APHC010209512024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] MONDAY, THE SECOND DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2026 in/and CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 3148/2024 I.A.Nos.2 and 3 of 2026 in/and CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 1553/2026 CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 3148/2024 Between: 1.NISSANKARAO SAI RAM, S/O N DURGA PRASAD, AGED 32, R/O F.NO.103, MUUAPUDI ENCLAVE, OPP RELIANCE FRESH, KANNAVARLTHOTA MAIN ROAD, GUNTUR. ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND 1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, (NAGARAMPALEMPOHCE STATION), GUNTUR DISTRICT, REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH. 2.SANDHU MADHAVL LATHA, D/O YALAMANDA, AGED 28, OCC CUSTOMER EXECUTIVE, SALES DEPT., IDFC BANK, WEST KRISHNA PLAZA, LAKSHMLPURAM MAIN ROAD, GUNTUR. ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1.P VIVEK Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S): 1.GRANDHI PRIYANKA 2.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) 2 CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 1553/2026 Between: 1.NISSANKARAO DURGA PRASAD, 1. NISSANKARAO DURGA PRASAD,S/O SESHAGIRI RAO, AGED66,R/O D.NO.3-123, YARRABASAVAIAH BUILDINGS,KARUMURU, GUNTUR. 2.NISSANKARAO UMA DEVI, ,W/O NISSANKARAO DURGA PRASAD, AGED 57,R/O D.NO.3-123, YARRABASAVAIAH BUILDINGS,KARUMURU, GUNTUR. ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED(S) AND 1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AMARAVATHI. 2.VICTIM, VICTIM ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner/accused(S): 1.P VIVEK Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S): 1.GRANDHI PRIYANKA 2.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Court made the following: COMMON ORDER: Criminal Petition Nos.3148 of 2024 and 1553 of 2026 are heard together and are being disposed of by this common order, as they arise out of the same P.R.C. number, though the Petitioners are different. 3 2. Criminal Petition Nos.3148 of 2024 and 1553 of 2026 have been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity, ‘BNSS’) by the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 to 3, seeking to quash the proceedings against them in Cr.No.197 of 2017 of Nagarampalem Police Station, Guntur Urban District in P.R.C.No.118 of 2022 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Court, Guntur for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 417, 376(2)(n) and 506 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity, ‘the I.P.C’). 3. I.A.No.1 of 2026 in Crl.P.No.3148 of 2024 and I.A.No.2 of 2026 in Crl.P.No.1553 of 2026 are filed by Respondent No.2/de-facto complainant seeking permission to compromise the matter with the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 to 3 in view of the settlement arrived between the parties. 4. I.ANo.2 of 2026 in Crl.P.No.3148 of 2024 and I.A.No.3 of 2026 in Crl.P.No.1553 of 2026 are filed by Respondent No.2/de-facto complainant seeking recording of the compromise with the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 to 3. A joint memo duly signed by the parties and countersigned by their respective learned counsel is filed. 5. The de-facto complainant lodged a written report with the Respondent police. Based on the report, an FIR was registered in Crime No.197 of 2017 for offences punishable under Sections 417, 376(2)(n) and 506 read with Section 34 of ‘the IPC’. After completion of investigation, a charge sheet was filed and the case was taken on file as P.R.C. No.118 of 2022 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Court, Guntur. 4 6. It is submitted that, with the intervention of elders and well-wishers, the parties have amicably resolved their disputes, parted ways, and decided to live separately. Respondent No.2 has expressed her intention not to pursue the criminal proceedings further and states that the compromise has been entered into voluntarily, without coercion, threat, or undue influence. 7. Ms.P.Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State, and Ms.Grandhi Priyanka, learned counsel for Respondent No.2, have reported no objection to recording the compromise. 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab1, at paragraph Nos.57, 58 & 61 held as under: “57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. 58. 58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. 1(2012) 10 SCC 303 5 or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed. 61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana2, at paragraph Nos.5, 6, 8 & 15 held as under: “5. After reproducing the seven categories of cases as given in para 102 of Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] the High Court has held that the parameters, principles and guidelines for quashing of complaints, first information report and criminal proceedings have been settled in terms thereof and has concluded therefrom that the instant case does not fall in any of the said categories. It is quite clear that the High Court has lost sight of the earlier part of para 102 which made it 2(2003) 4 SCC 675 6 abundantly clear that the said categories of cases were being given by way of illustration. Neither were the categories of cases given exhaustive nor could it be so. Before giving those categories, it was said in Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] that: (SCC p. 378, para 102) “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.” 6. