1 2026:CGHC:21968-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 776 of 2024 Suraj Deep S/o Mala Deep Aged About 20 Years R/o Village Bairagi, Mohalla Bhilai, P.S. Chhavni, Dist. Durg, C.G. ... Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Chhavni, Dist. Durg, C.G. ... Respondent (Cause title taken from CIS) For Appellant : Mr. Adhiraj Surana, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. N. K. Jaiswal, Dy. G.A. Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 11.05.2026 1. Heard Mr. Adhiraj Surana, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. N. K. Jaiswal, Dy. Govt. Advocate for the Respondent/ State. 2. The present criminal appeal has been filed under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 08/11/2023 passed by learned Special Judge Fast Tract Special Court (Protection of Children From Sexual SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.05.15 10:44:58 +0530 2 Offence) Act, Dist- Mungeli (C.G.) in Special Sessions Trial No. 56/2022 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as below:- S.No Conviction Sentence 1. Under Section 363 of IPC R.I. for 05 years and fine of Rs. 500/- in default of fine additional S.I. for 2 months. 2. Under Section 366 of IPC R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs. 500/- in default of payment of fine additional S.I. for 2 months. 3. Under Section 06 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine further S.I. for 2 months (All the sentences shall run concurrently) 3. Brief facts of the case are that on 03.08.2022, the mother of the victim (PW-4) lodged a written complaint at Police Station Fasterpur (Ex-P/24) with the allegation that on 02.08.2022, at around 2:00 PM, her minor daughter, aged 15 years and 4 months, had been enticed and taken away by an unknown person from her lawful guardianship. On the basis of the said report, the Police registered a case under Section 363 of the IPC against an unknown accused. During the course of the investigation, the victim was recovered and a recovery panchnama (Ex-P/10) was prepared. The victim was sent for medical examination to the hospital where she was examined by PW-3 Dr. Kritika Sahu, who prepared the medical report (Ex-P/07). During the medical examination, two vaginal slides, a UPT kit, and the victim's undergarments were seized (Ex-P/15) and sent for chemical examination to the State FSL, Bilaspur, from where the FSL report (Ex- P/23) was subsequently received. For the purpose of determining the 3 age of the victim, the original school admission register was seized from the Headmaster (PW-2), vide seizure memo (Ex-P/04). The appellant, Surajdeep, was arrested on 02.09.2022 (Ex-P/16) and was subjected to a potency test by Dr. Sandeep Patil (PW-5), who gave his report (Ex-P/08) finding the appellant capable of performing sexual intercourse. Statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. and the statement of the victim under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. (Ex-P/02) were recorded. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant for the offences under Sections 363, 366, and 376(2)(n) of the IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short “POCSO Act”), before the learned trial Court. 4. The learned trial Court has framed charges against the appellant for the offences under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The appellant abjured his guilt and claimed trial. 5. In order to prove the charge, the prosecution has examined as many as 09 witnesses. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. has also been recorded in which he denied the material appears against him, plead innocence and submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. 6. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier paragraph of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the offence. He would 4 argue that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that there is no legally admissible evidence to establish that the victim was a minor on the date of the incident. It is further contended that although the school admission register was produced, the prosecution failed to examine the person who made the entries, rendering the document unreliable for determining the victim's age. Counsel would point out that no birth certificate from the municipal authorities or any ossification test report was filed to conclusively prove the victim's minority. He would further argue that the victim, being a major, voluntarily left her home and accompanied the appellant to Bhilai, where she entered into a marriage and established physical relations of her own free will. In view of the conduct of the victim and the lack of proof regarding her age, it is submitted that the alleged offences are not made out against the appellant and he is entitled to acquittal. 8. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case by leading evidence that on the date of incident the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age. For determination of the age of the victim, the prosecution has relied upon the School Admission Register (Ex-P/05C) which is proved by PW-02, who is the Principal of the school. As per the entries made in the school register, the date of birth of the victim is 24/03/2007. From the medical evidence and the statement of the victim, it has been proved that the appellant made physical relations with her. The victim is a minor girl and her consent is immaterial in the eyes of law as the act of the appellant comes under the definition of aggravated penetrative 5 sexual assault. Therefore, the trial court has rightly convicted the appellant and the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence needs no interference. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the appeal. 10.The first question arose in the case as to whether the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident or not. 11.The prosecution has mainly relied upon the School Admission Register (Ex-P/05C) which is sought to be proved by PW-02, who is the Principal of the school. He stated in his evidence that the police seized the original school register from him with respect to the age and date of birth of the victim. The register was seized vide seizure memo (Ex-P/04), and while the original was returned after verification, its attested true copy was marked as Ex-P/05C. As per the entries made in the school register, the date of birth of the victim is 24/03/2007. In cross-examination, he admitted that the entries in the register regarding the date of birth were not made by him. When questioned about the documentation required for such entries, it was admitted that at the time of admission, the date of birth is often recorded based on the information provided by the parents without requiring further documentary proof. He further admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the basis on which the specific entry for the victim was made or by whom it was recorded. Admittedly, PW-02 is not the author of the school register, nor has the prosecution produced the primary documents or the person who provided the basis for the date of birth entry in the register. 