magnitude of the prospective injury. The duty of care is owed only to those persons who are in the area of foreseeable danger; the fact that the act of the defendant violated his duty of care to a third person does not enable the plaintiff who is also injured by the same act to claim unless he is also within the area of foreseeable danger. The same act or omission may accordingly in some circumstances involve liability as being negligent, although in other circumstances it will not do so. The material considerations are the absence of care which is on the part of the defendant owed to the plaintiff in the circumstances of the case and damage suffered by the plaintiff, together with a demonstrable relation of cause and effect between the two.’ *** 13. According to the dictionary meaning, ‘reckless’ means ‘careless’, regardless or heedless of the possible harmful consequences of one's acts. It presupposes that if thought was given to the matter by the doer before the act was done, it would have been apparent to him that there was a real risk of its having the relevant harmful consequences; but, granted this, recklessness covers a whole range of states of mind from failing to give any thought at all to whether or not there is any risk of those harmful consequences, to recognising the existence of the risk and nevertheless deciding to ignore it.” 19. In Mohd. Aynuddin v. State of A.P. [(2000) 7 SCC 72: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1281], the appellant was driving a bus, and while a passenger was boarding the bus, the bus was driven, which 29 2026:HHC:35439 resulted in the fall of the passenger and the rear wheel of the bus ran over the passenger. This Court, drawing the distinction between a rash act and a negligent act, held that it was culpable rashness and criminal negligence and held as under: (SCC pp. 74-75, paras 7 & 9) “7. It is a wrong proposition that for any motor accident negligence of the driver should be presumed. An accident of such a nature as would prima facie show that it cannot be accounted for by anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may create a presumption, and in such a case the driver has to explain how the accident happened without negligence on his part. Merely because a passenger fell from the bus while boarding the bus, no presumption of negligence can be drawn against the driver of the bus. *** 9. A rash act is primarily an overhasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still, a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the driver of a vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper care and precaution.” (B) Attendant circumstances and inference of rash and negligent driving 20 [Ed.: Para 20 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./53/2012 dated 5-9-2012.]. In light of the above, now we have to examine if negligence in the case of an accident can be gathered from the attendant circumstances. We have already held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is equally applicable to the cases of accident and not merely to civil jurisprudence. Thus, these principles can equally be extended to criminal cases provided the attendant circumstances and basic facts are proved. It may also be 30 2026:HHC:35439 noticed that either the accident must be proved by proper and cogent evidence or it should be an admitted fact before this principle can be applied. This doctrine comes to aid at a subsequent stage where it is not clear as to how and due to whose negligence the accident occurred. The factum of accident having been established, the court, with the aid of proper evidence, may take assistance of the attendant circumstances and apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The mere fact of the occurrence of an accident does not necessarily imply that it must be owed to someone's negligence. In cases where negligence is the primary cause, it may not always be that direct evidence to prove it exists. In such cases, circumstantial evidence may be adduced to prove negligence. Circumstantial evidence consists of facts that necessarily point to negligence as a logical conclusion rather than providing an outright demonstration thereof. Elements of this doctrine may be stated as: • The event would not have occurred but for someone's negligence. • The evidence on record rules out the possibility that the actions of the victim or some third party could be the reason behind the event. • The accused was negligent and owed a duty of care towards the victim. 21. In Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab [(2003) 9 SCC 208: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1183], the petitioner drove a bus rashly and negligently with 41 passengers, and while crossing a bridge, the bus fell into the nearby canal, resulting in the death of all the passengers. The Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur since, admittedly, the petitioner was driving the bus at the relevant time, and it was going over the bridge when it fell down. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 209, para 4) “4. It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge and then it fell into a canal. In such a situation, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play, and the burden shifts onto the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the 31 2026:HHC:35439 accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part.” 22. Still, in Mohd. Aynuddin [(2000) 7 SCC 72: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1281], this Court has also stated the principle: (SCC p. 74, para 8) “8. The principle of res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence to determine the onus of proof in actions relating to negligence. The said principle has application only when the nature of the accident and the attending circumstances would reasonably lead to the belief that in the absence of negligence, the accident would not have occurred and that the thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer.” It has also been stated that the effect of this maxim, however, depends upon the cogency of the inferences to be drawn and must, therefore, vary in each case.” 26. