2026:HHC:34455 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 921 of 2026 Decided on: 17.08.2026 Munish …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the victim : Mr Manish Kumar, Legal Aid Counsel. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge (Oral) The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No. 97 of 2025, dated 16.06.2025, registered at Police Station Haroli, District Una, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 64, 78 and 351 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:34455 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the informant made a complaint to the police that she was in a relationship with the accused. The accused had taken her photograph, and he started harassing her by threatening to upload her photograph on social media. The informant came to know about 15 days before the registration of the FIR that the accused had uploaded her photographs on social media. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The petitioner had filed a petition for pre-arrest bail, which was dismissed by this Court and the Special Leave Petition (Crl) filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was withdrawn. The police have filed the charge sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The initial allegations made by the victim did not disclose the commission of the rape, and this fact was subsequently added by the victim in her statement. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the victim was in a relationship with the accused. The accused took her photographs and started harassing her by threatening to upload these photographs on social media. The victim found, 15 days 3 2026:HHC:34455 before the incident, that the accused had uploaded her photograph on social media. The police registered the FIR. The police recovered the victim’s mobile phone and found 10 photographs of the victim. The police arrested the petitioner after his pre-arrest bail petition was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The victim identified two photographs as those of the present petitioner. She also identified one Tanuj Pal as the person who was with her. He disclosed during interrogation that some person had stolen the photographs from his mobile phone. The police seized his mobile phone. Subsequently, the police also found that the juvenile in conflict with the law had uploaded the victim’s photographs on social media. These photographs were sent to the victim’s maternal aunt, and her statement was also recorded. The police seized the documents and arrested the petitioner. The petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence, and he would intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4. The victim also filed a reply making preliminary submissions regarding the petition being misconceived. It was asserted that the police have collected sufficient material to show that the petitioner had raped the victim and uploaded her photographs on 4 2026:HHC:34455 social media. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State and Mr Manish Kumar, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the victim. 6. Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The victim had not made any allegation of rape or taking of the photographs in the initial complaint made to the police. She subsequently improved upon her version, and her testimony is not reliable. There are discrepancies in the material collected by the prosecution. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 7. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State, submitted that the petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence. He would intimidate the witnesses and interfere with the progress of trial if released on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5 2026:HHC:34455 8. Mr Manish Kumar, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the victim, submitted that the petitioner had applied for pre-arrest bail and his application was dismissed by this Court and a Special Leave Petition was withdrawn before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. There is no change in the circumstances, and the present petition is not maintainable. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 6 2026:HHC:34455 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benign jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has 7 2026:HHC:34455 used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 8 2026:HHC:34455 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the 9 2026:HHC:34455 accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating 10 2026:HHC:34455 other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 12. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. The police have collected the victim’s mobile phone in which the photographs of the petitioner and the victim were found, which corroborates the victim's version that the petitioner had taken her photographs and had threatened to upload them on social media. The police have also collected the record of Hotel Sahil Plaza, which shows that the petitioner and victim had visited the hotel on multiple occasions. The signatures of the petitioner and the victim were found on the register. Therefore, prima facie, the victim's version is duly corroborated by the material collected by the police that the petitioner had taken her photographs and had threatened her by uploading those photographs on social media. 14. Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner, had referred to the statements of the witnesses to point 11 2026:HHC:34455 out various contradictions in the statements of the victim and the witnesses. However, the Court, deciding the bail petition, has to see only a prima facie case and is not to appreciate the evidence on record. Therefore, it is impermissible to appreciate the contradictions pointed out by the learned Counsel. Suffice it to say that the victim's version is prima facie established on record. 15. The allegation against the petitioner is heinous. The offence under Section 64 of BNS is punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 10 years, but which may extend to life. Therefore, the punishment is severe. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed on page 244: “6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of, and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible 12 2026:HHC:34455 in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51] “I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point, three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.” 7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 16. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail because of the nature of the offence and severity of the punishment. 13 2026:HHC:34455 17. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed. However, this order will not prevent the petitioner from approaching the Court if the prosecution fails to complete the evidence within a reasonable time. 18. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 17th August, 2026 (Nikita)