6 12.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register with respect to the age of the victim. In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two 7 candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being 8 represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regardto the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the victim although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded,the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 13. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub- section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) 9 of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to 10 escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 14. In case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : "14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate 11 was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to thedescription of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side 12 within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3) (a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference." 15. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the victim has stated in her evidence that her age was around 16 years at the time of her statement, and the prosecution has alleged her date of birth to be 24.03.2007 based on school records. The victim (PW-01) stated in her cross-examination that she does not know her exact date of birth and 13 that she was admitted to the school by her parents. In the present case, while the school register was produced, the prosecution has failed to examine the person who originally provided the information for the entry or the author of the register to prove the authentic basis on which the date of birth of the victim was recorded in the school. 16.PW-04, the mother of the victim, has stated in her evidence that she does not know the exact date of birth of the victim, although she estimated her daughter’s age to be around 15 years at the time of the incident. She stated in her cross-examination that the victim was admitted to the school by her parents, yet she admitted to having no personal knowledge of the victim's recorded date of birth. Furthermore, she acknowledged that no documents such as a birth certificate from the village or school mark sheets were presented to verify the age. Since the mother of the victim did not know the specific date of birth, and in the absence of primary documentary evidence like a birth certificate or an ossification test report, coupled with the fact that the school register was not proved in accordance with law by examining its actual author, it cannot be said that the prosecution is able to prove that the victim was a minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident. 17. So far as, the offence of kidnapping, procuring a minor girl for illicit intercourse and the offence of rape are concerned, we again examined the evidence of the victim (PW/1). 18. The victim has stated in her evidence that she knew the appellant and on the date of the incident, she left her home after a disagreement with her mother. She went to Fasterpur, took money from a friend, and 14 traveled to Bhilai via Mungeli by bus. At the Bhilai bus stand, she met the appellant, who asked for her name. The appellant then took her to his house and kept her with him for about one month. During this period, the appellant established physical relations with her. She further stated that they were discovered by the police and her family members after about a month and brought back to Fasterpur. In cross- examination, she admitted that she did not raise any alarm or inform anyone while being taken to the appellant's house or during their stay. She further admitted that the appellant married her in a temple and that she did not inform anyone that she was being kept against her will. She admitted that while residing with the appellant, she made physical relations with him of her own will and they lived together as a married couple. 19. PW/04, the mother of the victim, has stated that on the date of the incident, she discovered her daughter was missing from the house and subsequently learned that the appellant had taken her to Bhilai. She stated that the appellant kept her daughter for about a month and established physical relations with her. She further explained that she lodged the report at Police Station Fasterpur only after her daughter could not be traced among relatives. In cross-examination, she admitted that she had not personally seen anyone kidnapping her daughter. She further admitted that according to the information received later, her daughter had gone with the appellant on her own will after a domestic dispute and that they had lived together as a married couple in Bhilai. She stated that the delay in recovery was due to the fact that they were initially unaware of the victim's whereabouts until the police traced them to Bhilai. 15 20. PW-03 Dr. Kritika Sahu, who medically examined the victim, has not found any external injury on her body, and no signs of any struggle were present. Although the vaginal slides and underwear of the victim were sent for chemical examination, no semen or sperms were found in the vaginal slides of the victim, which also goes in favor of the appellant. 21. From this evidence, when the victim is not proved to be minor and when the victim as well as her mother have stated in their evidence that the victim herself had gone with the appellant to Bhilai by bus, without raising any objection, it is evident that the victim was having a love affair with the appellant. Despite the fact that she stayed with the appellant for about a month, it was only after being recovered by the police and her family that the report was lodged against him. Thus, it cannot be safe to hold that the victim was being kidnapped by the appellant or that he enticed a minor girl to commit rape upon her. The victim's age was not established as minor on the date of incident, and she herself of her own will went with the appellant and made sexual relations with him, leading to the allegation of repeated intercourse. There is no forceful act proved to have been committed by the appellant, and no objection was raised by the victim when she was traveling to Bhilai or even while residing there with him for an extended period. She made no complaint to any person or authority during her stay, and therefore, it cannot be said that she was not the consenting party in making physical relations with the appellant. 