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B. Nagabhushanam v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 5 SCC 730: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 61: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 866 that where the facts speak for themselves, the accused is under an obligation to explain how the accident had occurred. It was observed: - 12. Reliance placed by Mr Kulkarni on Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka [(1980) 1 SCC 30: 1980 SCC (Cri) 59: AIR 1979 SC 1848] is not apposite. It proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stricto sensu would not apply to a criminal case, as its applicability in an action for injury by negligence is well known. In Syad Akbar [(1980) 1 SCC 30: 1980 SCC (Cri) 59: AIR 1979 SC 1848], this Court opined: (SCC p. 41, para 30) 32 2026:HHC:35439 “30. Such simplified and pragmatic application of the notion of res ipsa loquitur, as a part of the general mode of inferring a fact in issue from another circumstantial fact, is subject to all the principles, the satisfaction of which is essential before an accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone. These are: Firstly, all the circumstances, including the objective circumstances constituting the accident, from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, must be firmly established. Secondly, those circumstances must be of a determinative tendency pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused. Thirdly, the circumstances should make a chain so complete that they cannot reasonably raise any other hypothesis save that of the accused's guilt. That is to say, they should be incompatible with his innocence, and inferentially exclude all reasonable doubt about his guilt.” The maxim was not applied having regard to the facts of the said case and on the finding that it was a case of error of judgment and the accused gave a reasonable, convincing explanation of his conduct. The maxim res ipsa loquitur was not found to be applicable. However, we may notice that the said principle was applied in a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act in State of A.P. v. C. Uma Maheswara Rao [(2004) 4 SCC 399: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1276] in the following terms: (SCC p. 408, para 19) “19. We may note that a three-judge Bench in Raghubir Singh v. State of Haryana [(1974) 4 SCC 560: 1974 SCC (Cri) 596] held that the very fact that the accused was in possession of the marked currency notes against an allegation that he demanded and received the amount is ‘res ipsa loquitur’.” 27. Even this Court held in State of H.P. v. Mast Ram, 2009 SCC OnLine HP 808 that in a case under Section 304-A of IPC, the driver has a responsibility to show that the accident did not happen on account of his negligence. The judgment of Saiyad Akhtar Ali 33 2026:HHC:35439 (supra) was explained and was held to be applicable where the driver had adopted his best course to avoid the accident. It was observed: - “16. In a case under section 304-A IPC, the driver has some responsibility to show that the accident did not happen on account of his negligence. The principle of res ipsa loquitur comes into play, and the burden shifts to the person who was in control of the vehicle at the time of the accident. In Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 208, the Supreme Court has held as follows: - “It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge and then it fell into a canal. In such a situation, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play, and the burden shifts onto the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part”. Mr Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent, has relied on Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 in support of his submission that the principle of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in the present case. In Syad Akbar, the accident took place in spite of the driver adopting the best course to avoid the accident. In the present case, the facts are entirely different. Therefore, Syad Akbar (supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The respondent has not discharged his burden as held in the Thakur Singh case and has not succeeded in showing that the accident took place due to reasons other than his negligence. In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., he has not said anything about the cause of the accident. PW-2 and PW-3 have fully proved that the accident took place due to rash or negligent driving of the respondent at the time of the accident, which ultimately caused the death of Arushi. It is a well-settled principle that what matters is the quality and 34 2026:HHC:35439 not the quantity of witnesses. It is thus held that the prosecution has proved the accusation against the respondent and he is held guilty of committing an offence punishable under Sections 279, 304-A IPC.” 28. In the present case, the accused did not provide any explanation in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC. Balbir Singh (PW8) stated in his cross-examination that there was a kacha danga near the place of incident and the danga had collapsed, which led to the accident. However, this explanation is not sufficient because there is no explanation as to why the accused should have left the metalled road and taken the vehicle towards the kachha portion of the road. The length of the road was shown to be 18 feet in the site plan (Ext.PW7/A), and taking the vehicle towards the kachha portion of the road shows the negligence of the accused. 