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400] this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. 8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case [(1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power. 15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.” 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra3, at paragraph Nos.9 & 11 held as under: “9. In most of the cases decided during several decades the inherent power of the High Court has been invoked for the quashing of a criminal proceeding on one ground or the other. Sometimes the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court has also been resorted to for the same kind of relief by challenging the order taking cognizance or issuing processes or framing charge on the grounds that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance and proceed with the trial, that the issuance of process was wholly illegal or void, or that no charge could be framed as no offence was made out on the allegations made or the evidence adduced in Court. In the background aforesaid, we proceed to examine as to what is the correct position of law after the introduction of a provision like sub-section (2) of Section 397 in the 1973 Code. 3(1977) 4 SCC 551 7 11. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960) 3 SCR 388 : 1960 Cri LJ 239] Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, delivering the judgment of this Court pointed out, if we may say so with respect, very succinctly the scope of the inherent power of the High Court for the purpose of quashing a criminal proceeding. Says the learned Judge at pp. 392-93: “Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained.” We think the law as stated above is not affected by Section 397(2) of the new Code. It still holds good in accordance with Section 482.” 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. The State of Uttar Pradesh4at paragraph No.20 held as under: 4MANU/SCOR/68068/2025 8 “20. The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:- (i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality? (ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. (iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? (iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused” 12. Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or Section 528 of ‘the BNSS’ empowers the High Court to pass orders necessary to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has recently laid down in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani supra four-step test to guide the exercise of this power, requiring the Court to assess whether the material relied upon is of impeccable quality, whether it negates the factual assertions in the complaint, whether it remains unrefuted or irrefutable, and whether continuation of trial would amount to abuse of process and fail to serve justice. 13. In the present case, the parties have voluntarily entered into a compromise, and no further grievance survives. The prosecutrix has not opposed the quashing and has affirmed the settlement terms, thereby satisfying the threshold of judicial conscience. It is pertinent to note that while offences under Sections 417, 376(2)(n) and 506 read with 34 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ 9 are generally considered non-compoundable due to their gravity, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recognized that in exceptional circumstances, particularly where the prosecutrix is an adult, and the continuation of proceedings would serve no meaningful purpose, the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings to prevent miscarriage of justice. The present case falls within such exceptional category, where the compromise is genuine, voluntary, and not vitiated by coercion or undue influence. 14. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is inclined to allow I.A.No.1 of 2026 in Crl.P.No.3148 of 2024 and I.A.No.2 of 2026 in Crl.P.No.1553 of 2026. 15. I.A.No.1 of 2026 in Crl.P.No.3148 of 2024 and I.A.No.2 of 2026 in Crl.P.No.1553 of 2026 are allowed as the Respondent No.2/victim/de-facto complainant withdrew the accusations made against the Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 to 3 in P.R.C.No.118 of 2022 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Court, Guntur. 16. I.A.No.2 of 2026 in Crl.P.No.3148 of 2024 and I.A.No.3 of 2026 in Crl.P.No.1553 of 2026 are also allowed recording the compromise in between the Petitioners and Respondent No.2. 17. Accordingly, in view of the memo filed, the compromise arrived at between the parties, and the satisfaction of the parameters laid down under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or Section 528 of ‘the BNSS’, this Court is of the considered opinion that continuation of criminal proceedings would be futile and oppressive. The proceedings in Cr.No.197 of 2017 of Nagarampalem 10 Police Station, Guntur Urban District in P.R.C.No.118 of 2022 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Court, in respect of Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 to 3, are hereby quashed. 18. Accordingly, the Criminal Petitions are allowed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed. _________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 02.03.2026 PRA 11 116 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO I.A.Nos.1 and 2 of 2026 in/and CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 3148/2024 I.A.Nos.2 and 3 of 2026 in/and CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 1553/2026 Date: 02.03.2026 PRA