22.In the case of S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the taking and allowing a 16 minor to accompany a person and has held in Para 9 and Para 10 of its judgment that:- “9. It must, however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction between "taking" and allowing a minor to accompany a person. The two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstance can the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of of the Indian Penal Code. We would limit ourselves to a case like the present where the minor alleged to have been taken by the accused person left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the accused can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. Something more has to be shown in a case of this kind and that is some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to leave the house of the guardian. 10. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our, opinion if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfillment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to "taking". 23. In the matter of Tilku Alias Tilak Singh V. The State Of Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 INSC 226, the Supreme Court has held that he victim, who is between 16 to 18 years of age is very much in the age of 17 understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. Relevant para of the said judgment states as under:- “16. Even if the finding of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the prosecutrix was between 16 to 18 years of age is to be accepted, in our view, the offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC would still not be made out. 17. This Court in the case of S. Vardarajan v. State of Madras, reported in 1964 SCC OnLine SC 36 had an occasion to consider almost similar facts that arise for consideration in the present case. This Court has observed thus: “7. …..It will thus be seen that taking or enticiting away a minor out of the keeping of a lawful guardian is an essential ingredient of the offence of kidnapping. Here, we are not concerned with enticement but what we have to find out is whether the part played by the appellant amounts to “taking” out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of Savitri. We have no doubt that though Savitri had been left by S. Natarajan at the house of his relative K. Nataranjan she still continued to be in the lawful keeping of the former but then the question remains as to what is it which the appellant did that constitutes in law “taking”. There is not a word in the deposition of Savitri from which an inference could be drawn that she left the house of K. Natarajan at the instance or even a suggestion of the appellant. In fact she candidly admits that on the morning of October 1st, she herself telephoned to the appellant to meet her in his car at a certain place, went up to that place and finding him waiting in the car got into that car of her own accord. No doubt, she says that she did not tell the appellant where to go and that it was the appellant himself who drove the car to Guindy and then to Mylapore and other places. Further, Savitri has stated that she had decided to marry the appellant. There is no suggestion that the appellant took her to the Sub-Registrar's office and got the agreement of marriage registered there (thinking that this was sufficient in law to make them man and wife) by force or blandishments or anything like that. On the other hand the evidence of the girl leaves no doubt that the insistence of marriage came 18 from her side. The appellant, by complying with her wishes can by no stretch of imagination be said to have taken her out of the keeping of her lawful guardian. After the registration of the agreement both the appellant and Savitri lived as man and wife and visited different places. There is no suggestion in Savitri's evidence, who, it may be mentioned had attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority that she was made by the appellant to accompany him by administering any threat to her or by any blandishments. The fact of her accompanying the appellant all along is quite consistent with Savitri's own desire to be the wife of the appellant in which the desire of accompanying him wherever he went was course implicit. In these circumstances we find nothing from which an inference could be drawn that the appellant had been guilty of taking away Savitri out of the keeping of her father. She willingly accompanied him and the law did not cast upon him the duty of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. She was not a child of tender years who was unable to think for herself but, as already stated, was on the verge of attaining majority and was capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her…….” 18. It is thus clear that the prosecutrix, who according to the learned Single Judge of the High Court, was between 16 to 18 years of age was very much in the age of understanding as to what was right and wrong for her. 19. From the evidence of the prosecutrix itself, it will be clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant herein, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun.” 24.The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim's evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on 19 the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 25.From the evidence led by the prosecution and the legal principles established by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was kidnapped or abducted by the appellant and kept away from her lawful guardianship for the purpose of forceful sexual intercourse. The victim’s status as a minor on the date of the incident has not been established by legally admissible evidence. In light of the victim’s own testimony and conduct, she appears to be a major girl who went along with the appellant of her own free will and stayed with him at Bhilai, where she entered into a marriage and maintained physical relations. This amounts to consensual physical relations by the victim with the appellant, and therefore, the alleged offences under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act are not made out against the appellant. 26.In the result, the appeal is Allowed. The judgment of conviction and sentences passed against the appellant are set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 02/09/2022. He be released forthwith if not required in any other case. 20 27.Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant- Suraj Deep is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28.The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Sagrika