29. It was suggested to Dilbag Singh (PW2) and Raghubir Singh (PW3) that the accused was allowing a motorcycle coming from the opposite side to pass. However, both of them denied this fact. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof, and does not provide any explanation for taking the vehicle on the kachha portion of the road. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was driving the vehicle in a negligent manner which led to the accident. 35 2026:HHC:35439 30. Dr V.K. Raizada (PW12) examined Dilbag Singh (PW2) and the accused, and he found that they had sustained simple injuries that could have been caused in an accident. He also found that Raghubir Singh had a crepitus deformity and abnormal movement of the lower left thumb of the hand, tenderness over the right thigh, and multiple lacerated wounds over the chin, lips and forehead. He also found that the upper and lower incisors and canines were dislocated. He advised an X-ray. Dr Rachpal Singh (PW11) stated that he had treated Raghubir Singh, who was suffering from a fracture of both bones of the left leg and injury to the teeth. He was operated upon and discharged on 18.05.2007. He proved the discharge slip (Ext.PW11/A), bill (Ext.PW11/B) and OPD slip (Ext.PW11/C). Both these witnesses were not cross-examined at all. Therefore, the testimonies of these witnesses that Raghubir Singh had sustained grievous injury have remained unrebutted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Nahar Singh, 1998 (3) SCC 561 that where the testimony of a witness is not challenged in the cross-examination, the same cannot be challenged during the arguments. This position was reiterated in Arvind Singh v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 11 SCC 36 2026:HHC:35439 1; (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 208: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 4, and it was held at page 34: “58. A witness is required to be cross-examined in a criminal trial to test his veracity; to discover who he is and what his position in life is, or to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions may directly or indirectly incriminate him or may directly or indirectly expose him to a penalty or forfeiture (Section 146 of the Evidence Act). A witness is required to be cross- examined to bring forth inconsistencies and discrepancies, and to prove the untruthfulness of the witness. A-1 set up a case of his arrest on 1-9-2014 from 18:50 hrs; therefore, it was required for him to cross-examine the truthfulness of the prosecution witnesses with regard to that particular aspect. The argument that the accused was shown to be arrested around 19:00 hrs is an incorrect reading of the arrest form (Ex. 17). In Column 8, it has been specifically mentioned that the accused was taken into custody on 2-9- 2014 at 14:30 hrs at Wanjri Layout, Police Station, Kalamna. The time, i.e. 17, 10 hrs, mentioned in Column 2, appears to be when A-1 was brought to the Police Station, Lakadganj. As per the IO, A-1 was called for interrogation as the suspicion was on an employee of Dr Chandak since the kidnapper was wearing a red colour T-shirt which was given by Dr Chandak to his employees. A-1 travelled from the stage of suspect to an accused only on 2-9-2014. Since no cross-examination was conducted on any of the prosecution witnesses about the place and manner of the arrest, the argument that the accused was arrested on 1-9-2014 at 18:50 hrs is not tenable. 59. The House of Lords, in a judgment reported as Browne v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL), considered the principles of appreciation of evidence. Lord Chancellor Herschell held that it is essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his 37 2026:HHC:35439 evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged. It was held as under: “Now, my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross- examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses. Sometimes reflections have been made upon excessive cross-examination of witnesses, and it has been complained of as undue, but it seems to me that cross- examination of a witness which errs in the direction of excess may be far more fair to him than to leave him without cross-examination, and afterwards, to suggest that he is not a witness of truth, I mean upon a point on which it is not otherwise perfectly clear that he has had full notice beforehand that there is an intention to impeach the credibility of the story which he is telling.” 60. Lord Halsbury, in a separate but concurring opinion, held as under: “My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily express my concurrence with the Lord Chancellor as to the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my mind, nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not 38 2026:HHC:35439 to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity very often to defend their own character, and, not having given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to.” 61. This Court, in a judgment reported as State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850, quoted from Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL) to hold that in the absence of cross- examination on the explanation of delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 146 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. This Court held as under: (State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], SCC pp. 566-67, para 13) “13. It may be noted here that part of the statement of PW 1 was not cross-examined by the accused. In the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of the delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. The scope of that provision is enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by allowing a witness to be questioned: (1) to test his veracity, (2) to discover who he is and what his position in life is, or (3) to shake his credit by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to incriminate him or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture.” 62. This Court, in a judgment reported in Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana, (2016) 12 SCC 288: (2017) 1 SCC 39 2026:HHC:35439 (Civ) 268, laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. It was held as under: (SCC pp. 294-95, paras 15-16) “15. Moreover, there was no effective cross-examination made on the plaintiff's witnesses with respect to the factum of execution of the sale deed. PW 1 and PW 2 have not been cross-examined as to the factum of execution of the sale deed. The cross-examination is a matter of substance, not of procedure. One is required to put one's own version in the cross-examination of the opponent. The effect of non-cross-examination is that the statement of the witness has not been disputed. The effect of not cross-examining the witnesses has been considered by this Court in Bhoju Mandal v.Debnath Bhagat, AIR 1963 SC 1906. This Court repelled a submission on the ground that the same was not put either to the witnesses or suggested before the courts below. A party is required to put his version to the witness. If no such questions are put, the Court would presume that the witness's account has been accepted, as held in Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., 1957 SCC OnLine P&H 177: AIR 1958 P&H 440. 16. In Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai, 1943 SCC OnLine MP 128: AIR 1945 Nag 60, it has been laid down that the matters sworn to by one party in the pleadings, not challenged either in pleadings or cross-examination by another party, must be accepted as fully established. The High Court of Calcutta in A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian, 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 44: AIR 1961 Cal 359 has laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in the cross- examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court, Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal Koduram, 1949 SCC OnLine MP 35: AIR 1950 Nag 83 has laid down that when attestation is not specifically challenged, and the witness is not cross- 40 2026:HHC:35439 examined regarding details of attestation, it is sufficient for him to say that the document was attested. If the other side wants to challenge that statement, it is their duty, quite apart from raising it in the pleadings, to cross-examine the witness along those lines. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Karnidan Sardav.Sailaja Kanta Mitra, 1940 SCC OnLine Pat 288: AIR 1940 Pat 683 has laid down that it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the system of administration of justice allows of cross-examination of opposite party's witnesses for the purpose of testing their evidence, and it must be assumed that when the witnesses were not tested in that way, their evidence is to be ordinarily accepted. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court has gravely erred in law in reversing the findings of the first appellate court as to the factum of execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.” 31. In the present case, the statements of Medical Officers were not challenged in the cross-examination. Therefore, it is impermissible to make a submission before this Court that the testimonies of the Medical Officers regarding the fracture caused to Raghubir Singh should not be believed. 32. Therefore, it was duly proved on record that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle and his negligence had caused simple injuries to Dilbag Singh (PW2) and grievous injuries to Raghubir Singh (PW3). Hence, the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC. 41 2026:HHC:35439 33. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in not providing the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. This submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving, and a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to him. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of 42 2026:HHC:35439 driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 34. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life 43 2026:HHC:35439 and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 35. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 36. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused. 37. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for 1 month each for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC and 3 months rigorous imprisonment for the commission 44 2026:HHC:35439 of an offence punishable under Section 338 of the IPC. Considering the nature of injuries and the manner of the accident, the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court is adequate, which does not require any interference from this Court. 38. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it is dismissed. All the pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 39. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 21st August, 2026 (Nikita)